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

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




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THE ARMY AND NAVY MAGAZINE.

MAY 1883.

The Position of the Lieutenants of the Navy statistically treated.

BY LIEUTENANT C. SLEEMAN, R.N.

THE present seems an exceedingly fit and proper time for discussing the case of lieutenants of the navy, as the question of the improvement of the position of naval executive officers, more especially in regard to their pay, has lately been publicly brought forward by Lord Belmore in the Upper House, and has, besides, been the constant theme of the Service papers for some time past.

In the following pages, I propose to treat this important subject more comprehensively and in greater detail than has hitherto been attempted, by calling in the aid of statistics, and further, by so doing, avoid falling into the far too common error of generalising on such matters, and thereby I look forward to securing a fair and impartial hearing.

Then I shall also strive to steer clear of being charged with a desire to revolutionise the existing state of things—a charge which may so frequently and justly be laid against the majority of writers and speakers when dealing with reform, whatsoever be its nature.

It was stated only a short time since that “if the whole of the officers now on the lieutenant’s list were by some cause to be suddenly swept away, their places would be filled with the greatest ease in some thirty years of peace, if no war intervened, by men willing to serve under the same conditions as exist in the present age.”

Possibly this may be, in the main, a correct assertion, though I take leave to doubt it; but this question, in my opinion,

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demands to be carefully and honestly considered from a far loftier standpoint.

Are our naval lieutenants remunerated and treated in accordance with the grave responsibilities of their position, and as becomes the "back-bone" of a navy which we claim to rank as the most efficient and most powerful of all the navies of the world?

In considering only the wants of the lieutenants, I do not for one moment intend to claim that this particular branch of naval officers alone needs improving; and no doubt one of the principal causes which have deterred successive Boards of the Admiralty from advocating their special claims, may have been the supposition that by so doing they would have been springing the mine of a general cry for reform throughout the Service.

At the same time, there would seem to be no single one of the other executive branches in which any agitation for reform has been evinced, or in which any need for such is readily apparent; and, further, the lieutenants far exceed in number those comprised in either of the remaining executive branches, which is made very apparent from the following table:—

Number of Admirals on the list	.	.	66
" Captains "	.	.	178
" Commanders "	.	.	223
" Sub-Lieutenants on the list	.	.	190
" Midshipmen "	.	.	323
			<hr/>
Total	.	.	980
Number of Lieutenants on the list	.	.	884
			<hr/>
Difference.	.	.	146
			<hr/>

That is to say, the lieutenants alone afford 45·9 per cent. of the aggregate total (1,814) of executive officers of our navy.

In the following pages I shall endeavour to show that the particular branch of naval executive officers under discussion have certain solid and reasonable grievances which it is needful and proper, for the honour of the country and benefit of the naval service generally, as well as for the individual good of those officers, should be rectified at the earliest opportunity.

I prefer to deal with this question entirely on its own merits, without in any way seeking to deduce from the past arguments in support of the cause—the whole conditions of service in the navy having so materially changed during the last thirty years; and, further, I do not believe that systems which may seem fit

and proper in foreign navies can be applied in ours, where the character of the men is so materially different.

Before proceeding further, let us see what is the precise position of the lieutenants' list, according to the official Navy List for January of this year. This is shown in the following table :—

Number of Lieutenants employed . . .	697
„ „ unemployed . . .	137
„ Gunnery Lieutenants employed . . .	64
„ „ „ unemployed . . .	7
„ Torpedo „ employed . . .	15
„ „ „ unemployed . . .	0
„ Navigating „ employed . . .	95
„ „ „ unemployed . . .	25
„ Lieutenants on surveying duties . . .	28
„ „ Commanding . . .	48
„ First Lieutenants . . .	105
„ Flag „ . . .	12

Thus it is seen that the per-centage of the unemployed lieutenants to the total number (834) on the list, is only 16·4. Bearing this fact in mind, and glancing over the foregoing statement, it may not appear to the casual reader that a very lamentable picture of neglect is presented; but I would ask him to suspend his verdict until he has analysed the statistical diagnosis of the case of lieutenants which is offered him in these pages.

For the purpose of comprehensively treating my subject in detail, I have divided the different functions, the sum total of which constitutes the actual position of a lieutenant, into six sections, as follows :—

Section I.—Employment.

„ II.—Promotion.

„ III.—Education.

„ IV.—Rank.

„ V.—Pay.

„ VI.—Retirement.

In this category the various functions are not placed in regard to any order of merit, but merely arranged in the manner most suitable to my purpose.

SECTION I.—EMPLOYMENT.

The numerical strength of the lieutenants must be such that the requisite number of officers of that rank are at all times

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forthcoming for service during peace time, and also that it permits of a certain small proportion being from time to time unemployed, either by reason of their being on leave, or placed on half-pay due to ill-health, or other causes. At the same time the per-centage of unemployed lieutenants compared with those on active service, must be kept as low as is consistent with the requirements of the service, and with the power of enabling the Admiralty to meet a sudden extra demand for such officers as would occur on the outbreak of a war.

Of course, in the event of a naval war, all the executive branches, from the captains downwards, would have to be considerably strengthened numerically, by the re-appointment of retired officers, the unemployed lieutenants on the Active List only affording an immediate and partial supply.

The determination as to the number and composition of the lieutenants required for each class of ship in commission, that is to say, the seniority of the lieutenant-commanders of the "firsts," and various other matters, is a most important and an exceedingly delicate task if strict justice is to be dealt out to all alike. At present the system adopted by the Admiralty, if system there be, certainly appears somewhat defective, as is evidenced by the statistics adduced in support of this plea. The figures brought forward in this paper are obtained, where not otherwise specified, from the January Navy List of this year (1883).

The total number of officers on the Lieutenants' List is *eight hundred and thirty-four*, of which 83·5 per cent., or *six hundred and ninety-seven*, are actively employed, including the *thirty-eight* lieutenants performing coastguard duties; that is to say, there is *one* lieutenant on the list for every *fifty-three* seamen, and *one* lieutenant *actually employed* for each *sixty-three* seamen voted.

The following tabular statement affords a comparison of this nature to be drawn for each fifth year during the last twenty years :—

	1863.	1868.	1873.	1878.	1883.
Number of Lieutenants on the list (1) .	807	772	691	803	834
" " employed (2) .	597	570	458	645	697
" Seamen voted	49,007	45,189	41,773	42,252	43,890
" " for each lieutenant (1)	60·7	58·4	60·4	52·6	52·6
" " " " (2)	82·	79·1	91·2	65·5	62·8

From the above table it is seen that the number of lieutenants have fluctuated considerably, there being a difference of *one*

hundred and forty-three between the highest number for this year (1883) and the lowest number in the year 1873. It will be further observed that there is an excess as well for this year in the number of lieutenants on active service over the corresponding numbers for the other years.

Taking the years 1863, 1878, and 1883, the per-centages of the lieutenants employed as compared with those on the list, are respectively 73·9 per cent., 83·2 per cent., and 83·6 per cent., while for these same times the per-centages of "unemployed" to "employed" are 35·1 per cent., 24·5 per cent., and 19·6 per cent. respectively.

The foregoing comparisons may be taken as exceedingly favourable for the lieutenants of 1883, as they convincingly prove that, though the actual number of those officers on the Active List is greater than has been the case in each fifth year for the last twenty years, yet the chances of active service have considerably increased, and therefore a hitherto common source of grievance of this branch of the executive line, namely, the enforced length of time on half-pay, can no longer be urged.

When we consider the lieutenants who are on full-pay leave, and those obliged to remain on half-pay owing to ill-health, both of whom go to swell the total of the unemployed, it must be conceded that the number of these (unemployed) officers, only 16·4 per cent. of the lieutenants on the list, is as small as can reasonably be expected.

The first point to be dealt with is the consideration of the numbers of lieutenants appointed to the different classes of ships in our navy, which numbers will be found to vary considerably in the vessels comprised in each class.

Of course, some of the larger ships are enabled to accommodate a greater proportion of lieutenants than others of the same class, due to the difference in their size and interior construction, which may possibly account for the diversity which exists in this respect in vessels of the same class, though I am inclined to believe that this variety is due to the absence of any fixed system of appointments at the Admiralty.

From the Navy List for January 1883 I gather that there are *nineteen* first-class ships in commission, which carry five lieutenants and over; of these *two* (flag ships) have each *nine*, *two* of them *eight* each, *five* ships carry *seven*, *eight* of them carry *six*, and *two* of these vessels have *five* lieutenants.

The following statement affords a comparison between the

number of lieutenants and the tonnage of the ships, the flag-lieutenants in this case not being counted :—

	Tonnage per each Lieutenant.
Ships with <i>eight</i> lieutenants . . .	1485·
	1336·2
	1227·5
	1186·2
Ships with <i>seven</i> lieutenants . . .	1540·
	1327·1
	1310·
	1151·6
Ships with <i>six</i> lieutenants . . .	1781·6
	1386·6
	1271·6
	1001·6
	1001·6
Ships with <i>five</i> lieutenants . . .	621·6
	1708·
	1526·
	1202·
	974·
	828·

Thus it is noticed that the number of the lieutenants of a ship does not accord with the tonnage of the vessel, that is to say, is not in proportion to her size.

I would suggest that to each of the first-class ships, by which is meant the "battle-ships" and flag-ships on foreign stations, there should be appointed, as part complement, *seven* lieutenants, including a "first," a gunnery, and a torpedo officer, thus leaving four lieutenants for performing the ordinary duties of the ship, such as watch-keeping at sea, and as officers of the day in harbour, &c.

As nearly every one of our battle-ships is armed with the Whitehead, Spar, and other torpedoes, and as they all carry one or two second-class torpedo-boats, a torpedo lieutenant is indispensable; the gunnery officer has as much work as he can carry out in a manner satisfactory to himself and to the service, in attending to his training and other gunnery duties, without increasing his burden by adding to them the work of a torpedo officer as well.

Flag officers are not included in the seven lieutenants I consider should form part complement of all the larger vessels.

The actual number of lieutenants now serving in these *nineteen* first-class ships, including flag and supernumerary lieutenants,

is *one hundred and twenty-seven*. The supernumeraries include those officers who are serving their year at sea, which is necessary before they are eligible for gunnery or torpedo officers. In this scheme the number of lieutenants, including "flags," but not supernumeraries, would amount to *one hundred and thirty-nine* for these nineteen ships. The lieutenants serving their one year at sea, for gunnery and torpedo officers, would have to be appointed to those vessels which can afford accommodation for more than the seven regular lieutenants, a matter which could be easily arranged.

Besides these large vessels, there are two other ships, both on special surveying service, which carry *six* lieutenants, and one of these is commanded by a lieutenant.

Next comes the corvette class, which carry from *five to three* lieutenants as part complement.

There are fifteen such vessels, comprising *nine* with 14 guns, *four* with 12 guns, *one* with 6, and *one* with 4 guns, each of them being commanded by a post captain. I notice that of these ships *three* of them—of 14, 12, and 8 guns respectively—are unprovided with a gunnery officer, and that *three* of the larger corvettes have their "firsts" and gunnery lieutenants combined; both of these facts are, in my opinion, grave errors.

As these ships carry no commanders, it seems inconceivable that the multifarious duties which must necessarily devolve on the commanding officers of even corvettes, can be efficiently performed by officers who also have in addition to carry out the onerous and responsible duties of gunnery officers; one or other, it would seem, must be to some extent sacrificed. In stating this, I do not for one moment wish to reflect on the capabilities of those officers who are at present employed in this difficult position.

Then, again, in the event of the small-arm men being landed for actual service, either the proper officer (gunnery lieutenant) to be landed with this body of men cannot be employed, or else the ship is denuded at one and the same time of her commanding and gunnery officer. Therefore, it would be more advisable that the larger corvettes of 14 and 12 guns be provided with a first, gunnery, and at least *three* other lieutenants, making in all a total of five officers of that rank; and the smaller vessels of that class, with 8 and 6 guns, should have *four* lieutenants appointed to them, including a first and a gunnery officer.

Except under special circumstances, I hold that neither first, gunnery, or torpedo lieutenant should be called upon to keep

watch at sea (in harbour never), but in common with the other lieutenants they should attend from time to time when fleet evolutions are being performed.

I now propose to deal with the question of the seniority of the lieutenant-commanders and first lieutenants. The seniorities refer in each case to the date of appointment.

I find that there are *forty-eight* lieutenants commanding different classes of small craft; this number comprises those in command of 10 special vessels, 25 gunboats, 6 brigs, and 7 schooners.

In the special class I note that the seniority of the lieutenants commanding ranges from *fourteen* years to *seven* years, the former being the seniority of the lieutenant in charge of a drill ship for the Royal Naval Reserve, and the latter of the officer (lieutenant) commanding the *Vesurius*, torpedo vessel. Two of this special class are ships carrying out surveying work, the seniority of their lieutenants in command being respectively $12\frac{3}{4}$ years and $12\frac{1}{2}$ years.

It seems rather an anomaly that of three similar despatch vessels, the *Lively*, *Helicon*, and *Vigilant*, the former should be commanded by a commander of over 9 years' seniority, and the latter two by lieutenants of $11\frac{1}{2}$ years and $8\frac{1}{2}$ years respectively. As the work these vessels have to perform is very similar, then the reason why so great a difference should exist in the rank and seniority of their respective commanders demands some explanation; for either the *Helicon's* lieutenant-commander is too junior, or the *Lively's* commander far too senior for such an appointment.

Proceeding with the consideration of the seniority of the lieutenants commanding gunboats, I find that the senior one has 15 years', and the junior one 4 years' seniority, of whom the former is in command of a gunboat in the Mediterranean, and the latter of a tender; at the same time I notice that the junior of these two officers is stated in the Navy List as being only in temporary charge. Treating that as a special case, the next junior in seniority is the lieutenant-commander of the *Vesurius*, of 7 years standing.

This vessel being also a tender, I pass on at once to the *Cygnets*, which has as her captain a lieutenant of only *nine* years' standing; whilst in two other gunboats, also in the Mediterranean, the lieutenants in command have each a seniority of fifteen years, which is another curious anomaly.

On the China station there are at present four gunboats

commanded by lieutenants whose average seniority is $9\frac{1}{2}$ years—the maximum being $12\frac{5}{8}$ years, and minimum $8\frac{1}{8}$ years.

In the Mediterranean there are also four gunboats so commanded, the average seniority of the lieutenants being $12\frac{1}{8}$ years—maximum 15 years, minimum 9 years.

On the North American station there are three gunboats, average seniority of the lieutenants in command being $11\frac{1}{2}$ years—maximum $11\frac{5}{8}$ years, minimum $9\frac{1}{2}$ years.

On the Cape of Good Hope station there are also found three gunboats, the average seniority of the lieutenants in command being $10\frac{3}{8}$ years—maximum $11\frac{3}{4}$ years, minimum $9\frac{1}{4}$ years.

Thus, it is evident that there exists a great lack of uniformity as regards the seniority of lieutenants appointed to the command of gunboats, &c. The following table enables this statement to be more easily verified.

		Seniority of Lieut. Commanders.					
		Average.		Max.		Min.	
		Yrs.	Mo.	Yrs.	Mo.	Yrs.	Mo.
Special class of vessels		11	7	13	11	7	0
Tenders to harbour ships		9	4	14	3	4	0
Gunboats on the China station		9	11	12	5	8	10
„	Mediterranean station	12	7	15	0	9	0
„	North American station	11	3	12	5	9	6
„	Cape of Good Hope station	10	8	11	9	9	9

Next, I will consider the seniority of the lieutenants in command of schooners. Seven of these vessels are now in commission, the seniority of whose lieutenant-commanders averages $8\frac{1}{2}$ years—the maximum being $10\frac{1}{2}$ years, the minimum being $5\frac{3}{8}$ years. Here, again, I notice as an anomaly, that five years' difference exists between the seniority of two officers of similar rank in command of vessels of the same class and employed on the same work.

Of the six brigs in commission for training the boys of the navy, the average seniority of their lieutenant-commanders is $9\frac{1}{2}$ years—the maximum being 12 years, whilst the minimum is $7\frac{1}{4}$ years; showing too great a difference in the standing as lieutenants of the senior and junior officers in command.

This closes the case of lieutenant-commanders; and the lesson afforded by a careful review of the foregoing facts is, that in many instances too wide a latitude has been allowed in their appointment, as regards their seniority. I would suggest that for a lieutenant to be eligible for the command of any of the

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gunboats and despatch vessels employed on foreign stations, or for particular service on the home station, he should have *ten* years' seniority in that rank, of which *six* should be sea time, and should also be carefully selected. It must be remembered that such officers may have to act in positions where a considerable amount of diplomacy and tact on their part may be needed to prevent serious consequences occurring. And, besides, they may often be forced to act on their own responsibility, in asserting the authority and dignity of Great Britain; this especially refers to the gunboats employed in China, as for the greater part of their time they represent, in isolated ports, the military power of England. The lieutenants appointed to the command of the schooners and brigs should have *seven* and *eight* years' seniority respectively in that rank, of which four and a half and five years respectively should be sea time.

I will now proceed to discuss the appointment of the first lieutenants of different classes of ships in regard to their seniority.

There are twenty large ships in commission on the different stations, and the average seniority of their "firsts" is $10\frac{5}{12}$ years—the maximum being $13\frac{5}{8}$, and the minimum $7\frac{5}{8}$ years.

The junior is the "first" of the *Boadicea*, flag-ship on the Cape of Good Hope station; whilst the senior is the "first" of the *Audacious*, flag-ship on the China station.

I notice, further, that the seniority of the "first" of the *Alexandra* and *Minotaur* flag-ships respectively of the Mediterranean and Channel fleet is $10\frac{3}{4}$ years for the former, and but $9\frac{7}{8}$ for the latter; and in each of these cases there are eight lieutenants other than the "firsts."

Then, the "firsts" of the *Iris* and *Iron Duke* are each senior, by over one year, to the "first" of the *Inflexible*, who counts only $8\frac{5}{8}$ years time in that rank. It is hardly necessary to point out the difference which exists in regard to the comparative importance of these two appointments.

It is curious to compare the seniority of the "firsts" of the four most important ironclads now in commission, as will be seen from the following table:—

	Seniority on appointment as first lieutenant.	
	Yrs.	Mo.
H.M.S. <i>Temeraire</i>	13	2
„ <i>Sultan</i>	12	11
„ <i>Alexandra</i>	10	9
„ <i>Inflexible</i>	8	10

Proceeding with my diagnosis, I find that the two gunnery depôt ships—*Cambridge* and *Excellent*—have “firsts” (gunnery lieutenants) with a seniority respectively of only $7\frac{7}{8}$ years and $8\frac{5}{8}$ years; and in the flagships at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Sheerness, their “firsts” have a seniority of $7\frac{3}{8}$, $8\frac{5}{8}$, and $11\frac{3}{8}$ years respectively; and, besides that, the “first” of the *Enryalus* flagship of the East Indian squadron has only 7 years standing in that rank.

The following table gives the seniority of the “firsts” of the different sea-going flagships:—

	Years.
Flagship on the China station . . .	$13\frac{5}{8}$
“ “ North American station	$12\frac{7}{8}$
“ “ Mediterranean . . .	$16\frac{3}{4}$
“ “ Channel Squadron „	$9\frac{7}{8}$
“ “ Pacific „	$9\frac{7}{8}$
“ “ Australian „	$9\frac{5}{8}$
“ “ Cape of Good Hope „	$7\frac{5}{8}$
“ “ East Indian „	7

A glance at the foregoing data affords another proof of the want of uniformity in the system adopted at the Admiralty for the appointment of first-lieutenants. The seniority of the “firsts” of all the first-class sea-going ships, including the flagships on foreign stations, I would suggest should be fixed at twelve years, of which *seven and a half* years should be sea time. It must be borne in mind that, according to the standing of the senior-lieutenant, so is arranged the seniority of the other officers of that rank in each ship.

Dealing next with the seniority of the “firsts” of the six large troopships in commission, which include four of the Indian troopers, I note that their average seniority is $10\frac{1}{8}$ years—the maximum being $16\frac{1}{2}$, and the minimum $7\frac{1}{8}$ years.

Neither of these vessels carries a commander; and, looking to the peculiar work on which they are employed, it can hardly be allowed that great discretion is shown by the Admiralty *as regards the seniority* of the “firsts” appointed to these vessels, who would have the sole command—in the event of anything happening to the captain—of a vessel carrying possibly over *one thousand* souls.

I would fix the seniority of the first-lieutenants of these vessels at *twelve* years, of which they should be obliged to count *eight* years as sea time.

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The following table sets forth the seniority of the "Firsts" of the larger troop-ships:—

Indian troop-ship	.	.	.	16½ years.
"	"	.	.	12¾ "
"	"	.	.	8½ "
H.M.S. <i>Himalaya</i>	.	.	.	8½ "
Indian troop-ship	.	.	.	8½ "
H.M.S. <i>Tamar</i>	.	.	.	7½ "

Next to be considered is the state of the seniority of the first lieutenants of the different corvettes, of which fifteen vessels of that class are now in commission. All of them are commanded by post-captains, but carry no commander.

The seniority of the "firsts" of the nine larger corvettes (14 guns) averages 8 years, the maximum being $9\frac{1}{8}$ years, the minimum $5\frac{2}{3}$ years; while for four 12-gun corvettes the average seniority of their "firsts" is $8\frac{5}{12}$ years—maximum $10\frac{7}{12}$ years, minimum 7 years; and for the remaining two corvettes of 8 and 6 guns each, their "firsts" count respectively $12\frac{1}{2}$ years and 6 years' seniority.

Here I observe that the seniority of the "firsts" appointed to the smaller corvette of 8 guns exceeds by more than *three* years the standing in that rank of the *senior* "first" of the larger corvettes, and by nearly *seven* years that of the *junior* "first," which, as these latter vessels are far more important commands, ought not to be the case.

The following table sets forth the comparison of the seniority of the "firsts" of the corvettes:—

Guns.	Tons.	Years.					
14	2,380	$9\frac{1}{8}$	$9\frac{1}{8}$	$8\frac{3}{4}$	$8\frac{1}{8}$	8	$6\frac{5}{8}$
14	1,970	—	—	—	—	8	$5\frac{2}{3}$
14	1,860	—	—	$8\frac{1}{12}$	—	—	—
12	2,120	$10\frac{7}{12}$	—	—	—	$7\frac{2}{3}$	—
12	1,760	—	—	$8\frac{2}{3}$	—	—	7
8	1,420	$12\frac{1}{2}$	—	—	—	—	—
6	1,130	—	—	—	—	—	6

A glance at the above data suffices to make clear the absence of anything approaching a method in determining the seniority of the "firsts" of corvettes. I consider that the "firsts" of the corvettes of 14 and 12 guns, should have *ten* years' seniority, of which they should be able to count *six* years as sea time; and for the smaller corvettes, *nine* years should be

the limit of standing in that rank of lieutenants appointed as their "firsts," of which *five and a half* years should be sea time. It must be remembered that, as these ships carry no commander, the "first" may at any moment be called on to take entire command, under circumstances requiring great experience and judgment.

Lastly, there are *twenty-seven* sloops and gun-vessels, commanded by commanders, where the "firsts" average in seniority $5\frac{1}{2}$ years, the senior being $8\frac{1}{2}$ years and the junior $1\frac{1}{2}$ years. Of these officers, *eleven* are under *six* years' seniority (two of whom are under *three* years), *ten* of them between *six* and *seven* years, and *six* officers are over *seven* years' standing as lieutenant. The minimum seniority of the "firsts" of this class of ships should be *six* years, of which *three and a half* years must be counted as sea time.

Then summing up on what has been said in reference to the seniority of lieutenants appointed in command, and as "firsts" of different ships, and also in regard to the number of officers of that rank appointed to each ship, I come to the following conclusions:—

1. That lieutenant-commanders should have the following amount of seniority, according to the nature of the vessel under their command:—

	Average Age.	Seniority as lieutenant. Years.	Sea time. Years.
Gunboats and despatch vessels on foreign stations, and particular service vessels	33	10	6
Tenders to harbour ships	29	6	$3\frac{1}{2}$
Australian schooners	30	7	$4\frac{1}{2}$
Training brigs	31	8	5

2. That lieutenants appointed as "firsts" should be able to count seniority according to the following scale, in order to be eligible for such position:—

	Seniority as lieutenant. Years.	Sea time. Years.	Average Age.
First lieutenants of first-class ships	12	$7\frac{1}{2}$	35
„ troop-ships	12	8	35
„ large corvettes	10	6	33
„ small „	8	$4\frac{1}{2}$	31
„ sloops	6	$3\frac{1}{2}$	29

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The composition of the Lieutenants' List for certain specified periods of seniority is shown in the following table :—

	10 years' seniority and over.	8 to 11 years inclusive.	7 to 10 years inclusive.	6 to 9 years inclusive.
Gunnery-lieutenants employed	32	36	40	42
„ „ unemployed	4	3	4	2
Torpedo „ employed	4	5	9	9
Coastguard „	38	6	2	—
Lieutenants for navigating duties	4	6	8	12
Ditto unemployed	—	—	1	4
Ordinary lieutenants employed	130	143	230	238
„ „ unemployed	39	30	28	21
Total number of lieutenants employed	204	195	289	301
Total number of lieutenants unemployed	43	33	33	27

According to the seniority of the “first” of a ship, so will the corresponding seniority of the other lieutenants be governed; for example, take the case of the *Alexandra*, flag-ship of the Mediterranean fleet, in which *five* lieutenants, exclusive of the “flag,” are borne as part complement. These five average in seniority only $6\frac{1}{2}$ years, the senior being $10\frac{1}{2}$ years, and junior only $1\frac{1}{2}$ year : then adding the three supernumerary lieutenants, the average is reduced to $4\frac{1}{2}$ years, and it can hardly be denied that both of these averages for a ship like the *Alexandra* is far too small.

By adopting the plan of only appointing “firsts” to this class of ship of *twelve* years' seniority, and allowing a descending scale of seniority for each of the other six lieutenants of $1\frac{1}{2}$ years, the average then would be $7\frac{1}{2}$ years, with a maximum of 12 years, and a minimum of 3 years.

3. That the different classes of ships should carry a number of lieutenants according to the following scale :—

	“Firsts”	Gunnery.	Torpedo.	Ordinary.	Total.
First-class ships (sea-going)	1	1	1	4	7
Troop-ships	1	—	—	4	5
Corvettes	1	1	—	3	5
Sloops	1	—	—	2	3

Where the accommodation of a ship does not afford cabins for her proper complement of lieutenants, then the number of her ordinary lieutenants must be reduced, and their work performed by the sub-lieutenants.

Only in the larger class of vessels where a commander is carried should the first lieutenant be also a gunnery officer, in which case the second lieutenant would have to perform the ship work of the "first," leaving that officer to carry out his special gunnery duties. At the same time, it seems a mistake to make such an appointment as "first" and "gunnery," as the duties of the two positions must clash; and, besides, I contend that the special officers, such as the gunnery and torpedo lieutenants, should be considered as *special* officers, and not as ordinary lieutenants with special duties. As before stated, on no account should the "first," where he is also commanding officer, be appointed for gunnery and torpedo duties.

The following tables show the comparative state of the Lieutenants' List for January 1882 and 1883:—

		Ten years' seniority and over.	
		1882.	1883.
Lieutenants on Coastguard duty	.	27	34
"	„ (gunnery)	5	4

There are no lieutenants employed on coastguard duties of under ten years' seniority. It appears to be rather a waste of good material to employ officers who have undergone the special gunnery examinations for coastguard work, except under exceptional circumstances.

	A.		B.	
	1882.	1883.	1882.	1883.
Gunnery lieutenants employed	28	22	50	46
" " unemployed	3	3	1	4

A. Ten years' seniority and over.
B. Under ten years' seniority.

	1882.	1883.
Lieutenants qualifying for gunnery duties	11	18

From the above it is seen that the number of gunnery lieutenants for January 1882 exceeded those for January 1883 by seven; at the same time the number qualifying for gunnery duties for the latter year exceeds those of the former year by this same number.

The small per-centage (8·9 per cent.) of gunnery officers compared with the total number of lieutenants, does not afford a sufficient number of specially qualified officers for gunnery duties, when the increasing importance of naval gunnery is considered, and the complicated nature of the armaments of

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ships of war, which exists at the present time, and also of the component parts of those armaments.

		A.		B.	
		1882.	1883.	1882.	1883.
Torpedo lieutenants employed	.	3	1	10	14
„ „ unemployed	.	0	0	2	0
Lieutenants qualifying for torpedo duties	.			1882.	1883.
				13	13

Here, again, is to be noticed a paucity of lieutenants specially trained in the manipulation of torpedoes, and also that the number of such officers is not increased for this year.

The smallness of the per-centage (1·7 per cent.) of the torpedo lieutenants, as compared with the total number of officers of that rank, calls for the same remarks afore-mentioned in considering the case of the gunnery lieutenants. I would suggest that each of these special classes of lieutenants be increased respectively 1·6 per cent. and 1·3 per cent., which would give a total of 87 gunnery and 25 torpedo officers, in the place of 71 and 15 officers now on the list especially qualified for those duties. These numbers will necessarily have to be still further augmented as the strength of our navy in “battle-ships” is increased.

		A.		B.	
		1882.	1883.	1882.	1883.
Lieutenants qualified for navigating duties					
employed	.	4	4	83	91
Lieutenants qualified for navigating duties					
unemployed	.	0	0	26	25

The number of lieutenants qualified for navigating duties will be gradually increased as the navigating-lieutenants proper become absorbed; and for this purpose the Admiralty are authorised to raise the number of lieutenants on the list to a total of 1,000.

The officers of the rank of lieutenant, qualified as naval surveyors of different classes, number respectively 26 and 28 for the years 1882 and 1883.

This branch of a naval officer's work is a most important and a never-ceasing one; and, therefore, looking to the special nature of the duties to be performed by lieutenant-surveyors, differing so entirely from the ordinary duties of officers of that rank, it would seem advisable to keep their numbers at the lowest limit consistent with the sufficient and regular supply of such specially qualified officers, as they would probably have to be retained in the surveying-line throughout the remainder of their career.

SECTION II.—PROMOTION.

In this section the question of the promotion of lieutenants will be dealt with.

The latest Admiralty circular on this subject states :—

That *twenty-five* lieutenants may be promoted to the rank of commander each year, without regard to the number of vacancies, provided that the number on the commanders' list does not exceed two hundred and twenty-five; further if such vacancies exceed twenty-five, then, provided the commanders' list is kept up at two hundred, the excess to be carried over to the following year.

For the year 1882, I find that forty-two names have been removed from the list of lieutenants, due to a variety of causes other than promotion, then adding to this number the annual twenty-five promotions, there is obtained as an average a fraction under twelve and a half years' service for each lieutenant before being promoted, provided the foregoing figures are maintained; and also only a number of sub-lieutenants are promoted, equivalent to the deduction made on the lieutenants' list. Of course the aforesaid average would only be correct if the reduction of the list by promotion and other causes be effected from the head.

The number of lieutenants promoted to the rank of commander for 1882 was forty; the excess of *fifteen* over the orthodox number being due to the late Egyptian campaign, in which the Navy played so important a part.

The following table sets forth certain data in reference to these forty promotions :—

Average seniority of the total (40) promotions	.	12 $\frac{1}{2}$ years.
Maximum	„	16 $\frac{3}{4}$ „
Minimum	„	8 $\frac{1}{2}$ „
Average seniority of the ordinary (21) promotions	.	12 $\frac{5}{12}$ „
Maximum	„	16 $\frac{3}{4}$ „
Minimum	„	9 $\frac{1}{2}$ „
Average seniority of the special war promotions (19)	.	11 $\frac{2}{3}$ „
Maximum	„	15 $\frac{1}{4}$ „
Minimum	„	8 $\frac{1}{2}$ „

Among the *forty* promotions are included :—

- 9 lieutenant-commanders.
- 14 first lieutenants.
- 5 “firsts” and “gunnery.”
- 1 gunnery-lieutenant.
- 1 “torpedo” and “first.”

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1 torpedo-lieutenant.
1 lieutenant-surveyor.
1 yacht promotion.
1 flag-lieutenant.

The following is a general statement of the services as lieutenant of *five* of the commanders made in 1882:—

- | | |
|--|-------------------------|
| (1) Seniority on promotion | 16 $\frac{3}{4}$ years. |
| Qualifying for gunnery-officer | 1 year. |
| In first-class ship as gunnery-officer | 2 $\frac{5}{12}$ years. |
| Requalifying as | $\frac{5}{12}$ " |
| In corvette as | 2 $\frac{5}{12}$ " |
| In first-class ship as "first" and "gunnery" | 1 $\frac{5}{8}$ " |
| As lieutenant-commander | 2 $\frac{5}{8}$ " |
| Royal Naval College | $\frac{3}{4}$ " |
| As "first" in troop-ship | 1 $\frac{1}{8}$ " |
| Sea-time as lieutenant about | 12 $\frac{1}{4}$ " |
| (2) Seniority on promotion | 12 $\frac{3}{4}$ years. |
| As ordinary lieutenant | $\frac{7}{12}$ year. |
| As surveyor | 1 $\frac{3}{4}$ years. |
| " and lieutenant-commander | 1 year. |
| In Hydrographic Department | 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ years. |
| Indian Marine Survey | $\frac{5}{8}$ year. |
| Sea-time as lieutenant | |
| (3) Seniority on promotion | 10 years. |
| As ordinary lieutenant | 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ " |
| Qualifying for gunnery officer | 1 $\frac{3}{8}$ " |
| On the gunnery staff of the <i>Excellent</i> | 1 year. |
| As gunnery-officer of first-class ship | 2 $\frac{1}{12}$ years. |
| On the gunnery staff of the <i>Cambridge</i> | 1 $\frac{7}{12}$ " |
| As "first" and "gunnery" of | 1 $\frac{5}{12}$ " |
| Sea-time as lieutenant, about | 8 $\frac{1}{12}$ " |
| (4) Seniority on promotion | 10 $\frac{1}{4}$ " |
| As ordinary lieutenant | 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ " |
| As "first" | $\frac{5}{12}$ " |
| In Her Majesty's yacht | 1 year. |
| Sea time about | 8 $\frac{1}{12}$ years. |
| Time as sub-lieutenant | $\frac{3}{4}$ year. |

Promoted to lieutenant for obtaining three first-class certificates. Served in the Arctic Expedition 1875-6.

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| (5) Seniority on promotion | 8 $\frac{1}{12}$ years. |
| R. N. College | $\frac{3}{4}$ " |
| As ordinary lieutenant | 1 $\frac{7}{12}$ " |

Qualifying for gunnery officer	.	.	.	1½ years.
Junior staff in <i>Cambridge</i>	.	.	.	1 year.
As gunnery lieutenant	.	.	.	1½ years.
Sea time about	.	.	.	6½ „
Time as sub-lieutenant	.	.	.	4 „

Specially promoted to lieutenant for gallant conduct, and to commander for services during the Egyptian campaign.

With the exception of four cases which occurred amongst the promotions for service before the enemy, it is noticeable that there is only one instance of the seniority of the lieutenant promoted being under 10 years, and this was 9½ years, for the special promotion accorded to the “first” of the *Excellent*.

I would offer the following suggestions in reference to the promotion of lieutenants:—

1. That for a lieutenant to be eligible for promotion to commander, he should possess ten years' seniority, of which seven years should be sea time, including *two* years as a watch-keeper; for distinguished service before the enemy, eight years' seniority should be required, including two years as a watch-keeper.

2. That all vacancies on the commanders' list should be filled up as soon as possible after they have been created, instead of the present system of waiting until several such vacancies occur, and then making a batch of promotions.

3. That a special annual gunnery promotion be allowed, but not necessarily confined to the “first” of *Excellent* or *Cambridge*, provided that the officer selected has shown special gunnery qualifications and fulfils the conditions included in the first suggestion.

4. That a special bi-annual torpedo promotion be allowed, under the same conditions as the special gunnery promotion.

5. That the special promotions, which include the gunnery, torpedo, surveying, and yacht promotions, be not considered as a portion of the twenty-five ordinary annual promotions, if the number of commanders on the list does not, by these additions, exceed 225.

I would also suggest that a maximum limit of seniority be fixed, which should preclude the promotion of lieutenants except for some specially meritorious conduct. For instance, taking sixteen years as this limit, then I think that if during that period of service as lieutenant an officer has failed for some cause or other to secure a claim for promotion, it is better that he should

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not be allowed to suffer any longer from that most unpleasant malady of "hope deferred," but know, that except for some very special conduct he must become resigned at once to the inevitable.

There were *twenty-six* lieutenants on the list, in the January Navy List of this year, of sixteen years' seniority and over, of whom twenty were employed, including eighteen of the total number of thirty-eight on coastguard duty.

For the position of "firsts" in the larger troopships, there would seem to be no reason why these senior, not to be promoted, lieutenants should not be employed. This question is further dealt with in the section treating of the retirement of lieutenants.

Broadly speaking, there seems to be no great cause for grumbling in regard to the promotion of lieutenants*, excepting that which we believe to be a mistaken notion, namely, the Admiralty system of *batch* instead of *immediate individual* promotion. Patronage to some extent must and will always exist, and rightly so, wherever advancement by selection is the system adopted, but the Admiralty cannot be charged with the *undue* use of patronage in regard to the promotion of the forty lieutenants during 1882.

SECTION III.—EDUCATION.

The present system of requiring the lieutenants, other than the special classes studying at the College at Greenwich, to devote a *considerable* portion of their time to chasing the wily *x*, as the study of mathematics is playfully termed, does not seem to be a good one, or at all necessary; neither is it successful in attracting as many of the unemployed lieutenants to study

* Since writing this, the promotion of a certain lieutenant to the rank of commander has been made, which decidedly does appear most injudicious, and does offer a cause for grumbling on the part of his brother officers.

The services of this officer are as follows:—

Seniority as lieutenant on promotion	4 years.
As ordinary lieutenant in a first-class reserve ship	$\frac{1}{2}$ year.
As flag-lieutenant	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ years.
Sea time about	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ "
As sub-lieutenant	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ "

The whole of his service as sub-lieutenant and flag lieutenant has been performed in the flag-ship of the Mediterranean squadron, and it is extremely doubtful if he has ever kept watch as a lieutenant at sea, or during squadron evolutions. Such a promotion as this is nothing less than a scandal. If the officer is deserving of special promotion, then under the circumstances of his career he should have been first sent to sea for at least two years as a watch-keeper.

there as ought to be the case, and which is one of the principal objects of the college. For instance, in January 1883, there were only *eight* lieutenants other than those qualifying for gunnery or torpedo duties, studying at the college.

There are many subjects, to a study of which a lieutenant might, with benefit to the service and to himself, devote the full term of nine months.

For instance, naval tactics, foreign languages, the practice of courts-martial, naval history, international law, chemistry, naval architecture, physics, navigation, steam, &c. &c.

It is surely better, in the interests of the service, that a lieutenant, during his college course, should become a fair linguist, or well informed on the subject of international law; or, by devoting the chief portion of his time to the study of naval architecture, gain some real practical knowledge of the construction of men-of-war; or, further, should become a fair naval engineer: than that he should have been forced to give the greater portion of his time there to the study of mathematics, which, I venture to think, seven-tenths of the lieutenants thus unwillingly kept to the mathematical grinding-stone never find of the least possible value to them in the performance of their duties, and the study of which it is almost impossible to keep up on board ship, and which is, besides, very easily forgotten; whilst a subject which a lieutenant has voluntarily taken up at college, and for which he will probably develop a taste, if it requires only careful reading, can and will be continued throughout his career.

Further, looking to the average age and the position of the officers studying at the college, the system in vogue at the Oxford and Cambridge Universities would seem more suitable and correct than the school system of fixed and regular study hours, prevalent at our Naval College; and it is difficult to conceive what are the objections against this plan, entertained by the Admiralty.

Then, in the case of lieutenants qualifying as gunnery and torpedo officers, my opinion is strongly in favour of more *practice* and less *theory*.

By this is meant, that, in the interests of the service in every way, it would be far more sensible to entirely abolish the college theoretical course for the *majority* of the gunnery lieutenants, excepting a special few, who, starting with a good knowledge of mathematics, which must be proved at an entrance examination, are prepared to devote their time to the scientific study of naval

gunnery, with a view of becoming attached to and forming the Ordnance Department of the Admiralty, that on an extended scale must be sooner or later formed for the purpose of controlling the construction of the naval ordnance, and also for determining the armament of our ships.

Thus, the nine months spent at the college by these *special* gunnery officers would not be expended in being *crammed* with a knowledge of higher mathematics while yet ignorant of the rudiments of the same.

In evidence of this charge of "cramming," I will mention the fact that when qualifying for gunnery lieutenant (in 1875-6) at the Royal Naval College at Greenwich, a rather stiff paper was set in the final examination, on the Differential and the Integral Calculus, the former of which had only been studied by us three or four months, and the latter only a few weeks before the examination.

It is needless to comment on the farce of such a proceeding.

I dare to say that ninety per cent. of the officers who have qualified for gunnery lieutenants have never found the least use for the mathematics pumped into them during their *nine* months at the Royal Naval College.

What I would propose is this: that lieutenants desiring to become ordinary gunnery officers—that is, not caring to go in for the special class—should devote the nine months now wasted at college to a more extended practical study of gunnery, including a course of field fortification and of torpedoes, and also be thoroughly initiated in the manipulation of all and every portion of war material which they are likely to be at any time called on to use.

Further, as it should be considered part of a gunnery lieutenant's duty to forward reports on all foreign war material that he may be afforded an opportunity of examining, he should be initiated into the mysteries of weapons of war used by other nations, and be taught to evince some interest in gunnery and torpedo matters outside the Service.

Examining into the nature of a gunnery lieutenant's work, it will be found that it is entirely and essentially of a *practical* nature, and of a kind in which the wily *x* does not in any form intrude its ugly head: the armament of a ship is decided on, and is mounted in her before the gunnery or any other lieutenant is appointed; and thus the actual work falling on the gunnery officer is the drawing of gunnery stores, the detailing of the guns' crews, small-arm men, &c. &c., and the training of the

officers and men in all matters appertaining to the use of the guns, rifles, &c. usually supplied to a man-of-war, and further filling up the various returns, and occasionally the forwarding of a report which has been called for on the working of some new arm, &c. In vessels fitted with torpedoes, where no torpedo officer is carried, the gunnery lieutenant has also to proceed in a similar manner with the torpedo department.

It is hardly necessary to point out that the work falling on the shoulders of a gunnery lieutenant of any ship, especially the lately-constructed ones, is of no mean amount, and of great responsibility, and that he is well worth some extra consideration.

The special class of gunnery lieutenants—for which there should be, say, *five* vacancies every year to be competed for—should, in addition to their theoretical college course, be attached to the Woolwich Arsenal for a period of at least *six* months, for the purpose of obtaining some practical knowledge of the construction of guns, and all material appertaining thereto, and further have, of course, to pass a practical course in the *Excellent*; but this latter part would not be so important to these *special* officers as for the *practical* or ordinary gunnery lieutenants. These gunnery specialists should, also, not be required to pass any torpedo course.

What is hoped to be achieved by the formation of a special class of gunnery lieutenants, is the gradual control of naval armaments by naval officers, who, by a thorough scientific and practical training, are rendered capable of undertaking such an important matter.

These *special* gunnery officers should continue to be employed, after promotion, by the Ordnance Department, and on ordnance committees, &c. It is an unfortunate fact that when serving on a mixed committee, naval officers usually allow their opinions and decisions to be overruled by the supposed more scientific members of the sister Service.

This special class of gunnery lieutenants should be obliged to have one year's sea time before being eligible to compete, and should, after their course, be obliged to put in two years' sea time for each *five* years of seniority in that rank.

It is needless to say that such a scheme as here proposed must be for the benefit of the Service in the long run, and, further, that it requires to be more carefully worked out in detail than it has been possible to attempt in the scope of this paper.

The lieutenants who have obtained a first class in the *short*

torpedo and gunnery course in the *Vernon* and *Excellent*, are now to be appointed to ships not carrying a gunnery or torpedo lieutenant for the performance of those duties, and will be granted one shilling per diem extra pay when so employed; but it seems that the scheme I propose of making the lieutenants qualifying as gunnery officers, other than the five special ones, pass through a severe and complete practical course, and be increased in their number, is infinitely more suitable, for the *short* gunnery course does not seem sufficient training to make an efficient gunnery lieutenant.

What has been said in regard to gunnery lieutenants applies in a great measure to the lieutenants qualifying as torpedo officers. Here I would have *two* lieutenants *specially* trained in the theoretical as well as the practical part of torpedo warfare, while the other torpedo officers are to devote the whole of their time under training to the *practice* of torpedo warfare. More practice and less theory is also here needed for the majority of torpedo lieutenants, as the manipulation of torpedoes is entirely and essentially a matter of continued practice, which results in begetting the necessary familiarity needed for manipulating this modern branch of naval warfare with perfect safety and certainty.

I trust, some—not far distant—day, to see the whole of the submarine defence of our coasts in the hands of naval officers, as it most certainly ought to be.

Special instruction should be given to all officers, who may be called upon to take charge of torpedo boats, in the management of their engines, so that in the event of the single engineer officer being killed or wounded, the officer in command should be capable of taking his place.

In my opinion it is a mistake, and is quite unnecessary, to include in the torpedo department engineer officers; for torpedo lieutenants should surely be able to take charge of the torpedo mechanism they have to manipulate, with the assistance of practical mechanics, and the old saying that “too many cooks spoil the broth” is exceedingly applicable here.

I would further venture to suggest that there should be a Professorship of Naval Tactics at the College, held by an officer of the Executive line; and that also the education of gunnery and other lieutenants at the College in the art of field fortification, and in the management of naval brigades, should be entrusted to a qualified commander or lieutenant.

Of the twenty-six lieutenants who have passed as interpreters,

it is noticeable that only *five* of them have qualified in French, and *one* each in German and Spanish, the remainder being qualified to act as interpreters of Hindustani, Swahili, and Fijian. This is hardly as it should be; for surely French, German, and Italian are the linguistic attainments the Admiralty should endeavour more particularly to promote. There are professors for teaching French and German at the Royal Naval College, but none for imparting a knowledge of Hindustani, Swahili, &c., and yet, of the total number of lieutenant-interpreters, only *twenty-three per cent.* have passed in French and German.

SECTION IV.—RANK.

The time would seem to have arrived when some alteration must be made in the rank of lieutenants, tending to benefit the service generally, and that class of executive officers in particular.

I would suggest that every lieutenant should, after serving for *twelve* years in that position, be raised to the rank of "lieutenant-commander," provided he shall be able to count *eight* years sea time, and that he shall be then called, by courtesy, "commander," in the same manner as a commander is now, by courtesy, called "captain."

The present regulations entitle a lieutenant of eight years' standing to rank with a major in the army, but this does not seem to be sufficient seniority for advancement to the new rank.

Then this new rank would also be available, as an intermediary step, for the advancement of junior-lieutenants for meritorious conduct, provided they have *four* years' seniority in that rank, of which *two and a half* years should be sea time, and one year and a half as a watch-keeper.

The object I have in view in proposing this, is to decrease the stagnation attached at present to a lieutenant's career, which is so detrimental to the service in general, in promoting discontent amongst a body of executive officers nearly equalling, in point of numbers, the whole of the officers in the remaining executive branches.

The prefix (G. or T.) before a gunnery or torpedo lieutenant's name, in the Navy List, should be so arranged as to show his class—first and second, or special and ordinary. For instance: G¹. might represent the special, or first-class, gunnery officers, and the plain G. those of the ordinary, or second-class; also T¹. and T. as prefixes against the names of torpedo officers.

Further, such a prefix should be continued before an officer's name in all his successive ranks.

At present, it is impossible to discover in the Navy List whether a gunnery or torpedo lieutenant be a first or second-class man, or whether a captain or commander has held either of those positions, without expending a deal of trouble in hunting through back Navy Lists, &c.

SECTION V.—PAY.

In attempting to solve this problem, I feel that I am treading on dangerous ground, after the rather strong adverse opinion expressed by Lord Northbrook in the Upper House, a few weeks ago, in his position as Civil First Lord of the Admiralty, against an increase being made in the pay of lieutenants, or any other of the executive branches.

But, though Lord Belmore's question failed to secure the approval of the First Lord of the Admiralty, probably because of its covering rather too much ground, and thereby naturally alarming the Admiralty and Treasury, I am still of opinion that the pay of lieutenants is not altogether adequate.

I do not wish it for one moment to be understood that the pay of lieutenants is such as to doom them, in the words of one of the leading Service papers, "to a life of incredible privation, misery, and destitution," for such is a highly-exaggerated view of the case, and one not calculated to bring about any just consideration of their position.

Without doubt a lieutenant, who has not taken upon himself the expenses and responsibilities of married life, can live, by the exercise of ordinary self-denial, on his pay of *ten* shillings per diem; but, to do so without incurring debts for his uniform, &c., is a more difficult matter; but what I do say is, that a lieutenant of over ten and fifteen years' standing in that rank—that is, probably over *thirty-three* and *thirty-eight* years of age respectively—should be paid at a higher rate than those just promoted, of, on an average, twenty-three years of age.

It must be remembered that numbers of the senior lieutenants are placed in positions of as great responsibility as are commanders, who are in receipt of nearly double their pay; and the amount of the pay of any officer should in a great measure be dependent on the degree of responsibility of the position he may at any time be called on to occupy, an argument which can hardly be gainsaid.

The following table sets forth the present rate of payment for lieutenants :—

	Per Year.			Per Day.		
	£	s.	d.	s.	d.	
The ordinary pay of a lieutenant . . .	182	10	0	10	0	
Lieutenants in command of any sea-going vessel	269	8	9	14	9	
Lieutenants in command of any tender to a harbour-ship	246	7	6	13	6	
First lieutenants of ships commanded by a captain, but without a commander	228	2	6	12	6	
First lieutenants of other vessels . . .	209	7	6	11	6	
First-class gunnery lieutenants . . .	246	7	6	13	6	
Second „ „ „ . . .	228	2	6	12	6	
Third „ „ „ . . .	209	7	6	11	6	
First „ torpedo „ . . .	246	7	6	13	6	
Second „ „ „ . . .	228	2	6	12	6	
Lieutenants appointed for navigating duties	228	7	6	12	6	
Lieutenants appointed for navigating duties, if over five years' seniority . . .	237	5	6	13	0	
Lieutenants appointed for navigating duties who passed for first-class ships	255	0	0	14	0	
Lieutenants employed as transport agents, including allowance for servant	285	18	4	15	8	

It must be noted here that the extra gunnery, torpedo, and navigating pay only commences on the day of an officer joining his ship for the purpose of performing those duties, and ceases on the day he leaves his ship.

From the above data it is seen that the greatest aggregate pay of any lieutenant that can be obtained is that of a first-class gunnery or torpedo officer, who is also the senior lieutenant of a captain's ship, without commander, and also performing either gunnery or torpedo duties, which amounts to the respectable sum of £292 per annum. There is no instance, at present, of any lieutenant holding this combined position.

I would propose that the scale of lieutenant's pay should be an ascending one, as follows :—

	Per Diem.		Increase.	
	£	s.	£	s.
Five years' seniority and under	10	0	—	—
Over five years and under ten years	12	0	2	0
Over ten years and under fifteen years	13	6	1	6
Over fifteen years	15	0	1	6

The amount of seniority to entitle an officer to claim the increased rate of pay to include three years' sea-time for every five years of seniority. Thus, to entitle a lieutenant to receive the extra 2s., 3s. 6d., and 5s. per diem, he must have respectively three, six, and nine years' sea-time.

Then, as it is part of my scheme that no lieutenant of less than ten years' seniority should be appointed as "first," it would abolish the 2s. 6d. and 1s. 6d. extra daily pay now granted to officers holding such a position, and also would do away with the 1s. per day at present allowed to lieutenants appointed in command of any vessel, as it is proposed that officers holding that position should be of not less than six, eight, and ten years' seniority according to the importance of their command. Thus the first lieutenant of a ship commanded by a captain, but not allowed a commander, would at present be entitled to £228 2s. 6d., no matter what his seniority, whilst, according to my scale of pay, he would be receiving either £246 7s. 6d. or £273 15s. according to his seniority.

The amount thus obtained by doing away with the extra pay of lieutenants, commanders, and "firsts," would be an appreciable set off against the sum that would have to be added to the Naval Estimates for the proposed increase to lieutenants' pay.

I find, according to the January Navy List of this year, the following data :—

	Employed.	Unemployed.
Lieutenants of five years' seniority and under	246	53
B. Lieutenants between five years and ten years	301	41
C. Lieutenants between ten years and fifteen years	120	32
D. Lieutenants over fifteen years	30	11

Therefore, by the proposed new scale of pay, the aggregate amount of increase would be as follows :—

	£	s.	d.
Class B	10,986	10	0
Class C	7,845	0	0
Class D	2,737	0	0
Total	£21,568	10	0

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Then the pay of gunnery and torpedo lieutenants should be as follows :—

	Per Diem.	
	s.	d.
The special class of gunnery and torpedo lieutenants .	4	0
The ordinary ,, ,, ,, .	2	0

The amount that would be obtained by doing away with the present extra pay of “firsts” and lieutenant-commanders (but not the command money), and by adopting the above proportionate payment of gunnery and torpedo officers, is upwards of £4,635, so that the actual increase of the Estimates would be as follows :—

	£	s.	d.
For increase of lieutenants' pay .	21,568	10	0
Less	4,635	0	0
Actual increase of Estimates .	£16,933	10	0

Which would mean only an increase of 0·15 per cent. of the actual cost of the Navy for 1883–4, and would only be 2·5 per cent. of the value of the old store-moneys and extra receipts for this year, which are now allowed to be appropriated in aid of the Votes.

I come next to the question of the half-pay of lieutenants, which at present is arranged as follows :—

	Per Diem.	
	s.	d.
A. Lieutenants under three years' service .	4	0
B. ,, ,, six ,, ,, .	5	0
C. ,, ,, nine ,, ,, .	6	0
D. ,, ,, twelve ,, ,, .	7	0
E. ,, ,, above twelve ,, ,, .	8	6

The (A) class are allowed to count one year's service as sub-lieutenant; the (B) class two years, and the other classes all their service as sub-lieutenant.

I propose to increase the scale of the lieutenant's half-pay as follows :—

	s.	s.	d.
A class from 4 to 5	0	per day.	
B ,, ,, 5 to 6	0	,,	
C ,, ,, 6 to 7	6	,,	
D ,, ,, 7 to 9	6	,,	
E ,, ,, 8 to 11	6	,,	

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Then, roughly calculating, there are :—

In the A Class	24 lieutenants.
„ B „	19 „
„ C „	24 „
„ D „	19 „
„ E „	51 „

This would give a total augmentation of the half-pay of lieutenants, according to the proposed scale, of £5,100 17s. 6d., which, together with the amount required for the increase of lieutenants' full-pay, would be £22,034 7s. 6d., which means a reduction of the extra sum of £825,758, now allowed to be appropriated for the Naval Estimates, of 2·6 per cent., or an increase of the estimates of 0·2 per cent., which certainly cannot be considered a serious increase when is remembered the benefit accruing to the service, by the improvement of the position of a most deserving and most important body of naval executive officers.

Though I advocate an increase of the half-pay of lieutenants, yet I entirely concur with Captain Bridges in his statement that the worst possible use you can put a naval officer to is to place him on half-pay, but it is quite impossible to expect that the whole of the lieutenants can be employed on active service : and therefore it must fall to some to be placed on what is termed “half-pay,” and their lot, I would suggest, ought to be made an easier one than it has hitherto been.

There is yet another point which calls for some notice, namely, the fact that officers appointed to ships for gunnery and torpedo duties are not allowed to receive the extra pay accorded them for such duties until the actual day on which they join the ship they have been appointed to, which may mean a delay of several weeks if that ship be on a foreign station. In the place of this, it would seem only right and proper that an officer who has elected to go through the hard work of qualifying himself for either of those positions, should be allowed to count his extra pay from the date of his appointment.

The expenses of a lieutenant, in travelling from his place of residence to the port at which the vessel may be to which he is appointed, should also be allowed him. It is these small economies practised by the Admiralty which tend to discontent the lieutenants, and other naval officers as well.

It would also seem only just and right that the half-pay of gunnery and torpedo lieutenants should be slightly increased. so

as to recompense them to some extent for the hard work they have chosen to go through in qualifying themselves for such positions for the benefit of the service.

Before concluding this section, I must point out, even at the risk of repetition, the fact which seems to be entirely ignored by the majority of writers and speakers on this part of my paper, and this is that the executive line, from the midshipman upwards, are liable at all times to be placed in positions of great trust and responsibility, not in the same degree shared by any other branch of naval officers; and this is the main argument on which I base, and which should always be the basis of, a claim for increasing the pay and improving the position of executive officers.

Generally speaking, in the mercantile world the remuneration of employes depends, in a great measure, on the degree of responsibility of the position; but the extent of this responsibility can never compare with that which may at any time be thrust on the shoulders of officers of the executive line.

Lord Northbrook, in his answer to Lord Belmore, stated, as a **conclusive** reason for not advancing the pay of lieutenants, **that since his connexion with the Admiralty in 1853, several privileges, in the shape of extra pay, have been granted to those officers, but it must be remembered that such have been only accorded for some *special* and *extra* work which the Admiralty have called upon the lieutenants to perform, necessitating a considerable amount of extra hard work on their part.**

We note that, though no increase in the pay of lieutenants can be considered for one moment, yet the pay of the Permanent Secretary to the Admiralty has been augmented this year, and that the higher ranks of the Admiralty clerical staff have also received an access of pay. I do not mention this in a captious spirit, for no doubt such increases are absolutely necessary, but merely as a proof that the raising of pay in general is not objected to by the Admiralty, but only that of the lieutenants in particular.

When it is considered how entirely dependent on her navy England is for her safety, and for the high position she holds among the powers of the world, it seems scandalous that only by a general strike on the part of the fathers, against sending their sons into the navy, can lieutenants hope to gain what is indisputably their due.

SECTION VI.—RETIREMENT.

I do not propose to advocate any changes in the present system of retirement of lieutenants, as there appears that sufficient, or rather, too much, inducement is held out to officers to retire.

It seems to be the object at the Admiralty to induce lieutenants to leave the service, rather than to serve afloat, which latter, I should imagine, was the legitimate purpose, and also the ambition, of every officer of the executive branches.

It might possibly be better to secure the services of the senior executive officers who now are forced to retire, by employing them in the place of paymasters, and gradually abolishing that line.

This plan acts very well in the army, and there seems no reason to doubt but that it would act as well in the navy, and it would undoubtedly be the means of effecting a considerable saving to the estimates. One of the great evils attendant on the naval service is the variety of the classes serving therein, and I see no absolute need for aught but the executive line, if the medical and marine branches are excepted. But in stating this, I fear I shall be accused of attempting to revolutionise the service, and effect sweeping reforms, which, in the preamble, I stated it would be my endeavour to steer clear of; therefore, it is not intended to do more than allude to these points, the details of which I may possibly work up at some other time.

In summing up, I claim that the appointment of lieutenants requires to be systematised and treated with some degree of fairness and uniformity.

Secondly, that the education of the gunnery and torpedo lieutenants necessitates some changes; and that the system of study at the Royal Naval College might, with advantage, be made more alluring and suitable to officers of the rank and age of lieutenants.

Thirdly, that an intermediary rank between lieutenants and commanders might be granted.

Fourthly, that the full and half-pay of lieutenants might be raised without any considerable or serious increase to the estimates.

I also, further, foreshadow a scheme for expunging the enforced retirement of lieutenants.

In conclusion, I shall consider that all the trouble that has been occasioned in preparing this paper, will be more than recom-

pensed, if only one single particle of the different proposals of improving the position of lieutenants of the navy, duly set forth in these pages, be accepted and carried out by those who it is understood, by their position, can have but one aim and object, which is the welfare of all classes of naval officers.

The variety of the functions of a lieutenant's position which I have attempted to pourtray in the foregoing pages, and which, I have endeavoured to show, needs some adjustment and improvement, has prevented a very elaborate examination, the space at my disposal being limited ; but I trust some more able pen than mine may follow up this subject more closely.

Indian Districts during the Revolt.

By H. G. KEENE, C.I.E.

V.

THE next district, according to the map, is that of Aligarh, but the events there were not sufficiently grave to furnish much matter for a special narrative. The same may be said of the adjoining district of Muttra—or, Mathura, as now written—and the magistrates of these two districts, Messrs. Bramly and Thornhill, have described their mutiny administration with such brevity and lack of literary skill, as to render the events there less interesting, even, than might otherwise be the case. Good men were there who did good deeds; but they are in the same condition as the brave who lived their lives before Agamemnon. It will therefore be enough if we briefly consider Aligarh and Muttra in connection with Agra, to which they served as satellites.

The district of Aligarh is named after an old fort about two miles north of the city of Koil. Originally built under the Mughal Government, this fort had been strengthened by the Mahrattas and their French officers; but it was taken by Lake in 1803 by a brilliant *coup-de-main*, as described, under the chapter of Lásuari, in Colonel Malleon's *Decisive Battles of India*. It was not occupied during the early part of the Rebellion, and need not further detain us here. About half-way between the town and the fort stands the "Station," a small collection of bungalows grouped about the public offices.

At the time of the outbreak, several neighbouring estates were in the hands of British planters, amongst whom the most noticeable were Messrs. Paterson Saunders and John O'Brien Tandy,* cousins, and men of great spirit and influence.

The force present in May consisted of 300 men of the 9th Native Infantry, commanded by Major Eld; reinforced on the news of the Meerut outbreak by the right wing of the 1st Regi-

* I believe Mr. Tandy was not actively concerned in the management of these estates, but had come up from Calcutta on a visit.

ment of Cavalry of the Gwalior Contingent, under Captain Alexander. On the evening of the 20th the Infantry broke into mutiny, burned the offices, and carried off about thirty thousand pounds in specie, with which they marched off to the insurgent head-quarters in Dehli. The officers, civil and military, were allowed to depart to Hâthras, a town south of Aligarh, on the road to Agra, which they reached in safety. Here they were joined by a planter named Nichterlein, and other refugees, Mr. Nichterlein's son having been killed on the way. On the 26th they were reinforced by a body of mounted Volunteers raised by Mr. Saunders, and commanded by Mr. Wilberforce Greathed,* of the Bengal Engineers, one of three brothers who took very distinguished parts in the events that were going on in the neighbourhood. Other members of this little force were Messrs. Arthur Cocks,† C.S., J. O'B. Tandy, Harington, and Castle; Ensign Ollivant (since a prominent officer of the Provincial Police), and Ensign Marsh. These gallant fellows, having performed the main object of their expedition—which was the relief of a factory—proceeded to Abigarh, where they reinstated Mr. William Watson, the then magistrate (who afterwards died of cholera in Agra Fort), and remained there till the 2nd of July, when they were driven out by overwhelming invasions, and retired to Agra.

Meanwhile, Mr. Mark Bensley Thornhill, of Muttra, who had taken the field with a body of Bhurtpore troops under Captain Nixon, was recalled to his chief station by news that the detachment of the 44th Native Infantry had mutinied, murdered Lieutenant Burlton, their commandant, and plundered the Treasury. This occurred on the 26th. On the morning of the 30th Mr. Thornhill returned; but finding the Station ruined and deserted, proceeded to Agra to seek assistance. Not succeeding, he returned next day—having been repeatedly shot at on the road—buried Burlton's body (which he found naked in a ditch near the ruins of the Treasury), and endeavoured, with the aid of some wealthy native bankers, to restore order. In this he was only moderately successful. Fifty thousand pounds had been carried off; the jail-birds had broken loose; the police had mutinied, and spread abroad with arms in their hands; many of the zemindars refused to pay revenue, and set themselves up in all directions as Râjas. Thornhill seems to have

* Afterwards Colonel Greathed, C.B., Secretary to Government, North-West Provinces.

† Already distinguished during the Panjab campaign of 1848-9.

done what he could in these trying circumstances. He took up his quarters in the city, which he protected by barricades; he raised fresh police, and, on being joined by some of the Contingent of the Kota State under Captain Dennys, proceeded into the district, and seized one of the ringleaders of the rural revolt, who was immediately hanged for the discouragement of the others. Seven more were executed soon after, and a number of minor offenders severely flogged. The magistrate further evinced his resources by submitting to the Lieutenant-Governor at Agra a plan for utilising the loyal landowners, by giving them special powers to enforce authority, which was sanctioned and carried out. These measures, working surely, if slowly, gradually brought about some semblance of tranquillity.

To return to Aligarh. It has been said that the Volunteers remained there till the 2nd of July. That is, however, not strictly true, though so stated by Mr. Bramly. The fact is, that only eleven so remained, the majority having been recalled to Agra on the 21st of June. On the 30th of that month, these eleven gentlemen performed a notable exploit. Receiving intimation that the rabble of Koil were on the way to attack them in a factory where they were temporarily quartered, flying the green flag of Islâm, and sworn to have their heads posted over the city-gates by nightfall, they mounted their horses to receive the visit. Presently the advanced guard, a body of more than 500 men, were perceived marching up the road. Watson's party immediately charged. Fourteen of the assailants were slain; the rest fled in every direction, and their stragglers fell into the hands of the villagers by the wayside, who stripped them to the skin. The names of Watson's intrepid comrades are given in the note,* for such a deed ought to be fully recorded. Outram was son of the famous Sir James, whom he succeeded in the baronetcy.

Marsh and Tandy were doomed men. The former, a most promising young officer, was shot in a subsequent skirmish. On the same occasion, Tandy, reckless, as Irishmen of good birth are apt to be at the sight of combat, jumped his horse over the wall of an orchard crowded with fanatics, by whom he was immediately cut to pieces. Saunders—an equally fearless man—lived for many years after; and most, if not all, of the others still (1888) survive to look back, as on a dream, to those stirring times.

* A. Cocks, C.S., Outram, C.S., Ensign Ollivant, Ensign Marsh, Messrs. P. Saunders, J. O'B. Tandy, H. B. Harrington, Hind, Castle, and Burkinshaw, Stewart Clark, M.D.

It is unnecessary to dwell for the present on events in these outlying districts. Early in July Watson and Thornhill were both driven from their districts and forced to take refuge in the fort of Agra, to which place our scene now changes.

VI.

Agra, at the time of the outbreak, was the official capital of the province of Hindustan proper, or "North-West Provinces," to use the technical term. Here were stationed the Lieutenant-Governor, at that time the Hon. John Russell Colvin, a man of signal ability; the Chief, or "Sudder," Court of Judicature; the Board of Revenue; and the head-quarters of the several departments of the public service. The garrison comprised a battery of Horse Artillery, a newly-raised battalion of Foot—the Company's 3rd European Regiment—and the 44th and 67th Native Infantry. This force was commanded by Brigadier Polwhele, and the chief civil officer of the district was the Hon. Robert Drummond (brother of Viscount Strathallan). The population consisted of about 150,000 souls, of which over 2,000 were Christians.

On learning the news of the mutiny at Muttra, Mr. Drummond, a man of strong character, at once promised the sanction of the Government to the disarming of the sepoy regiments. This was effected on the morning of the 31st May without bloodshed, and the men dispersed "on leave of absence." This step was followed by the enrolment of the Christians capable of bearing arms; expeditions were sent in the direction of the Bhurtpore frontier, and order was maintained, *tant bien que mal*, for about a fortnight. On the 15th June the force stationed at Sindhia's capital, under the designation of "the Gwalior Contingent," mutinied, and the example was followed by the detachment of that force which had been hitherto serving in the Agra district. Soon after came news of the mutinies at Nasirabad and Nimach, and of the approach of a strong body of the mutineers from those places. According to the invariable practice, these men were to join the great gathering at Dehli; but, encouraged by sympathisers at Agra, they had resolved to make a slight deviation in order to capture and kill the English at Agra on their way. This would be a good feather to wear in their caps as they presented themselves before the King, besides gratifying the instincts for slaughter and loot, which were just then very active in sepoy bosoms. Their hopes, however, were destined to be disappointed.

The encounter between the mutineers and the defenders of

Agra has been described in the histories of the period (notably in Malleson's *Indian Mutiny*), and has no special claim to be noticed here, but for two reasons. One is that, though successful in so far that the mutineers were repulsed from Agra, it was attended by disasters; the other that, while not remarkable as a specimen of military skill, it was signalised by much dash and heroism on the part of men usually falling under the title of "non-combatants."

The enemy were met at Sucheta, being computed at 2,000 foot, 600 horse, and ten field-pieces. To these the Agra garrison could only oppose 600 bayonets, thirty-three mounted volunteers, and six Horse Artillery guns. Still, Englishmen in India had often been victorious over far greater odds than that; and the Brigadier was quite justified in assuming the offensive. Of the action that ensued it need only be here observed that every conceivable advantage was thrown away. With the exception of a charge by Major Prendergast, who lost twelve out of his eighteen civilian troopers, the British were demoralised by being kept back till their guns became useless by the explosion of their tumbrils and the death of their officer, the gallant Captain D'Oyley; and the troops had to be eventually retired from the field, and escorted into their quarters in the fort by the volunteer infantry left behind as a reserve. Two officers and thirty-nine men were killed, and ninety-nine of all ranks wounded. But the enemy had also suffered, and they turned from their vainglorious purpose and went their way to Dehli, *re infectâ*.

It is no doubt to be regretted that a bolder front was not at once assumed. But the Council was distracted. Over 5,000 persons were now crowded into the narrow limits of the fort, which became a scene of the utmost confusion. "Loose horses were fighting and galloping about; artillery-cattle lying wounded and dying with thirst; drunken soldiers bivouacking in the rain." From the ramparts a circle of fire was seen, denoting the destruction of the European habitations. It was not till the third day that, on urgent invitation from well-wishers in the city, the local authorities were permitted to emerge from this dismal shelter. An armed demonstration was carried through the city on the 8th July, and "from this moment," says the author of the District Narrative, "rapine, murder, and outrage ceased." It was not too soon. During the three days and nights of inactivity no less than seventeen men, women, and children of European blood had been gratuitously and brutally

murdered by the police and other rascaldom of the native quarters.

The writer hopes that he will not be charged with *esprit de corps* of an unjust sort if he invites the observation that these calamities were in no degree due to the civil officers. Drummond, though his policy in some respects incurred grave disapproval, had energy enough and to spare. March-Phillipps and Oldfield* charged like Paladins with Prendergast—the only thing bold that was done in the battle of Sucheta. Mr. E. A. Reade, senior member of the Revenue Board, was conspicuous wherever calm courage and sagacity could be of use.

On the 10th July Mr. Drummond was removed with promotion (at that time nominal) to the post of Civil and Sessions Judge at Banda, a district then in full revolt. Mr. March-Phillipps succeeded him in charge of the Agra district. A council of the leading native citizens was convened by Mr. Reade, and the place of the regular police—who had utterly betrayed their trust—was taken by the heads of the various *Mohalas*, or wards, of the city, under the control of a trustworthy *Kotwál* named Rájá Rám. It is very noteworthy that **this officer**, who was appointed on the recommendation of the **headmen of the native community**, proved in every way faithful and efficient: for we have here a specimen of the elective system tried probably for the first time in India, and certainly under the most searching conditions.

But, if the state of Agra itself had become reassuring, far otherwise were the feelings caused by a survey of the district at large. The inaction that followed immediately on the battle of Sucheta had given the signal for universal anarchy, of which the first symptom was an almost simultaneous attack upon all the outposts where authority was represented in the district. Some of the native officials joined the mutineers, others retired to their homes in distant places; those who remained and tried to do their duty were hard pressed and, generally speaking, driven away. In one case—the sub-collector having fled—the very landholder whom he professed to fear took charge of the office, and protected the records, and the town itself, until the troubles came to an end. So various are the workings of human nature!

The first efforts of the British authorities were directed to Fatihpur-Sikri, the old country palace of the Mughal emperors, about twenty miles west of Agra, where a strong party of rebels

* Shot through the lungs, this officer recovered, and is now (1885) the Hon. Mr. Justice Oldfield, Puisne Judge of the High Court, N.W.P.

had established themselves. The old town is steep and narrow, while the palace buildings are massively built of stone, on the top of a rock a mile and a half long, standing in a walled park. Decently defended, they might have afforded a stubborn resistance; and it was but a slender column that Agra could spare for their reduction. A body of fifty British bayonets and thirty mounted volunteers, under the command of Captain Patton, accompanied Mr. Phillipps to Fatilpur on the 29th of July. They were attacked in the narrow streets of the town by a strong force of Mewátis, a tribe of predatory Muslims, who at first drove them out. Being reinforced in the open, the magistrate and his men charged, killing fourteen of the enemy, and capturing two prisoners, who were afterwards tried and executed. The Mewátis evacuated the palace, in which Government offices were at once established. On the 10th August, a similar expedition was sent to Itmádpur, under the joint magistrate, Mr. W. H. Lowe, and order was restored there. Shortly after, the eastern border towards Mainpuri—a revolted district—was settled; and here, also, the offices were re-opened; while, on the north, matters were restored about the same time by the influence of a loyal native nobleman, the Raja of Awa-Misa. Greater difficulty was experienced in the parts to the south-east, which were too remote to be dealt with by the dwindling garrison of Agra Fort; but here again aid was obtained from a powerful clan of Rajputs, whose chief, though not himself a man of much force of character, was kept straight by a well-disposed councillor. So wore on the month of August, during which the Christian inhabitants of Agra, many of them women and children, accustomed to every comfort when they were not sent to the hills for the summer, were exposed to the ills of climate in the most extreme form. In close rooms, or in tents under broiling heat and pelting rain, the ladies bravely bore their parts, tending the sick and wounded, and winning the respect of all.

After the middle of September, disturbances were resumed by fugitives from Dehli. Some made their way across the Jumna to Rohilkand; others, under Prince Firoz,* assembled at Dhaulpur, about half-way between Gwalior and Agra; and finally, about the beginning of October, advanced to attack the fort. Before they could carry out their purpose, however, Colonel E. Greathed, of the 8th Foot, had arrived at Hâthras

* Afterwards transiently troublesome in Etáwa and elsewhere; ultimately believed to have retired to Mecca.

with a British column of all arms. Towards this officer the eyes of the British at Agra were now anxiously turned; and on the 9th October the best information available was sent to him, in pursuance of which he hastened on. He arrived in the nick of time. On the morning of the 10th, Greathed crossed the bridge of boats, and proceeded with his column to the brigade parade-ground, south of the fort, at the very instant that the Prince's columns, in entire ignorance of his arrival, were approaching from Dhaulpur. The collision was short, sharp, and decisive. "Such was the promptitude with which the different arms formed into position, that the artillery of the right flank replied to the fourth gun of the enemy." The battery was charged, and taken, by twenty-five of the 9th Lancers, under Captain Green, who unhappily was killed in the *mêlée*; the rebels soon took to flight, and were pursued for eight miles. They lost 1,000 men, in killed alone; the British loss amounting to eleven killed and fifty-four wounded, four of whom were officers. This is a military incident which will be found fully described in the standard histories; it has been only referred to here because a certain amount of blame has been sometimes thrown upon the civil officers, on account of their not furnishing Greathed with closer details of the enemy's movements. The evidence recorded in Mr. Phillipps' narrative shows that they gave all information that it was in their power to obtain, and that the surprise was perfectly unavoidable.

It remains to add that Rájá Rám, the new Kotwál, kept the city quiet during these events, and made public proclamation of the result of the battle as soon as he became aware of it. From that moment no further disturbance took place in the city, and the reorganisation of the district began to assume the character of "a question of time."

VII.

The remaining events in Agra, and the adjacent districts of Aligarh and Muttra, may be briefly disposed of. Mention has been made of the defensible position of the old palace of Fatihpur-Sikri, so familiar to sight-seers. A body of mutineers from Dehli was harboured there by the Mewátis, already mentioned as giving trouble in the same locality; and an expedition went to dislodge them towards the end of October. Colonel Cotton commanded, and carried the place by storm, after a severe resistance in which the defenders lost eighty of their number. The column then moved on in the direction of Muttra, putting down recalcitrant landholders, and restoring

the local officers and establishments. On the 27th of November, Mr. Phillipps took out a small force into the ravines of the Jumna on the opposite (eastern) direction, where forty-five policemen had been massacred in one night while engaged in an inquiry. Mr. Phillipps was only partially successful in this demonstration, as his force was recalled to the city before its full purpose had been attained. The city had been, by this time, surrounded by a wall; but no precautions appear to have given complete satisfaction. The ultimate result of the revolt, for Agra, was that the seat of government was removed to the less central, but more strategic, region of Allahabad, where it has continued ever since.

In the meanwhile, the districts of Aligarh and Muttra were gradually cooling down. After the battle of Sucheta had somewhat ceased to depress the military spirit at Agra, a small force under Major Montgomery was sent out, to which Mr. Cocks, C.S., was attached as Special Commissioner. The very presence of this little force produced a healthy effect on public opinion, "showing them," as Mr. Bramly naively puts it, "how vastly inferior they were to the men they were attempting to crush." On the 10th August, Montgomery marched towards Hathras, which was threatened by Ghaus Mohamad, a deputy of Walidad the "Subah" of Malagarh. The traders of Hathras, inspired by the example of a blind pensioner, named Chaubé Gansiam Das (who was afterwards killed), exhibited a bold front; and Mr. Cocks, having occupied the place, assumed the offensive, and marched out to attack the enemy, assembled near the town of Koil. A fight ensued, in which the enemy were defeated and put to flight, with the loss of their "Maulvi," or spiritual guide. But the fall of Dehli in September brought back the elements of disorder, for a time at least; and Major Montgomery had to fall back on Agra before the tide of maddened mutineers pouring out from the rebel stronghold. After the defeat of Prince Firoz by Greathed, on the 10th October, Mr. Cocks returned to Aligarh, bringing with him Mr. Bramly, who had succeeded the gallant Watson in the office of district magistrate.* These officers were accompanied by a force of 150 British bayonets and 100 stout Sikhs. The old fort of Aligarh was cleaned out, and utilised as a barrack; the city was held by a Jat chief, with

* It is curious that Watson, Saunders, and Tandy had all rebel blood in their own veins: the first from Colclough of Wexford, the second and third from Napper Tandy.

a strong force of constables; and the collection of the revenue began to proceed in the usual course.

The condition of the Muttra district was for awhile less satisfactory. The country-side was overrun by mutineers; and although Mr. Thornhill's plan of administering through the local chiefs was partially successful, there were many parts which continued more or less lawless throughout the entire period of his absence at Agra. On the 5th October, however, he returned to the district, making his temporary head-quarters at Saidábád, and there taking prisoner a ringleader, who was promptly hanged. On the 1st November he got back to Muttra, under convoy of Colonel Cotton's column above mentioned, and availed himself of its aid to punish some refractory villages. The restoration of order speedily ensued.

At the same time, Mr. Phillipps was doing what he could in the Agra district, while Mr. Bramly was similarly employed in that of Aligarh. Large bodies of mutinous troops continued to cross into Rohilkand, or march distractedly back. These were occasionally caught and chastised by flying columns—a state of things which was somewhat exciting, and delayed the calming of the public mind necessary for the complete resumption of peaceful life. At length, in March 1858, a strong column marched down under Major-General Penny, commanding the division*; and no further incidents are recorded in regard to this portion of the Dűáb.

Of the behaviour of the native population during this period, Mr. Bramly observes that it was generally "apathetic." A number of ex-landholders resumed estates from which they had been dispossessed in course of law; "that the people plundered when they suddenly found authority overthrown by the mutinous troops, and anarchy ready-made, was natural." But on the whole, here, as in most other places, the attitude was that of expectation, and order was restored as soon as the elements of disorder disappeared. Nevertheless, it is easy to see that the civilians in all three districts had arduous tasks set before them. It is hard to say which were the most tried: the officers of Muttra and Aligarh, left to their own resources among hordes of semi-barbarians tempted in every evil way; or those of Agra, controlled by superior authority, and hampered, to a considerable extent, by military inefficiency.

* This officer was soon after killed by an ambuscade in the Aligarh district, his death being instantly revenged.

Mounted Rifles.

By LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CHARLES FORD.

HAVING, in a previous paper, stated some of the reasons which appear to me to render advisable the constitution of a permanent force of mounted riflemen, I will now proceed to consider as briefly as possible the organisation, equipment, drill, &c., which would seem best adapted to such a corps. It is scarcely necessary for me to disclaim any pretensions to finality in this scheme; it simply suggests the lines on which, I believe, the organisation of a corps of mounted rifles should be proceeded with.

I propose to divide the subject into various heads, and to consider each in detail.

These heads are as follows :—

- a. Strength and organisation of the regiment.
- b. Officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and men.
- c. Horses.
- d. Dress.
- e. Saddlery, and kit to be carried in marching order.
- f. Arms.
- g. Drill (1. Mounted. 2. Dismounted).
- h. Musketry instruction.
- i. General remarks.

a.—STRENGTH AND ORGANISATION.

HAVING in view the fact that when the regiment is dismounted for action a considerable deduction from its fighting strength must unavoidably be made, not only for horse-holders, but also for a sufficient guard to protect them and the led horses, it would appear desirable to fix the strength at a considerably higher figure than that of an ordinary cavalry regiment, in order that, when acting on foot, it might present proportions approach-

ing those of an average battalion of infantry. I would, therefore, in the first place, fix the number of troop-horses at 800; in which case, keeping the establishment of staff and employed non-commissioned officers and men (*i.e.* such as would be unavailable for duty in the ranks of the squadrons), as low as possible consistent with efficiency, I would suggest 969 as the establishment of all ranks.

Of this number 25 should be officers, *viz.* 2 lieutenant-colonels, 4 majors, 4 captains, 12 lieutenants, 1 adjutant (a lieutenant or captain), 1 quarter-master, and 1 riding-master.

Of these, the majors, captains, and lieutenants would be squadron officers, the rest regimental staff.

One warrant officer, and 31 non-commissioned officers and men, would complete the number of regimental staff as follows:—

One sergeant-major (warrant officer), 1 quartermaster-sergeant, 1 farrier-major, 1 trumpet-major, 1 sergeant rough rider, 1 saddler-sergeant, 1 paymaster-sergeant, 1 orderly-room sergeant, 2 orderly-room clerks, 1 master tailor, and 21 privates as servants and *bâtmen* (*viz.* 3 for each lieutenant-colonel, 2 for each of the other staff-officers, and 1 for each warrant and non-commissioned officer, with the exception of the two orderly-room clerks who would be below the rank of sergeant). Six of the above (*i.e.* from the sergeant-major to the saddler-sergeant inclusive) would be mounted men. Consequently, 6 horses for them must be deducted from the effective of the squadrons.

We thus have 912 non-commissioned officers and men and 794 horses left to form the squadrons.

The regiment to be divided into four squadrons; each squadron to be commanded by a major, assisted by a captain, and to consist of three divisions, each commanded by a lieutenant.

We have, therefore, a uniform strength of 228 non-commissioned officers and men to each squadron, whilst two of them would have 198 horses each, and the other two 199 each.

The squadron staff (exclusive of officers) would consist of 1 squadron sergeant-major, 1 squadron quartermaster-sergeant, 1 farrier-sergeant, 2 trumpeters, and 3 privates as *bâtmen* to non-commissioned officers—in all 8 non-commissioned officers and men, and 5 horses, as the sergeant-major, quartermaster-sergeant, farrier, and trumpeters are mounted men.

We must also allow 10 privates as servants to the 5 squadron officers, making a total of 18 non-commissioned officers and men, and 5 horses to be deducted from the ranks of the three divisions.

(N.B. Of course, every officer, non-commissioned officer, man, and horse in a squadron would be shown on the strength of one or other of the divisions, and even on one or other of the sub-divisions of that division, for pay, rations, &c.; but this analysis is intended to show in detail the unavoidable deductions which render a large excess in the number of men over that of horses absolutely necessary, this being a point on which, I believe, not only civilians but many officers of the dismounted services, to be profoundly ignorant). This gives us 210 non-commissioned officers and men, and from 193 to 194 horses available to form three divisions of the squadron. Each division, therefore, would contain 70 non-commissioned officers and men, and either 64 or 65 horses.

In two of the squadrons, therefore, two divisions would have 65 horses each, and one division 64 horses; whilst in the other two the proportions would be reversed, two divisions having 64 each, and one 65.

Each division to consist of two subdivisions, each under a sergeant, and to be composed as follows.

In a division numbering 65 horses:—

1st Sub-division.—1 sergeant, 1 corporal, 1 lance-corporal, One shoeing smith, 1 private as bătman to sergeant, 31 privates, and 33 horses, leaving 2 spare men. *i.e.* privates not told off to any particular horse, but available to take the place of men in hospital, on guard, &c.

2nd Sub-division.—1 sergeant, 1 corporal, 1 lance-corporal, 1 saddler, 1 bătman to sergeant, 29 privates, and 32 horses; leaving 1 spare man.

In a division numbering 64 horses:—

1st Sub-division.—1 sergeant, 1 corporal, 1 lance-corporal, 1 shoeing smith, 1 bătman, 30 privates, and 32 horses; leaving 2 spare men.

2nd Sub-division.—1 sergeant, 1 corporal, 1 lance-corporal, 1 saddler, 1 bătman, 30 privates, and 32 horses; leaving 2 spare men.

It will be seen from the foregoing that there would be 3 spare men in each of the 65 horse divisions, and 4 in each of the 64 horse ones, so that two of the squadrons would have 10, and the others 11, spare men each. (N.B. Sergeants, or non-commissioned officers actually in charge of sub-divisions, would not groom their own horses, the private detailed as bătman performing that duty; all others groom their own horses when not

etailed for other duties.) I think no officer who has served in a mounted corps will consider the above too liberal an allowance of men, in proportion to horses; at the same time, judging by my own experience, I believe it to be sufficient if a good system be properly worked.

To summarise the foregoing—We have a regiment, numbering 969 of all ranks, with 800 troop-horses; organised in four squadrons, each consisting of three divisions, and each division of two sub-divisions. The sub-division is commanded by a sergeant: the division by a lieutenant; the squadron by a major, assisted by a captain: the regiment by a lieutenant-colonel commanding, assisted by a 2nd lieutenant-colonel, who would always be available to command a wing, either on detachment or in the field, and whose functions would, in fact, be the same as those of the one major formerly allotted to cavalry regiments on home service.

Each squadron would be a complete unit, not only tactically, but also as regards administration and interior economy, the squadron quartermaster-sergeant being also pay-sergeant; thus, moreover, avoiding the great disadvantages consequent on making pay-sergeants of troop sergeant-majors and colour-sergeants, which prevents their bestowing their whole energies on their disciplinary duties.

It will also be seen that the total mounted strength of squadrons, not including officers, staff-sergeants, farriers, or trumpeters, would be either 193 or 194, so that, putting 3 sergeants per squadron (1 per division) into the serrefile rank, we may say broadly that the *full* strength of rank and file would be 190 per squadron, or 760 for the entire regiment; and, making deductions for casualties, we may put the squadrons on parade at an average strength of 180 rank and file, or a total of 720 for the regiment.

It will no doubt be observed that, amongst the regimental staff, I have made no mention of musketry instructors. I have purposely omitted them, as I should propose that the whole of the musketry instruction be carried out by and under the squadron officers and non-commissioned officers.

I have also, whilst placing a farrier-sergeant among the squadron staff, included the saddlers in the rank and file of the divisions. My reason for this is, that not only is the farrier's daily routine work more constant and important than the saddler's, but that there is far more need for the supervision of a reliable non-commissioned officer in the matter of shoeing

horses than in that of repairs and alterations of saddlery, &c. The farrier's duties also include a considerable proportion of veterinary surgery, and involve the immediate custody of and responsibility for a considerable stock of valuable drugs.

I have taken no account of either medical or veterinary officers, as, in the present day, it appears quite impossible to foresee what may be the ultimate arrangement as to the connection of officers of these departments with regiments.

I have purposely made no mention of lance-sergeants, as, since recent provisions have rendered lance and acting rank permanent, it has always struck me that a most unnecessary and undesirable complication of ranks has been caused thereby; and the formation of a new corps appears a favourable opportunity for a new departure in the classification of the non-commissioned ranks.

Of course, there should be such a proportion of provisional, or acting, lance-corporals as to ensure the presence of a sufficient number of non-commissioned officers to carry out effectively all their many and important duties.

b.—OFFICERS, WARRANT OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS
AND MEN.

Of all points connected with raising the regiment, none would be of such vital importance as the selection of officers, and none would be attended with equal difficulties. As regards the junior ranks, comparatively little trouble need arise, as there are undoubtedly many of the younger officers, in the various arms of the service, admirably fitted in almost all respects to serve with such a corps; but, when we come to the higher ranks, we are confronted with the difficulty arising from the fact that, in the vast majority of cases, a considerable number of years passed in any one branch of the service tends to engender prejudices, and habits, both of mind and body, which are hard to overcome; while each succeeding year increases this difficulty. In other words, though there is no great obstacle to a lieutenant or young captain of infantry becoming a thoroughly efficient cavalry officer, or *vice versa*, but few majors, and fewer lieutenant-colonels of cavalry, could be expected to fill with success the corresponding ranks in an infantry regiment; whilst the number of infantry officers of those grades capable of acquiring, in any reasonable time, real fitness for the equivalent positions in a cavalry regiment, might probably be counted on the fingers of one hand.

Whilst, then, the captains and subalterns for the new corps might be readily obtained by careful selection from the numerous list of volunteers, which would undoubtedly fill from all arms of the service, the selection of the lieutenant-colonels and majors would need the utmost care. I am far, however, from suggesting that it need prove insuperable.

As, by the adoption of the squadron system in its entirety, much of the detail of interior economy, which in cavalry regiments is now administered by the lieutenant-colonel commanding, would be transferred to the majors commanding squadrons, peculiar care in their selection would be needed.

My suggestion is as follows:—Call for volunteers from among the majors of cavalry and of horse and field artillery. Make the selection, from the list thus obtained, with scrupulous attention to the fitness, both mental and physical, of the applicants. Put those selected through a course of drill with an infantry regiment specially chosen for its smartness in the field; and, further, send any who may have come from the artillery through a course of musketry instruction.

Surely four officers, from amongst the many of the required grade in the mounted branches of Her Majesty's service, could be found who would fulfil all requirements.

As concerns the two lieutenant-colonels, it would almost seem that there is at present a list from which to select. Several officers whose army rank quite entitles them to be considered eligible, have recently served with this very arm in Africa; and one, at least, of them, having served some years in the infantry, is now and has long been in a distinguished cavalry regiment; whilst another raised and commanded on active service the most considerable body of mounted infantry which, I believe, we have as yet put into the field.

Surely, from among these officers, besides the long list of lieutenant-colonels and senior majors of cavalry, it would not be impossible to find two fitted in all respects for the posts of first and second in command of the new regiment.

In selecting non-commissioned officers, I should be disposed to rely mainly on the cavalry, as non-commissioned officers of infantry, however zealous and efficient, could not possess that knowledge of details in the care and management of horses, under all conditions, which is one of the most important requisites for a non-commissioned officer in any mounted corps, but which most of those who have written on this subject appear calmly to ignore, being apparently disposed to adopt,

with that noble animal the horse, the well-known principle attributed by *Punch's* "hostler" to the fair sex: "Dam'me! 'e's a 'orse and 'e must go!" I would, at the same time, suggest the advisability of selecting some, at least, of those non-commissioned officers who have recently served with mounted infantry, as their long and intimate acquaintance with the minutiae of infantry drill would doubtless prove most valuable in the early days of the regiment.

The non-commissioned officers coming from cavalry should be put through a careful course of instruction with the infantry rifle, and should also be attached to infantry for a course of drill, as suggested for the majors.

The selection of the regimental sergeant-major might well be left to the lieutenant-colonel commanding; and, indeed, many of the officers would doubtless be able to render valuable aid in the selection of non-commissioned officers.

The men, saving only such as might volunteer from amongst those who have recently served in mounted infantry, should be selected entirely from volunteers from the cavalry. As Lieutenant Hamilton, 14th Hussars, in his able paper entitled "Mounted Marksmen," points out, but little extra instruction is needed to make a cavalry soldier an efficient infantryman, whereas months of constant and severe work would be needed to make an average foot-soldier a really efficient horseman.

Volunteering for the regiment should be confined to men of good character, of not less than three years' service, and it would be well if it were specially arranged that they should complete the whole of their first period of service with the regiment instead of passing into the reserve; being, moreover, given the right to re-engage to complete twenty-one years' service, at the termination of their first period, or after serving two years in the mounted rifles; provided always that they still bore a good character.

They should be from 5 ft. 6 in. to 5 ft. 9 in. in height, and not over 11 st. 7 lbs. in weight when in ordinary fatigue dress. There is no doubt that a man from 5 ft. 7 in. to 5 ft. 8 in. in height, with a good chest measurement, and rather long-limbed in proportion to his size, is about the best average for all round work both in and out of the saddle.

The corps once raised, it should be kept up by recruiting, not by volunteering from other regiments.

To revert once more to the officers. The adjutant and the quartermaster should certainly come from the cavalry, as would,

of course, the riding-master ; but it cannot be too strongly emphasised that, under the squadron system, the first of these must be simply a staff-officer to the lieutenant-colonel commanding, and not have power to interfere between squadron commanding officers and their men. The same principle applies in a modified degree to the riding-master.

No doubt objections will be urged against the above development of the squadron system ; but I can only point to the fact that its counterpart has existed for about a century in the Royal Horse Artillery, and for many years in the field batteries, and, whatever may be the past or present faults in the organisation of the Royal Regiment of Artillery as a whole, I may be pardoned for saying that but little has ever been alleged against the battery system or its results.

c.—HORSES.

In first forming the regiment, it would be advisable to obtain a considerable number of the horses, say one half, by drafts from the cavalry, in order that there might be from the very first a sufficient number of trained horses to enable the requisite drills to be carried on ; but I should be in favour, even at the commencement, of purchasing the remainder specially for the regiment.

As the dead weight carried would, as will presently appear, be much less than at present borne by cavalry troop-horses, and in consideration also of certain differences in the style of work to be demanded of the animal, I would lower the standard of height, making it not less than 15 hands or more than 15 hands 2 in., instead of from 15 hands 2 in. upwards, as is the present rule for cavalry.

At first sight this may seem likely to result in undermounting the men ; but there is a class of horse by no means uncommon, especially in Ireland, compact, active, and, above all, *well bred*, running commonly from 15 hands to about 15 hands 1 in., and which usually commands a considerably lower price in the market than many a really less serviceable animal standing a couple of inches higher.

Now, as long as you have great lumbering 16-hand animals in the ranks, it would be impossible to mix with them these small compact horses ; the sizing would be almost an impossibility ; but if your tallest horse is not over 15 hands 2 in., this difficulty disappears. I must here remark that sizing horses in the ranks is not the mere matter of appearance which the

uninitiated might suppose, a small horse being more liable to be lifted off his legs by the pressure from either side which will sometimes occur in executing movements at a rapid pace. As to the mere ability of horses of this stamp to carry their riders' weight, let me quote the words of the late Whyte Melville:—"Ask any celebrated 'welter' to name the best horse he ever had, he is sure to answer 'Oh! little So-and-so; he wasn't up to my weight, but he carried me better than anything else in the stable.'" There is no doubt that we are apt to confound mere height with weight-carrying power, and, moreover, we should lay to heart the old maxim that though "a good big 'un is better than a good little 'un," there are many more of the latter class than of the former.

While on the subject of horses, I would suggest that less of the *manège*, and more instruction in negotiating natural fences, would seem advantageous. I am far from undervaluing school breaking as a means of handyng horses; indeed, the best hunter I ever crossed was a perfectly broken charger; but I am sure that with the average troop-horse we *rather over-do* the *manège*, and *decidedly under-do* instruction in fencing and in working alone. How many troop-horses are there which are pleasant or handy mounts if taken away from the ranks?

d.—DRESS.

Before entering into details on this head, I must crave the indulgence of the reader for a few generalities.

There is a school of military reformers whose disciples express utter and unbounded contempt for appearance in military costume. Now, whilst warmly admiring the mental altitude attained by these gentlemen, I fear that their ideas on this point would, if carried out, produce a most unfortunate effect on the morale of the British soldier, and would, moreover, render still more difficult the already somewhat trying task allotted to the Inspector-General of Recruiting, of proving in his annual report that a deficiency of recruits tends, rather than otherwise, to demonstrate the extreme popularity of the profession of arms amongst the working classes.

The simple fact is that we have for many years been striving after the unattainable, in that we have been ever attempting to devise a dress for our army equally adapted to the frigid, the temperate, or the torrid zone, and equally appropriate for a royal levée or the vicissitudes of a campaign. The perhaps not unnatural result has been that it is, as a rule, *just about equally*

fit (or unfit) for all these varied circumstances. Now, do we attempt anything of this sort in private life? English gentlemen are generally allowed to be, all round, about the best dressed men of the age: does any one of them, in his most Utopian dreams, contemplate the possibility of a costume which he would don with equal confidence were he about to start for a day's snipe-shooting over an Irish bog, or an afternoon stroll in the Park, for a day with the Quorn, or a ball at the Duchess of Stilton's? To go to a lower grade in society, that from which ought to come some of our best recruits—does not the respectable working-man, who through the week wears fustian, corduroy, or moleskin trowsers, a rough, serviceable coat (when he sports one at all), a cap, and hobnailed highlows—does not he, on Sundays, don broadcloth, elastic-sided boots, and a chimney-pot? I do not assert that the noble British workman always looks better in his Sunday kit than in his working habiliments; but it is an outward and visible sign of respectability, he values it as such, and should he see the soldier taking his walks abroad in a dress obviously intended for work, not show, he would at once form a very mean opinion of the trade.

I humbly suggest, then, that the army may, without shame, follow the usual custom of other branches of society, and have a *working dress* and a *swagger dress*.

And now, to return to our mounted riflemen.

As a *working dress*, I should propose the following:—

Rifle-green, single-breasted patrol jacket, with five brass ball buttons, stand and fall collar similar to that of an artillery officer's patrol jacket, cloth shoulder-straps, with badge of the regiment in brass, and four pockets (two breast and two side). For warm weather, a false collar of the regimental facings (white) to button on inside collar of jacket (as in artillery pattern); and for cold weather, a sleeved cloth waistcoat, with standing white collar, to be worn under the jacket.

Pantaloon of same colour as jacket, and without any stripe, to button up to knee like hunting-breeches.

Field boots and jack spurs of the universal pattern.

Helmet, universal pattern, green cloth, with plain bronze plate showing regimental badge, button on top, and plain black leather chin-strap.

As full dress, to be worn in review order, &c:—

The same helmet, but with yellow metal badge-plate, yellow metal spike, and white horsehair plume, and brass chin scale.

Jacket, of same cut as undress, but embroidered in yellow braid in same pattern as an infantry officer's patrol jacket.

Pantaloon, same pattern as undress, but with double white stripe similar to light cavalry.

Boots and spurs, same as undress.

There should also be a forage cap, of the pattern recently sanctioned for officers on service, which should be worn only when walking out, on fatigues, or night-guard.

Each man to have also a pair of trousers, with double-white stripe, to be worn only when walking out, or in full dress dismounted, with half wellingtons and heel spurs.

Gloves should be worn only in review order, and walking out.

The various dresses, and the occasions when worn, would then be as follows:—

Full dress.—On birthday of the Sovereign, and other State occasions.

Full dress, dismounted (*i.e.* with trousers instead of pantaloons and boots).—On church parades, officers' funerals, &c.

Undress.—In marching and drill order, and for all guards, unless mounted over royalty and vice-royalty.

Walking-out dress.—Consisting of forage cap, undress jacket, and trousers.

The men should also have a pair of ankle-boots for stables and fatigue duties, and a double-breasted, split-tailed great coat, and a long waterproof cape similar to officer's regulation pattern.

The undress of officers should, except in quality of material, exactly resemble the men's, and their full dress be also of the same cut and pattern, but embroidered in gold chain lace.

c.—SADDLERY, KIT TO BE CARRIED, &c.

As the reduction of the dead weight to be carried by the troop-horse is of vital importance, I would suggest the following:—

Saddle.—A wooden tree-saddle, but with iron arches, with small small fans in rear, pommel and cantle as low as consistent with safety to horse's back, general shape somewhat similar to the recently-sanctioned regulation staff saddle. No pannels, but to be worn with two thick felt numnahs (These would be alternately worn next the horse's back, thus decreasing the well-known difficulty of having a dry surface next the back on first saddling).

Wallets attached to front of saddle.

Namaqua gun-bucket attached in usual manner, in front on off side.

One shoe-pocket (to contain one pair *fore* shoes), on near ring of saddle.

Girths.—Open raw-hide.

Surcingle.—Usual pattern.

Breastplate.—Adapted to Namaqua gun-bucket.

No crupper.

Bridle and head-collar.—Universal pattern, but with bit considerably lighter than the universal pattern; the bridoon rein should have a simple arrangement of buckles at the middle, so that, if the order be given to link horses, the bridoon reins could be unbuckled and attached to the squares of the head collars of the horses on either side.

Marching order.—In cold weather the great coat to be carried rolled in rear of saddle, waterproof cape in front. In warm weather, no great coat, and waterproof cape carried in rear.

Near wallet.—1 woollen jersey, 1 pair of drawers, 1 pair of socks, hair brush and comb, 1 towel.

Off wallet.—Oil tin and rag, blacking tin, shoe-brushes, cloth-brush, curry-comb and brush, hard soap in tin case, small sponge, horse-rubber.

Havresack (rifle pattern).—Worn over right shoulder, hold all (with knife, fork, spoon, and scissors) carried in it.

Water-bottle.—Worn on right side, strap passing over left shoulder underneath ammunition belt.

Heel rope.—Rolled round picketing pegs, carried on near ring of saddle, over shoe-pocket.

Mess tin.—On top of great coat (or cape), in rear of saddle.

Head rope.—Attached to ring of head collar, and passed round horse's neck, as at present.

f.—ARMS.

Martini-Henry rifle.—Carried in Namaqua gun-bucket, nosling and swivels removed.

Sword-bayonet (rifle pattern).—Worn in "Sam Browne" belt, belt to be worn under jacket, and to be all web except the frog; frog to be of black leather, and of such length that the guard of the sword-bayonet just clears lower edge of jacket, leaving grip standing up outside.

Sword.—Ordinary cavalry pattern, but with modified guard, like that of sword-bayonet supplied with artillery pattern

Martini-Henry carbine; to be carried edge to rear, on off ring of saddle. Scabbard, wooden, covered with black leather and with steel mounts.

Ammunition.—Carried in Transvaal belt, (worn over left shoulder) of black leather. All four pockets of undress jacket to be fitted with pipes to carry extra ammunition if required, and to have waterproof flaps to button over in wet weather.

g.—DRILL.

1. *Mounted Drill.*—The system of mounted drill must be framed with the double object of permitting a sufficient proportion of the men to be dismounted for action, without too completely destroying the mobility of that portion remaining mounted in charge of the led horses, and of enabling the whole, or any portion of the regiment, to act effectively as cavalry.

To this end I propose the adoption of rank entire, and a return to the old drill by threes.

As to the first of these two points, its desirability has long been maintained by many of our best cavalry officers. It offers, amongst others, these great advantages: greater elasticity and facility in passing over rough ground, the absence of the danger of a rear-rank man and horse being put *hors de combat* by falling over their prostrate front rank, and the doubling of the front shown by any given number of men. On the other hand, no real increase of weight, and consequent momentum, is gained by cavalry in attacking in double rank, the conditions being quite different from those of infantry charging in line.

As concerns the question of threes *versus* fours, while far from denying the advantages of the latter system when drilling in double rank (such as the increased variations of front which it offers, in fours, sections, and half-sections, as against threes and sections only), I fail to see that, in rank entire, these advantages counterbalance its obvious disadvantages.

I would simply have the wheel, or wheel-about, of threes made on the flank, instead of on the centre, unless specially ordered, thereby doing away with the necessity of reining back.

Considering the system with reference to dismounting men for infantry work, the advantages of threes are obvious. I should assume that the normal system would be to dismount two-thirds of your men. In that case the centres of threes would be the horse-holders, and, as one man can easily manage two led horses, the usual mounted formation would not be interfered

with, and the regiment, or squadron, left nearly as mobile as if every man were in the saddle.

Thus, with a properly-proportioned escort, the horses would not be liable to be at any moment seized by a small body of the enemy's cavalry, and the commanding officer might devote his entire attention to his infantry attack, in the full confidence that his horses and horse-holders were safe.

To take an extreme case, when it was necessary to exercise the utmost care to prevent the possibility of such a mishap as that above alluded to. We may suppose that three squadrons would be ordered to dismount, leaving the 4th as guard. The order would be: "1st, 2nd, and 3rd squadrons—dismount for action." The commanders of the named squadrons would give the word — "squadron for action, prepare to dismount—dismount." The centres of threes would advance two horses' lengths, left of threes pass off to the right, sufficiently to get room to dismount, flanks of threes draw rifles and prepare to dismount.

At the word "Dismount," flanks of threes dismount, unbuckle their spurs, and place them in the near wallet, lead their horses up into their places, hand them over to centres of threes, and fall in either in front, or on a flank of the squadron, as may be ordered; right of threes forming the front rank, left of threes the rear rank. Majors, 1st and 2nd lieutenants join the dismounted party, captains and 3rd lieutenants remain in charge of horses; sergeant-majors, and the three sergeants in the serrefile rank dismount, their horses being held by the other non-commissioned officers in the serrefile rank, and squadron quartermaster-sergeants remain mounted to assist the captains and lieutenants in charge of horses.

The dismounted men of each squadron would then be told off as an infantry company, officers and non-commissioned officers taking their proper places—the majors as commanders, the two lieutenants as right and left guides, &c.

The battalion would then be formed in whatever manner might appear advisable, the 2nd lieutenant-colonel being either left in charge of the horses, or told off to command any portion of the dismounted force. In the latter case the senior captain would assume command of the horses.

Meanwhile the 4th squadron complete (i.e. about 180 rank and file) would operate in whatever manner might seem best for the security of the led horses and horse-holders, and, if necessary, to keep up the communication between them and the dismounted force.

The above example is, of course, one in which the disposable dismounted force is put at its lowest, and it gives a strength of 360 rank and file, in three strong companies, amply provided with officers and non-commissioned officers.


It seems hardly necessary to point out that in many (we may almost say most) cases a much smaller mounted guard would suffice—say, a division, or about 60 rank and file; whilst not unfrequently, by linking horses and leaving one man in charge of 6 horses, 150 or more rank and file might well be drawn from each of the first three squadrons, and 100 from the fourth.

In this case we should get three companies of 150 each, and one of 100, or a total strength of 550 men for our infantry battalion; the led horses being still by no means immobile, and being guarded by 60 rank and file, or nearly the equivalent of an average squadron of cavalry.

So much for the adaptation of the system of mounted drill to the object of furnishing an effective dismounted force without entirely crippling that portion remaining mounted.

As to the formation and system of drill best suited to enable the regiment to act as cavalry, I should suggest that, seeing the large front covered by 180 horses in rank entire, each squadron should be formed with intervals between the divisions equal to the present squadron intervals. The accompanying rough sketch shows the proposed formation of a single squadron in line.

FIG. 1.



Conventional Signs showing various ranks of Officers and Non-commissioned Officers.

⊕	Major.	○	Farrier.
⊕	Captain.	■	Sergeant.
⊕	Lieutenant.	⊞	Corporal.
⊕	Squadron Sargeant-Major.	□	Lance-Corporal.
⊕	Squadron Qtrmstr.-Sergeant.	⊙	Trumpeter.

The usual formation of the regiment for inspection, &c., might be in two lines, thus occupying only the same front as if it were formed in two ranks; and this formation would seem all the more reasonable inasmuch as the whole regiment would seldom, if ever, attack in line, but either in two lines or some sort of echelon.

A convenient and handy formation for manœuvre would be in double column of divisions from the centre (as shown in the accompanying sketch); a formation readily assumed, very elastic, as it admits of a rapid formation of either single or double line to the front or to either flank, and having, moreover, the merit of not occupying too large a space for commands being readily transmitted to squadron leaders.

In changes of position, or while halted, the quarter column would be, of course, employed as a rule; column (*i.e.* wheeling distance) being only used when an immediate wheel into line seemed likely to be required.

FIG. 2.

*Regiment formed in double quarter-column of divisions
from the centre.*

	1		3	
	2		2	
3rd Squadron	3		1	2nd Squadron
	1		3	
	2		2	
4th Squadron	3		1	1st Squadron

In the above sketch, the formation is shown as made from single line, but it would make no difference were it made from the double line, except that the 1st and 2nd squadrons would be in front and the 3rd and 4th in rear.

Formations to the front or either flank would be made with equal readiness, for I need hardly point out that, in this system of drill, not only may the position of squadrons be inverted or altered to any extent, but the divisions of each squadron may also be inverted without causing any confusion.

To enter further into the details of this subject is impossible

within the limits of this article ; but I hope I have said enough to indicate generally the system of drill I propose, and to show that it need be neither complicated, cumbersome, or insufficient.

2. *Dismounted Drill.*—On this head I would only observe that, whilst adhering to the infantry drill book, attention should be devoted mainly to essentials, such as the attack formation and simple line and column formations and movements, complicated manœuvres being both unnecessary and inadvisable for troops of this description.

h.—MUSKETRY INSTRUCTION.

I have already remarked that I propose that the musketry course be carried on entirely by and under squadron officers. When I add that an increased annual allowance of ammunition, and frequent practice in field firing, are eminently desirable, I have said as much as this space will permit.

i.—GENERAL REMARKS.

As expense is an element entering largely into the consideration of any scheme of military reform or reorganisation, I wish to point out that even if mounted rifles received, as I should suggest, a slightly higher rate of pay (say 2d. per diem) than cavalry of the line, the proposed regiment would not appear an expensive one if fairly contrasted with either a regiment of cavalry or a battalion of infantry. Its staff of officers and non-commissioned officers differs but slightly from that of either.

As compared with a cavalry regiment, it would present, roughly speaking, double its mounted strength, and a power and efficiency for dismounted work quite beyond anything attainable by cavalry as at present organised.

Compared with an infantry battalion, it shows a compact and effective battalion of, at least, respectable strength, possessing a mobility totally unattainable by ordinary foot-soldiers, and capable, in consequence, of performing outpost and scouting duties of a far more daring and extended nature, of surprising detached posts of the enemy, or of rapidly reinforcing threatened points held by its friends.

With reference to certain points of detail in the various sections of this article, I will make a few explanatory observations. I have made no mention of a band in section (a.) as its constitution appears to me a question for after consideration.

As to including majors of horse and field artillery in the list from which selections for the same rank might be made, I may remark that officers who have served long in the mounted branch of the Royal Artillery have perhaps had greater opportunities of studying the action, both independent and combined, of all the three arms than usually falls to the lot of either cavalry or infantry officers. They have, as a rule, acquired a good eye for ground from the constant necessity of selecting positions for their batteries, and of reaching them by the safest and most expeditious route; and, from the very nature of the duties of artillery in the field, they are, perhaps, less prone than many officers of the other arms to that vice (a tendency to manœuvre on too cramped a scale) alluded to in Lieutenant Hamilton's article. When one adds that they are already versed in the system of cavalry drill, and thoroughly at home in stable economy, I think enough has been said to show that no great incongruity would be involved in the possible selection of perhaps one of the four majors from the Royal Artillery.

I have mentioned a pair of *fore* shoes only amongst the articles carried in marching order, not only because they are much more liable to be wrenched off than hind ones, but also it is much more important that they should be promptly replaced. Spare hind shoes would be carried in the waggons (of which each squadron should have at least two), in which also additional articles of kit, camp equipage, &c. would be packed. If thought necessary, the farriers might carry a small number of hind shoes (say two or four pairs), either in churns, or in special pattern shoe-pockets.

Referring to those articles which I have detailed to be carried in the wallets, I would observe that, though it is absurd to encumber the soldier, or rather his horse, with a wardrobe almost extensive enough to meet the requirements of a gentleman staying for a week in a country house; it is, on the other hand, desirable that a man should have a change of under-clothing always readily available, even if he is separated from the baggage-waggons. Jackets and pantaloons can often be dried with tolerable ease; but it is different with the guernsey, or shirt, or drawers. The man simply does not take them off (even if he has the chance) and sit in his pelt while they dry, but goes on getting them wet and letting them dry (more or less) on his body, and rheumatism and fevers are the results.

I have often been struck by the fact that nearly everyone who writes on the field-kit of the soldier gives him a comb, but no hair-

brush. Now, I confess that my own experience of roughing it leads me to the conclusion that a man with his hair close clipped scarcely needs the comb, however thick his thatch, but stands decidedly in need of the brush. I have therefore included the hair-brush, and, as the comb neither weighs heavy, or takes up much room, I have thrown it in also.

Concerning those articles detailed for the off-wallet, I consider them all so necessary for the care and preservation of the horse and his appointments, and the man's arms and accoutrements, that I should be most unwilling to relegate any of them to the baggage-waggons.

I recommend a modified guard for the sword, as, when slung to the saddle, the present pattern would be dangerous to the horse in case of a fall to the off-side; and might, even under ordinary circumstances, be liable to establish a gall.

Officers who have served with mounted infantry seem generally to advocate the Namaqua gun-bucket in preference to any system of slinging at the back, and it would certainly seem unlikely that a man dismounting for action would forget his rifle, unless he happened to be in the condition of the well-known volunteer bandsman who had "lost the big drum."

Recent experience seems also to point decidedly to telling off by threes for dismounting, as, though the number of horses one man can manage varies with their freshness and many other causes, three appears to be generally regarded as the normal number advisable if the horses are to be called on to move whilst the dismounted men are in action.

In conclusion I will only say that one, and that perhaps not the least, of the advantages of the mounted drill being by threes, lies in the absence of any chance of confusion arising in the men's minds between two systems of drill by fours, differing so utterly as those in use by cavalry and infantry respectively.

Ladies' Eyes.

THOSE living jewels have a charm and worth
 Far above diamonds, if their magic light
 Springs from the soul, and flashes flawless might,
 More than cold crystal : let it have its birth
 In righteous anger or in childlike mirth ;
 Or melt in tenderness, until the sight
 Swoons into shadow like a summer night
Falling to moonset.

There is not on earth
 A truer antidote for aching care
 Than love that answers love in woman's gaze,
 When faithful eyes return a faithful smile
 To him alone for whom she 'd fain be fair ;
 Nor—in the brightness of our brightest days—
 A curse like woman's eyes that harbour guile.

H. E. K.

Ranjit Singh's Death and its Consequences.

A MONOGRAPH.

By GENERAL COURT.

[General Court was a French officer who had "made his proofs" in the Artillery under Napoleon. He had served throughout the Russian campaign, and had distinguished himself in those which immediately preceded the fall of the first empire. Finding no congenial employment under the Bourbons, Court proceeded to Persia, stayed long enough in that country to acquire the language, made his way thence, in companionship with Avitabile, to Láhor, and offered his services to Ranjít Singh. That very able sovereign granted the two adventurers an audience, questioned them thoroughly, and soon perceived that whilst Avitabile was fit only for civil employment, Court was a real soldier. He then and there conferred upon the latter (1823) the command of a regiment, promoted him very soon afterwards to a brigade, and finally placed a division of the Sikh army in his hands. Court was a very able soldier, and it was due to him and to Ventura that the Sikh army was brought to the state of efficiency which enabled it to fight so well at Fírúzshahar. Before that event had happened, Court had quitted it, to return, with a well-earned competency, to Europe. The paper which follows, written by General Court in 1841, and which describes the anarchy at Láhor following the death of the Lion of the Panjáb, came, some years back, into the hands of the Editor, who considers that its importance justifies its literal translation and its appearance in this Magazine.—Ed.]

On the death of Ranjít Singh, which took place shortly after his interview with Lord Auckland, the sceptre of this sovereign—who has a just title to be ranked amongst the illustrious men who rise in every age to accomplish great things—devolved peaceably upon his son, Karak Singh. The peaceful character of the succession was due mainly to two facts: the one that the English who, in the belief of the Sikhs, nourished their own designs upon the Punjáb, were completely occupied in Afghan-

istán : the other, that the Afgháns, who might otherwise have tried to recover Pesháwar, were controlled by the English.

Karak Singh, a man without energy, almost without an idea, feeling himself wholly incompetent to direct the affairs of the kingdom, entrusted the management of them to Dhaián Singh, who had been trained under and become a favourite of his father. If the direction in the hands of this man fell somewhat short of the vigour and firmness which had characterised it under his great master, it at all events maintained the established order of things. In a short space of time, however, Karak Singh placed himself in the power of a favourite, Ajít Singh, and it became the aim and object of this man to thwart the minister in every possible manner. The son of Karak Singh, Nao Nihál Singh, who was at the moment at the head of the entire Sikh army at Pesháwar to co-operate with the English, when informed of the state of affairs, urged by his own ambition, determined to remedy the evil. In his view, the most effectual remedy was virtually to supplant his father, and to gather all the power of the State into his own hands. He therefore set to work without delay to gain all the Sikh and French generals about him, men who had an interest equal to his own in the maintenance of a strong government in the Punjáb. Nao Nihál Singh, having been promised their support, proceeded to Láhor, entered suddenly the fort by night, slew all the guards who opposed him, snatched from the side of the monarch his favourite, Ajít Singh, and slew him and his *entourage* before his eyes. In this act Nao Nihál Singh was personally aided by Guláb Singh, elder brother of the minister.

Seizing the actual power, and leaving to his father only the empty shadow, Nao Nihál Singh notified his accession to the army. Whilst the high officers of this army welcomed the change itself, there were many amongst them who regretted the unnecessary violence with which it had been accompanied, and especially the affront to Karak Singh, for whom, in spite of his *idiocy*, they had, as son of Ranjít Singh, a certain sort of veneration. Generals Ventura and Court were the only generals who, on this occasion, refrained from any manifestation of opinion.

The firmness and energy of Nao Nihál Singh, and, above all, his desire to deserve the esteem of his subjects, soon restored the Panjáb to its pristine condition. His public acts were, indeed, marked by a tact which reminded the old nobles of the best days of his grandfather, and it was felt everywhere that in his hands the future of the Panjáb was assured. Gradually,

however, a secret feeling of hostility grew up between him and the family of his minister, Dhaián Singá. This minister and his brothers, lords of the mountain tract of Jamú, close to Káshmir, were men of great influence and ability ; and Nao Nihál Singh was brought to think by his trusted councillors, Rám Singh and Kochal Singh, that their destitution was necessary to the consolidation of his power. Dhaián Singh, well informed of this state of affairs, and believing that destitution would lead to destruction, resolved to strike the first blow, to uproot the dynasty of his benefactor in favour of his own family. From the time he conceived this idea the court of Láhor became the scene of intrigues and machinations of the lowest character.

The faction of which Dhaián Singh was the head, had the folly about this time to affront the English Government by refusing a passage across the Punjáb to a convoy intended for Afghánistán. The terms of refusal were so unmistakably hostile, that for a time a rupture seemed imminent. Ultimately, however, Dhaián Singh yielded to the British demand.

On the other hand, although the Prince was full of attention to his father, and saw him surrounded by comforts, the confidants of the latter induced him to protest against his son's usurpation, and even to claim the support of the English Government. This action on the part of Karak Singh caused his destruction ; for, to prevent the possibility of any such intervention, his enemies—if public rumour is to be believed—caused a slow poison to be administered to him. It is certainly a fact that from this date the Mahárájá, who had till then enjoyed excellent health, fell suddenly into a sort of decline ; and that in proportion as the English troops approached the frontier, his sickness increased. Before they had crossed it, he died.

The day of the Mahárájá's death was the day of the celebration of his funeral. At those funeral rites Nao Nihál Singh was present. But, as he was on his way to make the customary ablutions, the brick balustrade of the gateway of the fortress fell upon him and fractured his skull. Many persons of his suite, amongst them the eldest son of Guláb Singh, were killed on the spot by the fall. The young prince was transported in a dying state to his palace, and expired without having been able to utter a word.

This fatal accident, which carried off a prince full of promise, and which put an end to the dynasty of Ranjit Singh, was regarded by the fanatical party as a punishment from Heaven. Others, however, beheld in it the hand of the ambitious family.

of the Prime Minister. Under instructions from that high officer, the death of the Prince was concealed from the public for forty-eight hours, during which time the generals present at court met to deliberate as to the choice of a successor. After much discussion, it was resolved to summon Prince Shér Singh, an adopted son of Ranjít Singh, and then on his estates at Vatala, as the only member of the family who, at such a time, could guide the fortunes of the State. Thus summoned, Shér Singh hastened to Láhor. In compliance with the Sikh customs, he abstained from any interference in State affairs until the obsequies of his unfortunate predecessor had been performed. These lasted twelve days. The delay was fatal to Shér Singh, for it gave time to the absent generals, amongst them Guláb Singh and Attar Singh Sindhánwálá, to reach Láhor. These two personages, by their intrigues and audacity, so influenced the other generals, that they recanted their previous decision, excluded expressly Shér Singh from the Government, and, on the pretext that one of the wives of the deceased prince was *enceinte*, proclaimed his mother, widow of Karak Singh, to be Regent of the kingdom. The two generals who caused this change were both actuated by the ambition of gaining the throne: Guláb Singh, by marrying the Regent; Attar Singh, by succeeding to it on her death. As to the other generals, they one and all believed that, under the reign of a woman, they would be allowed to live independently on their estates, and would not be tormented, as they had been under Ranjít Sing and his successor, by the fear of being suddenly deprived of them. The only general who continued to espouse the cause of the prince, was General Court, who foresaw that a deviation from the hereditary principle would cause a civil war, and tend to the ruin of the Sikh monarchy.

The resolution of the Council was duly notified to the Prince, accompanied by an announcement that he would be granted as compensation an allowance of a thousand rupees a day, in addition to the jaghírs he already held. Although inwardly furious at the conduct of his generals, Shér Singh accepted with outward complacency the decision they announced. He knew well by experience that, in the Punjáb, force alone insured possession, and that, for the moment, he was helpless. The energetic tone, however, which he adopted in his reply, having convinced the generals that sooner or later he would endeavour to assert his rights, some of them advised the Regent to have

th. The advice was adopted in principle;

and it was agreed that, on his coming to ask leave to return to his estates, he should be shot. One of the soldiers of the guard to which the duty had been entrusted warned Shér Singh, however, of the plot, and he abruptly quitted the court. The same day he proceeded to the camp to induce the division commanded by General Court to take up arms in his favour. That general, however, dissuaded him from the attempt, on the ground that the moment was inopportune: and that though the general feeling in the army was favourable to him, it was necessary to prepare it for action before acting; and that it was, in every case, prudent to await the arrival of General Ventura, then shortly expected. "Besides," added he, "the Government is sure to commit blunders, to become discredited in public opinion, and then your rights will come to you of their own accord." The Prince yielded to this reasoning, and, setting out at once for his estates, began to prepare the *coup d'état* which he meditated.

On his departure the Queen-Regent appointed a Council to administer the affairs of State. This Council was composed of the minister Dhaián Singh, of his brother Guláb Singh, of the generals Kochal Singh and Attar Singh, and of the fakir Rám Singh. Such a Government was discredited before its formation because the chief of the State, the Queen Mother, by her dissolute manners and her intrigues, which had led her husband and her son to death, had lost the public esteem. On the other hand, the presence in her Council of two rival parties, each bitterly hating the other, was ruinous to the conduct of affairs. All men of sense regarded it as an absurd Government, which could not last.

A very short time proved the truth of this opinion. The minister, Dhaián Singh, withdrew, in disgust, to his estates. His departure was a death-blow to the Government. In its uncertain course it knocked its foot against every stone, and did everything wrong. Its incapacity with respect to the administration of the army was so marked that, whilst it disorganised, it made discontented the men who composed it. With respect to civil affairs, both administrators and administrated came to a dead-lock; the funds of the State were dissipated, and everything seemed to presage its ruin. The nation at large cried out for a man!

Affairs were in this condition when General Ventura appeared upon the scene, returning from his brilliant campaign in the districts north-east of Multán. The court gave magni-

in his honour; and the artillery fired salvos in honour of the capture of Kamáliá, a fortress which, to that day, had been considered impregnable.

As, before his arrival, Ventura had come to an understanding with Shér Singh, he began at once to prepare the way of his return to power. In his efforts he was considerably aided by public opinion; a great deal by the strong feeling of the rank and file of the army. The chief difficulty was to gain the generals commanding the several corps, and who, bearing in mind their recent hostile attitude towards the prince, dared not approach him. But Ventura explained to them very clearly that, unless Shér Singh were supported, the certain result of the existing crisis would be the seizure of the royal power by the Jamú family, and that then short work would be made with them and with the army; that it was imperative that they should forget the past, and recall Shér Singh—a man whose courage was incontestible, and who, more than anyone else, had at heart the maintenance of the Sikh nation on the pinnacle on which it had been placed by Ranjit Singh. Convinced by this reasoning, the generals gave way, and sent secret emissaries to the Prince to give and receive guarantees. Finally, it was resolved that on the next great holiday, then approaching, when all the troops of the garrison of Láhor would be under arms to line, on both sides, the road to the sacred edifice, they should seize the opportunity of the Court being between the two lines, to pronounce the deposition of the Regent, and to proclaim Shér Singh king of the Punjáb. One of the divisions of the army having, in the interval, revolted against its general, the Prince, impatient for action, determined to throw himself in their ranks, and rally them to his cause. He did appear amongst them at sunset on the 13th of January, and was at once saluted by a salvo of artillery. This was a fatal blow to the partisans of the Regent, for it proved a signal of revolt against that lady to the forty thousand men at Láhor and in its environs. Amongst the divisions that went over was the division of General Court, unaccompanied, however, by that general, who, though sympathising with the Prince, felt himself bound by his oath of fidelity to stand by the Regent. During the night, Shér Singh's party was continually augmented. At day-break, thanks to the co-operation of the division of Kochál Singh, he was in a position to attack the fort with every prospect of success; but he confined himself to seizing an advantageous position. This delay gave time to Guláb Singh to take all

possible measures for defence, and to introduce into the fort three thousand of his own hill troops. The division of Mán Singh, a battalion of Gúrkhas, and a great number of Gur-churas, were already behind its walls. Aided by other generals still faithful to the Regent, Guláb Singh provided also for the defence of the city, manning the ramparts and gates with artillery and infantry.

At daybreak the following morning, 15th January, the Prince, massing his troops, marched along the north face of the town, and entered it by the gate Tanksáli without firing a shot. As he did this, from the artillery parks in the city and from the guns on the ramparts a salvo of artillery saluted him—a sufficient proof to the adherents of the Regent that Fortune had abandoned them. They were, however, still obstinate, and bade defiance to Shér Singh from the fort.

The Prince, observing this attitude, and hoping to attain his end without bloodshed, detached the division of General Court into the garden, called Bagh Hazúri, in the hope that on its appearance the garrison would open the gates. This so far succeeded, that the leading regiment of the division penetrated into the fort without being fired upon. It was asserted that this abstinence from firing was a consequence of the orders of Guláb Singh, who, believing that the Prince himself would lead the movement, had laid in wait for him, trusting that his death would put an end to the revolution. Deceived, however, in his anticipations, and seeing that the Prince was preparing to batter the walls, he opened suddenly upon his troops a fire so close and so murderous that it produced among them something approaching to a panic. They had not been expecting an attack, were huddled together in groups, and were forced to take the attitude of men surprised at a disadvantage.

The Prince at once turned his attention to his infantry, reformed them behind his guns, and then opened upon the fort a very heavy artillery fire. This fire continued without cessation during the 15th, 16th, and 17th January. During this period, likewise, several murderous hand-to-hand encounters ensued between the partisans of the several chiefs, the latter inciting their followers by profuse gifts of gold and silver. The besiegers, in the open and unprotected, suffered greatly from the fire of the garrison. But nothing could stop their intrepidity. They marched night after night to the foot of the walls of the fort, which Colonel Delaroché had mined at several points, and demanded with loud cries that the match should be lighted, to

give them an opening for the assault. The Prince, however, animated by the fear lest they should pillage the treasures amassed by Ranjit Singh, always kept them back.

On the 17th, all the generals who had till then held aloof made their submission to Shér Singh. He received them with great affability, but he could not refrain a smile of satisfaction when he accepted the *nazrîna** of Generals Ventura and Court. From that moment the first-named became the right arm of the Prince, and directed all his affairs. The Punjab, in the critical times when everything seemed to presage a terrible disorder, ought to esteem itself fortunate that this general used to so good a purpose the extraordinary popularity he enjoyed amongst the Sikh troops. But for his influence, many generals would have become victims to their own soldiers. As it was, this fatal period saw the introduction into the Sikh army of a license quite unrestrained. It went so far, that a battalion of Tej Singh's troops dared to present themselves to the Prince with a request that that general should be made over to them, for the express purpose of being massacred. Tej Singh owed his life solely to General Ventura's influence with his soldiers.

The same day, at midday, the garrison, harassed and discouraged, and seeing no signs of the reinforcements promised by Guláb Singh, offered to capitulate. At the news of this offer the besiegers raised mingled shouts of joy and rage, and swore that they would give no quarter. A great number of them ran to force the Prince to refuse all conditions. The disorder became terrible; the bugle-cry ordering cessation of fire was not listened to, and all was chaos. Suddenly Dhaián Singh and his brother, Guláb Singh, appeared upon the scene. Then this surging mass made a rush to exterminate these, their chiefest enemies. The Prince could only save them by taking refuge with them in a sacred edifice. This action only increased the fury of the crowd thirsting for blood. General Ventura, despairing of any other mode of appeasing them, moved with difficulty to a position in their rear, and, summoning them to him, offered them money in quantities. This action distracted their attention; and the night which followed put an end to this terrible scene, worthy of cannibals. Ventura and his confidants hastened to profit by it to cause the garrison to quit the fort. The Regent, on the invitation of the Prince, remained in it.

* The gift offered when a person of rank pays his respects to a prince.—Ed.

On the 18th the entire artillery in Láhore announced by a salvo the triumph of Shér Singh. Mounted on an elephant, and followed by his generals, the new King traversed the front of the line, congratulated the troops on their intrepidity, distributed to them money, and promised to reward still more those who had deserved the most. He then dismissed them to their quarters.

The troops obeyed this order—but, their minds still exasperated by the furious resistance made them by the garrison, they suddenly revolted against their officers, slew pitilessly the most severe of them, rudely expelled others, and kept only those who were ready to flatter and minister to their pride. From this moment massacre became the order of the day in the Sikh army, and the redress by murder of personal wrongs the rule. The soldiers indulged their grudge specially against their paymasters, who had paid them only according to defined regulations, and every one of these men suffered death. At the instigation, moreover, of some of the younger officers, ambitious of high rank, the soldiers dared even to attempt the lives of some of the older commanders who, whilst they had shown great solicitude for the comfort of the rank and file, had not the less been rigorous upholders of discipline. They made it a crime of these men that during the three days of the siege they had not appeared amongst them. They would not understand that those generals had been kept at their posts near the Queen-Regent, in spite of their secret wishes, by their oath. They did not the less pillage and devastate their houses.

The house of General Court—a charming residence bestowed upon him by Ranjit Singh—was not spared on this occasion. In spite of the knowledge they possessed of the devotion of this general to Shér Singh, the soldiers sacked it. The family of the General were exposed to great risks, and, but for the opportune arrival of the commandant of the royal guard, sent expressly by Shér Singh, would have been murdered. Some few days later, General Court, acting on the earnest representations of General Ventura, retired across the Satlaj to Firúzpur, in British territory. As to Ventura himself, he had a right to esteem himself fortunate that his own troops were not still occupied in the district beyond Multán.

The city of Láhore ran the greatest danger of being pillaged. But General Ventura, by patrolling the streets with his own men, and taking other vigorous measures for the public safety, succeeded in averting that calamity.

The Prince, petrified by this unexampled revolt, did not dare to proceed against the barbarians to whom he owed his throne. He hastened, nevertheless, to send amongst them his orderly officers, to bring them to reason. But it was in vain. At a general parade which he ordered two days later, the greater part of the troops appeared with the guns loaded and the matches lighted. Shér Singh did not the less attempt to bring them back to a sense of duty, telling them plainly that, whilst willing to forgive the past, he was resolved to proceed with the greatest severity against those who should attempt to repeat such conduct. He then ordered that five months' pay—which was in arrears—and one months' as a gratification, should be disbursed to them. He also increased their pay by a rupee per month all round. The first regiment which came to receive the pay and the gratification demanded more. The soldiers had even the audacity to declare that if the Prince did not comply with their demands, they would make him descend from the throne on which they had placed him, and seat upon it someone more complaisant. Forced to temporise, Shér Singh granted all they asked for, the more readily as he could do so without indenting on the royal treasury; for he had at his disposal the fifteen millions which his predecessor, Nao Nihál Singh, had left in his private treasure-chest.

On the great day of the sacred festival, Shér Singh seated himself on the throne of the Panjáb. The ceremonial was magnificent, but the tumult was great, for indiscipline continued to be the order of the day.

Such was the result of this revolution—a revolution surpassing, in the extremity which it reached, those of the times of the emperors Galba and Otho; for then, though the Prætorians showed great audacity, they never pushed their fury to excesses such as those which marked the revolution of Lâhor.

In this revolt of the Sikh army some have thought they recognised the hand of a secret enemy desirous of destroying its European organisation. However that may be, it is certain that a mortal blow has been dealt to it; for its discipline—that vibrating nerve without which no army can exist—can with difficulty be restored after so total a disruption.

Short Remarks on Short Service.

BY A GENERAL OFFICER.

AFTER many years service in the Royal Artillery at home, in the colonies, in the Crimea, and in India, I venture to think that I have had an experience which should enable me to form a just opinion of the existing condition of the army; and I offer the following remarks with the greater confidence from the fact that I believe I shall be supported by the great preponderance of military opinion, of any considerable experience, throughout all ranks and all arms.

I do not think I exaggerate when I say that a very general feeling of dissatisfaction exists as regards the fitness of the army to enter upon any really serious struggle, in which European complications might cause this country to be involved in self-defence.

It cannot be denied that the artillery is a very efficient arm as regards its separate merits, viz., batteries of Horse and Field Artillery, and when the field guns have been improved (as it is only reasonable to believe they must be at once*); and as the period for which the men enlist is considerable, it may be safely considered that this arm is as good as that of any country in the world, to say the least. The cavalry also, as far as its strength goes, is excellent, as to personal discipline, horses, and equipment. But, when we come to consider the infantry, forming as it does, numerically, the mass of the army, it is sad to think that its condition is such as to leave much to be desired.

* It is satisfactory to find that a new and very powerful field-gun is being prepared for introduction into the service, according to recent reports in the papers.

Without venturing to enter on so comprehensive a subject as the general organisation of this or any other arm, I will confine myself to considering the condition of the infantry generally, as illustrated in a single battalion, without reference to anyone in particular.

I have it on good military medical authority, that the physique is extremely bad—in fact, to quote the expression used to me, “we have no infantry.” Physical statistics prove this.

By this was meant that the age of the men, accompanied of necessity by physical shortcomings, their chest measurement, their power to stand climate and resist disease, render the force of small value.

But apart from these considerations, the conditions of service recently existing were such as to preclude the possibility of a battalion possessing those high qualities of discipline and *esprit de corps*, to which, with the desired quality of good physique, we can alone with reason trust for the proper performance of the functions of the infantry, in standing the severe trials of a possible conflict, in which it might be opposed to the highly-trained troops of some of the belligerent powers of Europe.

If the cause of this state of affairs is asked, I should reply that it is mainly, if not altogether, attributable to the Short Service System, than which I can conceive nothing worse adapted to the continuous, multifarious, and very distant requirements of this great empire.

It is said by its few advocates, and I presume as its strongest apology, that, in the present state of the country, short service is a necessity, the only alternative being general conscription.

I am by no means willing to admit the accuracy of this opinion, and I have no doubt that a plentiful supply of recruits could be obtained at all times were the old system of bounty on enlistment, or an increased rate of pay while serving, to meet the high rate of the labour market, with pension at the expiration of service, again resorted to; and especially if efforts were made to secure employment for capable men, of good character, in various Government establishments.

I would also parenthetically suggest that the means of employment might be immensely increased by inviting the co-operation, to this end, of the various municipalities throughout the country: their local influence with the mercantile community could hardly fail to have substantial effect.

To suppose, for a moment, that under any system a considerable number of a superior class of young men could be

induced to enlist appears to me most Utopian; and, for my part, I should say that they would, in large numbers, form a most undesirable element in the ranks of the army.

Good healthy labourers form a much more promising material out of which to shape well-disciplined and drilled soldiers, than the general run of failures in other walks of life, of which the ideal "superior class of young men" would principally consist.

It is also pleaded, as an excuse for the short service system, that it will be the means of amassing a large reserve force; and no doubt this is a point of very high importance*; but I am sure that the quality of the first fighting force cannot prudently be sacrificed even for the purpose of forming a numerous reserve.

To admit that this was justifiable would be *equivalent* to a consent to be defeated in a first battle, in the hope that such a disaster might be retrieved in a second battle—than which a more fallacious principle could not be advanced.

Not only is short service condemned by almost all professionally competent to judge, but support would be given to this verdict by every employer of labour, if informed that the moment of his service when a soldier is arrived at full possession of the physical and technical qualities which render him most efficient is the very one at which he is generally discharged, even though it be with liability to serve in the reserve.

In the various employments of civil life, a contrary principle prevails and is acted on.

Modified though the original short service system has been, an adherence to it even in its present form appears to me most undesirable.

With all due respect to a great supporter of the system, I may mention an anecdote in which shrewd common sense is shown, such as, I trust, in the interests of the country, will shortly prevail throughout it.

A labouring man said to me, about the time of the expedition to Egypt, "Ain't Sir G. Wolseley a great man for short service?" and to my reply, "Yes," he said, "Well, sir, it seems to me when he goes out hisself he takes care to take a good lot of old ones with 'im."

In view of recent events and representations, this, to my mind, speaks volumes.

* Recent statistics, published in the *Times*, show that even the estimated numerical results in development of the Reserves have not been realised, much less what was desired.

There are many consequences of short service (of which I will notice a few) which are most prejudicial to the efficiency of the infantry.

Foremost among these may be mentioned the increased difficulty of getting good non-commissioned officers, on whom so much in the way of discipline as well as elementary instruction must depend.

It is the more important that non-commissioned officers should be capable and judicious in the exercise of authority when the mass of the men are young. Though the power to *enforce* obedience to their orders must naturally be vested in non-commissioned officers, an injudicious exercise of authority, especially with young soldiers, is most detrimental, and often disgusts and spoils a man who might with tact be firmly guided into the right path.

Such discretion as is required for this is rarely to be found in the young corporal, while old seasoned non-commissioned officers, who through obedience in their several grades have learnt to command, often show a tact in dealing with their men, which is the means of preventing insubordination rather than of aggravating hesitation to obey into the more serious offence.

Then, again, the necessities of the service require so much instruction other than the matter of drill and use of the rifle. Classes have to be formed for gymnastics, signalling, telegraphing, cooking, &c. &c., besides the regular regimental school routine, and these have all to be kept up to their full numbers; so that with these, in addition to the ordinary daily duties, time is very fully occupied—properly, no doubt,—but it often happens that a soldier is found to be possessed of many accomplishments, though he may present on parade a sorry appearance, and be an absolute obstacle in the manœuvres of his company.

It may at first sight seem that it is not fair to attribute such results to short service, but as a matter of fact, they are more or less directly brought about by so much being crowded into the little time a man has with the colours.

Think of the five years—it was, the seven now—that a man has to serve, and observe what has to be done. Drills, rifle instruction, judging distance, school, guards, marches, field-days, camps of instruction, periods in hospital, moves at home from station to station, transport to India, period of acclimatisation, and how much remains for the performance of ordinary duty.

What, in fact, does the country get in return for the fresh

expense of enlistment, instruction, clothing, maintenance, and transport in the case of a soldier doomed to be discharged just as he arrives at professional maturity?

I set aside all matters of sentiment, such as are experienced by the various grades of officers, who cannot, however, fail to feel that instead of matter of satisfaction and pride in their commands, they experience what was well described by Mr. Mantalini when turning the mangle.

I am aware that there are some modifications of the terms of service, such as re-engagement under certain restrictions or conditions, but I do not think they are on a scale to materially affect the circumstances.*

There is another view of the subject in a general political sense, which is no doubt more a matter for the consideration of the legislator than the military critic, but which, however, I would venture to notice.

A very great result of the short service system is the casting loose on society, in very large numbers, of half-disciplined men fairly instructed as soldiers, without pension, without employment, and a large proportion of them, *i.e.* those of indifferent or bad character, unfit for most fixed employments, and of adventurous spirit.

Surely in these days, when it is patent to every observer that a great wave of democracy is sweeping through the world, and when, in parts of our own country, the spirit of law-breaking and sedition is rife, surely it might be wise to pause and consider whether this result of short service may not be fraught with danger.

It may, perhaps, be urged that all these suggestions are but a series of theories; but I would reply, what have been our experiences of our infantry as a fighting-machine during the last few years?

Have we not seen in India, at the Cape, yes, and even in Egypt, cases in which most serious shortcomings have been shown?

Is it not a fact that the feeling on the part of the officers, as to confidence in their men, is not what could be desired? Was it not the case that that very brilliant exploit, the march from Cabul to Candahar was performed by a carefully selected force

* Recently published General Orders, however, having still further increased the opportunity of extension of service, let us hope that the weakness of the system of short service is beginning to be recognised.

of the oldest soldiers available? and was it not the case that, including all branches of the service in the expedition to Egypt, the proportion of soldiers of considerable service was very large indeed? Was this not so arranged because the very strongest supporters of the system did not care to trust events to young soldiers?

I firmly believe that our shortcomings of late have arisen in the main from the large leaven of young soldiers with which the strength, the integrity, of our battalions is diluted. It would indeed be humiliating to suppose that the national spirit is changed, or that, properly dealt with, this country can no longer find an infantry capable of maintaining the glorious reputation of past days; but we should not shut our eyes to the fact that the best fabric may be ruined by the introduction of an element unsuitable in quality or quantity into its manufacture.

Whether it be that the short period of service, occupied as it is, does not afford sufficient time for a proper and efficacious instruction in the use of the rifle, I cannot say; but it is notorious (whatever the elaborately tabulated returns of rifle-shooting on the practice grounds may show) the results in real practice against an enemy are contemptibly and ridiculously bad.

I recently learnt from an old rifle instructor (entirely at a loss to account for it) that in Afghanistan he saw a regiment so utterly powerless to fire with effect upon the enemy, though at short range, that some officers and picked marksmen fell out, ran round the head of a ravine, and posting themselves among rocks where mounted Afghans below at some 150 yards distance could not get at them, blazed away for some time and only succeeded in wounding one man!

An officer commanding a native regiment at one of the battles in Afghanistan told me that he saw a regiment of the Line firing upon a force of Afghans advancing towards them over 1,500 yards of ground, and that the casualties our men inflicted were almost nil.

How is all this? It is bad indeed. There must be something radically wrong where not only the marksman fails, but even where the collective results of infantry fire are next to nothing. In the various skirmishes in Egypt the results appear to have been of like character.

Steadiness of firing and observance of necessary instructions are most to be expected when there is high discipline, and that this cannot be where the mass of the soldiers are very young there

can be no doubt. I therefore believe that the bad shooting of the infantry, synchronous as it is with short service, is in a great measure a consequence of that system; at any rate, if the period of service were longer, there would undoubtedly be greater opportunity of greater skill being shown.

It is not improbable that I may now be met with the argument, "But look how well the army did in Egypt." Well, let us look.

There are several points of view from which to consider this subject.

1st. As an effectual carrying out of our policy, it cannot be denied that it was a great success, and that much credit is due.

2ndly. As an illustration of our army system, I reply distinctly it is none at all. Short service was not tested. In the main young soldiers were discarded from the force, their places filled by older men, to the great deterioration of the battalions from which they were taken, by a call upon the reserve, in entire departure from the principle on which it is formed; and further by the employment of the Guards, the cavalry, artillery, and marines. The actual number of young soldiers was small indeed.

3rdly. From the strictly military point of view, it may be briefly summed up—

The best force we could muster of all arms, supplemented by an important contingent from India, aided by the boats of the fleet, supplying means of transport, which was most defective, succeeded in reducing to subjection a disorganised Egyptian army, reinforced by raw levies from the peasantry, all acting under the orders of an official in rebellion against the Viceroy, who was very doubtfully supported by his sovereign.

The climate no doubt was a serious difficulty, but fortune signally favoured us, and the end was a success, of which, by the way, we have heard a good deal.

Let us not, then, imagine that the merits of our system, or the quality of battalions of young soldiers, have been in any way tested; or suppose from our recent success, that we should so easily prevail, if opposed to the highly trained troops of Europe.

That the general character of the representations of events in Egypt has this tendency there can be no doubt. I might more correctly have said misrepresentations, for anything more preposterous than the comparison of the distinction earned by the

infantry at Tel-el-Kebir with *any* exploit of former days could not be.

Though to succeed in attack with few casualties is, of course, a happy circumstance, indicative of good management, yet the proportion of casualties to the numbers engaged is the only inerring test of the severity of conflict. Thus an occasion such as Tel-el-Kebir, where the casualties were no more than 4 per cent., cannot bear comparison with numerous instances of struggles, in which the proportion was enormous, culminating at Albuera, where 75 per cent. was the price of victory (*vide* Napier).

I have written thoughtfully, but very earnestly, for I am convinced that we are misguided; that the system whose weakness is practically illustrated in the hour of need is fraught with the highest peril to this country. I have limited myself to a few points; much more might be said in objection to it, but I know not one argument in its favour save those to which I have replied.

In these days, when the possibility is admitted that our naval power might not be sufficient to prevent a landing on our shores—when a tunnel under the Straits of Dover is contemplated, *and may Heaven forbid its construction!*—useful as it might be to the enemy, not as a means of invasion, but of subsequent communication for supplies, &c.—surely it behoves us to be careful that the small army, which alone this country will maintain permanently, shall not be allowed to deteriorate in quality, and that its organisation may be such as to ensure facility of expansion.

We have a precious treasure to guard in the independence of the British nation—a golden prize in its wealth to tempt the greed of nations whose principles might not prove sufficiently high to hold them back, should a plausible excuse for attack occur.

They see, they know the weakness of a system they can well judge of; they smile—nay, sneer—at the undue importance which has been given to recent events; and they may think we shall slumber on in a fool's paradise.

May it prove otherwise, and may the views of a very small minority be set aside in consideration of the vast majority of experienced opinions, and a gradual return to increased length of service be brought about!

However great importance may be attached, and properly, to other arms, it should never be forgotten that "*la victoire est*

toujours avec les gros bataillons," that infantry is the main-spring of battles, and that to experimentalise with the infantry, unless in the direction of a higher discipline, instruction, and solidity, is to incur a risk which may, we know not how soon, be the means of hurling this country from its pinnacle of greatness to irretrievable ruin.

The course which I have now endeavoured to advocate is one which no party interests or feelings should be permitted to affect; and in the firm belief that it is a matter of vital importance, I would venture to say to all who in power, or who by their votes and opinions, can influence the future conditions of service,

"Aide qui peut."



A Determined Spirit.

A TRUE STORY,

ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE CHARACTER OF THE GURKHA.

JAIBHAN THAPPA, Gúrkha, was a private in one of our Gúrkha regiments. He took unto himself the cast-off wife of a comrade, and, as she was not permitted to reside in the lines of his regiment, he procured for her lodging in the hut of a zemindar (farmer) in a neighbouring village. In this hut Jaibhan was in the habit of keeping considerable supplies of food, also a sword, an old revolver, and some ammunition.

One day, when returning from a shooting excursion, with his double-barrel gun over his shoulder, and his kukrie (Gúrkha knife) in his girdle, he saw the zemindar disputing with the former husband of his wife, and another comrade, about some debts incurred by the woman. His passion was at once aroused, and he angrily asserted his right to settle all such claims. A quarrel ensued. The zemindar endeavoured to pass a rope round Jaibhan's neck, when the latter promptly shot him dead. The other two men, fearing a similar fate, ran for their lives.

Jaibhan had now lost all control over his temper, and, seeing the wife of one of the fugitives standing near, he fired the other barrel of his gun at her, wounding her slightly.

Jaibhan Thappa despised and hated the police. He also understood the principles of the "defence of a house." He accordingly decided to stand a siege in the zemindar's hut, already stocked with food and ammunition for fourteen days. Having provided himself with an ample supply of water, barricaded the door and windows, and loop-holed the upper storey, he sat himself down, quietly and cheerfully, to await the arrival of the police.

In due course the native inspector of police arrived, attended by some of his followers, and proceeded to examine the corpse of

the murdered man, which lay a few yards from one of Jaibhan's loop-holes.

Such a chance the defender might not again have, so he gave the inspector a charge of slugs in his left arm, severely wounding him, and putting to flight his followers.

The aid of the military was now applied for, and the district superintendent of police arrived with a very considerable reinforcement.

In a very short time twenty soldiers and forty police surrounded the fortress of the resolute Jaibhan; but it was impregnable to everything but artillery or mines. Jaibhan was duly summoned to surrender. He agreed to do so provided the two soldiers and the woman, who were the cause of the quarrel, were brought before his loop-holes. He also added that he had no wish to take the life of any sáhib, or of his comrades; but that he would shoot any policeman who came within range.

Evening drew on, and the police grew impatient, and determined to storm Jaibhan's strongho'd. They crept up to the door, keeping close to the walls, and, taking a huge log with them, which they used as a battering ram, they proceeded to batter in the door. They succeeded in getting it open for about six inches; but Jaibhan's double-barrel knocked two of them over like nine-pins, wounding one severely and the other slightly. The remainder beat a hasty retreat.

It was now getting dark, so all offensive operations were abandoned for the night, and the besiegers set about placing a cordon of sentries.

A Gúrkha sepoy incautiously showed a portion of his head: the beleaguered man thought it belonged to a policeman, and promptly put a bullet through it, mortally wounding the unfortunate owner.

The advantage up to the present entirely lay with the defence, the assailants having lost in killed, one zemindar; mortally wounded, one sepoy; severely wounded, two policemen; slightly wounded, one policeman, and one woman. Total, six casualties.

On the following morning, the superintendent of police, accompanied by a European for whom Jaibhan was in the habit of shooting birds, and who stated that he would be able to persuade him to give himself up, went to have a consultation with the besieged from inside another hut, which was close alongside. The conference apparently produced no effect.

The superintendent and the European then consulted as to further operations, when Jaibhan suddenly appeared in the open

armed to the teeth, with his double-barrel gun at full-cock, a naked tulwar (native sword), and a kukrie, and said that he intended going to the kotwáli (police station). The police sentries were so astonished at his appearance, that they fell back on every side. Jaibhan saw the police superintendent and the other European, and invited them to accompany him, which they did. On seeing the men of his regiment, who had been sent to assist the police, he called to them to fall in behind him.

On being asked by the superintendent of police to give up his arms, he replied that he had not the slightest intention of doing so until he reached the kotwáli.

On the way there, he drank some water from a fountain, and ate some sweetmeats, which the police officer had procured for him.

On arrival at the police station, he kept his promise, and made over to the superintendent all his arms, saying, "Now, Sáhib, I am your prisoner."

In due course the man was tried, firstly, for the murder of the zemindar, and, secondly, for the murder of the Gúrkha sepoy, who had died from the effects of the wound he had received in the head. He was found guilty, and sentenced to death.

The night before the sentence was to be carried into execution, the jailors had neglected to put on his handcuffs, although the leg-irons were left on. Jaibhan was a powerful man, and determined to have another struggle. He wrenched off one of his leg-irons, and with it dug out some of the bricks from the walls of his cell. In the morning, when the police-guard came to take him to the scaffold, he pelted them with the bricks, and fairly drove them from the cell.

The magistrate and doctor then came on the scene, and succeeded in persuading him to give himself up quietly; but only on conditions that he should be allowed to walk with them, as a free man, to the scaffold, himself place the rope around his neck, and give the signal for the bolt of the drop to be drawn. These conditions were duly carried out.

The Afghan Campaign of 1878-80.

A FEW MILITARY DEDUCTIONS.

BY MAJOR M. J. KING-HARMAN, BENGAL STAFF CORPS.

(Continued from page 586, vol. V.)

IN my humble opinion the system of skirmishing adopted in the British army is entirely unsuited to Asiatic warfare. Long lines of scattered skirmishers never can work properly in a hilly country, such as Afghanistan and the intervening independent territories, and are entirely out of place when fighting against an enemy of great numerical superiority, who are very formidable in hand-to-hand fighting. This applies to British soldiers, and consequently with much greater force to native troops, who have so few British officers to guide or rally them. In India certainly our men should be trained to fight on hilly ground in compact but handy formation, thereby ensuring unity of action and control of fire, while at the same time the men will work with greater confidence and dash.

We have long ago recognised the fact that the conditions of Asiatic are totally different from those of European warfare, but we insist on one and the same set of regulations for the conduct of both. The very best lesson (as we will not learn from our own experience) is to be found in General Skobelev's instructions to his troops before the battle of Geok Tepe in December 1880, which are published in the Journal of the R. U. S. Institution for 1881, Vol. XXV. No. CXII. I believe that a careful study of these, coupled with an equally careful study of the manner in which our numerous fights in Asia have been conducted since the Umbeyla Campaign of 1863-64, will show how entirely wrong our present system is.

The time has now arrived for a complete alteration in the present system of musketry instruction and fire tactics which

does *not* make the mass of our soldiers good shots on service. To begin with control of fire; this is extremely difficult in the independent firing of British troops with regular company officers, but it is almost an impossibility in a native infantry regiment. And it is allowed by all that uncontrolled fire is generally unaimed, unproductive of results, extremely wasteful of ammunition, and very demoralising; therefore we come to this, that the skirmishing line should be less extended than at present, that there should be more British officers to control its fire and movements, and that the firing should be as much as possible by groups or sections in volleys. Then, again, there is too great a tendency to shoot at long ranges, a practice to which officers and men are alike liable to be tempted by the possession of a far-ranging weapon.

The careful instruction of officers, too, is most necessary, so as to accustom them to control and direct to the best advantage the fire of their men, and to teach them the necessity of economising their ammunition, and, above all, of hitting the object at which their fire is directed. I cannot do better here than to quote the words of Captain K. Brooke of the 15th Foot, in his lecture at the U. S. Institute on 15th January, 1875, on the object of musketry instruction. "This I hold to be the training of soldiers, to inflict the maximum of loss on the enemy in the minimum of time; and this condition can only be fulfilled when troops have been trained to fire with extreme accuracy, and also when this accuracy has been practised under conditions as nearly as possible representing the actual battle-field."

Our present system of instruction and money prizes seems more calculated to produce a few good marksmen in each regiment than a large body of fair average shots. Soldiers should be taught as far as possible never to fire until they are pretty sure of hitting, and to reserve their fire for close quarters, long-range fire being confined to selected marksmen only; and, above all, we should remember that the great merit of a breech-loading rifle is that it is a quick *loading*, as distinguished from a quick firing weapon, and that what is really required is *good* shooting, and not much shooting; and, above all, I would urge the necessity for the more careful selection of musketry instructors, and D.A.A. generals: such men should be real sportsmen and good shots in the field, and, not as some of them have been, mere target shots, and theoretical prize-hunters. As an example of careful shooting in the past war I would mention the action of Matoom in the Kosi Valley, and the

Bazar Valley expedition: in the latter, on the 22nd December 1878, Brigadier-General Tytler's Brigade, covering the retirement, was fighting all day, and only expended 1,029 rounds of rifle ammunition; but in nearly all the engagements of the campaign, reckless, rapid, uncontrolled fire at long ranges was the usual practice.

It may be instructive here to mention that at the inspection of a certain brigade during the winter of 1880-81, a crack battalion of British infantry was beaten both in actual hits and points by two regiments of native infantry quartered at the same station, the former being armed with Martini-Henry rifles, and the latter with Sniders. Further comment is needless. All officers and men armed with revolvers should be frequently and carefully exercised in the use of these weapons.

ON THE EQUIPMENT AND CLOTHING OF TROOPS.

The accoutrements worn by our infantry are a great improvement on what they were fifty years ago, but they can be easily improved still further, and Dr. Oliver's accoutrements are far superior in every way to those now in use. One great point about accoutrements, after comfort and ease to the wearer, and suitability for the requirements of war, is that they should be so made that a man can put on and take off everything by himself without requiring the assistance of a comrade to fasten a button here, or to tighten a buckle there, or rub the pipe-clay off his coat in another place; and this also applies to the long knee-boots worn by the artillery and cavalry, for no man can pull off his own boots if they fit him properly (boot-jacks not being carried on service).

The ball bag now used is an eyesore and a great encumbrance to a man, and bad in every way.

The water-bottle used by the British troops is a most unserviceable article, and should be replaced by a white metal vessel covered with felt, those for the mounted branches being of a special shape to fit into or to strap on to one of the wallets. Those for native infantry are extremely bad, inasmuch that they cannot be cleaned inside, and a new one answering this requirement should be adopted throughout India; for if there is one thing a native is more particular about than another, it is to be able to clean well with his hands both the inside and the outside of his drinking-vessel, and few of them will drink out of one that he knows to be dirty. The very best description of water-pot that I have ever seen is the one in use with the 5th

Bengal Light Infantry, which was devised by the late General Colin Troop, after the experiences of the Afghan War of 1838-41. The best one for cavalry that I have seen is the one made up for the 3rd Bengal Cavalry by Colonel Mackenzie. A good water-bottle is a most important article of a soldier's equipment, and should be carefully considered by Government. In like manner there should be regulation patterns of water-bottle and havresack for officers, which should be worn by them always on marching order parades and inspections, and form part of their equipment for service. Regulations are also urgently required for service-belts and pistols for all officers, as well as regarding the carrying of the great-coat by both mounted and dismounted officers on the line of march and on service, for it is no exaggeration to say that at present no officer carries his great-coat. There is no authorised description of sword-belt in the English army that is suited for service, and as yet a pistol is not a *recognised weapon* for an officer.

Hunting-saddles should be at once and for ever abolished, and all staff and mounted infantry officers should be ordered to adopt the new pattern staff saddle. All mounted officers should carry in marching order a small hobble and peg by which to fasten their horses. The long knee-boot for artillery and cavalry, and for mounted officers, should be discontinued on service, and replaced by an officially recognised black leather spring-sided gaiter, which is neat-looking, comfortable, and extremely serviceable in every way. The officers of the Punjab Mountain Batteries always wore these gaiters, and you may be sure that they never wore anything that was not serviceable. The "Graves" combined boot and gaiter is unserviceable and uncomfortable, and the men who have tried them hate them.

The regulation "ammunition" boot, as worn by the British infantry is, when made well and of good materials, and thoroughly well softened with castor oil, as good a boot for the general requirements of a soldier as can be imagined. The weak part about it is the fastening by means of leather thongs, which takes time, and is a matter of some difficulty in the dark, or when the hands are numbed by cold, and it would not be difficult for a practical bootmaker to devise a neat and effective mode of fastening by means of one, or at most two, cross-straps and "rink" buckles, so that the boot could be taken off or put on quickly and with ease.

A suitable foot-covering for native soldiers is a different matter altogether, for they have to supply their own, and there-

fore cannot afford to buy expensive articles; and, moreover, they cannot afford to buy good socks, which are absolutely necessary when English boots are worn. Of all regiments in the Indian army, the one that has paid most attention to this subject is the 12th Bombay Infantry, and they appear to have solved the question in a satisfactory manner, at any rate to themselves, by adopting well-made English boots, made by Messenger & Co., and by wearing greased rags instead of stockings, after the German custom. In this regiment the fact was first recognised that the native foot differs in shape from that of the European, and therefore requires a differently-shaped boot to the ordinary "Ammunition"; so they had each man's foot carefully measured, and the boots made in sizes accordingly.

For my own part, I consider that the best description of foot-covering for a native soldier on service is the one that he is accustomed to wear at his own home; but the commanding officer of a regiment should pay particular attention to the quality of the materials and workmanship, and not allow his men to save a few annas by buying articles of inferior make; and he should also always have a sufficient stock in reserve. Of course, in particular cases, such as the Gúrkhas, where the men, as a rule, have a special liking for English boots, they should be allowed to wear them, *provided that they can march continuously in them without getting sore feet.*

The wearing of boots in the Madras army is compulsory; and the results of this are shown in the official report of 1878, in which we find that in twenty-seven regiments serious complaints were made of footsoreness, caused by wearing English or badly-fitting boots; and the medical officers almost without exception condemn the boot as worn without stockings, and recommend the adoption of the native shoe or "chuppal." During the field operations of 1878 there were 3,089 men, or 3 per cent. of the native troops on service, admitted to hospital with sore feet attributed to bad boots. No statistics for Bombay and Madras can be found for 1879 showing the number of footsore men amongst the regiments in the field; but amongst the Punjab and Bengal regiments that were on service during that year, there were 198 cases in the former and 1,470 in the latter. All of the above I attribute entirely to want of practice in marching, to want of care on the part of commanding officers, and to wearing unsoftened ammunition boots that were made for the differently-shaped feet of the British soldier. Many very able

military and medical men utterly condemn the native shoe as being unsuitable for service in a rough country like Afghanistan; but in this view, after considerable experience, I am unable to coincide.

The war in Afghanistan (1878-81) is most remarkable as having given rise to that most unfortunate, unpatriotic, and extremely erroneous idea that the land forces of Her Majesty the Queen of England are no longer able to contend successfully against her foes if they are clad in the world-renowned scarlet uniform which has been worn heretofore by our victorious armies in all parts of the world, but that directly they appear in the presence of an enemy it is absolutely necessary for their safety and success that they must carefully hide away the honourable colour that is beloved by all ranks, sanctioned by Her Majesty, approved of by the country, and that has always been feared by their foes, and dress themselves up in such a way as to be as unlike the soldiers of Great Britain as possible, thus adopting an extremely slovenly-looking sort of fancy dress under the erroneous impression that it deludes the enemy and is safer for the wearer. No language is strong enough to condemn such a practice; the colour that was good enough for the Peninsula and Waterloo, for Plassey and Subraon, for Alma and Inkerman, is still the colour which should now and ever be worn by England's soldiers both in peace and in war; and I protest against the national colour being hidden and dishonoured in order to satisfy the whims of a few unpractical theorists. Could anyone imagine the brigade of Guards covering themselves up in garments made of dust-coloured drill, before turning out to repel the attack of a Russian force?

It is an acknowledged fact that the *style* of clothing ordered to be worn by officers and men is utterly unsuited for service; but the only step that has been taken to remedy this great evil is to discard, for the time, the regulation dress, and to adopt a variety of fancy ones. The most suitable and workmanlike dress that I can imagine for officers and men of the whole army, both British and Native, is a blouse of stout scarlet serge, coming well down over the hips, and trimmed with regimental facings, the belts being worn over it.

The lower extremities should be clothed either in long trousers or good roomy knickerbockers, made of stout dark-blue serge, with "putties" or gaiters. Such a dress would answer equally well for the plains in the cold weather, or for active service anywhere, and should be adopted in lieu of the present short-

cut tight coats and patrol jackets now in use. Brevity is the soul of wit, but is most inapplicable to the garments of a soldier. A short coat offends the eye, no matter who the wearer is, and is particularly hateful to all native soldiers, besides affording much less protection to the wearer than a long one. However, having discovered a costume which is admittedly unserviceable, we are pretty certain to stick to it as long as possible. This, also, is one of our singular insular prejudices.

With reference to the oft-repeated statement that a man clothed in khakee drill is less liable to be shot than another who is clad in scarlet, I take leave to deny it *in toto*; in the sort of shooting that occurs in war, the colour of a man's coat cannot possibly affect his safety in any way—the whole idea is a myth, a flight of fancy, and is not capable of proof; but what really does affect it, is the amount of intelligence displayed by the individual in skirmishing and other movements in the presence of an enemy, and it would be far better if our would-be reformers directed their attention to that point and left the national colour alone.

If it is considered absolutely necessary that drill clothing should be worn during the hot weather, I know of no reason why the coats should not be made of scarlet yarn dyed drill; but I believe, myself, that thin serge would be much better.

It has always been a mystery to me why helmets should be white, for as nothing can be more ugly than a big glaring white helmet on the top of a man dressed in dark uniform, and as the slightest splash of mud or the mark of a dirty finger destroys its appearance, it could not have been selected for its beauty; and I cannot discover any precedent for a white head-dress in the army of Great Britain or of any other country. Therefore, as there is not one single point in favour of, and there being many obvious objections to, white helmets, both for officers and men, I recommend that they should henceforth be coloured, and I would prefer a quite shade of grey or drab. White belts having at last been condemned, white helmets and white haversacks should also be done away with, unless there is some special reason unknown to me for retaining them of that colour.

Furthermore, no one under the rank of warrant officer should be allowed to wear spikes in their helmets when on service; these spikes are always in the way, and are at times even dangerous, as in the case of a driver harnessing his horse, &c. Moreover, all spikes and chin-straps worn by officers should be

bronzed, for there can be no object in having them made of shining brass at any time.

Whistles.—Considering the extreme difficulty that very frequently occurs in hearing bugle-sounds during the heat of an engagement, when the almost deafening noise caused by the roar of cannon and the interminable rattle of musketry is intensified by the echoes from the surrounding hills, it is a matter of considerable importance that all officers as well as non-commissioned officers should be provided with a whistle, but it should be a regular “boatswain’s whistle,” the shrill piercing notes of which can be heard in the heaviest storm, not the useless twopenny-halfpenny thing that is supplied to sergeants at present: and having got this whistle, all officers should be taught how to use it, which is not such an easy matter as may appear at first sight. One call to denote the “Cease fire,” and another for the “Charge” are all that are required.

GENERAL REMARKS.

Camp Equipage.—For the immense improvements that have been effected in the service camp equipage for officers and British troops, as also in the reduction in baggage and in the number of followers, the army is solely indebted to the present Quartermaster-General, Sir C. M. MacGregor, K.C.B., who ever since his well known contribution to the first number of the *Journal of the United Service Institution of India* more than ten years ago, has never ceased to work at the important subject of the field equipment of troops, and no one knows their requirements better than he does. Now that a service pattern tent has been officially recognised, it should be the only description of tents with regiments or batteries, as it is equally suited for use in camps of exercise in the cold weather and for service beyond the frontier. And I would recommend that a certain proportion only of the present large E. P. and S. S. tents be kept in each cantonments in charge of one of the regiments, for use in cholera camps or on exceptional occasions, and that a large supply of them be kept stored in each fort and arsenal in the charge of the Ordnance Department.

(To be continued.)



Reviews and Notes.

AN INDIAN NOVEL. Parikshâ-Guru [the Guide to Discrimination]. By Lâlâ Sri Niwâs Dâs. Dihlî: Sadâdars Press, 1888.

THIS book is one of considerable general interest, for it is the first attempt ever made to write a novel in the Hindi language. The Hindi, we may explain, is the most widely diffused vernacular of northern India, spoken by a population of our swarthy fellow-subjects certainly twice as numerous as that of Great Britain and Ireland combined. The language has long been kept out of sight by the film of officialdom, which has found it convenient to carry on the administration of the country in a strange tongue by the aid of an army of interpreters. Such a system could not be maintained after the light of personal and political freedom had been shed over the land; accordingly we find that during the last twenty years the speakers of Hindi have availed themselves of their liberty, and have published books and newspapers in vast numbers in their own vernacular, much to the astonishment of those who denied the existence of any dialect other than that in which they chose to carry on their office work. Quite recently the Hindi speakers have taken higher ground. They have sought to absorb the latest results of English scholarship, and a series of sound historical and scientific works have seen the light, of which any such nation might well be proud. A yet bolder attempt has now been made to create a literature worthy of the remarkably flexible and expressive character of the Hindi language. Sri Niwâs Dâs, an inhabitant of Dihli, has essayed the task of producing an original novel in the dialect of that district; and he has been sufficiently successful to deserve the thanks of his compatriots. He shows in his Preface that he is aware of the difficulties which beset a man who attempts, for the first time, to adapt an imperfectly developed language to the

exigencies of a foreign style of composition; but he also shows that he has no proper idea of what is understood by a novel on this side of the world. He tells us (we translate from his Hindi)—“The method of writing dramas and novels is altogether different. In dramas the names of the speakers are placed at the beginnings of the paragraphs which are understood to represent their speeches; but, in novels, what the speakers say is enclosed in inverted commas, and the names of the speakers are inserted in the middle, or at the ends of the speeches, at the convenience of the writer.” Acting on this canon, he has produced a book, divided into chapters, with little mottoes from famous writers at the head of each; the chapters give excellent and moral conversations among a set of acquaintances, with the words of each speaker carefully included in inverted commas. Here, then, is the complete form of the novel; but the essential feature of novel literature is wanting. There is no tale—no story—to bind these conversations together, and make them lead up to some conclusion. The Author asks for suggestions by which he might profit in the future; and we therefore add, for his benefit, that a novel is intended to show, by means of an imagined example, the result of a particular course of action. The chapters of a novel are like the scenes in a drama, each contributing its part towards showing how the final result in the last chapter is brought about. Having said thus much, there is no need to describe the series of chapters, consisting of conversations on the gratification of the senses, on discrimination of character, on heedfulness or prudence, on the advantages of useful occupation, on gentlemanly tone and life, on the true secret of happiness, &c., &c., &c., the only bond of union between which is that the speakers are the same in every chapter. We hope Sri Niwās Dās will set himself to master the spirit as well as the form of novel literature, and then have another trial; for he is a good stylist, and evidently a man of information and wide reading. There are some good bits of humorous writing in his book, as in Chapter VIII., where a Pandit, who claims to know a great deal, is amusingly chaffed for his ignorance. In another place he satirizes an English dealer, who sells some French glass to a native gentleman at an enhanced price “because he is his friend.” And elsewhere he represents a Hindû as grieving over the unpatriotic conduct of his countrymen in giving high prices for European wares to the neglect of native industry, and who then drives home in a new English phaeton.

One other thing deserves special commendation in this book and that is, the Author has had the courage and the good sense to avoid the prevailing love of fine writing, and has written his book in the actual colloquial of Dihli. This circumstance will induce all students of Hindi to read his book with more attention. The startling rapidity with which the English language is penetrating the vernaculars of India is clearly shown by such works as that before us. We meet with such words as "editor," "article," "report," "order," "post-card," "neck-lace," "pocket-chain," "fashion," "polish," and numerous other similar words completely assimilated in the colloquial of the people. It is clear that the Author has an excellent knowledge of the English language, this being shown not only by the appositeness with which he quotes F. Cowper, Byron, and Shakespeare, but by the skill with which he has even rendered extracts from those writers into Hindi verse. On p. 10 he has had the hardihood to attempt Shakespeare's famous lines beginning "The quality of mercy is not strained and it need not occasion surprise that the result is not happy; but on p. 111 he makes amends by a really spirited rendering of Byron's *eve of Waterloo*, beginning "There was a sound of revelry by night."

It will be seen, therefore, that in despite of the failure of this curious work as a novel, it yet contains much that is interesting and illustrative of the great change passing over society in India.

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THE ARMY AND NAVY MAGAZINE.

JUNE 1883.

Indian Districts during the Revolt.

By H. G. KEENE, C.I.E.

VII.

NORTH-EAST of Agra lies the district of Mynpoory—or Mainpuri, as now spelt—which affords but scanty material for our narrative, but that little of a somewhat peculiar character. The district officer was Mr. John Power, a name full of pleasant recollections to all who remember the stately presence, the dignified demeanour of one who, though he has been called “the Indian Brummell,” was a man of a far higher type than his English predecessor. A dandy Mr. Power certainly was, but it was not in a cockney way by any means, his elegance being of a massive and monumental character. The special commissioner, Mr. Cocks, who was at that time district judge, represents Mr. Power, on the 19th May as “rushing into the room where he [Mr. Cocks] was sleeping, to inform him that he had just heard of the mutiny of the 9th Native Infantry at Aligarh.” That might be Mr. Cocks’ recollection of the event eighteen months after (his report bears date 18th November 1858), but Mr. Power recorded at the time (*v.* his letter in the supplement dated Mynpoory, the 25th May 1857, in the first excitement) that it was on the 22nd that the news reached him, and that he “immediately proceeded to Mr. Cocks’ house to consult him.” Mr. Cocks was certainly wrong in the date; Mr. Power could not be mistaken, writing at the time; and the word “proceed” is so much more in accordance with Mr. Power’s usual bearing, that we may be sure that the “rush” is a mistake also. Mr.

Power could not, under any circumstances, have "rushed" in any direction; indeed, had the news by any chance reached him in his dressing-room, he would not have even "proceeded" to announce it to anyone until his toilet was completed to the last button, and the last touch of the hair-brush.

The result of the consultation was that "fourteen females consisting of ladies, sergeants' and writers' wives, with their children (an unlimited number), left" for Agra, which they reached in safety. The military force—consisting of three companies of the mutinous 9th—was then taken out under Lieutenant de Kantzow, a very gallant young officer, a small guard being left at the Treasury. It was now past four in the morning of the 23rd, and Lieutenant Crawford, the senior officer, followed the route taken by de Kantzow, with the intention of joining the force, which was to encamp at Bhaongaon, about eight miles off. Scarcely had the civilians (Messrs. Cocks and Power, and James Power,† Dr. Watson and the chaplain, the Rev. P. Kellner), lain down to get a little sleep, when Crawford galloped back with the information that his men were in open mutiny, had fired their muskets at him and had probably murdered de Kantzow.

Through the pretty little "station" of Mainpuri flows the Isan a small stream, which the road leading from the officers' bungalows to the public offices crosses by a masonry bridge. Here Mr Power took post, accompanied by his brother, and here they were joined by Dr. Watson and two or three European subordinates. Meantime, de Kantzow had not been murdered, though his men mutinied and defied his orders; many muskets were levelled at him, but the aim was always diverted by the better disposed sepoys, de Kantzow being of a frank and generous character with many friends among the men. Dragging him with them, the mutineers returned to their lines, loading the spare ammunition contained there on camels which they appropriated for the purpose. De Kantzow's nerve never failed him; urgently he appealed to the men to return to their duty, and restrain the excesses of the lawless. Heedless of his appeals, they marched to the treasury, still taking him along with them. Here they were met by the jail-guard and native officials, who prepared to resist them, and gave de Kantzow all the assistance that could be expected from under thirty untrained men acting against ten times their number of infuriated soldiers. "For three dreary hours he stood against

* A younger brother of Mr. Power's at that time serving as his assistant.

the rebels at the imminent peril of his life." Meanwhile, the English at the bridge, half-a-dozen in number, had been joined by Rao Bhawáni Singh, cousin of the rájá—the local head of the Chauhán Rajputs—with a small escort. This small force, the Rao was persuaded, would be insufficient to reinforce de Kantzow; and a message presently came from the heroic young man begging them not to run the hazard, adding that the mutineers were, he thought, cooling down. On this the Rao resolved to go to them himself, and happily succeeded in persuading them to depart with such plunder as they had already obtained. De Kantzow now joined the party at the bridge, and they went to the office, where they found the treasury still secure. Mr. Power explains that he had held the bridge long enough to keep back the bad characters of the "city" (as it is the Anglo-Indian fashion to speak of all chief towns), and that when the sepoys were known to have departed, the urban population at once calmed down.

On the 23rd came more bad news; and Power, by sanction of Government, raised a troop of horse for the maintenance of order, which was commanded by Lieutenant de Kantzow. The magistrate himself took up his post in the "Kutcherry," or office-building, which he fortified by the aid of some sergeants serving in the Department of Public Works. One feature of the defence is too extraordinary to be left out of this record. The Chief Court of the North-West Provinces was then called "The Sudder," and the Sudder had lately issued strict circular orders to all district judges and magistrates for the preparation and maintenance of the records of cases, upon a plan which some of those local officials considered pedantic and troublesome. In the height of the excitement (only two days, in fact, after the terrible morning above described), Mr. Power found himself unable to avoid a triumphant celebration of the "base uses" to which these records had come at last. These are his words:—

"All the Faujdari records" (those of criminal trials) "have been taken up to the roof of the Kutcherry, and being placed behind its railing form an excellent breastwork. This matter had better be reported to the Sudder; but at the same time it may be mentioned that the record-room has undergone a thorough purification by the purpose to which its contents have been applied. I may also mention, for the Court's information, that a good, stout *Khānujūji mīl*" (record of an affray case) "*prepared after the Court's latest rules and thickened with false evidence*, is an excellent article of defence; and has, by experiment, been found to be bullet-proof."

The italics are the present writer's. They serve to show an

irrepressible *fronde* wielded by a gallant spirit at a time when surely few would have indulged in professional sarcasm.

In this gloomy sanctuary, with perjury employed as a protection in the most unexpected and unusual fashion, the two brave magistrates and the doctor,* with two or three military officers (they had been joined by Major Hayes† and Captain Carey, Lieutenant Barber and Mr. Fayrer, who brought with them some of the Oudh Irregular Cavalry), held their own for some considerable time. The troopers were posted under Barber and Fayrer at Bhaungaon, where the road from Mainpuri falls into the grand trunk road leading to Cawnpore and Calcutta, and on the 1st June Hayes and Carey started to join them. The troopers had proceeded up the road to Karaoli, and there the officers found them, drawn up in parade order. But the native officers advanced, and warned them that treachery was intended. Hayes and Carey turned their horses' heads back, and rode in the direction by which they had arrived. The troopers spread over the plain in pursuit. Hayes was overtaken, and fell dead with a sabre-cut over the head; Carey, a lighter weight, escaped, and got safely back to Mainpuri; Barber and Fayrer were murdered about the same time at Karaoli; but the worthy lord of the manor, Lachman Singh (afterwards ennobled by Government), rescued all three of the bodies, and taking them to Mainpuri, delivered them to Mr. Power, who duly buried them in consecrated ground.

The rascally troopers departed to Lucknow, where they doubtless took part in the siege. Their place was taken by seventy sabres of the Gwalior Contingent (1st Cavalry), under Major Raikes, who accepted the services of the hard-riding Carey as his second in command. A few Sikh sepoy from disbanded corps, and about a dozen faithful sepoy of the mutinous 9th who had remained faithful to de Kantzow, formed the infantry nucleus. A telegraph-office was opened, and a couple of European refugees were brought in. The local horse, under de Kantzow, amounted to 100 sabres, with three native officers who had left various cavalry corps to come to their homes at Mainpuri on furlough. With these forces the town and station were patrolled, and some insurgent villages punished. Early in June they fought a severe engagement with a strong party of

* Messrs. Cooks and Kellner had gone to Agra, where the former soon found other fields of usefulness, as already described.

† He was Secretary to the Oudh Government, and an ardent student. His valuable library perished in the Residency.

rebels at Bhaungaon; the rebels beat them off, and killed the *Thánadar*, or native sub-inspector of police, who died bravely in the defence of his post. In this action de Kantzow was severely wounded. An unfortunate turnpike-keeper was about the same time murdered on the trunk road. All the neighbouring districts were now lost, and Mainpuri was nothing more than an imperfect oasis of partial order in the midst of a political wilderness. The trunk road swarmed with mutineers, and the Raja of Mainpuri, whose kinsman had behaved so well on the 23rd May, was known to be planning a treacherous outbreak. The district got rapidly out of hand, some of the sub-collectors and police-officers fled, others joined the rebellion, but honourable exceptions were duly noted. Among these last were both Muhamadans and Hindus, the subordinate judge, the *Kotwál* (head police officer), the deputy collector, and, chief of all, Raja Lachman Singh of Karaoli—a charming old man, whom to know was to love—by whose good-will and vigilance authority was maintained in the teeth of almost overwhelming difficulties and dangers, and the march of mutineers constantly impeded by the abandonment of villages and absence of supplies; other landholders, here and there, evinced the same spirit, and it is indeed creditable to the Indian character that when such men were faithful it was in no ordinary measure, life and wealth were freely hazarded in the cause of the alien Government.

So wore on the month of June, the worst of that bad year. The end was drawing nigh, when no prospect was apparent but a desperate attempt at escape, with the alternative of a soldier's death, or a long uncertain ride through deadly heat to a doubtful refuge. On the 28th the approach of the Jhansi mutineers, two regiments out of the entire brigade, was announced, and on the 29th their advanced guard reached Mainpuri, where they were joined by the Raja's people and by most of Power's police and levies. They threw open the jail and commenced a regular plunder of the place; and now the last decision had to be taken. Formally consigning the responsibility for Government property to the Raja and Bhawáni Singh, Mr. Power marched out, accompanied by Raikes, Carey, and half-a-dozen other Englishmen, escorted by the Gwalior cavalry, and preceded by Watson, de Kantzow, and James Power. The Gwalior men deserted peaceably on the road, the rest of the party arrived in safety at Agra and joined the refugees in the fort. The district was recovered about the beginning of 1858, and order was without difficulty restored.

VIII.

We next come to the district of Etáwa, and meet with increasing peculiarities. The land lies upon the Jumna, on whose banks the "city," or chief town, is situated. The ravines have, from of old, been haunted by tribes of semi-savages, called Ahirs, whose criminal propensities are with difficulty restrained even in times of the profoundest peace.* In the uplands a mixed population prevails, though the larger estates are held by Rajput colonists who have been settled there for many generations. The Jumna runs through the whole district, having the Chumbal as a parallel as far as Etawa. The population at the time was about 365 to the square mile, about one in five being Musalmans. The area is 1,698 square miles.

The magistrate at the time of the outbreak was a man of singular character. Hitherto we have had to describe the deeds of men of the old type of the Company's civil officers, born of the patrician or equestrian orders, brought up in the old unscientific public-school fashion, with no desire for display, doing and enduring what fell in their way with the cheerful stoicism of their class, and narrating their adventures with artless simplicity as if performing the last and least agreeable portion of an unpleasant task.

Mr. Allan Octavian Hume was by no means a man of that class, if indeed his peculiar character can be brought into any class at all. A younger son of the late Joseph Hume—that prosperous and energetic surgeon who died, after a long and useful career of public service in 1858, amid the general respect and regret of his countrymen—Mr. Hume had entered the service about eight years before the Mutiny. Quickly distinguished by his activity and acuteness, he had obtained the first great prize of the service—the charge of a district—in an unusually short space of time, and had been selected for what was deemed a post of special difficulty, as magistrate and collector of Etáwa. His qualities are reflected in his official *Narrative*. Though he was absent during the greater part of fifty-seven,† and though order was not restored till the end of the following year, he contrived to give his report—written, as

* In or about 1848 these people murdered an English traveller whom they mistook for Mr. Unwin, a magistrate who had offended them in the discharge of his duty.

† The narrative is dated November 18th, 1858, and states in the opening paragraphs that the district contains "here and there bands of rebels too desperate or too blood-stained to listen to our gracious Queen's late message of mercy." This was a year after order had been restored in the neighbouring districts.

he assures us, in twenty-four hours—the air of a chapter of history composed in the style of the late Sir A. Alison. As we shall presently see, however, the abnormal prolongation of disorder in Etáwa was not Mr. Hume's fault; and in courage and initiative he showed himself no unworthy colleague of the Dunlops, Spankies, and others, whenever he was able to command the due amount of force. But it is a drawback to his report that it takes a triumphant tone where most men in the same position would either have said nothing, or would have been content with a more "apologetic" treatment, to use the word in its classical rather than its social sense.

The early abandonment of Etáwa was due, in part at least, to the same cause that led to the evacuation of Mainpuri. Here also was a detachment of the faithless 9th Native Infantry, and here, even earlier than in Mainpuri, the approach of the Jhánsi mutineers made itself felt. Mr. Hume's hands were apparently, but only apparently, strengthened by the arrival of the Grenadier Regiment of the Gwalior Contingent, by whose aid he was enabled to return to his station for a few days, after being driven out by the first outbreak. The ladies were wisely sent into Agra, and with the aid of an excellent native subordinate (still in the service), named Kunwar Lachman Singh, Mr. Hume kept order, as best he could, until the middle of June. But on the 16th of that month the news arrived that the Gwalior Contingent had mutinied and driven the Christians from Gwalior. No further dependence was to be placed on the grenadiers, who plotted treason within earshot of their commandant. Major Hennessey's record of the conversation—so far as was overheard by him that night—deserves record as a specimen of the sort of feelings that were then being disseminated by agitators:—

Whispered conversation took place, of which the following caught my ear :

"What is this that has happened at Gwalior?"

"They have given themselves a bad name."

"True," said the emissary; "but all the world knows that for the last three or four years the *Faringhis* have exercised great oppression; they have ruined, and taken the lands of, all respectable Zemindars and given them to *Banias* (mercantile men). It is time to get rid of them. There is no *Izzat* (prestige) about their system; they will neither make an Emperor themselves nor allow anyone else to be Emperor: now, too, they attempt to destroy our religion."*

Thus warned, and aware that the Jhánsi mutineers were within two days' march, the British officers departed, taking up on the road some fugitives from Kalpi and Jalaun, of whom two were the faithful Lachman Singh to maintain

* *District Narrative*, App. V.

order, and writing to all landholders in whom he confided, Mr. Hume took his post at Agra, where he served with the right half-battery in the action at Sucheta, and was not able to return to his district till the end of December. This must have been felt by him as a severe misfortune; but it hardly warrants the claims to exceptional loyalty on behalf of his district which pervades the pages of his *Narrative*. Constant disturbance prevailed, though several of Mr. Hume's native friends behaved with creditable spirit; and even when he got back on the 30th of December, he found one Rup Singh, and other "refractory Zemindars," at the head of large forces, and rendering his position, as he himself says, "a *very* critical one." He seems to have acted with vigour. Before the end of January he had raised a respectable force, with which, "strengthened by a detachment of Alexander's Horse," he took the field on the 7th of February, and fought a successful action near Anantram, on the Kalpi road, in which it was believed that the rebels lost 150 men. A month later the Rájá of Ruru, a rebel leader, lost heart and committed suicide. But the forces of Rup Singh remained in possession of a whole Pargana (subdivision), having a bridge of boats in their rear, by which reinforcements and supplies were constantly reaching them from the other side of the Jumna. The Western tract, spoken of by Mr. Hume as the Jumna-Chambal Duáb, was held by Rájá Khushál Singh and his son, who remained in defiant occupation till September.

Mr. Hume's narrative now, and for nearly twelve months more, is little but a record of fighting; and certainly no officer of his cloth saw more purely military service. It is clear from his own admissions that for a long time he neither collected revenue nor exercised any other species of authority much beyond the limits of his own camp. Thus, at p. 13 he says: "Soon after the outbreak I, on my own responsibility, suspended the Government demand." And elsewhere he records that, up to March 1858, he "had collected no money but what was required for immediate use"; and even then it was only "the Zemindars of Bhartna and Etáwa," who "were directed to pay up the revenue." In a third paragraph he states that "care was taken to do nothing, and [to] issue no order in regard to any not openly against us, calculated to provoke opposition or disobedience." He was about this time joined by a column under Colonel Riddell—composition and strength not given.

Great contention raged in and round a village, or town, called Ajitmal, a few miles south of Anantram, in the neighbourhood of

which Rup Singh was maintaining disorder. On the 16th March the rebels attacked and plundered Phaphund—near to which is now a station of the East Indian Railway—and on the 30th Mr. Hume felt himself strong enough to move against them in view of chastisement. Driving them out of Ajitmal, he chased them into the ravines of the Jumna, a trifling loss occurring on either side. All this time Kalpi was the head-quarters of a large body of mutineers, and Rup Singh, obtaining reinforcements from thence, surrounded Mr. Hume on the 11th April, and drove him back towards Etāwa. General disorganisation ensued, only partially arrested by a renewed attack on the 21st. The levies then moved on to the river—horse, foot, and artillery—and seized the ferry-boat, inflicting some loss on the retreating enemy. In all these skirmishes Mr. Hume seems to have acted with great personal courage, ably seconded by Mr. Maconochie, his deputy, and Mr. C. Doyle, who had joined him from Meerut after Dunlop's Volunteers—with whom he served there—had been broken up. Lieutenant Furnell, another volunteer, who had been in practice at Mussoorie as a dentist, but was given a local commission for his military services in the Meerut district, also displayed signal gallantry. Both, indeed, were subsequently killed in action. The name of Mr. Furnell does not occur in Mr. Hume's *Narrative*, which makes it the more necessary to record it here: especially should it be noted for the chivalry of his death. When lying mortally wounded, this heroic young man—not a professional soldier, be it remembered—showed only one anxiety, and that was as to the prospect of his associate, Lieutenant Chapman, obtaining the Victoria Cross.

Operations on a more conspicuous scale were at hand. In the beginning of April, Sir Hugh Rose* had taken Jhānsi, and devoted the rest of the month to resting his troops, and preparing them for the advance upon Kalpi, where were collected almost all the remaining leaders of the revolt: the Rāni of Jhānsi, Tantia Topi, and the Nana's brother. The banner of the Peshwa now floated over the last stronghold of rebellion; and Rose, with an army decimated by disease and death in battle, had to move in the terrible summer of those regions in order to remove the last barrier that restrained communication between Central India and the main army under Lord Clyde. On the 5th May he had advanced within ten miles of Kalpi; on the 19th, being joined by Colonel Maxwell with the Connaught Rangers, the Camel Corps, and some companies of Sikhs, Rose

* Now (1883) Field-Marshal Lord Strathnairn, G.C.S.I.

felt strong enough to attack the place. On the following day after a hard-fought battle, the town was evacuated, and Her Majesty's birthday was celebrated in the last and lost fortress of the rebellion among the trophies of the previous day's victory. Tantia and the Ráni doubled back on Gwalior—with what result is known to all readers of Malleson—but a large body of the rebels crossed the Duáb in search of an asylum in the still disturbed province of Oudh.

These events kept the Etáwa district—especially the portion of it washed by the Jumna—in turmoil during the greater part of May and June, and large bodies of mutineers passed when Colonel Riddell did not feel strong enough to attack. On the 2nd July Mr. Hume was forced by ill-health to make over charge of the district to Mr. G. E. Lance, command of the local levies being assumed by Lieutenant L. Forbes of the 2nd Native Infantry. Rup Singh once more crossed the Jumna, and totally destroyed the unfortunate town of Ajitmal on the 6th. Two days later Mr. Lance, with a force consisting of 200 bayonets, 120 sabres, and 5 guns, drove them out of the ruins and back into the ravines. This sort of work went on, slow but sure, for the next two months. On the 6th September the last focus of disorder fell—a place called Chakarnagar—and the last fight (with one exception), took place at Parli on the 23rd October, when some of the forces of the indefatigable Rup Singh were defeated by the local levies under Lieutenant Allen, with the loss of over thirty men, the whole of their ammunition, baggage, and means of transport.

Order having been, as he hoped, finally restored, Mr. Hume—who had resumed charge of his district—wrote the *Narrative* to which we have mainly owed our information. After mentioning of those who had been his chief subordinates and supporters, he proceeds to devote a few paragraphs to various details of his administration during the trying times just passed. As to finance, he explains the reason of his having left the revenue uncollected. He shrewdly remarks that, having lost five lakhs of rupees by the plunder of his treasuries, he judges that the revenue would, just then, be “safer in the hands of thousand landholders than in a treasury guarded by sepoys so likely to mutiny.” When he set himself in earnest to the business of collection, he succeeded in realising the large sum of over twelve lakhs, and the balance was left to be recovered hereafter. He had the satisfaction of reporting that in many places the village-schools had been kept open; that “the little la-

were everywhere humming away at their lessons"; and that, when he wrote, there were 179 schools open with an attendance of nearly four thousand scholars. The remainder of the report is devoted to an examination of the causes to which the exceptional loyalty of his district was to be attributed. There is also a brief account of the method by which the villages were led to "submit to arbitration the adjustment of the cost of their transgressions." Of these "*panchayat* cases," Mr. Hume informs us there were 526, "some of which included the whole of the inhabitants of one or more villages." If one of these statements should seem to militate against the other, there can be at least no doubt but that Mr. Hume surmounted his difficulties—whatever they were—with tact, humanity, and resolution.

His greatest trial was yet to come. His report is dated November 18th, 1858. Three weeks later the district was invaded by Firoz Sháh, a member of the late royal family of Dehli, and the only one who displayed courage and conduct. Escaping southwards from Lord Clyde when the Oudh Begam, the Nana, and some other leaders fled into Nepal, the heroic prince, whose hands were free from innocent blood, and who might have secured a pardon and a pension by simple surrender, preferred to cut his way through the British territories.

On the 6th December vague rumours of the approach of a force, supposed to be headed by the Nana, reached Etáwa, and Mr. Hume immediately took the field, sending information at the same time to the military authorities at Cawnpore on the one side, and Agra on the other. His own force was composed of some 200 infantry, 140 cavalry, 4 guns, and a troop of the Meerut mounted police; the whole under the command of Lieutenant Forbes already mentioned. They marched with the intention of defending a fort called Harchandpur, held by a loyal landholder; and on the morning of the 8th, having driven in the enemy's pickets, found themselves confronted by a fine force of mutinous horse, estimated at 1,400 sabres, with nearly 200 infantry of the 28th Bengal Regiment. The enemy's baggage and transport were guarded by a strong reserve. These men were evidently no unskilled village-rabble, but a body of trained soldiers, whose business was to cut their way through all opposition, or perish in the attempt; and the sequel showed alike their capacity and their resolution. At first, perhaps, surprised, they speedily formed under cover of a village, sending off their baggage towards a bridge crossing the canal. Lieutenant Forbes placing the local horse—under Mr. Doyle—on his right, and the

Meerut troop on his left, opened fire from the centre under Messrs. Hume and Maconochie. The enemy, accepting the challenge, advanced so as to outflank the levies, on seeing which Forbes took Doyle's horsemen against the left attack, while the guns played upon the enemy's advance. The charge was only partially successful: Doyle's horse being wounded, the rider fell and was cut to pieces; his men retreated in more or less order. Meanwhile another party of the enemy came down on the English left, but were checked by two successive charges of the Meeru police, ably and bravely led by their Rasaldár, Asadulla Khan. This excellent native officer received a severe wound in the *mêlée*. But a third body presently got round to the rear and became engaged with the Etáwa foot. Mr. Hume's position now became very critical; and probably disaster was only averted by the firmness of the remaining foot-soldiers, and the presence of mind of a non-commissioned officer named Edmunds, who was in charge of the largest of the guns. Such clouds of dust were raised by the trampling of the bold and "ubiquitous" horsemen as, added to the smoke from the guns, prevented anything being clearly seen but the constant flash of the flickering sabres. Amid the confusion the levies formed square with commendable coolness, while Edmunds, with "conspicuous address," swung round his 12-pounder gun and poured grape into the flank of the assailants. The horsemen were thrown into a state of terror, the men lost heart on seeing the resistance of the square, and the attack ceased after a duration of fully three hours. Each side drew off in good order, and the Etáwa force occupied their original objective—Harchandpur, while the enemy proceeded on their route.

Well might the Governor-General, a man not given to enthusiasm, characterise this as "a daring exploit," and express his "warm commendation of the courage, skill, and determination which marked it." His Excellency gave his thanks to Lieutenant Forbes, to Messrs. Hume and Maconochie, and to Sergeant Major Edmunds. Doyle's family received a pension, and the brave Rasaldár received a decoration and the title of "Sardar Bahádúr." Mr. Hume was deservedly made C.B.

The enemy, who were well-mounted and equipped, comprised men of the 1st and 2nd Bengal Light Cavalry, the 11th, 12th, and 13th Irregulars, and a number of unattached rebels and mutineers, many of whom were Afghan and Sikh soldiers of fortune. They lost fifty-eight killed, among whom was the ex-Názim of Farrakhabad—a man who had long sought

the district; many more were wounded, most of whom were removed in ambulance "doolies," or litters, with which they were well provided.

British loss was twenty-one killed and nineteen wounded. For the Hon. Percy Herbert, coming up from Cawnpore, with some of the fugitives—for such they soon became—inflicted on them a further loss in material and men; and Mr. Showers arrived from Agra on the 11th, having ridden seventy-five miles in forty hours: he did not, however, add to the enemy's loss.

The unfortunate prince probably separated from his men, eventually—as it is understood—made his way to Mecca. He never, so far as I am aware, been seen or heard of

was the end of disturbance in the district of Etáwa, which at last fell into its usual routine. To conclude with the magistrate's fervid words:—

He turned: and then popular goodwill blossomed out and gave fruit in the happy restoration of peace and order: and now, though here and there desolate villages and bands of rebels, too desperate or too blood-thirsty to listen to our gracious Queen's late message of mercy, remind us of our people are once again quiet and contented, our fields are rich with crops, and we can look forward hopefully to the future, and cheerfully to the present that shall make that future all, and more, than in the past we ever had.

Peace, indeed, is the calmness with which the simple folk of the district could plough their land and sow their seed in such tranquillity and the readiness with which they accepted disorder and the restoration of order alike, "with a heart for any fate."

On November 1st 1858 the Royal Proclamation, translated into twenty languages, and promulgated throughout the country, announced that Her Majesty had assumed the direct sway of the Indian Empire. So we created a new era at last!



The National Defences of Sweden.

By CARL SIEWERS.

It is but natural that the question of reorganising the National defences which is at present before the Swedish Nation, should by a people which can boast of a Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII., be considered vital to its very existence, and propose in the present article to discuss the measures which are now proposed to enable this historically militant nation to defend its native soil in the present age of encroachment and conquest.

The army of Sweden has for the last two hundred years been raised by a system which is, I believe, wholly foreign to every other country, and consists of "stamtroppe," i.e. regular troops and reserves. The former are, however, raised in a very remarkable manner, viz. by common enlistment "värfröning" and "indelning." By the "indelning," adapted in order to ease the burthens of conscription, the so-called "rusthall," i.e. rural taxpayers, and the "roter," i.e. landowners, furnish the infantry soldiery and the cavalry, and are thereby exempted from personal service while also reducing their taxes to the Crown. There are at present on the rolls 20,176 "roter" and 3,000 "rusthalls" who furnish the "indelta" infantry, and 200 double "roter" and 3,505 "rusthall" who furnish the cavalry. The artillery, engineers, train, &c., are, on the other hand, raised by common enlistment. The Swedish army is now almost completely made up of "indelta" soldiers, who enlist for thirty years and who do not live in garrison, but receive a small farm, "torp," for their use. The regular forces of the army number at present 24,000 officers and men, and of these more than 17,000 are raised by the "indelning" system. The number of recruits required each year is 1,200, but the non-commissioned officers and "indelta" soldiers are drawn from the "stamtroppe."

reserves or "beväring," with officers, are raised by conscription by ballot and number nominally 135,000 men, besides 8,000 who are raised only in and for the defence of the island of Gotland in the Baltic. There are also in the Swedish army 18,000 voluntary riflemen, whose officers are chosen by the king. On the present principle the total strength of the army both in peace and war is therefore now the same, viz. 200,000 men all told.

For a considerable number of years this system has, however, been considered by military men in Sweden to be too elaborate and old-fashioned, and one on which the nation could not rely with security in case of war. Several propositions have therefore been made by the Government to place the army in a position to meet modern requirements, and it is not uninteresting to note that these measures have been the outcome of external commotions, which seem for a time to have stimulated their efforts to amend a state of the national defences which leaves the country at the mercy of almost any foe. Thus the first bill introduced by the Government in 1869 was caused by the Danish and Austrian wars, and the second in 1871 by the Franco-German war. Both these measures proposed to retain the "indelning" system referred to above, but merely to effect some important changes as regards the "rote" and "rust hallare," i.e. by those classes in the State who furnish the army. These propositions were, however, rejected by the Chamber, which declared it could not give its sanction to any organisation which retained the old system, but that the requirements of the nation was an army raised by the conscriptive system in a modified form. It will be early understood that it has not been an easy matter for the Government to frame a measure which by a stroke of the pen will uproot social conditions and customs of several centuries growth and standing. Nevertheless, they submitted to the representatives of the nation in 1875 a bill for the reorganisation of the army, which proposed to abolish the "indelning" system and to raise an army instead by conscription only. This proposition was, however, also rejected by the Chamber, and in consequence the Government again framed a measure in 1877 to meet the views of the Representation, which appeared to be that the army should be raised by a general conscription, from which a limited regular force should be elected by ballot as a standing force, and the rest form a reserve subjected to a ninety days' service with the colours in all. This Government proposition was rejected too, and since then the question of national defence has not been before the Swedish nation.

It will be seen from the fate of these propositions that there is a strong antipathy among the bulk of the Swedes to a general conscription, the "indelta" system being originated in order to avoid the name "conscription," which is undoubtedly fostered by the circumstance that Sweden rose to the rank of one of the great Powers of Europe without it, and by the seventy years of unbroken peace which the nation has enjoyed. Still, those men who have governed the country for the last few years, and the intelligent military portion of the nation, have long clearly realised that the existing army, while excellent in peace, would be utterly deficient in case of attack, and it is with this view before him, and with a due regard to the susceptibilities of the nation, that the present Minister of War has framed a scheme for the reorganisation of the army on the basis of the proposition of 1878, which, to some extent at all events, is, as will be seen, based on the English military system.

The proposition now made is to abolish the "indelnings" system and to raise an army in the following manner. A standing army with a war establishment of about 100,000 men will be the limit of the regular forces of infantry and cavalry, and of these it is proposed to obtain from 20,000 to 30,000 by means of voluntary enlistment, and the rest by conscription. As regards the former, they will consist of volunteers between the age of 18 and 24—which class is estimated to number 130,000 men of the population—who enlist for a term of at least two or at most six years, and of these it is estimated that 5,500 recruits will be required a year, viz. 3·6 per cent. of the male population. The men may re-enlist up to the age of 33. If they enlist for a term of two years only they would have to serve twenty months in the infantry, but the full two years in the artillery and cavalry. They will live in garrison and receive, besides uniform, food and lodging, kr. 10 (11s) per month as well as 5 öre (½d.) per day in addition, and a bounty for each of the first five years of kr. 40 (£2 5s.), and for each of the following kr. 80 (£4 10s.); the total remuneration for a soldier who enlists for six years will thus be about £23.

The force which will be raised by general conscription will number, it is estimated, 70,000 men. The conscription will be general at the age of 22, and every Swede will have to serve with the colours ninety days, i.e. thirty days for three years. Thus, if a man who has not done his conscriptive service enlists before this age, he will still on the expiry of such service be liable to ninety days' conscriptive service, but if he has enlisted voluntarily he

will have thirty days less for every year after the two first, and then be exempted altogether if having been five years with the colours. It will thus be in the interest of the country to obtain as young men as possible for the voluntary service, as the men after their time will form part of the first army reserves, while their training already attained will be of great benefit to both recruits, and their officers. The combatant forces of Sweden by the new system will thus be about 103,000 men, to which may be added 33,000 non-combatant men, 40,000 garrison troops, making a total therefore in the field of 176,000 men. There will also be a second reserve, or so-called "landstorm," comprising all able-bodied men in the country up to the age of 50, which will also embrace the three services, but will only be employed in case of war within the borders of the kingdom. This last reserve, it is estimated, would number 25,000 to 30,000 men. Sweden would therefore, in case of need, be in a position to mobilise an army of 200,000 to 206,000 men.

If we compare the existing system with that proposed, we shall immediately observe the advantages of the latter. While thus the regular forces are now stated to number 24,000 men, of whom 17,000 live spread all over the country, the new system will provide the nation with a trained and homogeneous army of say 30,000 men; and while by the old system the "indelta" soldiers are retained in the service until old age, the new army will consist of comparatively young men, of whom about 5 per cent. are yearly recruited, and thus contribute to maintain the spirit of energy and *amour propre* so essential to the *morale* of soldiers; and while the present soldiers live, as stated, in "torps" all over the country, those of the new type will be lodged in garrison and trained as a compact body, which latter enormous advantage is obvious to every military student. And whereas the small number of really fully developed and trained men, viz. the 6,000 enlisted men under the old system, would have to be almost entirely employed as non-commissioned officers for the reserves in case of war, the new system will offer a force of 30,000 men to choose these from! It will also easily be conceived that of the 17,000 "indelta" men now on the rolls, some 20 per cent. perhaps will, on being called, be found unfit for duty through age and failing health, while on the efficiency and full strength of the new army the nation could always rely with confidence.

Still there is no class of the service which would benefit more by the change than the reserves. This class, the chief one for

defence in case of war, is now put down at 135,000 men, of whom those mature for service serve thirty days with the colours, viz. fifteen days in two years; and leaving out the question of the doubtful numerical strength of this body in case of war, their efficiency and so-called training is certainly below the lowest in any army in Europe. Although the reserves in Sweden are in the field for fifteen days in a year, there is not, perhaps, one man in a hundred who has ever fired a gun during such service! As an illustration of this deplorable system I may state that last summer, when a regiment of the regular army was practising rifle shooting, in Scania, the "bevåring," or reserves then under arms, were commanded to be present and "look on," in order to benefit thereby. This was all the instructions these reserves received in this important science, and, in commenting on this not unusual occurrence, the Journal of the Academy of Military Science (*Krigsvetenskapsakademiens tidskrift*) p. 37, exclaims with justice: "For whom, friend or foe, would the fire from such soldiers be most dangerous?"

Instead of this untrained force the new system would furnish a regular army of some 70,000 men, a great many of whom had been in the voluntary army and remaining subject to a ninety days' service with the colours.

The relative advantages of the system now proposed are so great that they need hardly be discussed. While thus the old "indelning" system in twenty years gives only a *nominal* army of 24,000 men, in peace as well as in war, without non-commissioned officers, the new scheme will in the same period furnish a fully *numerical* army of 110,000 men provided with experienced non-commissioned officers. Instead of the four months' scanty drill a year which the "indelta" soldiers receive, the new ones will be carefully trained for ten. Another change would be effected as regards the officers, who now receive exorbitant allowances in proportion to the work they have to get through.

Still the new scheme has met with a most violent opposition in certain quarters. Although the reform is strongly advised by a Royal Defence Committee, appointed by the Minister of War, and nine of the ablest Swedish generals, the "peasant" party in the country is strongly opposed to it, firstly, by the dislike to reforms and uprooting of traditional customs, common enough to a race of mountaineers; and secondly, by a disinclination to make a personal sacrifice where their own private interests are opposed to those of the nation at large. It has also been

asserted, that the enlistment system and the consequent garrison life will tend to demoralise the soldiers and render them "homeless." But if this were so, it would follow that those regiments which now do garrison duty should have this vice, while it is a well-known fact that a finer, more spirited, and moral regiment than, for instance, "*Värmlands fältjägare*" is not to be found in the Swedish army. Their argument is not an original one, viz. that whatever suited our fathers ought to suit ourselves; and by this narrow-minded view of the requirements of our altered times and circumstances, a reform urgently demanded by the ablest and most intelligent party of the Swedish nation, to ensure its very existence, will, perhaps, be lost. It is also asserted, more with a feeling of sentiment than of wisdom, that it was the old system which produced the heroes of Lützen and Poltawa, while it is entirely forgotten that the soldiers of the Great Gustavus, brave as they may have been, had as little in common with those of the present day as the leather gun of the Hero King with the modern Armstrong. Although I have no hesitation in asserting that a finer body of men than the present Swedish army could not be easily found, and that the Swede of the 19th century will respond as enthusiastically to the call of a Bernadotte as did his ancestor of the 17th to that of Gustavus Adolphus, an impartial observer is bound to admit that the existing force is more an army of peace than of war, its strength being less in the former than the latter condition, while it is undoubtedly wanting in that kind of development which is now considered indispensable to the modern soldier.

If we turn to the expenses which will be incurred by the country if the new army organisation scheme is adopted, we find that the cost of the present army is about £890,000 a year, while the cost of the new is estimated at £1,100,000 during the fifteen years which will be required for its complete development, and from one to two hundred thousand pounds more after the year 1897. But it should be borne in mind that the actual outlay is not the difference between these sums, as a greater part of the keep of the soldiers would be provided by the Government, and not, as heretofore, by certain taxpayers. The total Budget of Sweden is, for the year 1883-1884, £4,580,000, and the population estimated at 5,300,000 individuals.

With regard to the Swedish Navy, this branch of the defences of the country is based on the same "*indelta*" system as the army. Simultaneously, therefore, with the proposition to re-

organise the army, the navy will also be remodelled, chiefly on the same principle as that laid down for the army.

The Minister of Marine thus proposes to raise the regular naval force to 4,000 men (at present about 2,000), of which 3,000 shall be combatant sailors and marines, 2,000 to be stationed at Carlskrona, the "Portsmouth of Sweden," and 1,000 in Stockholm. The men will enlist for a period of ten years, by the end of which time they would be considered sailors of the second class, but may recapitulate up to the age of 32. After such a term of service, the discharged men would belong to the first naval reserve. The number of men which would be required to enlist annually, in order to maintain the force, would be 350, and as their actual service would be limited to about half of the period, as during some six months snow and ice impede navigation in Swedish waters, they would be allowed to obtain suitable occupation within the kingdom, when not in training. Their pay would be as follows : On enlistment, a bounty of kr. 50 (£2 16s.); the first year, kr. 100 (£5 12s.); second year, kr. 110 (£6 3s.); third year, kr. 120 (£6 14s.); the fourth year, kr. 130 (£7 5s.); the fifth year, kr. 140 (£7 15s.); the sixth year and following four years, kr. 150 (£8 6s.) per year. Besides the fixed pay, the sailors will be allowed kr. 10 (11s.) every time they are called to or discharged from the stations. The remaining yearly contingent required for the navy will be raised by ordinary conscription among the nautical class of the country. The number of conscripts on the rolls liable to service is 1,500 men a year ; but as this number is chiefly composed of pilots and their apprentices, the Minister of the Navy proposes in time of peace only to call 500 of this class a year, in order, as is obvious, not to embarrass the mercantile marine of the country. He further proposes that mercantile sailor conscripts who when liable to service have for four years been registered as A.B.'s in this branch, and for twelve months have served in foreign waters, shall in time of peace be exempted from all service, as these men must naturally by such service have acquired the elements which the country indispensably demands from her sons who furrow the seas. The number of boys in training will be 400 a year.

The cost of the Swedish navy is at present about £840,000 a year, and the increased expenditure necessitated by the new system is estimated at £440,000 a year.

It was my intention in connection with this subject also to have dealt with a certain proposal, viz., the Neutralisation of

Scandinavia, recently made by a few men who, no doubt, have their purse more than the honour of their country at heart, but as this hare-brained scheme has already been rejected by the Committee of the Swedish Parliament, and will not, I trust, again be brought forward until the era of the millennium, I will merely conclude my task by hoping that the Representatives of the Swedish nation will, ere too late, adopt the measures which are imperatively demanded for the honour and protection of that glorious history and liberty for which the great Gustavus and "Alexander of the North" offered their lives in the days of yore.

Lord Hawke: the Father of the British Navy.

BY GEORGE C. V. HOLMES.

THE "Father of the British Navy"; such was the title which Keppel bestowed on Lord Hawke in the House of Commons, and those who are well acquainted with this famous man's history will readily acknowledge that not one of our great naval heroes has a better claim to the title; for Hawke not only won great victories at sea, and saved his country from foreign invasion, to him belongs the merit of having contributed more than any of his contemporaries towards reforming the *morale*, the *matériel*, and the tactics of the Royal Navy at a period when such reformation was sorely needed. He also may be said to have discovered and trained Rodney and Howe, whose fame has perhaps unjustly dimmed the glory of their illustrious chief; for the public at large are certainly unaware that to a comparatively unknown commander belongs the distinguished title quoted above. We therefore the more readily welcome the admirable life of Lord Hawke,* which has recently been written by Captain Montagu Burrows, R.N., and which will, without doubt, do much to restore to its proper place the fame of one of our most illustrious commanders. Captain Burrows' competency to write such a work rests not merely on his connection with the navy; he is also, as is well-known, the Chichele Professor of Modern History in the University of Oxford, and his book, as might be expected, is strictly historical in its method. It is much more than a mere personal biography of the man whose life it professes to relate, for it contains a striking and well-told account of the state of parties, and of home and foreign politics during the time when Hawke was fulfilling his career; and also

* *Life of Admiral Lord Hawke*, by Montagu Burrows, Captain, R.N. (Retired List), and Chichele Professor of Modern History in the University of Oxford. London: Messrs. W. H. Allen & Co., 13 Waterloo Place.

valuable sketch of the condition and administration of the navy, and the system of naval tactics then in vogue.

The book opens with an account of the origin of the great wars in the reign of George II., the first of which broke out with Spain in the year 1739, but on which was soon superposed the memorable conflict with Spain's protector and ally, France. This war, which lasted—broken only by a short truce—for all but a quarter of a century, was “in many respects the most important, as well as the most arduous, conflict in which Great Britain ever engaged; for in the course of twenty-four years, it issued in the foundation and establishment of the British Empire.” The great wars of the time of Marlborough had resulted in glory and little else to this country; they certainly contributed in no direct way to the establishment of the empire, for the only material acquisitions gained by this country at the peace of Utrecht were Gibraltar and Minorca; these were the sole returns for the huge expenditure of blood and treasure, and for one of the most brilliant succession of victories ever recorded. For the rest it was, we may suppose, deemed sufficient compensation to have averted (using the words of the treaty) “the great danger which threatened the liberties and safety of all Europe from the too close conjunction of the kingdoms of Spain and France.” Gibraltar has since become of immense importance to this country. Its capture was indeed the first of a series of steps which eventually, for a time, turned the Mediterranean into a British lake. But the circumstances which were soon to render it an invaluable acquisition had at the time of its capture no existence, and of such slight importance was the fortress rock held to be in the early days of the Hanoverian dynasty, that George I. on more than one occasion entered into negotiations with Spain for its restitution. These negotiations, fortunately, led to no result, and the retention by England of the fortress which cut the French and Spanish sea-boards into two unconnected and unsupported halves, was a source of perpetual irritation to both these Powers, and was undoubtedly the principal, though not the ostensible, incentive to the war of 1739. The other main cause of hostilities was the arrogant attitude which Spain, acting under the secret encouragement of France, assumed towards Great Britain in the matter of the trade with the West Indies. It seems utterly incredible that this country, which then, as now, claimed to be the mistress of the seas, and which only a few years before had been the principal agent in humbling the ambition and defeating the

combinations of the great French monarch, should ever have submitted to the arrogant ambition of a Power like Spain, which was then in the full swing of political decay. Yet to this depth of humiliation had Sir Robert Walpole brought his country. For years the Spaniards had, in spite of treaties, insisted on the right of search for contraband merchandise on the high seas, and had claimed to themselves the exclusive right to the navigation of the West Indian seas, and the trade with the West Indian islands. The famous petition of the West Indian merchants to the House of Commons in 1737 narrates that—

For many years past their ships have not only been frequently stopped and searched, but also forcibly and arbitrarily seized upon the high seas, by Spanish ships fitted out to cruise, under the plausible pretence of guarding their own coasts; that the commanders thereof, with their crews, have been inhumanly treated, and their ships carried into some of the Spanish ports, and there condemned with their cargoes, in manifest violation of the treaties subsisting between the two Crowns; that the remonstrances of His Majesty's ministers receive no attention at Madrid, and that insults and plunder must soon destroy their trade.

Yet Walpole was not to be moved. The House passed resolutions which endorsed the petitions. In these resolutions Walpole acquiesced, but it was for the time impossible to rouse him into action. He continued to endeavour to obtain satisfaction and full reparation by peaceable means, and insisted that "we ought not to involve the nation in a war from the event of which we have a great deal to fear." On another occasion he stated that "it may sometimes be for the benefit of the nation to pocket an affront." In fact, anything more cowardly and mean than was Walpole's policy at this period it is impossible to imagine. Had he shown a firm front when these insults were first attempted, the war might, with Spain at least, have been avoided. As it was, in proportion as our meekness and impotence became more apparent, the arrogance and pretensions of the Spaniards grew; and at length our ships' crews were denied the ancient rights of cutting logwood in the Bay of Campeachy, and of collecting salt in the island of Sal Tortugas, and the British salt fleet, though convoyed by a man-of-war, was actually attacked by two Spanish ships of the line, and only escaped through the daring of Captain Thomas Durrell, who was in charge of the convoy, and who with his little twenty-gun ship engaged the enemy's two liners so long that thirty-two out of the thirty-six merchant vessels were enabled to escape. For two years more Walpole temporised, but the nation was gradually being lashed into a state

of fury, and at length his own supporters combined with the Opposition, and forced him to declare war; and shortly afterwards he was hurled from power.

We should be neglecting the teachings of history, and failing completely to derive the greatest of the benefits which historical studies can confer, unless we applied the lessons to be learned from the results of Walpole's pusillanimous conduct to the circumstances of to-day. In his desire for peace, he landed his country in a war which lasted a quarter of a century, and which caused enormous sacrifices. That, in the end, the war turned out fortunately for us, was no merit of Walpole's, and is moreover beside the question. Captain Burrows very aptly quotes a saying of Machiavelli's, which shows how the Romans invariably acted under similar circumstances, and the moral of that saying is as applicable now as it was over: "The Romans never swallowed an injury to put off a war, for they knew that war was not avoided, but deferred thereby, and commonly with an advantage to the enemy." Have we not lately, in this country, been swallowing injuries, and defeats even, and pocketing affronts, to put off a war, and will not the result in the end be probably as disastrous and as disappointing as history shows that it always has been?

The circumstances above briefly described were such as existed when Hawke first made his appearance on the scene. The son of a barrister of Lincoln's Inn, who had settled in Norfolk, he was born in 1705, and appears to have first entered the navy when twelve years old. He owed his appointment to his maternal uncle, Colonel Martin Bladen, a man of considerable influence, who appears to have acted, as long as he lived, as a sort of providence to young Hawke. His earlier services were quite uneventful, and we first find him prominently distinguishing himself in Admiral Mathews' action with the combined French and Spanish fleets off Toulon in 1844. Captain Hawke, as he was then, was the only officer on the British side who came out of this action with any credit to himself, he having captured the solitary vessel which was taken on either side during the engagement. This battle will be more particularly referred to hereafter; but before considering the remainder of Hawke's active career, it may be of interest to glance at the condition of the navy about the time of the opening of the war.

When Hawke first entered the navy there had been a dearth of great officers for nearly a century. During the reigns of Anne and William and Mary, the country had developed its

fighting strength on land to a surprising extent, but the navy had been correspondingly neglected. The quality of the officers was anything but satisfactory. Courts-martial were numerous. "It is plain that there was an abundance of courage without conduct, sometimes a deficiency of the first and most necessary quality; for the exigencies of war bring out what a time of peace may fail to discover." As an instance of the conduct of officers, we may mention that in the year 1742 no less than three post-captains were severely punished for improper treatment of their men, viz. Captains Fanshaw, Sir Yelverton Peyton, and the Hon. William Harvey, the two former for hiring out their men to merchants. "Another contemporary captain, of good family, was executed for murdering an elder brother whom he had decoyed on board his frigate for that purpose." As another instance of the quality of officers at this period, we may cite what took place in Mathews' action above referred to. The indecisive character of this action was in large measure due to the jealousy which existed between the commander-in-chief and Lestock, his second in command. Lestock actually declined to join in the engagement, when his intervention would probably have been decisive, simply because Mathews, in the heat of the action, had forgotten to give him the formal signal to engage; and on the day but one following, when pursuing the combined fleets with every chance of overtaking them, Mathews suddenly gave the signal to cease pursuit, because, as it was supposed, Lestock, of whom he was jealous, occupied such a position that, in the event of battle, he would have sustained the brunt of the fight, and might have carried off the lion's share of the glory. During the same action, many captains behaved so disgracefully that they were afterwards court-martialled and broke. These are but a few instances out of many, but they serve to illustrate the prevailing condition of things, and they show the raw material with which Hawke had to deal, and out of which he contrived to rear the splendid body of officers—men of the type of Rodney, Howe and Keppel—who commanded the vessels of his fleet during his later actions. The quality of the seamen was probably as good as could anywhere be found. They were, of course, impressed and in this way a large sprinkling of inferior men was introduced; but the country had then, as now, a large merchant navy filled with skilled seamen to fall back upon. The treatment of the men by their officers varied according to the character of the officers; but their lot, at best of times, was a hard one.

It was one of the greatest points in Hawke's favour, and one which contributed most to his subsequent successes, that he devoted himself to the welfare of his men, and in this respect the best of his captains followed his example. The greatest hardships of the crews were due to the bad sanitary conditions which prevailed. The rotten state of the ships, which were continued in commission long after they should have been broken up, made matters worse; for diseases of various kinds were due to this cause alone. The scurvy was then, of course, the terrible scourge of the fleet. The only remedy known against the disease, when fresh provisions could not be obtained, was beer, and "beer was often the only and always the chief beverage of the men." Often the beer was bad, and this simply meant death and inefficiency. It is difficult, now-a-days, when the disease is almost unknown, to put ourselves in the position of the naval commander of those days. The scurvy was to him a far more terrible foe than the enemy, and often brought him to passes of which we can have no conception. As an illustration of the state of things which then existed, we may quote the figures from a summary drawn up at the end of the Seven Years' War, from which it appears that in all the naval battles of that war there were only 1,512 sailors and marines killed, as against the appalling number of 133,708 who had died of disease or were missing.

In one important respect we were far behind both France and Spain all through the war, and this was the art of building and arming men-of-war. We were, however, not long left without models to copy from. The *Princesa*, taken from the Spaniards, and the *Magnanime*, from the French, each by a superior force, and after a gallant resistance, supplied us with information which we were not slow to avail ourselves of. The *Princesa* was half as large again as the ships of corresponding rate in our own navy. These captures convinced the home authorities that we had been allowed to fall shamefully behindhand: and there was the less excuse for all this, because only a century before these events England led the world in all matters relating to naval architecture. It is not generally known that the four Stuart kings devoted much attention to this subject. James I. employed—so Captain Burrows informs us—one Peter Pett, a mathematician, to make ships of a superior design. In Pett's family the art was retained for more than one generation. Charles I. worked in the same direction, "and it was with the fine ships he provided with the doomed ship-money that

Cromwell and Blake conquered the Dutch." James II. was not only a distinguished admiral who did much to revolutionise the naval tactics of the day, he was also a scientific naval architect.

The stagnation which overtook the Navy in the reign of William III. affected even the art of shipbuilding; in fact, from that time forward till the present century we were totally dependent for our improved models on vessels captured from our various enemies, whether French, Spanish, or American. At the beginning of the war our *matériel* was terribly over-matched by that of the enemy, "and it was not till the end of the Seven Years' War that the energy of Anson and his peers, acting on the hints supplied by captured ships, had made up for the loss of half a century." And yet Anson could only have taught his countrymen slavishly to copy; they evidently were without the scientific knowledge which would have enabled them to originate, for we hear the same complaints again in the time of Nelson, and in 1812, when at war with the United States, we found their ships to be double the size of ours of the corresponding rate, and armed with guns throwing shot of twice the size of ours, in consequence of all which we sustained a succession of severe defeats. In our own days we have witnessed something of the same sort. The French were beforehand with us in the introduction of screw line-of-battle ships, of armour-clad vessels, and, lastly, in the introduction of steel. If we are to believe what we have been told in recent debates in Parliament, they are again leading us in the size and armament of their ships. Fortunately, however, now-a-days, the fault, if fault there be, lies not with our naval architects, for we possess in them a race of men who have restored to this country the pre-eminence in scientific shipbuilding which she enjoyed in the time of the Stuart kings. When the war first broke out, and for long afterwards, our officers found themselves out-sailed and over-matched by the enemies' ships. Our naval artillery was as inferior as the ships. The larger vessel was, of course, able to carry the heavier gun. When this was found out we attempted to put on board our ships heavier guns than they would bear, with the result of making them crank and bad sea-boats; and it was not till 1782 that the proportion of guns to tonnage was fixed substantially as it remained down to the time of the final abandonment of sailing ships. The ships were not only imperfect in themselves, but there was a great dearth of frigates and the smaller class of vessels generally. The

system of signalling was also most deficient, and there was a total absence of trustworthy charts of the enemy's coasts.

The last point in connection with naval matters at that time which deserves special mention, is the system of tactics which was in vogue. The system of fighting in line, which was first completely developed during the wars with the Dutch in the time of Cromwell and Charles II. had continued to be the recognised method of engaging down to the time of Hawke. When first introduced, it was no doubt a necessary change, for fleets were in those days exceedingly large, and some orderly manner of fighting had become indispensable.

The main reasons for fighting in line, broadside to broadside, each division sailing opposite to its counterpart in the enemy's line, were these: The admiral's motions might in this way, and this alone, be accurately followed, and the signals attended to, and thus the disasters proceeding from isolation and independent action on the part of captains of ships, often at first imperfectly trained, and likely enough to make mistakes of all kinds, were minimised. The fleet was, theoretically at least, one vast machine. Still more advantageous was the system when fleets could be long kept together. The constant practice of sailing in close order, exercising as it did all the skill and vigilance of the officers, and teaching those of each ship to regard themselves as a factor in the whole body, caused them to acquire a habit of comprehending what was required of them, and performing it as if by instinct.

There can now be no doubt, however, but that the system was grossly abused in the hands of men wanting in originality, and devoid of the true military instinct which has always enabled great commanders to revolutionise the system of tactics when circumstances required the change. Instead of being made use of when best adapted to the work to be done, the tactics of line fighting were invariably employed. Though its introduction did much to systematise the methods of sea fighting, and raise the latter out of the condition of a mere *mêlée* or scramble, it was, after all, but a very elementary stage in tactics. In the hands of the mediocre commanders who filled the interval between the great naval wars with the Dutch, and the time of which we are speaking, it led to the result of indecisive actions. It was reserved for Hawke to break through this established tradition, and to put naval tactics once more upon a rational footing. Whenever the old system did not apply, he resolutely disregarded it by disregarding the line of battle. The change in his hand was, no doubt, gradual, but it is a remarkable fact that, in the very first general engagement in which he was employed as captain of a line-of-battle ship, he, of his own initiative, threw the regulations to one side, and bore down out of the line on the Spanish ship, the *Poder*, and captured her after a sharp engage-

ment. The *Poder* was the only vessel that struck during the engagement, and she was so well fought that before Hawke bore down on her she had driven two English ships out of the line, and had kept several more at bay.

What he commenced as a subordinate in Mathews' action, he continued as commander in the battle which he fought on the 14th of October 1847, and he finally destroyed the old traditions in his magnificent battle at Quiberon, which was, in many respects, the finest victory ever won by the British navy. The work which Hawke so successfully commenced, was continued and developed by his illustrious pupils, Rodney and Howe. We call them pupils advisedly, because they both served under Hawke, and he is well known to have taken the greatest pains in instructing his captains. To Rodney, as is well known, belongs the supreme merit of having invented the system of breaking the enemy's line, and of doubling the attack on each ship cut off; but in assigning to Rodney his proper place as a naval commander, we must consider how far his method was a mere development of the system of tactics adopted by his great predecessor. When once the old tradition had been broken through by Hawke, the development of the revolution was a comparatively easy task. We do not for a moment wish to under-rate the great merit of Rodney; he fully proved, within a year of Hawke's death, that on him had descended that great man's mantle, and his achievement must be the more highly valued when we find that so considerable an officer as Keppel—the favourite pupil of Hawke—was, when deprived of his master's guidance, utterly unable to put his precepts into practice, and allowed a golden opportunity of winning a decisive victory over the French off Ushant to escape him, because he was unable to evade the tradition of fighting in line.

We can now consider more particularly Hawke's active career at sea. It has already been mentioned that the first considerable affair in which he was engaged was Mathews' indecisive action with the allied fleets in 1744. Into the particulars of this conflict it is needless to enter here. It was a golden opportunity allowed to slip. Had the British commanders been less jealous of each other, the French and Spanish naval power in the Mediterranean might have been irretrievably ruined quite early in the war, and it is impossible to foretell what might have been the influence of a decisive naval victory at this period on the future course of hostilities. Of all the officers who took part in the action, Hawke was the only one who distinguished himself, and

his conduct, contrasting as it did in strong relief with that of his colleagues and superiors, had no small effect in bringing his great qualities under notice at home. He had but lately joined the fleet in the *Berwick*, having been engaged previously on convoy duty. During his voyage out from England he was greatly troubled by sickness amongst the crew; at one time he reports that he has 123 working men ill, and that the rest of the crew continued to fall ill by tens and twenties at a time, consisting as they did for the most part of "poor, puny fellows," picked up by the press-gangs in London. This circumstance deserves mention, otherwise we can but half appreciate the fine work which Hawke succeeded in getting out of his raw and partially disabled crew when the day of trial arrived. The *Berwick* was a ship of seventy guns, and was attached to the van division under Rear-Admiral Rowley. Her station was towards the rear of the van, which was engaged with the centre of the allied fleets. Her first opponent was the Spanish ship, the *Neptuno*, which, after an hour's engagement, was driven out of the line with the loss of her captain, first lieutenant, four other officers, and 200 men. In spite of these losses she did not strike. At the end of this conflict, Hawke found himself within no great distance of another Spanish ship, the *Poder*, which was being splendidly fought, and which was, in fact, engaging ten British ships, belonging chiefly to the central division. Of these she had driven two, the *Princesa* and the *Somerset*, out of the line, while she kept the others at bay. Hawke, seeing this disgraceful state of things, determined to put a stop to it. "Bearing down upon her within pistol, or half musket shot, his first broadside killed twenty-seven of her men, and dismounted several of her lower-deck guns. In twenty minutes he had dismasted her, and at the end of a two hours' conflict at close quarters, during which the *Poder* lost 200 men killed and wounded, the brave Spaniard struck his colours." The loss to the *Berwick* was only five men wounded. More than one of the jackals which had previously been kept at bay, and which had witnessed the Spaniard strike, had the audacity to send off boats' crews to take possession of the *Poder*; "but the captain would deliver his sword to no one but the officer sent by the ship to which he had struck, pointing to the *Berwick*, and saying, at the same time, that he held the others in the greatest contempt." And well, indeed, he might, for of the captains with whom he was engaged that day no less than six were ordered to be tried by court-martial for their conduct in the battle; of these, two

only were acquitted, one deserted from the service when on way home to be tried, and three were cashiered or dismissed.

After this battle Hawke was employed under Admiral Row in the Mediterranean in the command of considerable squadron till the close of the year 1745, when he returned home and spent the greater part of the next year on shore. This was a year of naval disasters, which followed thick and close on the other. Peyton in the East and Mitchell in the West Indies fought engagements with the French, for which they were ordered to be tried by court-martial. Peyton died before trial took place, but Mitchell was broke. In the same year Lestock, the unruly subordinate of Mathews at Toulon, was with disaster at L'Orient. These events throw a flood of light on the unsatisfactory condition of the navy at that time; from thenceforward a real improvement took place, the credit which is due to Anson, who was at the Admiralty, and Hawke, who from that time forward was the right arm of naval power of Britain. In the year 1747 Anson, leaving Admiralty for a time, took the command of a large fleet, and went off in the hope of intercepting two French squadrons, one of which was destined to attack Cape Breton, and the other was intended to assist Dupleix in India. Anson caught the two squadrons off Cape Finisterre, just where they were expected, and being himself in overwhelming force he captured all the ships. The officer who was second in command to Anson in this engagement, Sir Peter Warren, bore the principal brunt of the fighting, and succeeded to the command of the entire squadron when his chief resumed his place at the Admiralty. Just at this time Hawke was promoted to the rank of rear-admiral, thanks to the personal intervention of the King, who was never slow to encourage merit, and who had not forgotten our hero's behaviour in the Mediterranean. He was fortunate in being placed under Warren's command, who, in consequence of his bad state of health, was forced to beg the Admiralty to allow Hawke to hold the command for him. This request was complied with, but only with extreme diffidence, on account of Hawke's youth. It is greatly to Warren's credit that he discerned the abilities and aptitude of the young admiral, and afforded him a chance of distinguishing himself and of rendering important services to his country. In the autumn of the same year Warren's health had become so bad that he finally relinquished his post, and Hawke was appointed to take the independent command of the "Western Squadron."

as it was called, which consisted of nineteen large ships, seven frigates, and two fire-ships. His instructions were, "to cruise between Ushant and Cape Finisterre, twenty leagues to the westward of each cape; to make the land of Ushant every fortnight, and to station one of his best sailing ships and frigates off each cape to communicate with the Admiralty." He had not long to wait, for on the 14th October he discovered an immense fleet of French merchantmen (some 300 sail) convoyed by nine line-of-battle ships and several frigates. His own squadron consisted of fourteen ships of the line, which were, however, for the most part considerably inferior to the French ships in size, thickness of sides, and number and weight of guns. Finding that he lost time in endeavouring to form line of battle, Hawke gave the signal for the whole squadron to chase, and 11.30 A.M. he gave orders for the foremost ships to engage. His flagship, the *Devonshire*, of sixty-six guns, bore the principal brunt of the fighting, for out of six ships captured no less than three, viz. the *Terrible*, of seventy-four, the *T'ridant*, of sixty-four, and the *Severn*, of fifty guns, were captured or silenced by her: while the *Tonnant*, of eighty guns, would most probably have shared the same fate had not the whole of the lower-deck guns of the *Devonshire* carried away their breechings at a critical moment in the attack, thus becoming unserviceable till the defect could be remedied. This accident was a proof of the amount of work which Hawke got out of his guns. It is known from other sources that he paid immense attention to the subject of quick firing; and the practice which he thus introduced into the navy stood it in good stead in the subsequent wars, and contributed, as much as any other circumstance, to the successes which were afterwards attained. It is curious that with such a large fleet so little was done by the other ships, when we remember that amongst their captains were such distinguished men as Rodney, Saunders, Watson, Saumarez, and Harland. This circumstance speaks volumes for the personal courage and energy of the admiral. The French, under Admiral L'Etenduère, fought splendidly on this occasion, against a superior force. It is much to their credit that they succeeded in saving any of their ships. Their own loss in killed and wounded was 800, while they inflicted a loss of 700 on us. Had they always fought as well, the empire of the seas would not have been so easily acquired. Their action for the time saved the convoy, which escaped under the protection of the frigates and a line-of-battle ship. Thanks, however, to

Hawke's energy, a large part of it was eventually captured; for the day after the battle he sent off an express to Commodore Legge, who commanded off the Leeward Islands, informing him of the destination of the convoy. Legge was dead when the message arrived, but his successor—Pocock—promptly acted upon it, and, intercepting the convoy, captured a very large number of ships.

For this victory Hawke was made a Knight of the Bath, and received a seat in Parliament as member for Portsmouth. Sir Peter Warren having now recovered his health, Hawke, at his own request, continued to serve under him as second in command till July 1748, when Warren definitely retired, and was succeeded in the supreme command by Hawke, who held the post till November 1752. This was a period of truce, for the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle had been signed in 1748.

For the next two years and a half he was unemployed, but at the commencement of the Seven Years War he again receives orders to hoist his flag, and continues in active service till about the period of the signature of the Peace of Paris. We may appropriately conclude the notice of this portion of Hawke's career with the following quotation from Captain Burrows' work :—

The effect produced by the action of the Royal Navy was, indeed, the sole ground on which the country could claim a peace. The land forces had never had a fair chance, and nearly eighty millions of debt had been incurred, chiefly in subsidies and the pay of Hanoverian troops. But the navy of France had been most seriously crippled in battles and single fights, her hostile colonial enterprises effectually checked, and her support of Spain had fallen still more ruinously than ever on the decaying state. The commerce of all three nations had suffered enormously; but the balance of prizes was estimated to be in favour of Great Britain by two millions sterling.

Into the circumstances which led up to the Seven Years' War it would be impossible now to enter. Whatever may have been the apparent issues of European politics, the conflict between this country and France was at bottom one for maritime, commercial, and colonial supremacy. Hence the immense interest which attaches to the doings of the navy during this epoch; and of all that was done by the navy the greatest and the noblest part was borne by Hawke. The war commenced disastrously. A great deal of the new spirit which had been infused into the navy during the last years of the old war, appears to have been lost during the peace. The *matériel* of the fleet had also been neglected, and nothing could well have been worse than the victualling or the sanitary arrangements generally. The

anean was left to take care of itself, though it was known that the French were openly preparing an expedition to Minorca.

Nothing seemed able to rouse Newcastle's Government. It was not till thirteen months after they had received intelligence of the French preparations, that Byng was ordered to equip a fleet of ten line-of-battle ships for the protection of Minorca. A worse equipped or more ill-manned expedition never left our shores. It met with nothing but bad luck on its way out, and its ultimate fate, as also that of its unfortunate commander, are so well known that it is unnecessary here to refer to them. The fury of the nation at the failure of the expedition was unbounded, and, like all national fury, it was cruelly unjust.

The reading of the history of that year is not pleasant work. The whole nation seemed at fault, from the Government downwards, and behaved disgracefully to the unfortunate Byng. One good thing, however, resulted from all this evil, the miserable and incompetent Government was driven from office, and Pitt becomes the soul, if not the head, of the new administration. From henceforward he is the preponderating figure in the conduct of the war. The mainspring of every movement, his fiery energy seems to animate the whole nation, and to infuse new vigour into every service. Well might Frederick the Great exclaim that, the travail pains of England had been long and distressing, but that at length she had been delivered of a man. Like his great contemporary, Pitt commenced his career with a succession of failures which only had the effect of teaching him how for the future to command success. With one of these Hawke was connected, though he was in no way responsible for the result. We allude to the ineffectual expedition to Rochefort. Pitt was determined to divert the attention of the French from their eastern frontier, and at the same time to prevent them from sending succour to their North American colonies and to India, by carrying out a succession of descents on their northern and western coasts. That his policy in the end succeeded, and that he not only expelled the French from India and Canada, but utterly destroyed France as a colonising power, is known to every child; but his earlier expeditions to the French coast were anything but successful, and, what is more, the fault of their ill-success must be laid principally at Pitt's door.

The first of these was the descent on Rochefort, a naval fortress which was erected by Colbert in the time of Louis XIV., and which is in such an inaccessible position that the French

Admiral, Aube, writing some little time ago in the *Révue des Deux Mondes*, names it as one of the three naval arsenals of Europe which cannot be taken by sea. Hawke was selected for the command of the naval portion of the expedition, while Sir John Mordaunt commanded the troops; and Wolfe, afterwards so famous, was quartermaster-general. The fleet was composed of sixteen line-of-battle ships, seven frigates, two bomb-ketches, two fire-ships, two busses, one horse-ship, and fifty-five transports, which latter carried ten infantry regiments, two of marines, a train of field-guns, and sixty light horse. There was no siege-artillery; for the whole expedition was kept a profound secret, and the place was intended to be surprised and taken by escalade. It was arranged that the expedition should leave Spithead about the middle of August, but, owing to the tonnage of the transports necessary to carry so large a force having been miscalculated, great delays took place, and the fleet could not start till September 10th, only a fortnight before the equinox, which was far too late.

Nothing was known about Rochefort; there were no charts, and no English pilots; the waters into which this great fleet had to be taken were excessively intricate, and none of the English seamen knew anything about their navigation. Everything had to be trusted to a French pilot, who turned out to be very ignorant of the waters. During the voyage the breezes were light and mostly contrary, so that the fleet did not sight the islands of Rhé and Oleron till the 20th, about noon. The admiral attempted to get into Basque roads that night, but could not succeed. The next day also the weather proved unfavourable, and it was not till the day following at 9 p.m. that he succeeded in entering the roads.

As three days were thus unavoidably lost outside, all hopes of effecting a surprise had to be abandoned; and as it turned out that the French had had ample warning from an English spy, before Hawke himself knew that the expedition was in contemplation, a surprise could in no case have been effected. Once inside the roads Hawkes responsibilities were over. The further initiative rested with the military officers, and they proved themselves to be men devoid of resolution. They wasted three days in holding councils of war, and finally resolved to do nothing. The expedition then returned, not a man having been landed, and thus a million of the public money was absolutely squandered.

Looking back upon the expedition from this distance of time,

and with the wisdom which always follows the event, we can come to no other conclusion but that the generals by their irresolution, and want of dash, saved the country from a frightful disaster. The enterprise depended for its success upon too many chances, any one of which going against it would inevitably have led to failure. As it was, every single chance turned out adversely, and Pitt ought to have been thankful that nothing worse came of it; but it was an expedition planned by himself, **and** which he forced upon the reluctant king, and his fury at its failure knew no bounds. At the opening of Parliament he so far forgot himself as to express himself in the following ignoble manner:—

He declared solemnly that his belief was that there was a determined resolution, both in the naval and military commanders, against any vigorous exertion of the national power. He affirmed that though His Majesty appeared ready to embrace every measure proposed by his ministers for the honour and interest of his British dominions, yet scarce a man could be found with whom the execution of any one plan, in which there was the least appearance of danger, could with confidence be trusted.

The only excuse the Great Commoner could have had for using such violent language, was that the number of the disasters which befel him just about this time may have caused him to lose his head; for a few weeks before the termination of the Rochefort expedition, the Duke of Cumberland had been all but driven into the sea by Marshall Richelieu, and had signed the notorious convention of Closter-seven.

Thus the autumn of 1757 closed in gloom, with disaster on every side; but it was fortunately the gloom of the darkness which precedes the dawn, for the grand spirit of the nation was now thoroughly roused, and from thenceforward king, people, ministers, and officers vied with each other in the efforts which they made, and the sacrifices which they endured, to raise the fallen fortunes of the country. And nobly were their efforts, and the corresponding exertions of their allies, rewarded. The great Frederick turned the tide with his victory at Rossbach, followed quickly by that of Leuthen, and before Christmas he had rolled back the invading hosts of French, Russians, and Swedes from the districts which they had occupied. The army which capitulated at Closter-seven was, moreover, set free by the action of its capturers.

In the next year, in April, Hawke destroyed the French expedition which was destined to sail from Rochefort to the relief of Louisbourg; in July, Boscawen and Amherst recaptured the latter place from the French, together with the whole of Cape Breton

and St. John, and secured both banks of the mouth of the St. Laurence, thus cutting off the French in Canada from all support from Europe; and on the French coasts Howe and General Bligh succeeded in doing a good deal of damage, burning a quantity of shipping and stores at St. Maloes, and destroying the basin and forts of Cherbourg; this latter expedition, however, ended unfortunately in the disaster at St. Cas. Lastly, from India came the news of Clive's great victory of Plassy won in the previous year.

The year 1759 brings us to the most famous events in the life of Hawke. After an eleven months' leave of absence, caused by ill-health, he hoists his flag in May on the *Ramilies*, and takes command of the large fleet of twenty-five line-of-battle ships destined to blockade Brest. The French Government, believing that England had expended all its strength on distant expeditions, determined to make a grand effort to turn the balance of fortune nearer home. An invasion in force of this country was determined on, and a large naval force, destined to cover the invading force, was fitted out at Brest. It became Hawke's duty to watch, and, if possible, to destroy this naval force, and thus to check the threatened invasion. For six months he keeps up the blockade, under circumstances of exceptional difficulty. Whenever a westerly gale set in, there was great difficulty of the fleet being driven on shore, while on the other hand the French could not come out till the wind changed. Hawke had, therefore, to withdraw his ships to a place of safety, such as Plymouth or Torbay, and be on his station again when the gale moderated, before the French should have time to come out. The vigilance and the energy required to carry out this work successfully were extraordinary, while at the same time the difficulties of victualling the fleet, of maintaining the health of the men on such a long cruise, and of keeping his ships clean and fit, were such as to tax to the uttermost the admiral's powers of organisation. In those days copper-bottoms had not yet been invented, and vessels consequently soon got foul, especially so when engaged in blockade work.

The summer and autumn seem to have been exceptionally stormy, for we find the admiral several times driven off his station, and on each of these occasions there was the utmost anxiety at home lest the French should get out.

When we read the history of this long blockade, and of the magnificent victory which concluded it, we scarcely know which most to admire, the untiring patience, vigilance, and resource

which the admiral displayed while watching the enemy's coasts, for the dare-devil courage and masterly skill which enabled him to destroy their fleet under the circumstances which will presently be narrated.

The policy of the French was, of course, to remain in Brest as long as possible, in order to wear out the British ships and sailors by the trials of the long blockade, and also to take eventual advantage of any storm which might either destroy the hostile fleet or drive it off the station. In this wise policy they nearly succeeded, and would most probably have done so but for the splendid behaviour of Hawke.

On November the 10th we find that he had been driven by a tremendous westerly gale, against which he had struggled for three days, into Torbay, and he writes that he was lucky enough to get in there. He is off again on the 12th, but is driven back on the 13th. He shifts his flag to the *Royal George*, his old flagship having become water-logged whenever it blew hard. On the 14th the wind changes once more, and he is enabled to proceed to his station. This was the opportunity which the French had waited for so long. The change of wind which had enabled Hawke to get back, also permitted them to come out. The British fleet was gone, and they probably, and with reason, concluded that it had been scattered or destroyed by the tempest.

On the evening of the 16th one of the victuallers reported to the admiral that the French had been seen at sea working to the eastward. It so happened that Admiral Bompard had been carried into Brest by the very gale which drove Hawke off, and reported the absence of the British fleet. Marshal Conflans acted with great decision on receipt of this news; he put Bombard's experienced sailors on board his own ships, and set sail on the 14th with twenty-one line-of-battle ships and three frigates, the very day on which Hawke left Torbay. His first destination was Quiberon bay, where Duff's squadron of frigates would be easily disposed of; next he intended to take up the transports with the land forces at Morbihan, and endeavour to make a descent on our coasts before the British admiral could find him out. He was destined, however, never to get beyond Quiberon bay. He was in the very act of fulfilling the first part of his programme when the ever-watchful Hawke pounced upon him. Having heard of his escape on the evening of the 16th, and concluding that his destination was Quiberon, he at once sets off in pursuit, and reports to the Admiralty on the 17th:

"I have carried a press of sail all night, with a hard gale at S.S.E., in pursuit of the enemy, and make no doubt of coming up with them either at sea or in Quiberon bay." On the 18th and 19th the winds were very variable but more favourable, and on the morning of the 20th, at half-past 8, to the great joy of the whole squadron, the *Maidstone* frigate, which was ahead of the squadron, let fly her top gallant-sheets, which was the signal for seeing a fleet. Hawke immediately made the signal for line abreast in order to draw all the ships of the squadron up with him. At a quarter to 10 the *Magnanime*, which had been sent ahead to make the land, also made the signal of seeing the enemy. On being discovered, the enemy's fleet, which was in the act of pursuing Duff's squadron, endeavoured to make off, and put right before the wind towards the shore, whereupon the admiral made the signal for the seven ships nearest them to chase and to draw into line of battle ahead of him, and endeavour to stop the French till the rest of the squadron had time to come up; the other ships had also orders to form as they chased so that no time might be lost. At half-past 2 the action began to the southward of Belleisle, the French admiral leading round the Cardinals while his rear was in action. All day it was blowing a great gale at N.W. and W.N.W. with heavy squalls; and the fleet was now on a part of the coast amidst rocks, islands, and shoals which were quite unknown to the English, who were without chart and without a pilot, while the French were familiar with every inch of the navigation.

So few hours of daylight remained that it was necessary to make quick work, and, indeed, no time was lost. The first vessel to strike was the French rear-admiral's ship the *Formidable*, of eighty guns, at 4 P.M. She had been engaged by the *Resolution*, Captain Speke, and also by the *Torbay*, Captain Keppel, but the *Resolution* had the principal share in subduing her. The admiral gave the master of his flagship, the *Royal George*, orders to lay him alongside the French admiral's ship, the *Soleil Royal*. The master remonstrated, believing that to do so would wreck the ship on a shoal. Hawke replied in the memorable words, "You have done your duty, Sir, in showing the danger; you are now to comply with my order, and lay me alongside the *Soleil Royal*. The two ships exchanged a few broadsides, but the French admiral then made off, though he did not succeed in saving his ship, which next day was driven ashore and burned. The *Royal George* had no sooner driven off

the French admiral, than she was attacked by four other ships, which poured their broadsides into her in succession. The last of these, *Le Superbe*, met with a terrible fate, as Hawke poured his whole broadside into her at once, and, repeating the same, sank her alongside of him with her whole crew of 800 hands. The *Royal George* was now engaged with seven of the enemy's ships simultaneously, but several English ships coming up to assist her, and darkness, fortunately for the French, coming on, they retreated. In addition to the ships mentioned above, the *Thésée*, of seventy-four guns, was sunk by Keppel, and the whole of her crew lost; and the *Héros*, of seventy-four, struck at 5 p.m. to Lord Howe in the *Magnanime*, but so great was the storm that no boat could be sent to take possession of her. The *Juste*, of seventy guns, was also driven on the Charpentier rocks and wrecked. In addition to the six thus taken or destroyed in the action, seven others threw all their guns and stores overboard, and crept next day into the river Vilaine, but in crossing the bar of the river four of them broke their backs. The remaining ships escaped under cover of the night to Rochefort, and were there dismantled and warped several miles through the mud of the Charente, in order to save them from Keppel's squadron which was detached in pursuit.

The night after the battle must have been a terrible one for victors and vanquished alike. The storm increased, the waves broke with redoubled force, and the night was pitchy dark, while minute guns as signals of distress were being continually fired off, but in consequence of the darkness and the waves nobody was able to render assistance.

The condition of things that night has been thus described in Thackeray's life of Chatham:—

The dangers of the coast, the darkness of the night, the fury of the tempest, all united to perplex the scattered fleets both of England and France. Although minute guns were heard on every side, yet none could afford relief to either friend or foe. To the bellowing of the waves from below, and the thunders of heaven from above, was added the constant roar of cannon from the ships.

The next morning the *Soleil Royal* and the *Héros*, which under cover of the night had anchored amidst the British fleet, cut and ran ashore, and were burned. The *Essex* was detached to pursue the former ship, but unfortunately got upon the Four shoal and was wrecked, and the victorious *Resolution* had also been driven on the same shoal during the night and was totally lost. The better parts of the crews of both vessels were saved. The only losses which the British sustained were due to the tempest.

Thus ended the famous battle of Quiberon, the greatest victory which the English fleet had won since the defeat of the Spanish Armada, perhaps in many respects the greatest which it has ever achieved; for Hawke fought and conquered three foes, of which the French fleet was the least formidable, the tempest and the unknown rocks and shoals of the lee shore were to him far more dangerous. It may safely be said that not one of his contemporaries and one only of his successors would have dared to engage the French squadron, on the short afternoon of that November day, in a violent gale, and so near the unknown shore that ten thousand Frenchmen on land witnessed the defeat and destruction of the fleet which was the last one their country had to look to. But Hawke had not waited patiently during six months for nothing. He knew his duty, and did not hesitate for a moment. That duty was to save his country at all hazards from the chance of invasion, and he knew that he could do this, even at the risk of the loss of his own fleet and perhaps of his own reputation. Whatever happened to him, he felt confident that if he attacked, the French fleet must be destroyed. His experience of the previous year at Rochefort had taught him that in their efforts to save themselves they would incur destruction, and the result most fully confirmed his anticipations; for what the short hours of daylight obliged him to spare, the French themselves rendered incapable of further harm. Such were the facts, and the mere statement of them appeals with such force to the imagination that further commentary is unnecessary. At one blow, not only the expedition but the whole navy of France was shattered irretrievably, so far as this war was concerned. Henceforward the French gave but little trouble at sea. Hawke had nothing more to do. He had rendered himself unnecessary. His career at sea, though not over, was practically finished, for the remainder of it was quite uneventful.

He hoisted his flag for the last time at Spithead on board the *Royal George* in April 1762, and cruised with a squadron of ten line-of-battle ships off the north-west coast of Spain, and in August he put into Torbay to refit, and obtained Lord Bute's permission to haul down his flag, for there was nothing to do, and the preliminaries of peace were as good as signed.

The news of Hawke's victory at Quiberon was received at home with frantic expressions of delight. During the long blockade which had preceded it, the nation was kept in a state of perpetual anxiety and alarm. When Hawke was driven into Torbay by the storms in November, the fury of the people had

no bounds. They made no allowances for circumstances which he could not control, and on the very day that he was destroying the French fleet at Quiberon, he was being burnt in effigy at Plymouth by an infuriated rabble of his own countrymen. Truly there have been occasions in our history when we have rivalled the reputation of the Carthaginians for ingratitude. As a reward for the victory, Hawke received a pension of £2,000 a year, assigned for his own life and for that of his two sons, but he was given no other distinction. Anson had received a peerage for services which were insignificant compared with Hawke's, and there was no excuse for passing him over at this time, for he possessed ample wealth to support a title.

Shortly before Hawke concluded his last cruise, his old friend Anson died, and the position of First Lord of the Admiralty became vacant. During his long tenure of office, Anson had done wonders towards improving the administration and condition of the navy. Hawke had been his right-hand man at sea, and no one was better qualified, both by his knowledge of the service and his general talents, to succeed him; but he was passed over, and the post was held by a succession of very incompetent civilians. When Lord Chatham resumed office in 1766, he determined to have a naval First Lord, and again passed over Hawke, because he ascertained that Admiral Saunders, who had already held high office at the Board, would retire if any naval officer were placed over his head. Saunders' retirement would have involved the resignation of Keppel, and the Board would have been broken up. He was accordingly appointed First Lord, but he resigned after holding the post for two months, and Hawke was immediately selected to fill the vacant place, which he held for five years. An incident connected with Saunders' appointment may here be mentioned as an illustration of the generous spirit which distinguished Hawke. Admiral Sir George Pocock, who was one of the most distinguished officers of the day, and, like Hawke, much senior to Sir Charles Saunders, was extremely indignant when he heard of the appointment, and immediately called on Hawke, and complained to him warmly of the indignity to himself and the other senior officers. He found Hawke in the very act of going out to congratulate Saunders in person on his promotion. Hawke's example had such a marked influence with Pocock, that he moderated his anger, and even went so far as to congratulate Saunders himself.

During his tenure of office he devoted himself, as far as the financial authorities would allow him, to increasing the strength

of the navy. It was he who laid down the maxim which has since become a standing principle, though unfortunately too often neglected, "that our enemies being peculiarly attentive to their marine, our fleet could only be termed considerable in the proportion it bore to that of the House of Bourbon"; or, as Captain Burrows interprets it, "the British fleet must always be kept in such a state that it would be a match for France and Spain combined, the only nations which could, in that day, be thought of as hostile maritime powers." While he was in power he was obliged to break up fourteen line-of-battle ships which had become worn out, but he built thirteen new ones, and left fifteen on the stocks when he went out of office. He also did much to improve the pay and position of naval officers.

In 1770, when Chatham was succeeded by Lord North, Hawke was induced to retain his position at the Admiralty. It was unfortunate that he did so, for he soon "found himself in opposition to his old, and feebly supported by his new friends. The new Board contained no other naval men, and Hawke was left alone to bear the burthen of preparing for war with Spain. The supplies for the navy had been cramped by a succession of Governments, and he had the greatest difficulty in keeping up the proper establishment of ships. His health broke down under the strain to which it was subjected, and he was compelled to resign office in January 1771. Here was another opportunity of conferring upon him the honours which he had so amply deserved, but it was again allowed to pass; and it was not till 1776 that the peerage was conferred on him which he should have received after his great victory at Quiberon.

After his retirement from the Admiralty, the navy was allowed to fall into a state of decay; and when the American War broke out, and France and Spain once more joined against us, the strain on the national resources was exceedingly severe. Keppel missed the golden opportunity of destroying the French fleet off Ushant, and Sir Charles Hardy, who afterwards took the command, found himself in the humiliating condition of being forced to keep sixty-six hostile line-of-battle ships at bay with a fleet of little more than half the size.

Lord Hawke died in 1781, just six months too soon to witness the restoration of the naval power of his country by Rodney's great victory of the 12th April 1782. In forming our estimate of him, we have to consider much besides his great qualities as a fighting seaman. He possessed the rare power of raising the

intellectual and moral level of those who were about him, and he knew how to attach them to himself. He could never have met with the misfortune which befel Mathews off Toulon, because his officers would have been incapable of behaving to him as they did to Mathews. During the whole of his career, he had never to deal with a case of mutiny, for the simple reason that he never allowed the conditions to obtain which engender discontent. His correspondence throughout his whole career proves that he treated his superiors and inferiors alike with consideration and kindly respect. He was exceedingly firm in checking official abuses : had he been less so, he could never have maintained the six months' blockade off Brest ; the inefficiency of the home authorities would have ruined the condition of his fleet ; and instead of being able, as he was, to bring his whole fighting strength into action when the day of battle arrived, a less far-seeing and energetic commander would have had half his ships undergoing refit, and half their crews stricken down with fever and scurvy. The great merits displayed during the conduct of that blockade, and the battle which followed it, have never, at least in our times, been fully appreciated. They should rank with the very highest feats of the greatest of our naval officers. Such men as Howe are called fortunate. The appellation is a misnomer. They obtain success because they know how to command it. If they are fortunate, it is because they trust nothing to Fortune's chances and favours ; but rather, so far as limited human intelligence is able, because they provide with foresight for every contingency. In the words of Juvenal :

Nullum numen abest si sit Prudentia ; noster
Te jacimus, Fortuna, deam.



The Afghan Campaign of 1878-80.

A FEW MILITARY DEDUCTIONS.

BY MAJOR M. J. KING-HARMAN, BENGAL STAFF CORPS.

(Continued from page 93.)

TELEGRAPHS.—The present system, which obliges Government officers to pay to Government in cash for every telegram sent by them on Government service or received by them “hearing,” and then to recover the amount again from the same Government by contingent bills, is so unintelligible, so vexatious, in a word, so senseless, and gives rise to such unnecessary friction in peace time, that it is a perfect marvel that it was ever allowed to stand for more than one day; but when we find that the same system is obligatory with an army on active service in the field, it becomes a very serious matter indeed.

The gross iniquity of the system is, however, so patent to all, that further explanations are not required. The obligatory payment of cash for doing Government work is the weak point in an otherwise splendidly-organised department, which performed invaluable services during the past war, and which is surely able to devise some simple arrangement of transfer, or telegraph cheque-books.

The rapidity with which the Government Civil Telegraph was laid was most remarkable. On the 3rd October 1871 orders were issued for the supply of 200 miles of semi-permanent wire for the Kohat Force, and 250 miles for the line from Quetta to Kandahar. By the 8th November an office was opened at Thull, a distance of sixty-six miles; and on the 10th January 1879 another was opened at Paiwar; and on the other line forty

miles were laid to Gulistan Kerroz by the 8th January. From thence to Chummun, twenty-three miles, crossing the Khojuck pass, was constructed in five days; and in twenty-five days more the remaining seventy-seven miles into Kandahar was completed.

As an instance of the great difficulties that the department had to contend against, I may add that the 108 miles of wire on the Khyber line was cut ninety-eight times during the first phase of the war, and a total length of sixty miles was carried off and never recovered.

Correspondence, &c.—As a rule, the written and telegraphic despatches from and to commanders in the field were too long and verbose; the talent of compressing the maximum of meaning into the fewest words is not possessed by all; but the art should be studied, and I would venture to give here what I consider to be a model despatch, short but full of meaning, feeling and ardour, from the President of the United States Army at Washington to Major-General McClellan, commanding in the field:—

“15th September 1862, 2.45 P.M.

“Your despatch of to-day received. God bless you and all with you. Destroy the rebel army if possible.

“A. LINCOLN.”

One universal system is required for the supply of clerks and stationery for all military offices. At present some receive a monthly allowance for the purpose, and others receive no allowance, but are supplied by Government. It is not too much to say that such a mixed arrangement is very objectionable in peace time, and caused a great deal of unnecessary trouble during the past war. I would therefore strongly advocate the abolition of *all* such allowances throughout India, and the universal supply of all office requirements free of cost by Government; also that a regular roll be kept of qualified clerks from which men should be selected to fill vacancies wherever they occur.

In like manner I consider it most desirable that there should be *one* code of regulations on *all* points throughout India.

Hutting.—Further, I submit that all the barrack accommodation for native troops should be provided by, and should be the property of, Government; and in this way would be avoided all the trouble that was caused during the past two years by the *hutting* money system that is in force in the Bengal army,

regiments being paid a fixed allowance, and made to build their own barracks.

Native Army.—The experiences of the past war have shown us plainly that there are a certain number of Bengal infantry regiments that are not fit for active service, and it has also again shown the great advantage of “class” over “mixed” regiments, and I claim for these numerous and manifest advantages that they are political as well as military, and am therefore a strong advocate for the gradual reorganisation of all the Bombay regiments, and of all but a few specially selected corps in Bengal, and for commencing at once with the so-called “low-class” regiments in the latter Presidency, two of which might advantageously and with great ease be converted into pioneer corps composed of good men, such as the Bhurtpore Jâts; and one could be made into a 6th Gûrkha regiment by withdrawing all Gûrkhas from such of the others as have not special permission to enlist them, at the same time strictly prohibiting the unauthorised and mischievous enlistment of these men; the presence of a few Gûrkhas can never make a bad regiment good, while at the same time these sturdy little aliens are like fish out of water, hate their isolated position, and by their consequent discontent increase the difficulty, already great enough, of obtaining good recruits for the regular Gûrkha regiments and such others as are specially allowed to enlist them.

The paucity of British officers with all our native regiments is a source of national danger, and has been favourably considered I believe, by the Army Organisation Committee; but I would here venture to suggest the following as the strength for an infantry battalion, supposing that only ten officers are allowed:—

- 1 commandant—to hold appointment for five years only, no time before attaining substantive rank of Lieutenant-Colonel to count as part of the five years.
- 3 company leaders—i.e. one for each double company—the regiment being divided into six companies.
- 3 company subalterns—i.e. one to each double company.
- 1 adjutant.
- 1 quartermaster.
- 1 instructor in musketry and signalling.
- 6 subahdars } native officers.
- 6 jemadars }
- 1 native adjutant.

42 havildars.

42 naicks.

24 drummers, and 24 buglers and fifers.

800 sepoy divided into six companies. And no band to be allowed for any regiment that was raised after 1856.

Every officer will then have his own duty to do; each double company will have its British company *leader* as well as two native officers, instead of the present system of wing commanders and wing officers, which is as senseless as it is detrimental to regimental efficiency.

Entrenching Tools.—Although the regimental entrenching tools were but seldom made use of, yet they should still form part of the regular equipment of each battalion of infantry, should be carried on the regimental animals at *all* marching and field exercise parades, and the men made more acquainted with their use.

The tools now issued to regiments of native infantry are unserviceable because they are unsuitable to the nature and habits of the men who are intended to use them, and who, being unacquainted with the use of spades and shovels, would do double the amount of work if allowed to use the instruments commonly employed by them at their own homes, for which reason it would appear only common sense to make "phowrahs" or "mamooties" and pickaxes the standard entrenching tools for native regiments; and I am not at all sure that, considering the fact that a large proportion of men in British regiments are enlisted in towns, and have never used a spade before entering the army, the "phowrahs" would not be a more efficient tool for the whole army than the spade. Felling axes should be increased to three per company, and at least 5 per cent. of spare handles should be obligatory—at present none are allowed!

Ammunition.—An improved and recognised manner of carrying reserve ammunition for artillery and infantry is very urgently required; several make-shifts were tried during the war, but none of them were satisfactory. Every regiment of cavalry and infantry should have a fixed number of solid leather cases, each case being so made as to contain one box of small-arm ammunition, and capable of being quickly and firmly attached to any description of pack-saddle.

COMMUNICATIONS.

On the safety and efficiency of the lines of communication between the supply of the army in the field with provisions,

ammunition, and men; and it was owing to the long lines of roads from Kandahar, Peiwar, and Kabul, to the nearest points of the railway, that so much difficulty was found in keeping up regular supplies of food, clothing, &c. for the advanced troops. Had the railway from the Indus to Sibi been completed in the autumn of 1876, as was strongly recommended by that far-seeing man, Sir Andrew Clarke, R.E., the great losses that occurred in marching between those places would have been avoided, and much valuable time gained. In like manner, had the railway from Jhelum to Peshawar been steadily pushed on while there was time, *before* the war commenced, the advantages gained thereby would have more than repaid the cost of construction. As the chief safety of a long line of road in an enemy's country lies in the judicious selection and careful construction of fortified posts along its length, it is necessary that the particular attention of generals in command should be given to this important point. At the outbreak of hostilities a selected officer should be detailed as permanent commandant of each post to be established; he should be entirely responsible for everything connected with the place, and his authority should never be interfered with by other officers passing through, even though of senior rank. Notwithstanding that the posts on the Khyber and Kurrum lines were well and rapidly constructed, yet very great inconvenience was caused by the want of a responsible permanent commandant for each, to look after the defences, conservancy, &c. On the Kandahar line there were no *fortified* posts of any sort as far as Quetta, and to the north of the Khojuck they were all very badly and insufficiently protected, with the sole exception of Chummun, which was strong; and although situated in the enemy's country, they were held by local Pathan levies. This state of things continued until the night of the 16th April 1880, when the post of Dubrai was attacked by some 400 men supposed to belong to the Murzai and Achukhzai tribes, and the gallant Major Waudby (Road Commandant) with two sepoy and one sowar of his escort were killed after a noble defence. The very next day, detachments of Bombay Infantry were sent to each post, Mundi Hissar and Abdúl-Rahman were strengthened, and an Engineer officer with some sappers was sent to put all in a defensible state; but even then the work progressed very slowly indeed, owing to the difficulty in procuring local labour.

There should also be fixed rules regarding the conservancy of all posts, as it is well known that the exhalations proceeding

from badly-constructed and half-filled-in latrines, or the total absence of latrine trenches, and the decomposition of animal matter, are rapidly taken up by the atmosphere, and in hot weather may produce an epidemic. A good water-supply is also of the highest importance, and it seems extraordinary that no attempt was made to use Norton's tube wells along the road to Kandahar, where water is scarce, and in some places bad. General Phayre's water-channel at Dozán, in the Bolan, was a great work.

While on the subject of communication, it may be well to say a few words regarding the line from the Indus to Kandahar. Jacobabad was established many years ago as the advanced frontier post on this line, and its retention is still advisable as the best place from which to command and protect the Scinde border; but the garrison should be at once much reduced, and part of it pushed on as a support to Quetta, or to some *good* position on the flank of the Marri country. Quetta itself is an open cantonment, and might easily be raided any night by a hundred determined men, who could destroy the bazaar and do much damage in a very short time. This and all other advanced posts should be defended by entrenchments of some sort. Moreover Quetta is unhealthy, and there is no reason why part of the garrison should not be located in and about the Guzurbund pass, ten miles further north, where water is abundant.

The garrison of Kurrachi should be much increased, and so form a reserve from which to support Jacobabad and Quetta, and the railway should be pushed on at once through the hills *to the west and clear of* the Bolan pass, where it would run through the comparatively friendly country occupied by the Beluchis.

The Indus at Sukkur should be bridged as quickly as possible, for with the present arrangements only 120 loaded vehicles can be crossed daily under the most favourable circumstances; a very serious matter if it were found necessary to send large reinforcements to Quetta.

Signalling.—Little need be said here of the invaluable services performed by the Lieutenant Whistler Smith, R.E., Captains Straton and Wynne, and Lieutenant Dickie, R.E., in organising and working the visual signalling on the different lines; for it was owing to the skill, intelligence, and indefatigable exertions of those officers, and of the others working under them, that (with the sole exception of General Burrows' brigade) at all times our troops were always in communication with each other

and with army head-quarters; and the great value of signalling by heliographs, flags, and lamps, was clearly demonstrated to the world at large—so much so, indeed, that the Russians have adopted the system in its entirety.

We know that in the American War of Independence, the army of the Potomac had a regular signalling corps, which rendered important services throughout the campaign of 1861-63, formed of officers and men from different regiments instructed in signalling with flags and torches, and portable insulated telegraph-wire.

It is essential that all British officers belonging to native regiments in all three presidencies should be instructed in visual signalling, and such instruction should be compulsory; it is also very desirable that in every regiment three or four men per troop or company should be carefully instructed in signalling with flags and heliograph in English, and for this purpose Government should supply the necessary apparatus free of cost, and the signallers should, after passing a satisfactory examination, receive two rupees a month each as an addition to their pay. The course of instruction will be rather a severe one for sepoys, involving a thorough knowledge of English; therefore, the men should be excused all duties during that time. The present arrangement of allowing the men to be taught, but not allowing them the means of instruction or rewarding them for learning, is not judicious.

Postal.—The postal arrangements on the Khyber and Kurram lines were most satisfactory, owing to the great energy of the officers and subordinates of that department, who invariably carried the mails in pony-carts and tongas,* whenever the roads were good enough for wheeled traffic. On the Kandahar line, from Sibi upwards, no tongas were used, although the road was perfectly easy all the way to Kandahar. Sir Robert Sandeman reported officially that a tonga postal service had been established on the 9th February 1880, but it does not appear that it really was ever carried out, and the mails were carried by local contractors on raw-boned half-starved ponies at the rate of about five miles an hour, while on the Khyber line they were carried at nearly double that pace.

Fords.—The necessity for carefully marking out all fords was made painfully evident by the disaster on the night of the 31st March 1879, when a squadron of the 10th Hussars, crossing the

* Low spring-carts on two wheels, drawn by two ponies.

Kabul river in half sections, missed the ford, and were suddenly swept over a rapid into water six or seven feet deep and running like a mill-race, in which they lost one officer, forty-six men, and thirteen horses. It seems that this long and intricate ford was not staked out, owing to objections on the part of the politicals, which were listened to by the General.

Again, on the 5th January 1880, five men of the Carabineers were drowned whilst fording the Kabul river near the Dorunta gorge, by an easy ford over which natives were crossing on foot at the time.

Railways.—The value of our railway system in India has been dwelt on in the essays of last year on transport; but it may not be generally known that the Scinde, Punjab, and Delhi Railway during the war carried by train 8,645 camels, a feat which would never have been dreamt of ten years ago. The one great want is a regular set of military train time-tables for the whole of India, after the pattern proposed by Mr. David Ross, C.I.E., the able traffic manager of the Scinde and Punjab Railway. Such tables, if drawn up in time of peace and altered yearly according to the necessities of the service, would enable an army to be concentrated at any point in a very short time and without hurry, confusion, or friction; and the few details that require consideration before publishing them, should be at once settled by the intelligence branch of the Quartermaster-General's department, in communication with the agents of the different railway companies, and officially confirmed by the Supreme Government.

Politicals.—One of the military deductions from the past war is that the mere presence of non-military political officers with a punitive army in a foreign country is most objectionable; while the uncontrolled and uncontrollable actions of these gentlemen, who are in reality quite independent of the general commanding, and who are not amenable to military discipline, are frequently fraught with danger to our troops, and constantly tend to lower the prestige of our armies and to embarrass and hamper our generals. General Burrows was held responsible for the Maiwand disaster; but Major St. John, the political officer, was to blame all through for invariably giving the General unreliable information. He, moreover, usurped to himself the position of the chief military commander in reporting direct to the Viceroy all events as they happened, and in attempting to dictate to the General what course he should pursue; and it was not until the arrival of General Roberts, and afterwards of General Phayre, that he was forced, by the latter, to revert to his proper position

as political assistant to the commander of the troops. In all wars, the subordination of the military *point of view* to the political, is necessary; but that does not mean that the *action* of military commanders in the field is to be hampered by the special whims of civil political officers, who (as in the past war) were often young and inexperienced, though it cannot be denied that there were some good sound men, such as Hastings, Arthur Conolly, Loch, Warburton, Clifford, Prothero, Evan Smith, and Biscoe, all of whom, by the way, were military officers in either permanent or temporary civil employ. Surely the first Kabul war of 1838-41 contained sufficiently numerous and good examples of the danger of employing political officers on service, and the gallant General Nott's out-spoken censure of the system should have saved us from a repetition of it. If political officers are considered necessary, they should be employed only as assistants to, and on the staff of, the commander, without whose permission they should do nothing whatever, the General himself being the chief military as well as political officer, and possessed of full powers, *independent of the Foreign Office*, to carry out the orders of Government conveyed to him in *all* cases through the commander-in-chief, and all "intelligence" work being carried out by his officers of the Quartermaster-General's department, in the same way as was done by Colonel Lockhart at Kabul, and only *assisted* by the political officer when considered necessary. We have, however, become so wedded to the old and dangerous practice of allowing meddlesome politicals to interfere constantly in the work of our generals, that it is improbable that even another disaster like Maiwand will cause an alteration in it.

Furthermore, I consider the presence of a semi-independent civil political in the field, with his durbar tents, munshis, and rag-tag and bob-tail, to be a standing insult to the army, to whom he is at times looked upon as a dangerous lunatic, and always as an insufferable nuisance; while in nine cases out of ten the people of the country, with whom he attempts to deal in a lordly, patronising style, hood-wink him in every possible manner.

What greater insult could be offered to an army than the despatch of the inexperienced Mr. Griffin to do work which would have been performed much more efficiently, and with greater dignity and effect, by such proved leaders of men as Sir Donald Stewart or Sir Frederick Roberts?

Reserves.—The want of reserves for native regiments was sorely felt, and it is a very serious question; but notwithstanding

the Government do not appear disposed to take it up or interfere in any way ; and after the lapse of another year it is more than probable that it will have been forgotten altogether. Many proposals have been made regarding the best way of raising a reserve, but most of them are upsetting and unpracticable, and the *only* good and practicable one that I have seen written by Lieutenant Barrow, in the *Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, Vol. VIII., No. 39, of 1879, and well deserves the attention of the Supreme Government.

A certain limited number of "Oomedwars" or candidates, say twenty-five or thirty, should also be allowed with each regiment ; and men to receive subsistence allowance from the State until they are enlisted, on condition that during this time they are carrying their drill, and otherwise fitting themselves for the service.

Supply of Horses for Native Cavalry.—The past war has shown how difficult it is on extraordinary occasions to obtain a sufficient supply of *good* remounts for our native cavalry, and as long as the country is over-run by numbers of unsound screaming try-bred stallions, that difficulty will continue. There is one remedy for this, which is at the same time cheap, simple, and effectual, and that is to impose such a heavy tax on animals throughout India, as to make their retention in large numbers an impossibility, and at the same time to provide, free of cost, trained native assistant veterinary surgeons (tries), and the requisite implements and medicines for the purpose of gelding all entire horses and ponies, and even donkeys ; the natural effect (if continued for ten years) of this measure, coupled with the present liberal supply of well-bred Government stallions, would be an almost unlimited supply of good serviceable horses, ponies, and mules, which would free the Government from all anxiety regarding cavalry remounts, and would be of inestimable benefit to the country generally. No philanthropic ideas should be allowed to interfere with the immediate passing of such a law.

I commenced by stating how impossible it was to compress so small a space all the deductions from the past war, and I must now close this paper, though many have been omitted out of necessity, and not from want of materials ; but before concluding, let me draw attention to the words of the French Commission on Organisation, which Hime has brought to notice in his famous prize essay :—"The army is the annual premium insurance against foreign invasion and the dismemberment of

our territory. You cannot diminish the premium without at the same time diminishing the safeguard of the country; forgetfulness of this fact cost us two of our most patriotic provinces and five milliards."

In the Afghan war of 1871-81 we have received one more serious warning, and we can scarcely expect or hope for another and if, therefore, we persist in ignoring the lessons of the past war, and return to our former state of unreadiness, and at a future time have to fight with a power which is numerically very superior, and which is perfectly prepared for and constantly exercised in war, a catastrophe will be inevitable; and instead of beating off and utterly destroying our enemy, we shall find ourselves engaged in a terrible struggle for existence which will shake the British empire to its foundations. Our watchword should, therefore, always be "Prepare," and we should set to work at once to prepare in real earnest for the great struggle which we know is being gradually forced upon us, so that when the crash comes we may be ready to meet it. What is wanted is a sufficient and efficient fighting army; and the great problem is to provide it in the best and most economical manner.

In conclusion, I may say that the principal military deduction to be drawn from the events of the past war in Afghanistan is that the military power in India, on which *alone* the safety of the country depends, has been forced during the past thirty years to hold too secondary a place, from which it follows as a matter of course that everything connected with the army has received far less attention than it deserves or requires, and this unfortunately, is likely to continue, so long as the head of the army, the Commander-in-Chief, is entrusted with so little power. The safety of the country depends on an efficient army, and the efficiency of this army depends in such a very great degree on the amount of power and authority possessed by its chief commander, that his authority should be paramount; and, therefore, I say that the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian army should also be the Governor-General of the whole country, and I state, without fear of contradiction, that in the present head of the army we have a man who would make as good a Viceroy as ever came to the country.

APPENDIX.
STATEMENT SHOWING THE SCALE OF FRESH RATIONS SUPPLIED TO TROOPS ON DIFFERENT CAMPAIGNS.

Campaign.	Flour (atta) lb.	Dal (oz.)	Ghee (oz.)	Clarified Butter.	Salt (oz.)	Firewood (lb.)	Turnerie (oz.)	Sugar (oz.)	Pepper (oz.)	Meat (oz.)	Rice (oz.)	Kokum (oz.)	Vegetables fresh or preserved, as procurable (oz.)	Tea (oz.)	Vinegar (drachms.)	Grains & Meal (oz.)	Onions and Garlic (drachms.)
British Expedition to China, 1860 (Natives) . . .	2	4	2	2	2	2	16	3*	1	Twice a week	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
British Expedition to Abyssinia, 1868 (Natives, on landing) . . .	2	4	2	2	2	—	16	3†	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Subsequently altered to . . .	1½	—	2	—	2	—	—	—	—	16	—	1†	—	—	—	—	—
British Expedition to Afghanistan, 1878-81 (British) . .	Bread 1½	—	—	—	2	4	—	—	—	16§	—	—	16	3	—	—	—
British Expedition to Afghanistan, 1878-81 (Natives) . .	2	4	2	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Additional in April 1880, when to spare, for men who drank no spirits . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Russian Expedition to Khiva in 1873¶ . . .	Black biscuit, 2	5	2	2	2	—	—	13	—	32	—	—	—	1½	5	16	9
Russian Expedition to Tekke in 1879 . . .	Biscuit, 2	—	—	—	1½	—	—	2½	—	5	5	—	1½ comprsd. or 8 sour cabbage.	5	3	14½	2½**

* Or 1 oz. of tobacco, rum, opium, and tea, were issued in payment.

† Plentiful in the country; supplied when considered necessary.

‡ A good antiscorbutic.

§ Afterwards increased to 30 oz.

¶ Only for night-guard and sick.

** A small quantity of bay-leaves and pepper.

† In the Steppes campaign each company of 170 men had carried for it, 7 lb. of pepper, ½ lb. laurel leaves, 100 lb. leaf tobacco, 9 bottles essence of

vinegar, 100 lb. onions, 10½ lb. garlic, 10 lb. horse-radish, 200 lb. salt.

War Premiums on Life Policies.

By SPENCER C. THOMSON, MANAGER OF THE STANDARD LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY.

My attention has been drawn to a series of articles in *Colburn's United Service Magazine* on the subject of "War Premiums on Life Policies," and as I have some experience of the matter from the point of view of the offices, I beg to offer a contribution to the fair discussion of the question. Colonel Brackenbury has already done much, in his very sensible letter on the subject in the magazine in question, to show that the severe terms in which the Life Offices are referred to in the series are undeserved, and I would merely, before proceeding with what I have to say, protest in the strongest manner against the use of the words "iniquity," "victims," "exactions," "extortions," "harvest of spoil," "charlatanism," "negligence and incapacity," and the like, as by any possibility applicable to the dealings of any but the merest fraction of offices transacting life business. To none of those whose names are known to the public have they any application whatever. For this I can answer.

The boards of directors have no desire to act in any way but fairly towards all their constituents; and even if it were otherwise, the keen competition which exists between offices would prevent their carrying on their business successfully on any other plan.

In the several articles of the series I am replying to, it is fully admitted that the charge of an extra premium for war risk is justifiable, so that the only questions which call for practical consideration are—first, the sufficiency or otherwise of the charges usually made; and second, whether the manner of charging such extras at present in practice is the most convenient and equitable. Towards the first of these points the writers contribute no statistics whatever, saying that the matter is one for actuaries; but this does not prevent their use of such

I have above quoted regarding a question on which I am uninformed. It would surely have been better to call on the offices in plain words to justify their charges, than to leave them unheard and in ignorance of any explanations they may have to offer.

Government's reflection will show that the war risk of one man cannot be deduced with any certainty from the war risks of others which have gone before it; nevertheless (where no extra premium is paid year by year to cover this risk), the directors are called upon, on the outbreak of a war, to take account of such facts as the following, and to deduce a premium therefrom: (a) the probable duration of the war, (b) the climate at different periods of the year of the country in which the campaign is to take place, (c) the organisation and strength of the armies with which our troops have to contend, (d) the appliances for their comfort and attention during the campaign &c. &c. With so many varying elements to be considered, it is little wonder if directors do not always arrive at the same conclusion, though considerable uniformity is preserved in the rates of premium fixed by different offices acting in concert with one another. The rate of extra premium has, however, been pretty uniform in the recent years, and it may naturally be asked how large is justified by past experience as a whole.

A "Note on War Mortality in Recent Campaigns," by Mr. Mackenzie, F.F.A., published in the transactions of the Actuarial Society of Edinburgh for 1881, I extract the following table:—

	Losses per 100 from Battle.	Proportion of total Losses from Battle.	Losses per 100 from Disease.	Proportion of total Losses from Disease.	Total Losses per 100.
<i>War—</i>					
English War, 1855-60	3.3	.262	9.3	.738	12.6
Crimean War, 1854-56	3.4	.219	12.1	.781	15.5
<i>War—</i>					
1st year	1.7	.254	5.0	.746	6.7
4 years	3.9	.345	7.4	.645	11.2
<i>Russian War, 1866—</i>					
War losses, 7 weeks	1.4	.438	1.8	.562	3.2

The figures here given (which include the deaths of both soldiers and men) show at a glance how impossible it is to estimate the probable death-rate in one campaign from any one which preceded it.

It is only in the case of the Franco-German war of 1870-71 that Mr. Mackenzie's tables draw distinction between officers and men, the following being the results reported :—

	Killed in Battle. Per Cent.	Died through Sickness. Per Cent.	Total Deaths. Per Cent.
<i>German Army—</i>			
Combatant officers . . .	8.08	.82	8.90
Men, including non-commis- sioned officers . . .	3.12	1.38	4.50

So that as regards this war at least, the percentage of deaths amongst German officers was about double that amongst the men. No statement of the French losses is given, but they are hardly likely to have been less than those on the German side.

Mr. Mackenzie does not give the statistics of the Abyssinian or South African wars, but, from figures furnished to the Association of Scottish Life Offices by the War Office in 1874, it appears that of 168 officers exposed to war risk in Ashantee, 15 were killed in action or died of disease, besides 27 wounded and 44 invalided.

On the basis of the facts relating to the Franco-German War Mr. Mackenzie proceeds to draw up a table of "estimated extra premiums to cover European war risk for one year's campaigning, based upon deaths among German officers in war of 1870-71"; the result being that the extra premium which (without addition for expenses, &c.) should have been charged for such risk, had it been ascertainable beforehand, would have been £8 18s. per cent. for combatant officers, or at the rate of £15 5s. per annum. Nor do the figures above given take any account of the deterioration to health from wounds and disease, which cannot but have been considerable. The figures for the Ashantee war would justify a still higher extra premium.

Looking, therefore, to such data as I have been able to give, I do not think it can be maintained that the extra premiums which have commonly been charged by the Companies for war have been excessive, or at all more than is required to cover the risk involved.

With reference to the return of any portion of extra premium paid, I think this is only justified where the life assured has not incurred any war risk whatever. The extra charged in the first instance is based, as it must be, on an assumption, and may be more or less than the risk which will be really incurred; and as the officers cannot be called on at the termination of the war

ny more than they have originally been charged, so the ould not be expected to pay back anything in the event isk terminating in their favour. That the risk is likely, to past experience, to evolve more frequently in favour of red than of the office, I have already shown to be borne the actual facts, so far as these are available. It would satisfactory, however, if the authorities were to publish

statistics of the proportion of deaths from war and and of wounded and invalided, in all the campaigns in ritish troops have been engaged of recent years.

maximum sum were to be charged, which would be likely nnify the office under all circumstances, and from which or smaller return would be made according to the y rate as ascertained at the end of the war, a very much harge would be required, say £20 or £25 per cent., ould not certainly be more popular with the service than ent practice.

oly to a request at the end of the war by those assured e Company with which I am connected, that a portion extra of five guineas per cent. paid for war risk should dded to them on the ground of the campaign having sted a few months, my directors replied, and I think stice: "The premium charged was an average one to campaign of one year or less, not for a year certain.

charged you for a year certain, with an agreement for for the unexpired portion of the year, we should have l to charge you, to commence with, very considerably an you actually paid. We regret, therefore, that your cannot be complied with."

aware that a contrary practice has been followed by a number of offices, but their course was not justified by e, and was only adopted as a matter of expediency or of advertisement, and to such extent the interests of aral body of policy holders were sacrificed.

boards of management of the different offices are not the fact that it falls hardly on an officer to be called his own resources to pay a heavy extra premium for , but the question in relation to his pay is one for the authorities entirely, and all that the offices can be l to concern themselves with is that military men should a every opportunity of paying the charge in the way nvenient to themselves *if they will avail themselves of it*, l the office is put to no disadvantage thereby.

This brings us to the second question which I propounded for discussion, viz. whether the manner of charging such extras as present in practice is the most convenient and equitable that could be devised.

Colonel Brackenbury explains the practice of the office with which he is connected, to charge, namely, a uniform annual extra of one pound per cent. for whole world and war policies, but admits that the service has not availed itself of the option to the extent he would have expected.

Without any desire to set one plan against the other, I would desire to mention that the office of which I know the most—the “Standard” office—which from its wide connection in India and other parts of the world must be, perhaps, a more familiar name to the members of the service than any other, has for some thirty-five years past been in the habit of requiring all military men in India, not in civil employ, to pay a constant extra (in addition to the rate for climate) of ten shillings per cent. per annum on the sum assured, covering war risk; and more recently they have been allowed the option of continuing this payment when in civil employ, or while resident in this country, so as to cover the contingency of being unexpectedly called into active service.

Officers assured through the offices of the Company in this country are also now allowed the same privileges. For the most part, however, the members of the service have declined to avail themselves of this last voluntary provision, preferring, while not on active service, to pay only the ordinary rate, and to run their chance of being called on to take part in war with the heavy consequent extra. As regards the extra premium for climate in India, the rate charged by this Company is calculated, I may mention, in accordance with the past mortality experience of the Company there, and the rates are reduced to the home scale immediately on return to Europe, without certificate of health.

We have, further, at all times been ready to quote terms for military risk, including whole world residence, as is done by Colonel Brackenbury's office; but as we have rarely, if ever, been asked to do so, we have not made the plan a feature of our prospectus, officers apparently preferring to pay the climate risk according to their place of residence at the time.

I do not at all claim for the “Standard” a monopoly of the plan of charging a permanent annual extra of ten shillings per cent. to cover war risk. Many others of the best offices no doubt offer the same facilities, and still more would probably

do so if the matter was brought home to them in the same way as it has been to us by our large military connection. With such facilities offered them, military men have only themselves to blame if they incur the risk of paying a heavy war extra in one sum at the outbreak of war, when their other expenses are doubtless heavy, instead of meeting it by small instalments spread over their whole period of military service.

The cases in which this Company charged any additional extra for the late war were: (1.) Where the life assured had elected not to pay the permanent extra charge of ten shillings per cent. (this charge being imperative only for military service in India, as I have explained). (2.) Where a military man proposed to assure with the company after the outbreak of the war, in which case the permanent extra of ten shillings per cent. would be manifestly insufficient. In such instances the directors charged an extra of five guineas per cent. (in a few cases five pounds fifteen shillings per cent.), and the statistics which I have given of former wars show that the rate was by no means unnecessarily high.

The case to which I understand the writers refer on page 151 of the February number of the *United Service Magazine*, in connection with this question, was one in which the proposal was made after the outbreak of the war, the life assured accepting his policy in full knowledge of the extra charge. As the life assured had been under fire, no return could be made to him.

I do not enter into the question of the terms on which loans are granted by the life offices, which is an altogether different subject, further than to say that the contention that when a policy for double the amount of a loan is taken, the war premium should only be charged on one half the risk, is altogether untenable. There is just as much reason for not charging any premium whatever upon that half. If the practice contended for were followed, the heirs of the assured would, in the event of his death, get the benefit of a policy on which an insufficient premium had been paid, of course at the expense of the other policy holders of the Company.

Major-General William Roy, F.R.S.,

COLONEL 30TH FOOT.

[A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.]

By H. M. C.

Now that the Ordnance Survey of North Britain is announced as completed, the time appears opportune to recall the memory of one who was associated with its earliest beginnings—Major General Wm. Roy, “the first British geodesist.”

To soldiers of the present day his name is well-nigh unknown. Indeed, it is a question if any man of his time, of equal calibre, has remained so little known to posterity or has been more persistently made the victim of biographical blundering. To cite a few instances in point:—In the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 8th edition,* article Roy, and also in the late General Portlock’s “Memoir of General Colby,” in Vol. III. of *Papers on Subjects connected with the Corps of Royal Engineers*, Roy is described as a “Colonel of Artillery,” and in the former work he is stated to have in that capacity executed a survey of Scotland for the Duke of Cumberland. In other recognised works of reference, as in *Gentleman’s Magazine* (1790, Part II.), like statements occur, accompanied by minute details equally inaccurate. The facts are, that Roy was never in the Artillery—his whole service having been passed in the Engineer Department and the line—and that when the survey of Scotland commenced, his position was the humble one of a hired clerk or draughtsman in the office of Colonel Justinian Watson, then Deputy Quartermaster General in North Britain.

Yet, despite the comparative neglect with which his memory has been treated, the career of Roy was a remarkable one, and deserves to be better known. He was the prototype of a worthy few, of whom Lambton of the 33rd Foot, who commenced the Trigonometrical Survey of India, and Kater of the 12th Foot, well known by his elaborate mathematical researches, were

* In the new edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, now appearing, this error will be corrected on information supplied by the writer of this sketch.

examples—men who, in days when the acquisition of knowledge was immeasurably more difficult than at present, had never the special training even then enjoyed by those of the scientific corps, but yet were men of science, in the true sense of the phrase, as well as hard-working regimental officers. For a soldier of fortune in the British service in those days, his rise was rapid, almost beyond precedent; but his subsequent services were many, and the more important of them were as original in their character, at the time, as they have been enduring and useful in their results.

For trustworthy particulars of the parentage and birth of General Roy we are indebted to the painstaking researches among parochial and other records of the editors of Dr. Chambers' *Biographical Dictionary of Eminent Scotsmen* (revised edition, 1870, Vol. III.). From this source we learn that William Roy was born in the little parish of Carluke, Lanarkshire, on 4th May 1726; that his father was gardener or bailiff to a neighbouring laird; and that the General, together with his brother, afterwards minister of Prestonpans, received his education at the parish school, and afterwards at the grammar school at Lanark.

The biographers go on to say that "no record has been discovered of the early career of General Roy," adding that, "he was first brought under notice in 1746, when he was employed by the Government to make a survey of Scotland." This statement needs some qualification.

At the time in question, immediately after the suppression of the rebellion of '45, a force of five line regiments, those afterwards known as 12th, 16th, 19th, 21st (Royal North British Fusiliers), and 27th (Inniskilling) Regiments of Foot—were encamped near Inverness, under command of Major-General Lord Blakeney, for road-making and other military purposes in the Highlands. Colonel, afterwards Lieutenant-General Justinian Watson, "one of His Majesty's engineers," was Deputy Quartermaster-General of this force, and to this officer was entrusted the duty of making a survey of the Highlands, which was afterwards extended to the whole of Scotland. The original protraction of this survey, or rather sketch, in eighty-four large rolls, is now in the King's library, at the British Museum, and is generally known as the "Duke of Cumberland's Map." In one of his scientific memoirs, Roy mentions incidentally that he fell to his lot, when an "assistant quartermaster" in the camp at Inverness, to commence "this magnificent military

sketch." In later years, the results were reduced by him to a single sheet, measuring 18 inches by 23 inches, which is known as the "King's Map" of Scotland.*

The earliest official mention of Roy's name which the writer of this sketch has been able to discover, occurs in a "List of Warrants passed by Right Honble. Wm. Pitt, Paymaster-General of our Forces, and which are signed by H.R.H. the Duke and other our General Officers at Home and Abroad." The list is dated 26th March 1750, and is preserved among the Treasury Papers, in the Public Record Office. The warrants themselves are of earlier dates, covering various "extraordinaries" for the period 1746-49. Among them is record of a payment of £24 8s., due on 28th December 1748, to Lieut. Stewart and William Roy, as assistants in the office of Colonel Watson, at Fort Augustus, N.B.

After this Roy appears to have received the appointment, although the warrant has not been found.† One or two casual references in his posthumous work, *Military Antiquities of the Romans*, show that during the period 1747-55 he was chiefly employed, "with other young people," in the execution of the aforesaid survey of Scotland, under the superintendence of Colonel Watson and Captain G. Morrison.‡

At the commencement of the Seven Years War, ten fresh regiments of infantry were added to the British line, and among the names of the lieutenants appointed thereto appear those of Engineers Wm. Roy, A. Durnford, and Lieut.-Fireworker David Dundas.§ the date of their several commissions being 4th January 1756. Roy, then in his thirtieth year, was nominated to Colonel Napier's Foot, afterwards known as the 51st Light Infantry, and now the 1st K. O. South Yorkshire Regiment, and among his brother officers were Bailey, afterwards Treasurer of Greenwich Hospital and the famous Rembrandt-esque engraver, who became captain of the grenadier company; and Bisset, who long afterwards succeeded Roy as Commissary

* This map, which was intended to illustrate the Roman military arrangements in Britain, has a clever-pen-and ink vignette by Roy, of a grenadier in Hogarthian garb, seated amid Roman relics, bears the title: *Mappæ Septentrionalis faciës Romanarum secundum sidem monumentarum depicta ex Ricardo Coriensi monachi*. Drawn by Colonels Watson and Roy.

† The engineer branch of the Ordnance—not yet a separate corps—then consisted of 1 chief engineer, 2 directors, 2 sub-directors (of whom Colonel Watson was one), 9 engineers in ordinary, 7 engineers extraordinary, 3 sub-engineers, and 6 practitioners. The practitioners got 8s. a day.

‡ Afterwards General Morrison, Colonel 4th Foot and Quartermaster-General.

§ Afterwards Commander-in-Chief.

General of England. The rendezvous of Napier's regiment was at Exeter, and thither the lieutenants and ensigns were directed in the *London Gazette* to repair, "on approval," which event, provided the appearance and approval took place before a named date in March 1756, they were to receive their commissions and pay. The new regiment soon afterwards moved into the West Riding, with which it has ever since been associated, to complete its establishment, and in 1758 embarked for the seat of war in Germany.

Roy by this time was senior lieutenant, and after the battle of Minden, on 1st August 1759, where the 51st bore a distinguished part, his talents as a military draughtsman appear to have brought him to the special notice of Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, who commanded the allied troops. The incident related in a forgotten book of Scottish memoirs,* and is worth noting, alike as almost the only contemporary notice of Roy (and a pleasant homely anecdote told by Dr. Chambers), and so for the sake of its amusingly naive tone of patronage. The narrator, whose name then was Callender, had joined the 51st, as a boy-ensign of fifteen, just before the battle, and says:—

When I was yet at my father's house at Craigforth, a year or two before my departure for Germany, I met there a Mr. Roy, a highly respectable land-surveyor, who had been employed by my father in taking a plan of one or two of his fields near Stirling. He afterwards adopted the military profession, but it chanced that I had never heard of him until we met and recognised after the battle of Minden As this was the first great battle in the gaining of which the British had anticipated, His Serene Highness the Commander-in-Chief was pleased to require that plans of it should be presented to him by the engineers of the army, in addition to those which were furnished by the gentlemen whose province it was to prepare such returns in their official capacity. Mr. Roy was one of those who volunteered his services on this occasion, and from his previous habits combined with his superior ability, he succeeded in exhibiting the operations of the day in a much more intelligible and satisfactory form than had yet been attempted by the military engineers. The plans received from the others were prepared in the only way known at the time, showing upon one paper the first formation of the army in order of battle, and on another the formation when the enemy gave way. Mr. Roy's design was totally different. As the basis of his plan he first made a general representation of the field of battle, and, as during the day there were three distinct changes of position of the allied armies, he had made three separate papers, which were adjusted so as to coincide in all fixed positions, as roads and rivulets, with the ground plan, which formed the base of the work, and were so adapted and attached to it as to convey a much clearer conception of the relative positions of the troops at the three most critical and important periods than could be effected by ordinary methods.† The idea, in short, was entirely new, and the Prince was so much pleased with it that Mr. Roy was soon after attached to His Serene Highness' personal staff.

* *Memoirs Sir J. Campbell* (Edinburgh, 1832).

† This plan, the original of which is also in the King's library, at the British Museum, is drawn with the pen (vertical style) in colours, with a marginal journal

As a matter of fact, Roy was immediately afterwards promoted to a company in the 87th Highlanders, then forming at Perth out of certain companies of the Black Watch, his commission therein bearing date 25th August 1759.

The 87th (Keith's) Highlanders and its linked battalion, the 88th (Campbell's) Royal Highland Volunteers—the officers and men of the two corps were interchangeable, as in a modern "territorial regiment"—won great fame on subsequent fields, at Zeirenberg, Kirch-Denkern, and elsewhere, but Roy was not with them. He was re-transferred to the Ordnance as engineer in ordinary with the rank of captain, and was appointed deputy-assistant quartermaster-general at the head-quarters of the Marquis of Granby, who succeeded to the command of the English contingent of the allied army immediately after the battle of Minden. In this capacity Roy appears, from Lord Granby's order book, to have made the campaigns of 1760–61–62 in Germany. On 23rd July 1762, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the army, and then, or immediately afterwards, was appointed deputy quartermaster-general in South Britain, a post he held until his death, twenty-eight years later.

It seems to have been in contemplation at this time to have a survey of England executed, the conduct of which was to be entrusted to Lieut.-Colonel Roy, but the scheme fell through. A new appointment was, however, created for the exercise of his special talents—that of Surveyor-General of Coasts. The Warrant, dated 19th July 1765, is preserved among the Home Office papers. It directs, "Lieut.-Colonel William Roy, one of our engineers, to survey and make reports from time to time on the state of the coasts and districts of country adjoining the coasts of this Kingdom and the Islands thereto belonging."

The remuneration is fixed at "twenty shillings a day, in four quarterly payments yearly,"—not an extravagant allowance, remembering that the military departments then swarmed with sinecurists drawing larger stipends for doing nothing by deputy. The results of Roy's industry are to be found at the War Office and Admiralty, and may also be seen in two neatly-written MS. volumes, now in the British Museum, which exhibit, in a remarkable degree, his powers of military observation. The first of these books is entitled, *A Military Description of*

of the operations. Portions of other plans, to the same scale, are cut and pasted upon it—in the fashion of a pen-wiper if the simile is permissible—by laying each flat on the base map in turn, the successive changes of position of the troops from 27th July to 2nd August are shown.

South-East of England, and is dated 17th July 1765. It purports to be the result of slight sketches and observations made some eight or nine years previously applied by the light of the writer's later military experience. "They are such," the preface modestly sets forth, "as usually do strike the eyes of military men in riding over a country, and are hereby offered with the intention only of assisting in giving general ideas to such, whose time being employed in matters of infinitely higher moment, have not leisure or opportunity of examining things of this nature themselves, without pretensions to exactness, which could never take place in sketches made in a hurry."

The second book bears the title, *A General Description of the South Part of Ireland, made during a Tour of about Three Weeks in that Country in the Month of August 1765*. It is dated July 1766. It notices the physical features and chief military positions in that part of the island, and, among other things, suggests the utility in any military operations there of the small flying columns which have since been so largely employed.

About the last-named date Roy appears to have been also employed on special service at Dunkirk, in connection with the destruction of the defences there. It had been agreed by Art. XIII. of the Treaty of Fontainebleau that the fortifications of the town and port should be razed as soon as possible after the exchange of the ratifications; but the work proceeded haltingly, and a question arose as to whether the *cunette* was not indispensable to the health of the place. General Lord Ligonier was sent to report, but the French, not unnaturally, demurred to his lordship's engineering capacity, and some English engineers, including Colonel Roy, were despatched thither. Roy's claim for expenses in the Home Office Records shows that he was employed for a period of 119 days (with Colonel Desmarests and Mr. A. Frazer), in taking levels, &c., from 26th October 1765 to 21st February 1766, for which he received special remuneration at the rate of £3 a day.

Roy became a colonel on 29th August 1777. The rest of his military service was spent as Deputy Quartermaster-General at the Horse Guards, in which capacity he was present during the Riots of 1780. Together with this post he combined the office of Surveyor-General of the Coasts, and latterly of Commissary-General of England.

His scientific labours during these years were unremitting and varied, the most important among them being his barometrical experiments made in conjunction with Sir Geo. Schuckburg,

F.R.S., which are contained in *Philos. Trans.* 1777, and in *Experiments and Observations made in Britain in order to attain a Rule for Measuring Heights with the Barometer* (London 1778), and his antiquarian researches and surveys which were embodied in that fine work, *Military Antiquities of Great Britain* (London 1793), first published after the author's death at the cost of the Royal Society of Antiquaries. He became a Fellow of the Royal Society and of the Royal Society of Antiquaries, London. On 18th October 1781, he was promoted to the rank of major-general, retaining his staff appointments.

Three years later Roy undertook the measurement of the Base Line on Hounslow Heath, for which he received the Copley Medal of the Royal Society, and which, together with the subsequent trigonometrical operations for connecting the Meridians of Paris and Greenwich, were the first geodetic measurements ever attempted in Britain—the first stage in the long series of scientific labours which in many indirect ways have contributed so largely to human welfare and progress, and have made the work of the British Ordnance Surveyors famous throughout the world.

From a memoir by Roy in *Philos. Trans.*, 1785, it appears that when, at the end of the Seven Years War, the Government of the day, as before said, contemplated a public survey of Great Britain, it was proposed to entrust the work to Roy, and to utilize the survey of Scotland, already alluded to, by carrying the English system of triangulation across the border, and filling in the details from the "Duke of Cumberland's" map. The scheme, however, was allowed to drop, and various events in the course of the next twenty years prevented its renewal. He goes on to say:—

The peace of 1763 having been concluded, and official business having detained me in or near London all through that summer, I embraced the opportunity of my own private amusement to measure a base of 7744·3 feet across the (Marybone) fields between *Jews Harp*, Marybone, and Black Lane, St. Pancras, as a foundation for a series of triangles carried on at the same time for determining the relative positions of the different steeples and other places in and about the capital with reference to each other, and to the Observatory at Greenwich. The principal object that I had in view (besides that it might probably serve as a hint to the public for the revival of the now forgotten scheme of 1763), was to facilitate the comparison of observations made by the lovers of astronomy within the limits of the projected survey, *vizt.* Richmond and Harrow on the west, and Shooters Hill and Wanstead on the east; and thinking that a paper containing the results of the trigonometrical observations might not prove unacceptable to the Royal Society, I was engaged in making the computations for that purpose, when very unexpectedly I found that an operation of the same nature, but much more important in its nature, was really in agitation. This I saw would supersede, at least for the present, all

own private observations, and perhaps render them wholly useless, unless it were as a matter of curiosity hereafter to see how far such as depended on so short a base and a small instrument (a quadrant of 12 inches radius) would agree with those founded on a much larger base and angles determined by a circular instrument, being that proposed as the best that could be made use of in the operations.

The circumstances referred to may be briefly told as follows: In the autumn of 1783, Comte d'Adhemar, French Ambassador at St. James', transmitted to Mr. Fox, then Foreign Secretary, a memoir drawn up by the eminent French geodesist, Cassini de Thury, setting forth the advantages which would accrue to astronomical science and navigation by the carrying of a series of triangles from the neighbourhood of London to Dover, to be connected with the triangulation already made in France, with a view to the more exact determination of the relative positions of the Royal Observatories of Greenwich and Paris.

By the King's command the matter was referred to Sir Joseph Banks, then president of the Royal Society, who suggested that General Roy should undertake the triangulation in question. Early in the following year the council of the Royal Society petitioned King George III. to place funds at the disposal of the society, to carry out the work; and on the 24th June 1784, Sir Joseph Banks was enabled to inform the council that the King had signified his approval, and "permitted Major-General Roy to proceed with the task under the direction of the President and Council of the Royal Society." *

A beginning had, by this time, been already made on Hounslow Heath, which was selected for its long stretch of level waste; and as it was considered that soldiers would prove more useful than ordinary workmen, a party of the 12th Foot had been brought from Windsor to assist in the operations and act as guard.†

The first portion of the base was measured on 16th June 1784, and thenceforward, during many succeeding weeks of that summer, the work was carried steadily on by soldier hands, under the close scrutiny of all the leading men of science of the day, and amid the very scenes which had witnessed the pageantry and riot of King James' lawless camp just 100 years before—a not unworthy illustration of the great changes wrought in that time. The total measured length of base (reduced to the sea-level), was 27,404·89 feet, or, in round

* Weld's *History Royal Society*, vol. ii.

† Windsor was not then a Guards' station. The 12th Foot, as the senior corps at the famous defence of Gibraltar, had been ordered to Windsor after its return home, and treated with marked distinction by the King.

numbers, about $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles. The measurement was made partly with a 100-ft. steel chain of peculiar construction, partly with deal rods cut out of the heart of a long-seasoned New England mast, and tipped with bell-metal caps, partly with glass tubes like magnified thermometer tubes. Of the indomitable ingenuity and skill displayed in ensuring the mathematical straightness of the line of measurement, the rigidity of the measuring bars and the perfect contact of their extremities, in determining the corrections necessitated by variations of temperature and humidity, and a hundred other geodesic niceties, for which, it must be remembered, few or no guiding data then existed, it is unnecessary here to speak. The plain unembellished details recorded in *Philos. Trans.*, 1785, are sufficient testimony to the skill displayed and the success achieved. For this work, as before mentioned, Roy was awarded the Copley gold medal of the Royal Society.

It may be noted that Roy's assistants were all volunteers for the work, and with the exception of Colonel Pringle, R.E., were not members of the ordnance corps. Among them may be mentioned Lieut.-Colonel Calderwood, F.R.S., of the 1st Troop Horse Guards,† a young man of wealth and scientific tastes, who died soon after at the early age of twenty-seven; and Ensign T. Vincent Reynolds, of the dépôt 34th Foot, by whom the preliminary surveys of the Heath were made; also Mr. Lloyd, F.R.S., and Mr. Isaac Dolby, afterwards professor of mathematics at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich.

The construction of the great theodolite to be used in the triangulation—a magnificent instrument, now in possession of the Royal Society, with a horizontal circle 3 feet in diameter graduated with unprecedented care and minuteness, and carrying telescopes of 36 inches focal length—had been entrusted to the famous maker, Ramsden; but the delays involved in this task postponed the further progress of the operations until the summer of 1787. The instrument—it is in sixty pieces, packed in four large cases—being at last completed, the work recommenced on 3rd July 1787.

With the aid of Colonel Williams§ and Captain Mudge,

* Died of yellow fever at Grenada, 1793.

† Now part of 1st Life Guards.

‡ Afterwards major and brevet lieutenant-colonel 30th Foot. Retired from the service 1801.

§ Died 1802.

|| Afterwards Major-General Wm. Mudge, R.A., F.R.S., Lieut.-Governor Royal Military Academy. Died 1817.

R.A.,—the officers to whom the extension of the triangulation was entrusted after Roy's death—and 2nd Lieutenant A. Brice, R.A.,* the work was speedily carried down from Hounslow Heath to the Kentish coast, and in October 1787 Roy had the satisfaction of seeing it completed by observations connecting the French and English survey stations, which were made in the presence of the French mathematicians Cassini, Mechain, and Legendre, who came over to Dover for the purpose.†

A "base of verification" measured by Captain Mudge and Lieutenant Bryce on Romney Marsh, at the same time, showed a discrepancy of 28 inches only as compared with the measurement on Hounslow Heath, thus evidencing what in those days was justly regarded as an altogether remarkable example of precision in measurement. The object in view having been accomplished, the work of triangulation was discontinued, and not renewed until after the "first English geodesist" was laid in his grave, when the extension of Roy's triangulation by Mudge (for Colonel Williams had but a brief connection with the work) commenced the Ordnance Survey of Great Britain.

General Roy, who had been appointed Colonel 30th (Cambridgeshire) Regiment of Foot, on 15th November 1786, had for some time been in failing health, which necessitated his wintering in Lisbon. He died, rather suddenly, at his residence, 2, Argyll Street, on 1st July 1790, just as the last proof sheets of his memoir on the Triangulation of 1787, published in *Philos. Trans.* 1790, had been placed in the printer's hands.

Thus passed away, in harness, a modest but untiring worker in the cause of science, a good and meritorious soldier, of whose memory the British army has every reason to be proud.

* Afterwards Lieut.-General Sir Alexander Bryce, R.E. Died 1827.

† The longer distances were observed at night with the aid of white lights. From a MS. note in the British Museum we learn that the latter were produced with a composition of twenty-eight parts nitre, four saltpetre, and two orpiment, finely pounded together and burned before powerful reflectors. They were the invention of the elder Congreve, and gave the brightest and steadiest flame then obtainable.

Two Lobes.

Who can doubt that all his rapture
Would be slowly, surely quelled,
If the poet could but capture
All the beauty he beheld?

Only let your Dante marry,
He would find that marriage means
Beatrice Portinari
In the kitchen cooking beans.

Or, if I must have the Real
Fit for use, and truly mine;
Let me keep the blessed Ideal,
Hallowed in a sacred shrine.

Though the one, a thing of beauty,
Be, in silent hours, adored;
Still the other claims my duty
From the tongue, the pen, the sword.

H. G. K.

Pre-eminence in War.

BY MAJOR F. W. GRAHAM.

"It has been a great and long debate whether success in war is most owing to bodily strength or mental abilities; for as counsel is necessary before we enter upon action, after measures are duly concerted speedy execution is equally necessary; so that, neither of these being sufficient singly, they prevail only by the assistance of each other."—SALLUST (Rose's translation).

WAR affects the character, the policy, and the vital interests of nations; it may be popular; on the other hand it may be foolish and eccentric; again, it may be just, even necessary, or it may be entered upon for the aggrandisement of his country by a despotic monarch.

Those who discuss and analyse the causes of war, who endeavour to show the justice, necessity, or, on the other hand, oppose the extreme measure, are the representatives of a nation—statesmen—in whose hands the helm is placed, guiding the state through the shoals of diplomacy; they discuss the question of peace or war on certain principles tending to prove the justice and necessity for the action; they endeavour to show that the interests of the country are clearly involved; and it is incumbent on them to prove that the objects for which the war is undertaken are probable, or at least possible, of attainment, and also that the end proposed to be accomplished is worth the cost of the sacrifice about to be incurred.

The causes which have led to wars may be summed for the present purpose, and denominated the policy which initiated the war; and it will be found on investigation that the war will oftentimes take its character from this policy, and that the policy influences the spirit with which a war is entered upon and carried out, and that it is in intimate connection with the ultimate success which crowns the endeavours of one side or the other.

Napier says: "A cause manifestly unjust is a heavy weight

upon the operations of a General ; it reconciles men to desertion, sanctifies want of zeal, furnishes pretext for cowardice, renders hardships more irksome, dangers more obnoxious, glory less satisfactory to the mind of the soldier." Book I. chap. i. p. 5.

The interests of nations and states are interwoven in the most diversified and changeable manner, and it is through the political intercourse of governments and states that war is called forth ; it can never be separated from political intercourse, which also leads to the establishment of leagues and alliances between states whose line of policy may be similar ; these alliances, mutual understandings, contracted during peace time, are fraught with most important results when the state assumes a warlike attitude, and are a source of power to be wielded by the ministers of the state, together with a vigorous policy and astute diplomacy, under the cloak of which the preparations for war are oftentimes carried on.

War having been determined upon, the representatives of the state must be at hand with the means to carry out the extreme measure, both with honour to the nation and to those they employ as the instruments of their policy ; and in the happy event of the state coming victorious out of the struggle, it is a duty incumbent on it either to hold by the sword that which has been obtained by the sword, or else by such good government as will preclude its further use ; for many empires founded on the blood of valiant men have been lost through the negligence of princes and ministers, who have thrown away that which their soldiers have won.

The object of war has been defined as *Victory*, the disarmament of the enemy, the destruction of his military force, conquest of his country, subjugation of his will, by which he is forced to make peace. The agents by which this object is carried out are armies and navies, representing the armed force of the nation ; at the head of the armed forces are placed the leaders, who develop the two leading characteristics which form the basis of military operations, viz. strategy and tactics.

Pre-eminence is an attribute, or a term, which may be applied to an individual, or, in a collective sense, to a nation. Applying the term to individuals in war, we have instances in the roll of David's mighty men recorded in 2 Sam. xxiii. ; they were pre-eminent men, the cause of whose pre-eminence was apparently to be found in the number of men they had slain and spoiled. Retreat in those times being almost impossible, defeat was followed by the annihilation of the vanquished.

hence the number of slain and the pre-eminence of David's captains.

Using the term in a collective sense as applied to nations in war, it is natural to infer that the nation to which it applies is ruled by great statesmen, and that the administration and direction of the national forces are in able hands; but the causes of pre-eminence of nations in war are not to be found solely in great statesmen and leaders, these are only some of the elements. Hannibal was the greatest leader of his time, but the Romans came off victorious in the final decision of the Punic wars. The term cannot, therefore, be held to apply solely to individuals in the sense in which it is under discussion; still, in treating of the term, the individual cannot be thrown out of the case, for what record is there of a war in which the individual leader has not borne a prominent part?

We have alluded to the political and military objects of war and stated that policy declares war, war being only the instrument to attain the political or ultimate object of war; the military object is secondary, but at the same time it would appear that the military conduct of a war in every case must determine the pre-eminence, or otherwise, of the nations engaged; and, further, it would appear that when a nation has been assailed or provoked, or engaged in war during a long series of years, and has always been enabled to carry out successfully the military objective, viz. the "disarmament of its enemies," such a nation may be justly called pre-eminent in war.

If the successful attainment of the objects of war, as previously stated, and pre-eminence in war be synonymous, then the causes which have led to the first will be those which have brought about the second, or *the pre-eminence of nations in war*.

The agents of victory are armies, whose constitution, characteristics, and conduct may be investigated under three heads:—

First.—The military institutions of the country.

Second.—The strategy, political and military, which presides over and gives direction to the war.

Third.—The tactical forms used on the field of battle; armament, &c.

I.—MILITARY INSTITUTIONS.

To the struggle of small states in the beginning of their career either with their neighbours, to gain a footing in some new country, or to establish themselves on an equality with other more powerful states, may be attributed the foundation of military institutions and the growth of military power; which

again appears from history to decline as luxury and bad government creep in, and the state in turn is attacked by one more healthy and vigorous than itself.

Philip of Macedon developed a standing army out of the militia of Greece, with which he obtained complete ascendancy in that country. His troops were divided into distinct classes, the masses again of his troops were sub-divided into phalanxes, and a complete system of castrametation, discipline, and rewards for military service was instituted in his armies. To this methodical arrangement and development of force, coupled with the great intelligence of the people, are attributable the victories of Philip of Macedon. The defeat of Philip and the Macedonian host at Cynoscephalæ was not the result of mere fortune. The shrunken population of his country could but fill the ranks of his army with young boys and decrepid men; but the military institutions of the country and the training of a few, solidified these into masses which withstood the attack of the soldiers of Rome who had fought the Carthaginians. The army handed over by Philip to Perseus was perfect, but its formation had not been changed, and although it defeated the Roman army of Licinius, composed of raw recruits, at Sycurium, the short but murderous battle at Pydna not only decided the fate of the phalanx formation, but that of the Macedonian monarchy.

Let us take another instance from Greek history. Philopœmen, a Greek, jealous of liberty, and a soldier passionately fond of his art, by his own individual exertions rescued the Achæan League from a state of dependence for protection on a foreign power, and raised it to one of military pre-eminence among the provinces of Greece. The Achæan citizens had depended on a mercenary force for their defence, their habits were foreign to a military life, and they were addicted to luxury and ostentation. Philopœmen reorganised their army and changed the whole course of their social usages, tastes, and feelings; their army was soon re-armed, and trained to the complicated evolutions of the Macedonian phalanx; the tastes of the youth of the country were directed to pursuits where personal emulation in toils, hardships, and dangers supplanted the effeminate luxury with which they had vied with one another. The proficiency of this state in military art led to the victory of Mantinea.

Polybius and Strabo assign the decay of Greece to the decay of its financial resources and its population, brought about by bad government, intestine warfare, foreign invasion, and a long continuance of destructive wars; but the evil lay deeper

the ravages of war, for the period immediately preceding the establishment of the Roman Government was a period of peace and comparative prosperity; but even then the population was sinking rapidly, through causes intimately connected with the moral character and habits of society itself. The change from republican to monarchical institutions was in itself beneficial to Greece and was marked by the growth of colonies and the restoration of ruined cities. But even if the spirit of the ancient institutions had remained in all its vigour, it could have availed nothing, when the body which it had animated was so nearly wasted away. Luxury took the place of the primitive simplicity among those who had the means of indulging it. The intercourse which Alexander's conquests opened in the East caused this change of manners to enter into Greece, and finally ruined it.

The power of Rome sprang from warrior citizens. The state, at first, fosters their martial qualities, and the renown which is the fruit of their military intuition. Their knowledge of tactics, castrametation and topography surpassed anything of the kind, and all of this was gained from the experiences of their soldiers in incessant warfare in Africa, Spain, Greece, Italy, Gaul and Britain.

It is needless here to describe the Roman legion, its deeds recorded on the pages of history; but it may be said that the order and ingenuity displayed in its organisation was most remarkable. The rigid discipline of the Roman armies, combined with the exercises and training, rendered the Roman soldier individually superior to any other of his time. Arms, tactics and discipline gained most of the Roman victories. The points, together with the creative genius of their generals, formed the foundation of the military power of the Romans. The extent of their dominions was owing to the military spirit infused in the institutions of the country, which required an incessant war in conquest. The experience they gained always added to their knowledge of the military art: defeated by Hannibal at Cannæ they quickly learned his manœuvres.

In a military empire such as the Roman, girt about with hostile nations, the highly-disciplined forces of the Empire were in a manner kept from deteriorating by the constant demand for their service. They incorporated territory with the empire by means of colonies, and by the diffusion of their laws and customs. These colonies bordered on states naturally disunited with their neighbours, various in character

and distinct in interests; and these states served Rome line of outposts against the attacks of the barbarous tribes of Asia and Europe. When these states were merged into provinces, the Empire came into direct communication with them under the pressure of the warlike tribes beyond them. Extension went beyond bounds, and brought down the barbarian Rome at a time when the military spirit was found wanting.

After the defeat of Varus, the efforts that were made to recruit the legions by conscription, made it apparent that the ancient military spirit of Rome and Italy had decayed and its citizens.

Out of the enfeebled generation a new *régime* springs not of a pure and sound description, but marked by violence and prevailing corruption. The power of gold and the force of arms were the means employed at this later period to maintain the few in the lap of luxury, and to keep the many in misery and abasement. Evils crept readily into the army and discipline suffered. The soldiers served not their country but their leaders, and they did not serve them from obedience but from offers and promises of gain.

Without doubt, towards the close of the second century civilisation had gained in extent; the arts and trades flourished, and literature increased; but patriotic feeling and civic virtue decayed. The old Roman spirit had gone; laws made for the Republic suited not the Empire. Following the example of Asiatic nations with whom they had contact, slavish splendour, unbounded profusion were introduced, exhausting the finances of the Empire and deteriorating its citizens.

Greece through the strife and jealousy of her cities tore one another, and Italy through the decay of all energetic character and all martial spirit in the people, lost the pre-eminence of station which had belonged to them, whilst they were injuriously affected by contact with the East, and voluptuous habits they copied, instead of imparting the civilisation they possessed.

One principal cause of the downfall of Carthage was the inferiority of its military institutions to those of the Romans and the want of a native army. The citizens of Carthage were essentially a trading people. The life of an industrious merchant—of a Carthaginian—was far too precious to be risked as long as it was possible to substitute advantageously that of a barbarian from Spain or Gaul. The military in-

tions of the Romans gave their armies, drawn from a hardy population and perfected in war, a great superiority over those of any of the people they had to contend with. They were organised with great care and rapidity. As long as these institutions continued superior to those of other people, the discords and civil wars so frequent at Rome did not prevent the Romans from triumphing. Immediately that military service began to be avoided by the inhabitants of Italy, and that effeminate inhabitants were suffered to buy themselves off from service, the power of Rome began to decline, and its military institutions to decay.

The causes which led to the pre-eminence of these nations in war above others, was the simplicity and hardihood of their citizens in the pristine state of the nation; the foundation of military institutions in the country tending to incorporate the army with the people; the good government which presided over their destinies, and the superior knowledge of the military art acquired by practice and study; and, as made visible in their tactical formations, discipline, training, and armaments. Some of the causes which have led to their decay have been touched upon. Among those chiefly to be remembered are the decay of the martial spirit, the corruption and voluptuousness that crept into the nations on the increase of wealth, and the deterioration of the race by admixture with the East.

In modern times the history of Prussia furnishes a striking illustration of the value of military institutions. Sprung from humble origin in the fifteenth century, in the sixteenth Frederick William formed the design of obtaining for Prussia a place among European powers by means of a strong military organisation; strict economy and discipline perfected in his time 60,000 men. It is stated he regarded his army like a miser regards his money, and it was left to his son and successor, Frederick the Great, to use the weapon bequeathed to him. As a general he was not at first distinguished, but his career as a warrior was established at the close of the Seven Years War. During the great coalition against him, backed by the funds that Pitt placed at his disposal, his energy, and the unity and secrecy of a strong dictatorship, enabled him to triumph over his many enemies, whose jealousies, slackness, and dissensions he knew how to profit by.

The Prussian troops of that period were perfect in all the sal parts of the military calling; but it was not till after
at Tilsit in 1807, when Prussia was bound not to keep

more than 12,000 men under arms, that the principles upon which the present military institutions of the nation are founded were introduced. To the unparalleled excellence of these institutions may chiefly be traced the belief which has grown up "that the vast political genius of the present Chancellor, coupled with the great military triumphs of the nation, combine in giving the German nation more weight in the councils of Europe than even belonged to Napoleon at the time of Austerlitz and Jena." How much of this is due to statesmanship, how much to generalship or to military institutions, it is difficult to say, but that a portion at least is due to the latter will be readily conceded, considering that there is hardly a nation in Europe which has not at one time or another borrowed something from the Prussians, either in military dress, discipline, or organisation.

The history of the Prussian Army divides itself into two periods: the one comprising the time between the reign of the Great Elector and the battle of Jena; the other dating from the battle of Jena up to the present time. The army that Frederick the Great inherited was very differently constituted to the Prussian armies of the present day; for the state was then so small, it was obliged to fill the ranks of the army with foreigners. From a population of two-and-a-half millions, it has increased to one of twenty-four millions, with a sway over the minor states of Germany which makes the North German Confederation the most formidable military power in Europe.

The last remains of the army of Frederick may be said to have perished at the battle of Jena; but not so its traditions, or the spirit infused into the country by long-established military institutions. These traditions and institutions have not been blindly adhered to, but have been adapted to the changing requirements of the age, and, familiarised as the nation is with military life, when any new system becomes requisite, or is forced upon them, it comes upon the nation rather as an improvement than the introduction of something new.

The astonishment caused by the appearance of Prussia in the field in 1812 with a well-appointed army of 200,000 men, is vividly expressed by a French writer (M. Ballyet) when he says: "The dead Prussian army rose up behind us, completely organised, like a spectre from the tomb, called forth by the genius of vengeance." Its cadres now open to receive the whole population; every German is liable to military service, and no substitutes are allowed. Persons unfit to serve under arms are liable to such service as they are fitted for in the army.

The liability to serve in the army and Landwehr lasts twelve years—three years in the standing army, four in the reserve, and five in the Landwehr. In addition to this, there is the levy of all the manhood of the nation from seventeen years of age to forty-two; this body, called the Landsturm, can only be called out in case of invasion.

The annual contingent required for education in the army is regulated by the requirements of the army itself. In 1814 it was fixed at 40,000; since then it has increased, in 1867 it was 100,000 men.

The military organisation is based on territorial divisions corresponding generally to civil ones. Provinces corresponding to Corps d'Armée, districts to brigades, circles to Landwehr battalions, circles again are divided into company districts.

The Prussian army and reserves form four distinct classes in peace, viz. :—

1. Standing army of men actually in the ranks.
2. Reserves: men who have passed through the ranks, and are liable to return to the active army when required.
3. Landwehr: men who have served in the army and reserve, and now separately organised as Landwehr battalions.
4. Ersatz reserve: men entirely untrained, but called in to replenish depôts when required in war.

The war with Austria in 1866 afforded an opportunity of testing the whole system; but although success attended their arms on that occasion, they did not on that account rest contented with what had hitherto been done. Whenever the experience there gained showed that further alterations might be made with advantage, the necessary modifications were immediately taken in hand; and the successful termination of the great struggle in which Germany and France have since been engaged, is the best proof of the efficiency of the present military system of North Germany.

France, in the latter half of the sixteenth century, was looked upon as the wealthiest power in Europe; her compact and fertile territory, the natural activity and enterprise of her people, were her chief sources of wealth, and enabled her to set on foot such forces as had never been seen since the downfall of the Roman Empire.

During the sixteenth century the French recruited their army by voluntary enlistment.

The wars of the Revolution ushered in great changes in the military institutions of France, the organisation into brigades

and divisions that had existed, was perfected in the Corps d'Armée that assembled at the camp of Bologne, and, according to the national vanity, the most glorious page of the history of France is found during the Napoleonic wars.

The successes of Napoleon were owing to the originality of the systems he introduced. The army, as it was the sole basis of his power, was also, at all times, the primary object of his thought. The conscription law of 1798 acquired, under him, the character of a settled and regular part of the national system. The distribution of the army into corps under tried leaders, the celerity imparted to strategic movements by the combination of the system of requisition with that of contracts, a real combined action of the three arms in battle, crushing of the enemy's centre by artillery fire, followed by powerful strokes of cavalry and infantry, all these combined to form part of his system; but the country was drained of its manhood by conscriptions, and on his exile the country sank into revolution, and its military pre-eminence faded for want of an individual great both in the council and the field.

The Second Empire had left the French military system entirely unaltered, and in no way rendered the army more of a national institution.

In 1870 the French army was kept up by compulsory service, modified by substitutes. The military results were unsatisfactory; in 1869, out of a contingent of 75,000 men, 42,000 paid the bounty of £92 for substitutes, thus the proportion of conscripts was very small, and the number of those who shirked military service great, and indifferent men obtained.

The classes into which the army was divided were:—

1. The active army, in which the men served five years.
2. The reserve, in which they served four years.
3. The mobile national guard, who were drilled for fifteen days annually, officered by civilians.

Gaps in the field army were filled from the depôts, of which there were 120 battalions, 60 squadrons, and 144 guns.

In the war of 1870 it would appear that, from the outset, the decision of the campaign depended on the organisation of the contending armies.

As compared with the German organisation, the French was faulty; the army was not ready organised into manœuvring units. France had no permanent brigades, divisions, or corps; the country was divided into territorial districts under Generals,

and, in case of war, troops had to be hurried up to form the unit of command.

However perfect the organisation may be, a certain time must elapse for mobilisation, and the great problem of the national armies of the present day is ; *first*, to organise them in sufficient numbers, and *second*, to turn them quickly into the field.

The forethought displayed in the military institutions of Prussia in the location of certain portions of force to certain territorial divisions of country, and the decentralisation thereby obtained, as contrasted with the system of centralisation adopted by the French, served in a very short time to place the Prussian army in the field fully equipped and prepared for war.

As soon as war was determined on, the French pushed forward their peace garrisons towards the frontier. The organisation of these garrisons was perfect on paper, but they were not on a war-footing, and when they commenced to collect the complements for the different regiments, brigades, and divisions, in rear of the railway junctions from whence they were to be conveyed to their corps, a scene of the most utter disorder and confusion occurred.

The difference of the systems may be stated as follows :—

The Prussians organise first, and then concentrate ; the French concentrate first, and then organise.

France was over-matched in the war of 1870 ; her army on a peace-footing was inferior to that of Germany by 50,000 men.

The whole available reserves of France to fill and support her armies in the field consisted of some contingents of the second class of conscripts and of the newly created Garde Mobile, both forces being wholly untrained, if we except five months passed at *depôts*, and, therefore, useless at first as soldiers ; their numbers have been estimated at 252,000 men.

The reserves of Germany, on the other hand, divided into the reserve proper, and the Landwehr of north and south Germany, were 800,000 trained soldiers in the highest state of efficiency, every soldier having passed three years in the ranks.

There is, perhaps, no point in which the inferiority of the French institutions to those of the German is more conspicuous than in the rapid prostration of the French after their defeats in the early part of the war. While the Prussians day after day were pouring fresh levies, fully disciplined and organised, into France, the power of bringing forward disciplined reserves actually did not exist in the French organisation.

Lastly, the Germans had during peace time studied the science

of communications as applied to the use of railways in war ; knowledge thus obtained enabled them to keep the great mass of men and horses supplied with munitions of war and food.

It is not the object of this essay to enter into a description of even a comparison between, the different military institutions of the nations of the world ; an investigation of one or two instances of undoubted supremacy is sufficient to point out the cause of that supremacy ; and the attention which is being directed to every nation in Europe at the present day to the reorganisation of its armed forces, is only an acknowledgment of the correctness of the example displayed in the forces of the German empire.

Before concluding this portion of the subject let us notice Russia. The progress of Russia within little more than a century almost as extraordinary as that of Prussia, and offers a peculiarity which, in its bearing on the military as well as on other institutions, deserves to be noticed. It is thus described by late Lord Macaulay (Macaulay's life by Trevelyan) :—

Within the last 120 years a nation which had previously been in a state barbarous as that in which our ancestors were before the Crusades, has gradually emerged from the ignorance in which it was sunk, and has taken its place among civilised nations. I speak of Russia. There is now in that country a large educated class, abounding with persons fit to serve the State in the highest functions. And how was the change effected ? Not by flattering national prejudices ; not by feeding the mind of the young Muscovite with the old worn stories which his rude fathers had believed ; not by lying legends about St. Nicholas, &c. ; but by teaching him those foreign languages in which the greatest mass of information has been laid up, and thus putting all information within his reach. The languages of western Europe have civilised Russia.

It may be said that moral influences, such as the religious and political enthusiasm which inspired the pikemen of Cromwell, the patriotic ardour of devotion to a great leader which influenced the old guard of Napoleon, national characteristics, character of a General, have also considerable effect in pre-eminence in war. Any or all of these things may be lying dormant in an army during peace, and require but the call to arms to develop them.

The stubborn valour and implicit subordination, which are distinguishing characteristics of the Russian soldiery at the present day, were instilled into them at Pultowa, where they beat the previously invincible Swedes ; before that time they had been a disorderly and irresolute rabble.

The Prussian army took the field in 1866 after nearly fifty years peace. Their efficient condition after such a long peace is to be ascribed to the excellence of their military institutions.

and this, combined with their able generalship and superior armament, is the cause of their success.

In the military institutions of a country lie the seeds of durable success. An army by its institutions is, as it were, welded into the state to which it belongs, if we comprehend under the term institution all that relates to the recruitment, organisation, discipline, formation, and manœuvres, the rules which regulate first appointment and promotion, the relations between officers and soldiers amongst themselves, and the composition and education of an efficient staff.

The military institutions of a country have more of the military and less of the civil element in their nature, according as the national force approaches more or less to the nature of a standing army. When the force is a regular standing army, almost the only part of its institutions which is both civil and military is the recruitment; but whether these institutions partake more or less of the civil element, they are not the less important as regards the causes of success in war.

The political circumstances in which a nation is placed regulate to a great extent the number of troops to be kept up, as well as the constitution of its army; but if the military organisation is on a sound basis, after providing a sufficient force to ensure the execution of the laws, to maintain order at home, and repel any sudden aggression of foreign armies, it should further provide the means of putting forth the *whole strength of the country* in case of need.

This preparation for war during peace is a vast question, involving the concentration of men and material at certain points, ready to move in any required direction, and in the shortest possible space of time.

A vast amount of information, requiring constant revision and correction, has also to be collected, so as to keep with the changes which are always going on in the surrounding world.

"The science of war has reached a point when to be unready is to be undone."

The second French Empire failed to renew the military glories of the first, because its military institutions did not admit of its putting forth the whole strength of the country; instead of a proper gradation of responsibility there was the curse of over-centralisation. "The whole nation was imbued with over-confidence, springing from a want of knowledge and favouritism, which destroys a high tone of thought, teaching the members of a noble profession to become sycophants, and leading inevitably

to a false condition of discipline, kept up only by fear, and certain to break down in the first hour of trial."

"Courage and the spirit of an army have in all ages multiplied its physical powers, and will continue to do so in future. A superiority in the organisation and equipment of an army has also at times given a great moral preponderance; but armies are now so much on a par in regard to arms and equipment, that there is no very notable difference between the best and the worst in these things; so that except the commander-in-chief, a thing entirely dependent on chance, there is nothing now but habituation to war which can give one army a decided superiority over another." (*Clausewitz.*)

The nearer armies approach to a state of equality in all these things, the more decisive becomes the relation in point of numbers.

II. The STRATEGY, POLITICAL and MILITARY, which presides over and gives direction to the war.

Clausewitz says that "war is an instrument of policy"; and in the examination of this definition goes on to state that "if war belongs to policy it will naturally take its character from thence; and although it is true the political element does not sink deep into the details of war, its influence is great in the formation of a plan for the whole war.

"The subordination of the political to the military point of view would be contrary to common sense, for policy declares war. The subordination of the military to the political is, therefore, the only thing possible; hence the leading outlines of a war are determined by the Cabinet.

"If the policy promises itself a right effect from the war, then it acts favourably; if, on the other hand, it promises itself a wrong effect, or in its conduct is wrong, then it is prejudicial.

"The art of war is a policy which fights battles instead of writing notes."

From the general plan of a war results the particular plan of operation relative to the different countries where the war is to be carried on; but in the formation of the general plan is to be found the genius of the leader, which influences the whole; and it is absolutely necessary that all those who aspire to the first military ranks should possess the great knowledge necessary to form the general plan of a war.

When war has been determined on, and the general plan thereof has been committed to the hands of the military, that

the character of the war, whether offensive or defensive, is, or ought to be, founded exclusively on military and not on political grounds.

Rüstow says: "To carry constitutional principles into warfare is fatal to whoever does it."

Strategy teaches us how to plan a campaign, and the bases on which to build up a plan are comprised under three heads, viz., geographical, historical, and statistical; or, in other words, an accurate knowledge of the theatre of war, a close study of the military operations that have been transacted on the same theatre in former wars, and a knowledge of the resources of the territory in the proposed zone of operations.

The end to be obtained is the ruin and destruction of the enemy's army, which means victory in the field; and neither political objects or causes have anything to do with the actual military operations which lead the shortest road to our ends.

However great Alexander appears in his victories, perhaps his greatness is still more apparent in his general plans.

When we see Alexander leave Macedon with 30,000 foot, 6,000 horse, and cross the Hellespont for the conquest of Asia, the enterprise seems more than human.

The solidity of his plan and the great extent of his genius is set forth in his speech to the generals.

"He does not see how Egypt is to be easily attacked while the Persians are masters of the sea, nor can he pursue Darius, leaving behind so large a tract of country suspected, at least, if not real enemies. These matters would not only prostrate his design, but perhaps ruin the affairs of Greece."

"Our enemies," he says, "may recover the maritime towns in our absence, and then, after augmenting their naval army, transport the war into our own country while we are pursuing Darius on the plains of Babylon. This is more to be feared, that we are at open war with the Lacedemonians, and that the Athenians continue in our party rather from fear than from love. But, if we are masters of Tyre, we shall soon have all Phœnicia, and deprive the Persians of half of their naval army, which is composed of the fleet of that province. For it is not possible to imagine that, after seeing us in possession of their towns, they will still remain in the service of our enemies. It will then follow that Cyprus will be surrendered to us, we can easily conquer it, and even Egypt itself, if we are once masters of the sea. And thus, having nothing to fear for our country, we can with more glory and assurance undertake the conquest of Persia."

In these few words is the great plan of Alexander comprised. He points out to his generals the necessity of the conquest of Tyre and the maritime towns of Egypt, and by these measures he may carry his army as far as he pleases. His rear will ever be covered, and his communication with Greece secured. We

have only to compare his general plan with the map of the country, to be convinced of the truth.

By taking the maritime towns one by one he deprived the Persian fleet of their harbours of refuge and the possibility of recruiting, and eventually dispersed them, as his own fleet was not powerful enough to attack them.

We cannot attribute Alexander's science and conduct of war to long experience or to that fickle element fortune, but must ascribe the cause of his pre-eminence to his great military capacity, to the distinguished talents nature had united in his person. Having perfectly studied the rules and principles of the science of war, by the time he had attained the age of twenty-six, he had far successfully applied them, that at the head of his small but perfectly disciplined and warlike army he prevailed against the forces of Darius in three battles and conquered Asia.

Having conquered the Persians he knew how to accommodate himself to the manners of those people. He mixed the Persians among his phalanx, and the most illustrious he placed in his companies. This was a piece of Alexander's politics.

Let us take another instance from Grecian history.

The Lacedemonians had leagued themselves with several States of the Peloponnesus to attack the Athenians, simply from jealousy of their power.

The celebrated speech of Pericles, recorded in Thucydides, is an exposition both of policy and a general plan of war.

He points out to his countrymen that, in spite of existing treaties, the Lacedemonians wish to pick a quarrel and decide by arms.

He tells them not to imagine that to obtain peace they need simply to annul a decree which is the cause of the war: on the contrary, he adds, depends your whole force and empire. If you yield, they will immediately impose new laws on you, as to a people they regard as inferiors and have made afraid of them; whereas, if you resist vigorously, they will be constrained to treat you as equals. We must either yield our power, or decide by the way of arms, what is demanded of us.

He then goes on to show that the Lacedemonians are an agricultural people, strong by land but weak by sea; that they are composed of many small states, each having equal authority and who, having different interests, do not pursue the same object; they have no public council which provides against future events and puts everything in order in an instant, and they are unable to support a long war against a nation more rich

powerful than themselves ; that though they should put garrisons in the frontiers, and blockade the Athenian towns, yet they can never prevent the Athenian navies from ravaging their coasts and bringing in provisions.

Such was the situation of the enemy's affairs.

He then goes on to say that the Athenians were free from all these defects, and had other great advantages. " If they attack our country by land we will invade theirs by sea, and if we ruin only a part of the Peloponnessas they will be greater sufferers than we can be if they lay waste the whole country of Athens, because they have no other resource, but we possess other states both on the islands and on the continent. This shows how important it is to be sovereign of the seas."

He then counsels them not to risk a battle by land, by which they might in case of defeat lose their allies, but to abandon the low countries and retire into Athens ; and lastly, bids them not to degenerate from the valour of their forefathers, who failed not to resist the Persians with more courage than force, nor to leave the state to their successors in a worse condition than it was received over from their ancestors.

The design of Pericles' harangue was to lead the Athenians to declare war against the Lacedemonians.

In this speech, which has not been given at length, there is the most careful examination and exposition of the political system of the adversary, and also of other powers ; the circumstance whether they would interest themselves for or against the Athenians is discussed, the advantages or disadvantages that would proceed from the war, the means to be employed for attack or defence ; and allusion is also made to the succour expected from outlying colonies and states, and the neutrality of others.

The careful investigation of these points, and the judgment deduced therefrom at the outset of a war, must certainly be classed among the elements which tend to bring about a successful termination.

The results of the Second Punic War made peace, however agreeing to peace would be the superiority of the regions, which was have been the same, allies in subjection. firmness of the Roman Senate during the can hardly be over-rated. If Rome had good the terms, the very fact of her would have been a tacit acknowledgment of the Carthaginians. The dread of the Roman great moral auxiliary to them, would never and it would have been difficult to keep the

The empire held by Philip II. of Spain was unquestionably gained by all the arts of policy and war. Spain was then the land of statesmen and soldiers; the skill of the Spanish diplomatists was renowned throughout Europe; the sovereign nation was unrivalled, both in regular and irregular warfare. The impetuous chivalry of France, the serried phalanx of Switzerland, were alike found wanting when brought face to face with the Spanish infantry.

Overleap 100 years, and look at Spain since end of 17th century. Macaulay says, in one of his foreign essays: "Foreign conquest had begun to eat into every part of the gigantic empire, and within there was an incurable decay. All the causes of this decay resolve themselves into one cause, *bad government.*"

During the reign of Louis XIV. France occupied a very important position in Europe. The names of Richelieu, Lionne, Louvois, and Colbert are associated with that period, but no monarch ever kept affairs more in his own hands than did the King of France himself; therefore, it is only fair to allow that the high position of France at that time was, in a great measure, due to the abilities of the Sovereign.

It was reserved for Marlborough to put a check on the aggrandising spirit of the French. In this great man were united the qualities of a statesman and a general. For ten years he took the general direction of the war in Flanders and Spain, besides managing every negotiation with the allies. This intimate knowledge of the causes of the war and their bearing on the interests of the nation, enabled him fully to carry out the wishes of the Government by whom he was employed.

As a statesman, the high qualities of Marlborough were owned by his bitterest foes. "Over the confederacy," says Bolingbroke, "he, a new, a private man, acquired by merit and management a more decided influence than high birth, confirmed authority, and even the Crown of Great Britain had given to King William." But great as he was in council, he was even greater in the field. He stands alone in his unbroken good fortune. Voltaire notes that he never besieged a fortress that he did not take, or fought a battle that he did not win. His difficulties came not from the enemy, but from the ignorance and timidity of his own allies. He was never defeated in the field, but victory after victory was snatched from him by the incapacity of his officers or the stubbornness of the Dutch.

Mr. Pitt's administration in this country affords an illustration the great influence which may be brought to bear in war by those who take no part in the actual operations in the field. "I want to call England," he said, as he took office, "out of the servile state in which 20,000 men from France can shake her." His call was soon answered; he at once breathed his own lofty spirit into the country he served, as he communicated something of his own grandeur to the men who served him.

"No man," said a soldier of the time, "ever entered Mr. Pitt's closet who did not feel himself braver when he came out than when he went in."

"England has been a long time in labour," exclaimed Frederick of Prussia, "but she has at length brought forth a son." If we look at the history of that period, it is no exaggeration to say that three of the many victories which then took place determined, for ages to come, the destinies of the world. With the victory of Rossbach began that great political change in Germany which was to lead, in our own day, to the creation of a united empire under the leadership of Prussia. With the triumph of Wolfe, on the heights of Abraham, may be said to have begun the history of the United States; for the fall of Quebec, by extinguishing the power of the French in Canada, removed the enemy whose dread had hitherto knit the colonists to the mother country, and flung open to their energies the boundless plains of the West. By the victory of Plassey, the influence of Europe told for the first time, since the days of Alexander, on the nations of the East.

(To be continued.)

Reviews and Notes.

EGYPT: Native Rulers and Foreign Interference. By BARON MALORTIE, Author of *Diplomatic Sketches*, *Mr. Gladstone and the Greek Question*, &c. &c. London: William Ridgway, Piccadilly. 1882.

THE truth of the very apt motto attached to this book, "*Max semper in rebus humanis momenti Ægyptus fuit*," was never so much appreciated by Europe as at the present moment. We are bound to add, that no writer upon the subject has been successful as the author in placing before the public a calm and statesman-like review of the more recent past, in suggesting a practical line of conduct for the future. It is in all respects a most excellent book. It points out, in the clearest language, the mistakes which have been committed, and indicates the mischiefs which have resulted from the interference of foreign powers. Whilst upon this point, we may note that although the English Government has nominally abolished the dual control, it has allowed many English officers to remain drawing large salaries for doing nothing. The excuse preferred by the gentlemen is that they do not belong to the Control. Though this may be technically true, it partakes nevertheless of the character of a subterfuge, a subterfuge moreover of a very dangerous character, for it stereotypes the evil which causes the main agitation amongst the Egyptian population—that allowing lazy Europeans to draw large salaries from the revenues of the country, exempt from taxation.

One important matter dwelt upon by the author, and on which, we believe, has occupied for some time the attention of the Government, is the advisability of purchasing from the Sultan the right of suzerainty over the country. This is a step preliminary to further action. As it is, our troops remain in the country, not because the English Government is anxious they should remain, but because their withdrawal would be the signal for anarchy. For the present, we believe, the remedy chiefly indicated by Lord Dufferin, and viewed not unfavourably by the author of the work under review, that of placing the Khedive in the position of an Indian ruler, resting on English

protected by England, with a Resident at his Court, is the solution of the question. But to enable the reader unfamiliar with politics to form any opinion at all on the subject, necessary that he should read the most able and instructive work of Baron de Malortie.

SEA, THE HERMIT NATION. By WILLIAM ELLIOT GRIFFIS, late of the Imperial University of Tokio, Japan. Author of *The Mikado's Empire*. London: W. H. Allen & Co. 1882.

1. GRIFFIS has in this fascinating volume introduced the reader to a new world—a world not long united to the old one by means of American diplomacy—and displaying features which cannot fail to attract the geologist, the man of science, the scholar, the linguist, the political economist, and the missionary. The task has been performed with the same ability, the same eloquence, the same research which characterised the author's work on the Mikado's empire, and is even more interesting, inasmuch as his subject is less generally known. The chapter on the modern and recent history of the country possesses all the fascination of a romance. It shows how gradually, step by step, the links were riveted which now bind the Corea to its older sister lands. A very copious appendix gives exhaustive details regarding the language, the literature, the weights and measures, the coinage, and the cartography of the country. It is difficult for anyone who takes up the book to lay it down again; and when we add that it is beautifully printed on fine paper, requiring no paper-cutter, we add the last word of praise to a book which, from the first page to the last, is a gem of instruction and delight.

THE RUSSIANS AT MERV AND HERAT, AND THEIR POWER OF INVADING INDIA. By CHARLES MARVIN. London: W. H. Allen & Co. 1883.

MR. MARVIN has done good service by exposing the secret thoughts and aspirations of the Russian war party. These revelations confirm the views of that English party which resisted the abandonment of Kandahar. It will be in the recollection of some of our readers that Colonel Malleson, on his return from India upwards of two years ago, declared, in a lecture he delivered on the abandonment of Kandahar, that one result of that retrograde movement would be that native opinion tended to the conclusion that when the English should

assemble their armies to repulse the Russian invader from the north, the independent Indian princes would seize opportunity to rise in their rear. Compare this prophecy, result of special investigation, with the repeated declaration of Soboleff and other Russian generals that already India undermined, and that when the Russian invasion does take place the English army will find a very formidable enemy of its communications. It is within the personal knowledge of the writer of this notice that ten years ago, a Mahári whose territories would play a very important part in the event of a Russian invasion, asked, at a private and secret audience, a German traveller who happened to be at his Court, whether it were true that the Russians were more powerful than the English, as, if they were, he would have to shape his course accordingly. Every page of this most valuable work testifies to the folly, absolute, the incredible folly, of the abandonment of Kandahar, and, by that abandonment, of the renunciation of the power influencing Herat. Herat is to the Russians what the fort Napoleon declared that a fortified Cherbourg would be to France. It is an eye to see and an arm to strike. Mr. Mar proves that Russia is already within striking distance of Herat. From that new basis she will be a standing menace to India!

We have space only to indicate the contention of this valuable work. It deserves deep study from every politician, especially from politicians now in office. There is yet time, barely time, but just time, to repair some of the mischief. Mr. Mar indicates how. We greatly fear, however, that a Ministry which has proved itself so careless of the traditions of the empire will be deaf and blind even to these open avowals of the pretensions of the great rival of England in the East.

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Reviews of Books and Notes on salient matters connected with the Army and Navy will be continued each month.

THE ARMY AND NAVY MAGAZINE.

JULY 1883.

Indian Districts during the Rebolt.

By H. G. KEENE, C.I.E.

VIII.

In this and the next section the treatment must be somewhat different from that adopted hitherto. From Saháranpur to Etáwa there was no interregnum of pure belligerence; the civil officers being left to deal with the anarchy with such aid as was from time to time available. "Martial law" was generally proclaimed; but the magistracy were, on the whole, the directors of events; and succeeded, in longer or shorter time. In Cawnpore and Farrukhabad, on the contrary, there was a long period when all semblance of authority was obliterated; and the civil officers were scarcely of any weight in affairs, but were mainly restricted to fighting or foraging in association with their comrades of the army, and only gradually employed in restoring order as the tide of war subsided.

Still, in order to complete a civilian's view of the country technically known as "Hindustan"—which was the focus and chief scene of the outbreak—a few circumstances may be noted such as may have escaped the attention of the ordinary historian.

Cawnpore is the chief town of a district, of the same name, lying on the right bank of the Ganges, on the opposite side of which is the province of Audh—or Oude. It was selected as a cantonment so far back as 1777, and formed the basis for the attacks of the British conquerors upon Rohilkand and Dehli. At the time of the outbreak it contained a population of about

100,000, chiefly traders and operatives, in fact the ordinary Indian urban population. At Bithur—a village some miles higher up the river—lived a Mahratta of rank, named Dhundu Panth, but most commonly known by the title (not unusual among noble Mahrattas) of “Nána Sáhib.” He had been adopted in 1832 by the deposed *Peshwa*, Báji Rao, and inherited his private property. But Lord Dalhousie had decided that the titular dignity of Peshwa (head of the Mahratta confederacy) should not pass under the adoption, and the political pension and salute of guns were discontinued on Báji’s death in 1852. During the next few years the Nána spent a good deal of money in trying to bring his wrongs before the Queen’s Government in England, employing for that purpose a Muslim adventurer named Azimulla Khán, who had been made his private secretary, and who was an accomplished rascal of the Gil Blas, or Casanova, type. While this man was intriguing with third-rate politicians, and philandering with credulous females in Europe, his master shut himself up in his palace at Bithur, where he sulked in splendour, and nursed his wrongs in the society of Baba Bhatt, Bála Rao, and other chosen companions. On stated occasions a British civil officer visited him ; and about November there was a religious fair on the river, when refreshments were provided for European visitors. But the Nána never willingly associated, in the slightest degree, with persons of that race from the day on which the Peshwa, his adoptive father, died.

The garrison, at the time of the outbreak, comprised the 2nd Bengal Light Cavalry, a detail of artillery, and three regiments of Bengal Infantry ; all the rank and file of which were natives of India. The British troops had fallen below the proportion proper to such a force, a detachment having been sent to the aid of Sir Henry Lawrence at Lucknow. Those that remained at Cawnpore were as follows :—

Artillery—One battery of 6 guns with 59 men ;

Infantry—60 men H. M. 84th.

74 invalids H. M. 82nd.

18 1st Madras Fusiliers.

The whole under the command of a distinguished officer of the company’s army, Sir Hugh Massey Wheeler, K.C.B. The civil chief was the magistrate and collector, Mr. Hillersdon, of the Bengal Civil Service.

About eighty miles higher up the river was the station of Futtehgarh, the official centre of a district named after the neighbouring city of Farukhábád. Here was stationed the

Native Infantry, a regiment posted there for the protection of the gun-carriage factory in the fort. The civil officer was Mr. George Probyn, C.S., the military command being vested in Colonel Smith. After the receipt of the news of the Meerut mutiny, the men of the 10th continued for some time to behave peaceably, though in conversation with Mr. Probyn's native assistants they admitted that if other sepoys were to attack the Europeans they would not oppose them in arms. All they could guarantee was that they would not kill their own officers. Amidst the minister omens the Europeans prepared for the worst. Mr. Phillips and Bramly came in from neighbouring districts, but passed on to Agra where we have already had occasion to notice their services; other refugees afterwards included Mr. W. Edwards, the magistrate of Badaon in hand, brother of the R. M. Edwards, mentioned above in connection with the Mazafarnagar district.

Regarding these, to be followed hereafter in a few concise sentences, we return for the present to Cawnpore, where General Hillersdon and Mr. Hillersdon were taking counsel as to the best mode of weathering the storm until they should receive the intelligence that they expected from Calcutta. That city, it may be added, was 628 miles off, only a small portion of the distance being covered by a railway. The people of Cawnpore, therefore, were somewhat in the same situation as that in which the people of Edinburgh had been in 1745.

Whatever passed at the first we have to trust chiefly to conjecture. But I have been so far fortunate as to obtain the assistance of Mr. J. W. Sherer, C.S.I., who came up with the relief in July. It is this gentleman's opinion that the steps taken by the civil and military chiefs at this crisis, which led to disastrous results that have obtained such sad notoriety, were entirely justified by the circumstances. It is proper to bear in mind that they had peculiar opportunities for forming a judgment. Wheeler was a thorough "sepo-y-officer": his habits and associations were those of the old school; he understood, from long life-long experience, the feelings of native troops; he was fully in receipt of the most trustworthy information. Hillersdon, for his part, had a brother in command of one of the regiments; and was, himself, personally intimate with many of the men, among whom he was a favourite. A month before Colonel Hillersdon told Mr. Sherer—who happened to be present at Cawnpore—that his men had discussed the question of suspected cartridges, and had declared themselves willing

to use them as long as they were permitted to tear off the end and were not required to touch them with their teeth. The sword that metallic tubes were not avoided in intercourse with the men. Nor was the Nana openly hostile: on the contrary Hillersdon is believed to have had reason for hoping that, by promising to obtain the concessions so long pleaded for in vain, he might secure in the Náná an influential ally. It is further, Mr. Sherer's belief that, up to the final outbreak, there was no collusion between the Náná and the sepoys. Whatever communications may have passed between Azimulla and the Court of Delhi—and it is my personal belief that such had been made—the fact that, at the first mutiny, the troops started from Delhi is a proof that they were not then acting with the Bithur people. The British authorities, I repeat, had to provide again trouble arising from the departure of the native troops, and the safety of the seven or eight hundred white non-combatants until they could obtain assistance from Calcutta. It was all necessary that the magazine should be guarded, so that the bad characters of the town should not obtain arms. All now seems to point to the conclusion that it was Azimulla who, on returning from Europe and becoming aware of the discontents of Queen Zinat Mahal at Delhi, thought he saw his way to fame and fortune as a political creator. The Náná was to stand forth Plenipotentiary of the restored Emperor; though it might be work of time and trouble to persuade the chiefs of the army to accept this part of the programme. But we ought not to blame Hillersdon for not knowing all this, or for thinking that it was best, in his perplexed situation, to endeavour to outbid the sepoys for the only alliance that had a chance of safety in it. He probably thought, as above suggested, that he could secure the Náná by promising a reconsideration of his case as the reward of his adherence. Only, unhappily, Azimulla had watched the Crimean collapse (see Russell's book on the war, where he mentions having received a visit from the gay rascal in the trenches before Sebastopol). He had also been in correspondence with foes of England on the Continent (the letters and drafts were found at Bithur and fell into the hands of an officer of Bengal Artillery). The Persian war seemed to him a part of the advance of Russia, and he had just enough knowledge of political drama to be "a dangerous thing," first to Hillersdon and ultimately to himself and its cause. As will be presently shown, there is evidence that he negotiated with some agents and leaders of the sepoys before they mutinied, though their

sequent march towards Delhi renders it doubtful how far these negotiations had been ratified by the men in general.

Certainly the first events bore out the plans of the British officials. A temporary refuge was secured on the Calcutta side of the town; the troops moved up the Dehli road; the Nána took charge of the magazine. Lastly, since the first batch of the 84th had actually reached Cawnpore from Calcutta, after the news of the Meerut mutiny had been received there, Wheeler was amply justified in expecting timely relief and in communicating his hopes to Hillersdon.

How all turned to sorrow and destruction is known to the readers of Mr. Trevelyan's graphic work, and has been duly chronicled in history. When the troops had reached their encampment on the second stage, the Nána joined them, and succeeded in persuading them that it was not their interest to leave him. The Peshwa had, for some time before the conquest under Lake, represented the Mughal Empire, and carried on (through his Deputy) the administration of Hindustan. It was natural to identify the cause of the Nána, as Peshwa, with the cause being defended at Dehli; largesse and the promise of plunder did the rest. The troops returned to Cawnpore, and joined in attacking the entrenchment.

The conduct of the Nána is an illustration of two truths that must never again be lost sight of in Indian affairs. The first is, that we cannot predict what Asiatics will do on grounds derived from our own notions of what is their duty, or even their interest. The second, that we must put no confidence in those whom we have offended in a deep and enduring manner.

The implacable Mahratta and his confederates declared themselves as foes: the skilful soldier, Tantia Topi; the sleek tiger, Akimulla, fresh from the ill-judged hospitalities of London. On the forenoon of the 7th June, they opened their heaviest batteries on the rude parapets of the entrenchments, so low, that a refugee from the district one day during the subsequent siege entered by leaping his horse over them. For three dreadful weeks the wretched Europeans were sapped, bombarded, starved; but their courage held out. Hillersdon was cut in two by a round shot; his chief subordinate, McKillop, was shot as he was drawing water for the women from an unprotected well; Colonel Hillersdon and his family perished in the fatal *enceinte*. At last came the end. Despairing of succour from Calcutta, and trusting to the promises of the Nána—who offered plausible terms—Wheeler consented to evacuate the scene of horror, and

moved out on the 27th to take boat at the Sati Chaura G. What happened there is too well known. The banks of Ganges were stained with innocent blood. The surviving vict were marched back in captivity, with the exception of boat's crew, of whom four only finally escaped, two, at least whom are still (1888) alive.

In the meanwhile, the Fattehgarh people had gone thro somewhat similar sufferings. On the 1st of June they heard the outbreak at Shajahánpur, where poor Mordaunt Ricketts his companions were murdered as they were worshipping church. On the 3rd a party of Audh troops entered the stati and the 10th men fraternised. At 1 a.m. on the 4th some of white inhabitants, 140 in number, left in boats, hoping reach Cawnpore, and unacquainted with the state to wh matters were tending there. All perished ultimately with very few exceptions. Colonel Smith, Colonel Goldie, Mr Robertson (head of the factory), Majors Munro and Phill with some other commissioned and non-commissioned offic and a number of women and children, remained in the F. The fugitives were at first guarded and assisted by Har Baksh, an Audh landholder, who, indeed, continued faithful the last to all who continued to avail themselves of his assistance. Of those in the boats, some sought shelter in the gentleman's fortified residence at Dharmpur; but Mr. Probyn and two others returned for a time to Fattehgarh. From he Probyn wrote to Dharmpur, directing that it should be defended to the last, and garrisoned by 500 matchlock-men, for which pay he would be responsible. On the 10th June he rejoined party there, accompanied by Mr. W. Edwards and two plant Messrs. Donald. On the 13th the bulk of the Dharmpur refugees returned to Fattehgarh, on the urgent invitation of Colonel Smith. But Messrs. Probyn and Edwards, with the family the former, remained in the fort of Hardeo Baksh, as they not trust the 10th Native Infantry.

On the morning of the 18th their anticipations were fulfilled. The sepoys of the 10th finally abjured their allegiance, placed the descendant of the Muhamadan Nawábs on the throne, divided the contents of the treasury, and disbanded quietly. Only one man remained faithful; his name was Kálé Kh. The Europeans in the fort now prepared for an attack. There ensued in a few days, being headed by the 41st Native Infantry who had marched in from Sitápur in Audh. After a brief defence—for which he had only thirty-two men—Colonel Smith

evacuated the untenable place by night on the 4th July. Some were killed on the voyage; those who ran the gauntlet reached Bithur or Cawnpore, where they swelled the slaughter there. Only two escaped, Messrs. Churcher and Jones.

The narratives—especially a supplementary one by Mr. C. R. Lindsay, Mr. Probyn's successor—afford harrowing details of some of these incidents; but they have little relation to our subject, and their recapitulation can serve no good purpose. Sufficient to say that great courage was displayed by the unhappy fugitives. On at least one occasion they landed and chased away their pursuers with loss; on another, to avoid the consequences of capture, the non-combatants of one boat leapt overboard, and were drowned or killed in the water. Our countrymen and countrywomen have never been exposed to more dreadful trials, and never underwent trial more valiantly. One who lost friends in those scenes may be pardoned if he declines to dwell upon them. Hardeo Baksh protected Edwards and the Probyns as long as he could, and then sent them down, disguised, by water, and handed them in safety to the British authorities (who had then recovered Cawnpore), on or about the 1st September.

A momentary glance may be allowed on the other side of the Dub. At Fatehpur, Mr. Sherer, the then magistrate, executed a skilful retreat, and conducted all committed to his charge *via* Banda to Allahabad, whence he himself presently proceeded to the Grand Trunk Road, where he fell in with the advanced force under General Havelock. Robert Tucker, the district judge, insisted on remaining at his post, where he fell, fighting to the last. Mounting to the roof of his court-house, with rifles and ammunition, he defended himself and his records desperately. Some of the assailants got into a tree which commanded the roof, and fired upon him till his arm was broken; they then assumed courage to get on to the roof and cut his throat. At Hamirpur Messrs. T. K. Loyd and D. Grant, totally defenceless, took refuge in the ravines of the Jumna, where they were followed, and mercilessly shot down like wild animals. Such is the savage state to which the human race is soon reduced when deprived of the restraints of civilisation! *Homo homini lupus.*

IX.

We are not without glimpses at civil life in Cawnpore and Farrukhabad during those days of darkness. Whatever good our country may get from India, the good that India will eventually receive in return is more than compensation. But

the process is slow. When the strong hand and will of the Imperial race were temporarily paralysed it was soon seen what a poor thing was the civilisation of a people that, having been reduced to anarchy beneath the heel of armed violence for nearly 800 years, had been in leading strings ever since without having learned to walk alone.

Colonel Williams, whom we saw at Meerut, was sent down Cawnpore after the restoration of order; and he took the evidence of forty-two persons who had been present in June 1857, among whom were Christians, Muhamadans, and Hindus. From these it appeared that the Nána and his brother, called "Bála Sáhí," had tampered with agents of the troops as early as the 1st of the month, assisted by the rascally secretary though—if Mr. Sherer's surmises be correct—without the troops being pledged to remain at Cawnpore; that the conspirators obtained assistance from several farmers and from the scoundrelism of the bazaars; that 10,000 persons assembled at the fatal ghat to witness the first massacre; and that the chief—accompanied by Tantia Topi—sat on carpets upon the estrade before the temple, privileged spectators at the festival of carnage. That, during the second massacre—when, for hours the women and children of our race were hacked to pieces at the slaughter-house—these wretches sat in a neighbouring hotel looking on at a "nautch"; that all sorts of incompetent ruffians were employed as police officers; and that plunder of the respectable citizens raged unchecked and encouraged. A court, composed of Bába Bhatt, Azimulla, and some pleaders, was formed on the 17th, which sat to hear criminal cases but the accused were of the humbler classes and the punishments were cruel and capricious. A gypsy had his hand cut off on a charge of theft; some poor men's huts were razed to the ground "for disreputable livelihood." Supplies, extorted by torture, were openly stolen by the officers and men as they came in. On the 1st of July the Nána was solemnly enthroned as Peshwa, and persons were sent into the district to collect revenue; on the 3rd the troops showed signs of disaffection and were appeased by distribution of pay. The Nána passed most of his time in pleasure at Bithur, till compelled by his followers to show himself and return to Cawnpore. The arrival of Havelock scattered the ruffians, never to meet again; and the British were received by the people with every sign of joy and welcome.

Mr. Sherer, who had—as we saw—joined Havelock on the

road after successfully leading his party into a place of temporary safety, assumed some kind of authority at Cawnpore, and at once attempted to form administrative outposts. But the attempt was premature; and after two of his police officers had been killed by the enemy, General Neill directed him to stay further efforts for the present. A military police, under Captain Bruce, of the Bombay army, was organised for the city and immediate neighbourhood, and Mr. Grant (then in charge of the civil administration, and afterwards, as Sir J. P. Grant, the successful governor of Jamaica) sanctioned these measures, which were deemed necessary on military grounds, to which just then all was necessarily subordinated. Bruce was an able and energetic man, and Sherer gave him full and willing co-operation, confining himself to transit and commissariat work, in which he was admirably seconded by a Brahmin Tuh-seeldar named Bholanāth, whom he had known at Fatehpur.

An idea, however, arose—as ideas will rise in times of general excitement—that Mr. Grant and his civil subordinates resented General Neill's arrangements; and this got so much credit in England, that the late Charles Dickens was led to embody it in a tale in *Household Words*, in which much sport was made of the pompous obstructiveness of "Mr. Commissioner Pordage." Like most things of the sort, it was short-lived, and I believe the tale has dropped—as it was only proper that it should—out of all collections of Mr. Dickens's works. Neither at Cawnpore nor anywhere else did Mr. Grant obstruct any good work; nor is it needful that this statement should be made, were it not that the calm wisdom of that really distinguished official is not so generally recognised as might have been the case had he possessed the love of display and advertising power that are sometimes found in public men. Mr. Sherer well remembers referring to him about some temporary difficulty about the use of the telegraph, and receiving Mr. Grant's answer: "Whatever you do, give no offence to the military authorities." On another occasion, the late Sir James Outram—one of Britain's truest heroes—wrote to the same officer: "So far from taking offence, or relaxing your endeavours to aid us, you ever exerted your utmost influence in the district, with the most unwearied, unceasing personal labours in our behalf. Your hearty, cordial good-will and friendly assistance were deeply felt by us all."

This much upon an uninviting subject. Neill and Sherer and Bruce all worked thoroughly in concert, and there was never the least misunderstanding between red-coats and black-coats.

After Havelock's arrival, the farmers began to negotiate a payment of land-revenue; but, of course, the money was only proof of their sincerity, and much had yet to be done endured before much of that demonstration could be achieved. It became clear soon that Cawnpore was only a military post, and that the troops collected there were not immediately intended for the pacification of the Duáb, but for more remote purposes. The new-born desire to conciliate subsided; and we turned to Gwalior for a new dawn of disorder which had no promise of permanence. The best of the Rajput clans and their leaders were not more than neutral. When Sir James Outram arrived, reorganisation proceeded more rapidly; then came the certainty of the fall of Dehli, and renewed offers of money, not much actual payment. Some native gentlemen under the duty of temporary tahsildárs (sub-collectors), but their want of business-habits crippled their efficiency; still, it was felt that a beginning. The tracts bordering on the Jumna (where Gwalior influences were strongest) continued in open rebellion even at Bithur a number of Bruce's police were surprised and slaughtered at the great November festival of the *Dasahra*. The fall of Dehli again filled all the tracts bordering on the Triloch road with a demoralised soldiery; but Greathed's column cleared the way. Then the commander-in-chief crossed the Ganges and proceeded to relieve Lucknow; Cawnpore was left to the protection of General Windham's small force; and Gwalior contingent at length arrived and delivered the most successful attack that was made by any of the enemy during the war. When Sir Colin returned, on the 28th November, his first care was naturally the safe departure of the rescued women and children from Lucknow; the force under Windham was completely cooped up in the entrenchment, the whole town being in the enemy's hands. On the 1st December, Captain Bruce was put in over charge to Sherer, the two despatching their business to the house which was being raked by round shot. But the triumph of the mistaken mutineers was soon lost. As soon as Sir Colin heard of the safe arrival at Allahabad of the precious convoy, he had done so much to rescue, he turned fiercely upon the enemy whom he chased from the district before proceeding to relieve Farrakhabad.

At that place, as we have already seen, power had been transferred by the mutineers upon a titular Nawáb who lived there on a pension, being, in fact, the lineal representative of a Rohilla family who had usurped power there during the decline of

Mughal Empire. Towards the end of June the mutineers inaugurated his reign by the massacre of a score of Christian captives who had survived the previous troubles. The day was rainy, but the spectacle attracted a large crowd to the parade-ground where it took place. The district was then made into two grand divisions, the east and west, each being placed under Názims, or commissioners, one of whom was an imbecile drunkard, the other a ruthless tyrant. There was also a court of two (*military officers*), for the hearing of appellate causes; under these were Muftis, or Judges, men who had formerly held subordinate posts in the British administration. The Nawáb himself was a man of quiet character, much absorbed in the fine arts, as understood by him; and his insignificance was recognised after the return of the British, when his life was spared on condition of his retiring permanently to Mecca. His share in the administration was confined to the promulgation of rules, borrowed from the British, for the administration of justice and the collection of the revenue. On paper the rules look fair enough, therefore; but Mr. Lindsay got together abundant proof that they had but little effect in practice. "Each man ruled as he liked; the Tahsildárs became nonentities; there was much writing, as in our courts; in lieu of stamp-papers, fees were levied. Some of the decisions are curious enough; in one case a Hindu murderer was released on promising to become a Muhamadan. In a case of rape, the defendant was fined two rupees and dismissed." The following is a precept addressed to a police officer in a murder-case:—

"You are directed to go in person to the village, and collecting fifty of the most respectable inhabitants, write their depositions in the following manner: 'We have not killed the deceased, nor are we aware who were the murderers.' . . . But, if they know who the criminals are, you shall write their depositions thus: 'We have not killed the deceased, but certain other persons have. We say this by our faith and on our oath.' And, when taking these depositions, you must administer the oath in the following manner: 'We swear by the Almighty God, who made us and the universe.'"

It does not appear that any result ensued on this strange proceeding, which only shows the childish imitativeness of people who have observed forms without discovering their principle. The sentences, however, were sometimes very severe: the penalty for theft was amputation of the right hand; in a case of undoubted murder the sentence was that the culprit was to

give up his property to the complainant, or to be killed by him on the failure of either of these alternatives, he was to be blown away from a gun. The slaughter of oxen was prohibited, the women were not even to bear burdens; this, being, of course, a concession to the Hindu sepoy. A system of barrier-dues was imposed in the town, the proceeds of which, together with the excise, went to the privy purse of the Nawáb. Most articles bore an *ad valorem* duty, which in some cases reached a rate of seven per cent. Prices were trebled, and the trade in piece-goods became a monopoly. On one occasion the proceeds of the Farrukhabad octroi rose to 1,700 Rs. in one day. Similar duties were raised in outlying towns, the proceeds being realised by the sepoy. Civil war went on from time to time, and one of the Názim's drunkards—received a wound and lost his influence, which has been founded on a belief that he was invulnerable. Farrukhabad continued for seven months to be a centre to which unsuccessful leaders repaired from time to time as they were beaten out of other places. At length this place had to take its turn, too. In the end of December Sir Colin appeared upon the scene. The Nawáb fled on the 2nd January 1858, accompanied by Firuz Sháh and another of the Dehli princes who had joined him: next day British authority was restored on the West side of the Ganges. About the 18th, Brigadier Adrian Hill won a battle over the rebels at Shamsabád, and the enemy sustained a final defeat at the hands of Sir T. Seaton on the 21st April at Bangaon. After May, order was rapidly and permanently restored.

In the Cawnpore district the progress of events was necessarily somewhat different. The apparent ebb and flow of British success, already noticed, continued for some time to puzzle the waiters on events. There was no enthusiasm felt for the Názim who was soon seen to be a mere obese voluptuary with no taste for affairs and no courage in the field. But there was, among the humbler classes, a revival of the lawless element that came down in the blood from the great anarchy of the 17th century—a factor never to be overlooked in the social question of Hindustan. There was also a revival of old clan-feeling, pleasure of fray and reprisal, unclouded by the fear of police, or the shadow of the tax-gatherer. The people were out on a holiday, and enjoyed it like badly-taught school-boys. Last of all, the dread that the return of British power would be accompanied by the return of the auction-purchaser—an evil, perhaps, which must apparently cling to a civilisation which

resources come from land-revenue—enlisted many interests against the cause of order. Bacon long ago remarked :—"It is certain, so many overthrown estates so many votes for troubles."*

But after the final reduction of the great rebel stronghold at Lucknow in the spring of 1858, all began to cool down. The southern *parganas* (hundreds) continued to feel the effect of the long disorders in Central India. But then came Sir Hugh Rose's victory at Kalpi, referred to in treating of Etáwa. Temporary distraction was caused by Prince Firoz's last appearance; but it was only temporary. By the winter the district was entirely reoccupied and composed. Mr. Sherer's printed narrative is dated 13th January 1859; and it concludes with a pleasing picture :—

I followed but the other day close upon the retreating footsteps of Feroze Shah ; but I found the ploughman in the field, the boy singing at the well as he urged the bullocks down the slope, the old woman sitting at her door twisting her little cotton-gin, and her daughters grinding millet ; all supremely unconscious of the descendant of Timoor, who with unseemly haste had made but yesterday a royal progress through their village.

One more subject connected with the civil administration of Cawnpore deserves at least a passing notice. In an earlier chapter a story told in Mr. Bosworth Smith's *Life of Lawrence*, was quoted as an illustration of the difficulties that attended the efforts of the civil officers to prevent hasty reprisals at the expense of more or less innocent natives of India. As such the anecdote may pass ; but as an incident of life at Cawnpore, it is neither correct nor well-fancied. The "Mess" at Cawnpore consisted of men like Frederick Gubbins, Sherer, Power, Mowbray Thompson, Dr. Tresidder, Martin, and others, with Inglis, W. H. Russell (of *The Times*), Layard, Grenfell, &c. for guests, none of whom were likely to "insult" Mr. Batten on account of due or undue leniency had he wished to show it, or had the power of doing so. In fact, I believe Mr. Batten had very little voice in the earlier part of the administration ; and those who had were for the most part successful and efficient enough to be independent of harsh procedure. As soon as the revenue was collected at all, it came in without need for coercive measures. A fine was imposed upon the city, which was promptly paid, with one unsuccessful protest conducted by an English solicitor. Neither during the rebellion nor afterwards was a single sepoy blown from guns at Cawnpore. Four or five officers held special

* Sherer's *Narrative*, p. 16

commissions, and persons accused of crimes were tried by them, of whom some were properly executed, others acquitted; the sentences being invariably reported to the Government. General Neill's melodrama, of making the people clean the slaughter-house, was played once and then withdrawn, two persons in all being made to take part in it. Comparing the conduct of the authorities at Cawnpore with the reprisals of most conquerors—even with those of others in the like situation at the time in other parts of India—the recovery of power there was marked by a most singular and creditable moderation.



The Seaforth Highlanders,

AND CHIEFS OF KINTAIL.

By W. E. MILLIKEN.

Now mute on thy mountains, Oh Albyn! are heard
Nor the voice of the song nor the harp of the bard;
Or its strings are but waked by the stern winter gale,
As they mourn for Mackenzie, last Chief of Kintail.

No authoritative history exists of the 78th Highland Regiment, "Ross-shire Buffs," whilst that of the 72nd, "Duke of Albany's own Highlanders," by Cannon, ends with their departure on foreign service about forty years ago. These two corps—recently amalgamated as the Seaforth Highlanders—together with the 71st Highlanders, are the earliest example of the embodiment of any particular clan for military service under the Crown.* In view of the prominent part they took in the recent Egyptian campaign as portion of the Indian contingent a few words may be opportunely devoted to their origin and antecedents. "We passed through Glensheal with prodigious mountains on each side. We saw where the battle was fought in the year 1719. . . . We soon afterwards came to Auchnasheal . . . we sat down on a green turf seat at the end of a house. . . . We had a considerable circle about us men, women and children, all McCraas, Lord Seaforth's people. Not one of them could speak English. . . . The poor McCraas, whatever may be their present state, were of considerable estimation in the year 1715, when there was a line in a song—

'And aw the brave McCraas are coming.'†

* The 42nd, originally the 43rd, represent the six "Independent Companies," known as *Am Freicadhán Dhu* from their sombre tartan, who were raised in 1729 for enforcing the disarming Acts in the Highlands. In 1777 were embodied the old 74th (Argyllshire), 76th (Lord MacDonald's), 77th (Atholl), 81st (Aberdeenshire), and 84th (Emigrant Regiment), all of whom were reduced after the peace of Versailles 1763. There were raised in Scotland a second battalion to the "Black Watch" (1780), which in 1809 became the 73rd Regiment; and, during Pitt's first administration, the 74th Highlanders, with the Highland companies of the 75th Regiment (1787), the 78th and 79th (1793), the 91st and 92nd (1794), and the 93rd (1800)—Highlanders. The 73rd and 75th have lately regained their former status of Highlanders.

† The line is thus printed in Hogg's *Jacobite Relics*: "And the wild MacRae's comin." It was on this occasion that Dr. Johnson uttered his memorable saying on the few and small pleasures of the indigent poor.

So writes James Boswell when, on the 1st September 1776 he and Dr. Johnson in their tour to the Hebrides and Western Isles were journeying from Glenmorison to Glenelg where they were to take boat for Skye. The battle of Glensheal was the outcome of an invasion of Scotland on behalf of the Chevalier St. George projected by the kingdom of Spain. Owing to reverses of storm and tempest only three frigates, with 30 Spaniards on board, reached the western coast of Scotland. They were commanded by James, second Duke of Ormond, who had served as captain-general and commander-in-chief under Queen Anne and, on the accession of her successor, was impeached of high treason and attainted. He was accompanied by the banished Earl of Seaforth (William Mackenzie, first earl), also labouring under attainder for his active share in "Fifteen." Disembarking near Kintail, the ancestral home of the Mackenzies, Seaforth was joined by a numerous band of Highlanders of his own and friendly clans, as well as William Murray, Marquess of Tullibardine, son of the Duke of Atholl. General Wightman having marched from Inverness with a few regular forces and several of the Grants, Rosses, Munroes, and other clans well affected to Government met them at Glensheal. In the engagement that ensued Seaforth was dangerously wounded, a party of his people carried him to the ships, others dispersed; the Spaniards surrendered prisoners of war to General Wightman. Tullibardine, making good his escape, returned to Scotland with Charles Edward, and, after sharing the fortunes of his Prince, yielded enfeebled in health on the 27th April 1746 to Mr. Buchanan, of Dummakill; taken prisoner to the Tower, he died there the following July. The family bard composed a pathetic ode upon the disaster of Glensheal. The rhythm is arranged to a beautiful Gaelic air, the chorus being adapted to the double pull upon the oars of a lymphad or galley, and therefore distinct from the ordinary *lorram* or boat-song. The "Lament," translated, opens thus:-

Farewell to Mackenneth, great Earl of the North,
The Lord of Lochcarron, Glensheal, and Seaforth;
To the Chieftain this morning his course who began,
Launching forth on the billows his bark like a swan.
For a far foreign land he has hoisted his sail,
Farewell to Mackenzie, High Chief of Kintail!

According to the *Record of Icolmkill* and a Charter,* bearing date "Kincardine, 9 January 1266," a grant of the lands

* Mr. W. W. Skene throws doubts upon this charter; see his *Celtic Scotland*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1880). He would deduce the descent of the Chiefs of Kintail from Gillean-og (Colin the Younger), a son of the ancestor of the Rosses.

Kintail, county Ross, thereby erected into a free barony, was made to Colinas Fitzgerald, son of the Earl of Kildare (or Desmond) of Ireland, who had settled in Scotland in 1261, for his defeat of Haco King of Norway at Largs in the reign of Alexander III. His descendants enjoy the lands to this day. The Geraldine's followers rose upon the downfall of the MacDonalds Lords of the Isles, and the Earls of Ross whose banner they at first followed in the field, to acknowledged supremacy in the North. In the reign of King James I. of Scotland, their chief was leader of more than three thousand armed men. The barony passed from father to son, from Kenneth to Kenneth—Mackenneth having become corrupted into the English Mackenny or Mackenzie—to the twelfth feudal baron, who, in 1609, was made Baron Mackenzie of Kintail. His son Colin was created in 1623 Earl of Seaforth. George, second Earl, Colin's brother, became a steadfast adherent of Montrose; and his son, the third Earl, suffered imprisonment for many years at the hands of Cromwell. Marrying Isabella, daughter of his kinsman, Sir John Mackenzie, of Tarbat, bart. (of whom hereafter), his wife put to death the aged family seer who, in virtue of his gift of "second sight," had revealed the infidelity of her husband when absent in Paris. In his last moments the Warlock predicted the misfortunes of the house in terms which actually came to pass. "I see," he says, "into the far future, and I read the doom of this race. The long descended line of Seaforth will, ere many generations have passed, end in extinction and sorrow. I see a chief, the last of his house, both deaf and dumb. He will be the father of three fair sons all of whom he will follow to the tomb. He will live careworn and die mourning, knowing that the honours of his line are to be extinguished for ever and that no future chief of the Mackenzies shall bear rule at Brahan or in Kintail . . . the remnant of his possessions shall be inherited by a white-hooded lassie from the East" * Kenneth, third Earl, died in 1678. His eldest son, Kenneth, fourth Earl, accompanied King James II. to France who there created him Marquis of Seaforth.

Notwithstanding the disabilities under which he lay, rendered graver by the attempt of 1719, a portion of the family estates were restored to William his only surviving son. His grandson, Kenneth, was created Baron of Ardelve, co. Wicklow, and Viscount

* I do not quote the prophecy or rather malediction *in extenso*, as members of certain families mentioned therein are yet living. The Warlock's portrait still hangs in Brahan Castle the ancestral home of the Chiefs of Kintail.

Fortrose, Scotland; and in 1771 was advanced to the dignity Earl of Seaforth in the peerage of Ireland. When in 1775 England, already at war with the American colonies, was menaced by France, Spain, and Holland together, Lord Seaforth offered to raise a regiment from his own clansmen. Furnished with letters of service, he was appointed lieutenant-colonel commanding by commission dated the 29th December 1777. Amongst the men of this at first numbered the 78th Regiment, who to a number of 1,000 mustered at Elgin on the 15th May 1778, were the descendants of those MacRaes, call them savages if we will, who, with the fidelity that is commonly ascribed to a dog and a Highlander, carried their wounded chief through the vale of Glensheal, and who in 1732 had marched down to Edinburgh more than 400 strong, to lodge a portion of their rents to be remitted to him in France.* The MacRaes, who in July 1747 misguided by the machinations of Richard Parker the mutineer at the Nore of some years later and his fellows, encamped several days upon Arthur's Seat in defiance of the whole force of Scotland, and could only be quieted with formal articles of capitulation, were the same who fought and won our battles at Cudalore, Palacatcherry, Coimbatore, at Seringapatam, in Carnatic and the Mysore. Embarking for India with his regiment in 1781, the Earl of Seaforth died on the voyage, and leaving no male issue,† was succeeded in the chieftainship of the clan, and command of the regiment, by his kinsman, Major Thomas Humberston Mackenzie, great-grandson of the third Earl. Landing at Madras after a voyage of nearly ten months' duration, the 369 men who alone were fit for duty advanced into the country to join Sir Eyre Coote's forces at Chingleput. I cannot here follow in detail the glorious career of this regiment, who

* Five hundred, including a few Frasers, came from the Chief's own estates on the mainland, about 400 from those of the Mackenzies of Scatwell, Killooy, Applecross and Redcastle, all of whom had sons or brothers holding commissions in the regiment. The officers from the Lowlands brought 200 men, of whom seventy-five were English and Irish. The clan MacRae had for a long period been faithful adherents of the *Caber Feigdh* (the stag's head and antlers of the Mackenzies); so general was the name in the corps that it became known as "the MacRaes."

† His only child Lady Caroline (a distinguished member of the literary and fashionable circles of her day, and who could boast that as a child she had sat at the knee of Dr. Johnson, who, in allusion to her descent from King Charles II., and to the well-known sympathies of her race, would salute her as his little Jacob's mistress) married Louis Malcolm Drummond, Count de Melfort, Inspector-General of Cavalry to Napoleon, then heir presumptive to the ancient but attainted earldom of Perth and Melfort. He and his two sons were in the French Hussars at Waterloo, the 2nd battalion of the 78th being then in garrison at Brussels. The attainder was reversed in favour of the now earl about thirty years since.

1786 were placed upon the establishment as the 72nd. After taking part in the reduction of the Dutch settlements in Ceylon they reached Scotland in August 1798. For their pre-eminent services in India, "Hindustan" was added to their colours and appointments. In 1805 they went to the Cape; and in 1823 were further distinguished by the special authorisation of the king to resume their national dress and to bear the title of the "Duke of Albany's Own Highlanders." In the Crimea the 72nd formed with the 42nd, the 79th, and 93rd Highlanders, the Highland Brigade, commanded by General Sir Duncan Cameron. With the 78th, their sister-regiment, the 72nd played a leading part in the "Mutiny." Attached to the Bombay column, under the late Sir H. Roberts, despatched in 1858 to Rajpootanah they shared in the assault and capture of Kotah. Nor does their Indian fame end here; the 72nd stood forth conspicuous throughout the recent Afghanistan campaign from the outbreak of the war to General Roberts's memorable march from Cabul and crowning victory at Candahar. Until the changes of last year this regiment wore the trews of the MacRae tartan, consisting of black green and blue chequers upon a red ground picked out with white yellow and black strands.

Colonel Thomas Mackenzie, of the 72nd, did not long enjoy his inherited honours. Having with 2,000 men repulsed Tippoo Sahib, whose army numbered ten times his own at Paniané in November 1782 he went back to Bombay. Sailing thence in the *Ranger* to rejoin the army, his vessel was attacked by the Mahratta fleet, and after a desperate resistance of five hours was captured. Every officer on board was either killed or wounded; the gallant colonel, shot through the body with a four-pound ball, died at Geriah on the 30th April 1783. The command of the 72nd devolved upon James, second son of Lord George Murray, lieutenant-general to Prince Charles Edward, from the colonelcy of the recently disbanded Atholl Highlanders, the old 77th Regiment. The chieftainship of Kintail passed after the death of Colonel Thomas to his brother Major Francis Mackenzie, who in 1797 was elevated to the British peerage by the title of Baron Seaforth of Kintail, co. Ross. In the person of his lordship the prediction of the Warlock of the Glen was fulfilled.

In vain the bright course of his talents to wrong,
Fate deadened his ear and imprisoned his tongue—

despite his affliction Lord Seaforth played no unimportant part in the world by dint of natural ability and force of character.

He filled several high offices of state, and was governor of the Barbadoes and Demarara in 1800-8. After two rebuffs from the Government he embodied from amongst his own people a regiment of Highlanders—the present 78th, as well-known, perhaps, by their cherished cognomen of “Ross-shire Buffs.” Receiving letters of service, dated 7th March 1798, he caused the following notice, highly characteristic of the times, to be posted throughout the Seaforth property in Ross, Cromarty, and the Lewis.

SEAFORTH'S HIGHLANDERS.

To be forthwith raised for the DEFENCE of His Glorious Majesty KING GEORGE the Third, and the Preservation of our Happy Constitution in Church and State.

All LADS of TRUE HIGHLAND BLOOD willing to show their Loyalty and Spirit may repair to SEAFORTH, or the Major ALEXANDER MACKENZIE of *Belmaduthy*; or the other Commanding Officers at Head-Quarters at [], where they will receive HIGH BOUNTIES and SOLDIER-LIKE ENTERTAINMENT.

The LADS of this Regiment will LIVE and DIE together!—as they cannot be DRAUGHTED into other Regiments, and must be reduced in a BODY in their own COUNTRY.

Now for a stroke at the Monsieurs, my Boys!

KING GEORGE for ever!

HUZZA!

In September 1794 the 78th joined Lord Mulgrave in Walcheren, and the next year went to the Cape. Arriving in Calcutta in 1797, they in June 1803 came under the command of General Wellesley (Duke of Wellington) at Poonah, to act against Sindiah and the Mahrattas. I must forbear to dwell upon the achievements of so gallant a corps; but even at this distance of time none can read unmoved how, with the now 74th and 78th Highlanders, the 19th Light Dragoons, three native cavalry and four native infantry regiments, with four 12-pounders, Wellington won the battle of Assaye the hardest ever fought in India, defeating the combined armies of Sindia and the Rajah of Berar whose troops exceeded 30,000 men; how they fought in the Peninsula, Egypt, and Persia; and how, at the head of the “Ross-shire Buffs,” Havelock entered Lucknow after, in Sir James Outram's own words, three months of such continuous fighting as English troops had never before undergone. No more cherished tradition exists in the regiment than the words of Sir James Outram who at parade on the 26th January 1858, used language in which no British regiment had ever been addressed. He deemed it advisable to reduce his address to writing, lest anything should be attributed to the excitement of the occasion. To Brigadier Hamilton he wrote:—

What I did say is what *I really feel*, and what I am sure must be the sentiments of every Englishman who knows what the 78th have done . . . I had fully weighed what I should say before I went to parade.

The following passages occur in Sir James's written address :—

Your exemplary conduct, 78th, in every respect throughout the past eventful year I can truly say and *I do most emphatically declare* has never been surpassed by any troops of any nation in any age, whether for steady discipline in the camp, for indomitable valour in the field, under an amount of fighting, hardship, and privation such as British troops have seldom, if ever, been before exposed to. . . . I am sure that you, 78th, who have borne the brunt of the war so gloriously from first to last, when you return to old England, will be hailed and rewarded by your grateful and admiring countrymen as the band of heroes as which you so well deserve to be regarded."

At Lucknow the Victoria Cross was won by Surgeon Jee, Lieutenant Macpherson who, as Major-General, commanded the Indian Contingent in Egypt, Colour-Sergeant Stewart Macpherson, Privates James Halliwell and Henry Ward. It was also bestowed on the 78th as a body, who resolved that the Cross should be worn by Surgeon MacMaster for his intrepidity and humanity in succouring the wounded. Embarking at Bombay on the 18th May 1858, under the distinguished honours of a royal salute from the battery, and the "dressing" of the ships of the Indian navy, the "Saviours of India" reached Fort George in September after an absence of seventeen years with but fifty-nine of the 530 of all ranks who had gone out in 1842. Their enthusiastic reception in Scotland included a banquet to officers and men at Brahan Castle, given by the Honourable Mrs. Stewart-Mackenzie, daughter of the Seaforth who had originally raised them, when they were welcomed by a large family gathering of the Mackenzies. On the 19th May 1874, the 78th were brigaded with the 42nd, 79th, and 93rd Highlanders at Aldershot in review before the Emperor of Russia. These four kilted regiments had represented Scotland at Lucknow. The several colonels on that day—Mackenzie, MacBean, Macleod, and Miller — had served each with his respective corps in the crisis of 1857–8. Old colours of the 72nd and 78th are preserved at Brahan Castle, in Dingwall church, and at Balmoral. Honorary colours were decreed by the Government of India to the three European regiments (74th and 78th Highlanders and 19th Light Dragoons) engaged at Assaye, but the first-named alone retain theirs. The 78th wore the full Highland dress of the Mackenzie tartan, with buff facings and buff leather belts. The tartan consists of green, black, and dark-blue chequers with red, pale blue, and white streaks. Their motto is *Cuidich'n Rìgh*, meaning "Defenders of the King." The Mackenzie tartan was also worn by the 71st, another regiment raised from the clan, in 1777, by John Mac-

kenzie, Lord Macleod, eldest son of the third Earl of Cl (a descendant of Sir John Mackenzie of Tarbat), w attained and condemned to death—though ultimately re at his wife's intercession—for his share in the "'Fort Some months ago the 72nd and 78th were re-organised first and second battalions of the Seaforth Highland 71st and 74th as the Highland Light Infantry, with k trews respectively of the Mackenzie tartan, and yellow. The former tartan of the 74th was of the Lamond C pattern, a dark blue and green checked ground relieved w stripes of white. At Assaye their every officer was eithe or wounded. Particularly renowned as part of the "' division" in the Peninsula, and for their self-sa discipline under Lieutenant-Colonel Seton on the wreck *Birkenhead*, they belonged to the Highland Brigade of part still remains in Egypt.

With the death of Lord Seaforth in 1815, his thre having predeceased him, the titles again became extin the chieftainship passed to a remote collateral. Of his dau the eldest, Mary, married, as her second husband, Al Stewart, a grandson of the seventh Earl of Gallowa thereupon took the name of Mackenzie and settled u wife's property in Kintail. This lady was the "white lassie from the East" of the Warlock's prophecy, she resided for some while in India with her first husband / Sir Samuel Hood. She set up in the Pettah Wall, a nuggar, the black granite slab in memory of her relative (Mackenzie and his brother officers who fell there in 180 this lady Sir Walter Scott, resuming the strain "Lament," addressed the fine lines beginning, "So s old bard in the grief of his heart." The last two stan thus :—

Thy sons rose around thee in light and in love,
All a father could hope, all a friend could approve;
What 'vails it the tale of thy sorrows to tell—
In the spring time of youth and of promise they fell!
Of the line of Fitzgerald remains not a male,
To bear the proud name of the Chief of Kintail.

And thou, gentle Dame, who must bear to thy grief,
For thy clan and thy country, the cares of a chief,
Whom brief rolling moons in six changes have left
Of thy husband and father and brethren bereft,
To thine ear of affection how sad is the hail,
That salutes thee the Heir of the line of Kintail!

The Naval Strength of China.

BY LIEUTENANT HON. HENRY H. SHORE, R.N.

possession of vast accumulations of war material, of ironclads, and heavy guns, does not necessarily place on in the front rank of naval powers. Behind all these must be a carefully-trained and well-disciplined force of men commanded by competent officers, thoroughly versed in various branches of modern warfare. The material for a force must exist, moreover, in the form of a nation which is fully engaged in seafaring pursuits.

If these conditions are not fulfilled, it is doubtful whether the most lavish expenditure of money will ever place the naval power of a country in the first rank; and for this reason we are on whether, notwithstanding the prodigious efforts China has made of late years to place her naval forces on an efficient basis, she is likely to prove a formidable antagonist.

In the present proceeding, it would be as well, perhaps, to recapitulate briefly what China has done of late years in the matter of naval reorganisation; for there is a widespread belief that she is more advanced in the art of war now than she was fifty years ago; that her means of attack are still confined to gunboats and stinkpots; and that, in the event of hostilities, our ships would simply have to push their way without inconvenience to themselves through fleets of rickety junks.

It is quite time, however, that these fallacies were exploded; China's defeats in her last encounters with the "barbarians" have had no other result, they have at least opened the eyes of her statesmen to the inferiority of the Empire, in a naval and military sense, to the nations they have been accustomed to despise: a discovery which, if too unpalatable to be admitted, they have tacitly recognised the truth of by their eagerness to work in desperate earnestness to copy from their conquerors the points in their systems which seemed to constitute

a superiority. Hence the vast warlike establishments which have sprung up almost simultaneously at Foochow, Shanghai, Nanking, and Tientsin, where, under foreign direction, ample provision has been made for the construction of ships and engines, and the manufacture of war material on a vast scale.

The employment of foreigners in posts of responsibility, though by no means an innovation on the traditions of the Empire, one of the emperors having even condescended to take lessons in mathematics from a Jesuit Father—shows the dire straits which the country was reduced at this time: and yet, if reforms which had been determined on were to become reality such a step was absolutely necessary, in the absence of any native officials who were competent to organise establishments of this nature. And not only were foreigners employed in the organisation of the arsenals, but a numerous foreign staff was engaged for the purpose of supervising the various departments as well as for instructing native citizens in the sundry mechanical operations connected with the manufacture of arms and ammunition, and the designing and construction of ships and engines.

Each of the arsenals really merits a separate notice to itself, having claims on the serious attention of all who are desirous of informing themselves as to the warlike resources of the Empire. But we must confine our remarks here principally to those at Foochow and Shanghai, as being distinctively naval in their scope and aim. Enormous sums have been spent in the purchase of plant and machinery of improved type; and as competent native workmen have been trained up, the staff of foreign *employés* has been reduced, until at the present time the arsenals are practically in Chinese hands, ships as well as engines having been constructed without any extraneous assistance whatever. These establishments have been in working order now for several years, and a considerable number of vessels have been turned out. The majority of these are of the gunboat and transport class. But a fine corvette of 1,393 tons and 250 horse-power, armed with thirteen Whitworth guns, has been built at the Foochow arsenal; while at Shanghai, the authorities being of a more ambitious turn of mind, and not content with producing a very fine wooden frigate, 363 feet long, and carrying twenty-eight rifled guns, the whole of which, with the exception of the screw shaft and guns, was the work of native artisans, must needs try their hands on an ironclad, with a result which does not call for any special comment here.

Whether the results on the whole are in any way proportionate to the sums which have been expended on these establishments may be open to question, but in any calculations of this nature regard must be had to the immense accession of strength to the country through the development which these arsenals have given to native industry, and the number of skilled workmen they have been the means of training up to the service of the country, as well as the knowledge of foreign arts and sciences they have been the means of disseminating.

But the branch of modern warfare which exercises a peculiar fascination over the Chinese mind, and which seems, moreover, peculiarly suited to the genius of the people, is the somewhat comprehensive one included under the heading of "Torpedoes"; and judging from the attention bestowed on these formidable engines of late, there is reason to suppose they will play a prominent part in any future war. One of the most enlightened and at the same time most influential officials of the Empire, the great Si-Hung-Chang, has particularly distinguished himself by the active interest he has taken in the subject, and this resulted some time ago in the establishment of a school of instruction, under an English electrician, at Tientsin, which took to itself the somewhat high-sounding name of "Imperial Torpedo College," where a number of young men, after receiving a thorough grounding in theoretical and practical electricity, were initiated into the mysteries of torpedo warfare. It may be added that several torpedo-boats of improved type have recently been purchased in this country as well as in Germany.

The principal naval strength of the Empire unquestionably, however, lies in the very formidable mosquito fleet of iron gun-boats supplied by Messrs. Armstrong and Co. of Newcastle-on-Tyne; but as full accounts of the constructive peculiarities of these little craft, as well as of their performances under steam, appeared in the daily papers at the time of their departure for China, it is needless to describe them again here, beyond remarking that from their light draught, good manœuvring powers, and heavy armament—their guns being sufficiently powerful to penetrate all except the most recent of our iron-clads—they seem admirably adapted to the special purposes for which they have been designed. While influenced, no doubt, by the extensive war preparations recently undertaken by her saucy neighbour Japan, China is now augmenting her fleet by the acquisition of iron-clads, the first of which, constructed in Germany, having by this time probably reached her destination.

From what has been stated, it will be seen that China's war preparations have been undertaken so far rather with a view to defensive than offensive measures; and the acquisition of gun-boats adapted to the rivers and inlets on her coasts, in preference to squandering thousands of pounds on an imposing fleet of cruising ironclads, augurs powers of insight and discrimination on the part of the responsible officials, which the statesmen of smaller but more ambitious countries would do well to take note of. As a matter of fact, China has no need of a large fleet for cruising purposes, having no distant and widely separated colonial possessions to look after, or a mercantile marine scattered over the face of the globe, the foreign trade of the Empire being almost entirely carried in foreign bottoms; and at present, at least, China entertains no aggressive designs on countries beyond the seas. Her earnest and often expressed wish just now is to be left alone, so as to enable her to develop her own vast resources, and to adapt her institutions to modern requirements in the manner in which she thinks fit. It may be taken for granted, then, that in any war in which China may be engaged, the operations of her fleet will be confined to the protection of her extensive sea-board, and especially of those points which afford means of access to the vital points of the Empire.

Passing on to the personnel of the fleet, it must be observed at the outset that the only systematic attempt to establish a course of naval education and training for officers as well as men is that which was set on foot some years ago at Foochow. It formed a part of the original scheme for the establishment of the arsenal, and comprised—

1st. A school on shore, an elementary naval college in fact, where young men who were intended for the naval profession received a thorough grounding in mathematics, foreign languages, and the various subjects now generally included under the head of education in Western lands.

2nd. A training-ship, where, after having attained to a certain standard in theoretical subjects, the young gentlemen were drafted from the college on shore to be instructed in the practical duties of their profession. Occasional cruises were taken to foreign ports, exercises aloft and in boats were regularly carried on; and while every opportunity was taken advantage of for initiating officers and men into the mysteries of seamanship, and everything connected with the duties of a seaman in the widest sense, the theoretical studies were assiduously kept up.

and special attention was paid to gunnery, prizes being given for good shooting, and, according to the testimony of the English staff of instructors, the practice was often of a very high order.

Both the college on shore and the training ship were under the control of English officers and instructors at the time I had the privilege of seeing them, and from a careful inspection of the work, I can answer for the thoroughness with which it was carried out.

So far as intellectual training goes, the system of education gives little to be desired; while by way of still further qualifying the young men for posts of responsibility, several of the most promising students were sent to Europe for the purpose of completing their studies at the naval colleges of France and England; and, finally, by arrangement with the English Government, a certain number were permitted to serve for a time on board the vessels of the Channel and Mediterranean fleets, so as to enable them to gain a practical insight into the routine and internal economy of English men-of-war.

Thus, it will be seen from this brief outline of the course of education pursued at Foochow, that everything that forethought and practical experience could suggest has been done with a view to supplying the fleet with competent officers and trained seamen. The scheme has evidently been well thought out and carefully elaborated, and is worthy in every sense of a great country. If the question now be asked, With what result? the answer cannot, on the whole, be a satisfactory one.

So far as theoretical knowledge is concerned, the young officers who have passed through the course may be pronounced proficient—many of them, indeed, highly so, their minds having been saturated with mathematics to a degree which would delight the advocates of a more advanced mathematical training amongst our own officers. Nor need we be surprised at this. Their minds are eminently adapted to the study of mathematics" was the verdict of M. Gignel, the head of the Foochow Arsenal, in answer to my inquiries. Equally high was the testimony of the gentleman in charge of the college, Mr. Woll, who informed me moreover that their powers of application and of protracted study were astonishing, exceeding anything that had come within his experience of English students. All this is, indeed, what we might expect from the youth of a nation which has been pronounced, by those who know the people best, to be intellectually quite our equals—a people,

moreover, amongst whom scholarship is held to be the sole test of merit, and by whom intellectual attainments are honoured far beyond any mere physical accomplishments.

When, however, we come to consider the qualifications of these young gentlemen in a wider sense, the verdict must be unfavourable. Various causes contribute to this, some of which are so closely bound up with the social life of the people that a tolerably intimate acquaintance with Chinese manners and customs is almost essential to a complete understanding of the subject.

It must be premised that athletics, as we understand them form no part of Chinese social economy; indeed, if we except such mild forms of dissipation as kite-flying on certain State occasions, and the game of battledore and shuttlecock played with the feet, the life of the well-to-do classes is essentially a sedentary one; a sort of existence in harmony with the teachings of that peculiar, but harmless modern excrescence of British polite society—the æsthetic school. Violent physical exertion of any kind is eschewed as fit only for actors, and professionals of an equally low social status; and, in consequence, games requiring skill of eye and hand, and which call forth any extraordinary agility, powers of endurance, or what we call pluck, are conspicuous by their absence amongst the recreations of the youthful Celestials. Hence it was found that although certain hours were set apart for purposes of recreation at the Foochow College, the lads just moped about, or retired to their rooms, for the very simple reason, as was pointed out by their master, that they didn't know how to "recreate." And this antipathy to violent exercise sticks to them throughout their career, with the result that the most of them grow up into weak, puny, effeminate young gentlemen, more suited to monastic occupations than the profession of arms. The opinion formed of the young men who were serving on board English ships, by our own officers, was that they were physically and constitutionally unfitted for the active duties of their profession, lacking as they did conspicuously those hardy physical qualities and powers of endurance which we consider essential for the men who would embrace the naval profession. They seemed, moreover, to have an innate aversion to manual labour, for fear of blistering their hands or of soiling their fingers; and, horrible to relate, a violent and unreasoning prejudice against the use of cold water has been laid to their charge, which, if true, shows only too plainly that they are deficient in some of the first

feelings of our nature ! As these young officers took no active part in the duties of the ships, being, in fact, merely intelligent and sharp-witted observers of all that went on, it is perhaps scarcely fair to infer from this their inability to do great things when called on to act ; but I give the opinion of English officers for what it is worth. I can add with much pleasure, from personal experience, that socially they were pleasant fellows enough, with an insatiable love, almost amounting to a passion, for gambling ; that, in fact, they seemed to take a far keener interest in games of chance than in the more serious, if less exciting, game of war.

Another difficulty with which the Foochow authorities have had to contend has its origin in social causes. This we will endeavour to explain.

When the scheme was first set on foot, aspirants for the naval profession were sought from amongst the best families of Foochow ; but as the inducements did not prove sufficiently alluring, and the proverbial " fool of the family " was not forthcoming in sufficient numbers, the recruiting ground was extended as far afield as Canton, and even to the British colony of Hong Kong. The limit of age was, moreover, relaxed in favour of promising youths of twenty and twenty-two, and, in course of time, the requisite number of students was obtained. No sooner, however, did the young officers begin their professional career than favouritism began to display itself, the Foochow officials not unnaturally exhibiting a preference for their own townsmen in their selections for promotion. But there were other and more serious obstacles in the way of the advancement of the young men from the South, more especially of those who had come from Hong Kong, many of whom having been educated in the Government schools of the island, though well advanced in the subjects comprised in the Foochow curriculum, were unfortunately ignorant of the " Mandarin " or " Court dialect." And here I must remind my readers of a fact which is not very generally known outside of China, namely, that the dialects which are spoken in the various provinces of the empire differ from each other ; the divergence in the case of those most widely separated being so great as almost to constitute a different language, the inhabitants of different provinces being often unintelligible to each other. Hence, strange as the fact may seem, it is no uncommon thing in the " treaty ports " to hear natives conversing in Pidgin English, as the only available means of linguistic intercourse. All official business is, however,

transacted in the dialect which prevails over the province contiguous to the capital; and this is called the "Court dialect." Hence it follows that all aspirants for office under the Government must be thoroughly conversant with the Court dialect, and it is worthy of remark that nearly all parents of respectability bring up their sons in the hope—vain as it proves in vast majority of cases—that one, at least, may succeed, by close application to his studies, in attaining the first rung of the official ladder, from whence a vista of glorious promise opens out before him, the highest posts in the empire being accessible—in theory—to men of the humblest parentage.

But before all things it is necessary first to master the "official" language. This is a *sine qua non* of social and official status. The aspirant for office may be a profound mathematician, an advanced scientist, or a skilled physician; but, unless he can discourse glibly in the classical language of the country, and display, when need be, a wide acquaintance with the writings of the great teachers of antiquity, he will be regarded by the mass of his countrymen as a mere uncultivated boor.

Anything corresponding to the "modern side" in our own schools has not yet obtained a footing in the educational system of China, though, indeed, in the matter of science teaching we can scarcely afford to throw stones at our Celestial friends, the "modern side" being of only recent introduction among ourselves—a sort of tardy recognition on the part of the heads of our great educational establishments of the claims of scientific truth to a place in the education of the young. How hard the struggle has been to get in even the thin end of the wedge Professors Huxley and Tyndall can tell us; a knowledge of dead languages, which in nine cases out of ten proves of no use whatever in the keen struggle for existence which is the lot of most young men on entering life, having been considered as of more importance than even the most superficial acquaintance with the great laws which govern the physical universe. The worship of the past is by no means confined to China. But in matters educational considerable progress has been made in this country since Sidney Smith penned his caustic essay, "Too much Latin and Greek." His remarks, however, still apply with pungent force to the absurd importance attached to classical learning amongst the Chinese.

These remarks may seem a wide digression from the subject, but if we apply them to the case of the young officers at Foochow we shall be better able to realise the difficulties which have hitherto

to be contended with. The very fact that the officers of the army and navy do not compete for honours at the literary examinations which form so important a part of the social system of the Chinese, causes them to forfeit the respect of their countrymen ; and, in spite of Naval Discipline Acts, they cannot command the respect of their subordinates. Hence, to some extent, no doubt, may be traced the want of discipline which has been rather a marked characteristic of the war-ships under native control. For our own part, however, we should hesitate before entrusting a modern war-ship to the command of an officer whose sole recommendation was a profound classical scholarship ; and unless China is desirous of courting disaster in war, she must be content to place her ships under the charge of men who, under existing circumstances, happen to be considered illiterate.

As regards the seamen of the fleet, it is a singular fact that, notwithstanding the enormous population engaged in sea-faring pursuits, Chinese sailors do not bear a high reputation. Those who have been brought up in junks, and received their training under the peculiar school of seamanship associated with these antiquated specimens of naval architecture, are not of much use on board ships of modern type, and for this reason Chinese are only employed to a very limited extent on board steamers of their own and of foreign nationality plying on the coast. As we have already remarked, an attempt was made at Foochow to train up a body of seamen adapted to existing requirements ; but, for reasons which it is needless to discuss, this has not been attended with the success which was looked for. And yet, so far as one can judge from the materials at his disposal, there seems no reason why China, with her enormous junk fleet and the vast number of men employed in the sea-fisheries, should not possess a magnificent force of seamen. We may even go so far as to question whether there is any country in the world with so fine a material at hand for the manning of a fleet. Such a material skilfully utilised, and commanded by competent officers, could not be surpassed.

That the Chinese are not wanting in fighting capacity, or in bravery, has been shown over and over again. The records of the "ever victorious army," under the able leadership of our own "Chinese Gordon," ought to have brought this fact home to us, if proofs were wanting from the previous history of the country. Chinese annals are, however, by no means deficient in the records of great generals—natural leaders of men, who

built up the vast empire which we find existing at the present day, men who were enthusiastic in the cause they were fighting for, and, what is of more importance, who were able to impart their enthusiasm to others. The achievements of these men mark the great epochs of Chinese history, and the power for good or for evil which the system of government places in their hands is prodigious. The empire is in sore need of a guiding genius at the present time: when he appears, the attention of the world will be directed towards China with anxious gaze.

A curious feature of the Chinese arsenals, which is worth noticing, is their entire independence of each other and of any central authority. But this is the outcome of the somewhat anomalous system of government, which throws the responsibility of the defence of the coast-line on to the shoulders of the viceroys of the adjacent province. Decentralisation is all very excellent in its way; but in the absence of any ruling principle, each official does what seems good in his own eyes, without paying much regard to what his neighbours are about. So that we find each arsenal with its own peculiar organisation, its own system of construction for ships, and its own methods for the manufacture of war material, just according to the views of the official who may happen to hold the reins of government at the time. Such a peculiar want of system must, more especially in the case of the naval arsenals, entail disastrous consequences in war time, and has already on more than one occasion been the cause of rather amusing fiascos; notably so, when some few years back it was proposed to assemble the naval forces of the empire for a series of manœuvres in the river Yang-tze. The enlightened official with whom the idea originated pointed out with truth that a Chinese fleet had never yet manœuvred in company, and that, without some drill in joint evolutions and tactics, ships fighting in company with a common enemy were as likely to run each other down as to damage the foe. The *Times* correspondent at Shanghai, in a very graphic account of the assembling of this motley flotilla of eleven ships, tells us how the evolutions were indefinitely postponed until someone should decide whether the fleet was to be commanded by a Foochow or Shanghai general; and that although the officers, both combatant and engineer, were Chinese, and that the ships were in fairly good order, the practical management of them was entrusted to gentlemen who, under some such sobriquet as Jim or Johnny, had been in the habit of piloting merchant ships about the coasts. The writer further pointed out a difficulty which the Chinese authorities, in

their exuberance of spirits at having collected together such a formidable armada, would seem to have overlooked, namely, that from the fact of these vessels carrying a mixed armament, comprising specimens of every known system of ordnance, there would be some difficulty in keeping them supplied with the proper kinds of ammunition. It is easy to see that a system under which such a state of things is possible must be inherently bad.

The training of the naval forces of the empire has been entrusted hitherto almost entirely to Englishmen; arrangements have recently been made, however, for the temporary appointment of a German naval officer for purposes of instruction, a step which has been no doubt taken in consequence of the last addition to the fleet having been constructed in Germany, and navigated out to China by German officers. Why the Chinese have suddenly transferred their allegiance to German building yards, not only in the matter of ironclads, but for the supply of torpedo-boats, is well worth inquiring into. Such a step argues a want of enterprise on the part of our own ship-builders. The inclining sympathies of Chinese officials towards Germany, may be due in some measure to reports from the Chinese ambassadors abroad as to the preponderating influence of Germany in European affairs. But it is vain to speculate on the motives which influence Chinese statesmen where the foreign relationship of the empire is concerned. Certainly no people in the world are greater adepts at turning international jealousies to account as a means of neutralising foreign influence than are Chinese officials. Playing off foreigners of different nationalities against each other is a very old and favourite game of theirs. But whether it is a wise one where the training of their naval forces is concerned, is questionable. Such tricks can scarcely conduce to efficiency in the public service.

The conclusion to which the preceding remarks point is that in an encounter with a naval Power of even second-rate importance, the Chinese fleet, from its general want of organisation and of system, must inevitably suffer a disastrous defeat. Indeed, in the opinion of competent judges the comparatively high state of efficiency of the Foochow contingent has been brought about by the energy of foreigners; and it is thought that when this stay is withdrawn, the vessels will relapse into a state of indiscipline and neglect. It has always been found most difficult to instil into the official mind the amount of watchful care necessary to maintain such complicated mechan-

isms, as modern war-ships, with their engines and boilers, in a state of thorough efficiency and repair. Sometimes there has ever been a difficulty in persuading them of the necessity of buying oil to keep the engines from rusting. There is a sort of impression even amongst those in high position that if a ship is bought and taken possession of, it will keep itself in order without further trouble or expense. Our dock-yard accounts would enlighten them on this matter to an extent which would probably surprise them; and if Chinese officials had studied this sort of statistics and calculated the cost beforehand, they would doubtless have been less anxious to saddle their country with such ever-increasing burdens of expense as modern iron-clads have proved.

As regards the organisation of the Chinese fleet, it may be questioned whether at the present time there is a native official of high rank competent to organise and control a fleet of modern construction. And here we touch on the real weakness of the fleet—the absolute dearth of good officers; not only of intelligent, experienced, and well-educated men, but of high-minded, public spirited and patriotic servants of the Crown—men whose aim in life it is to raise the reputation of the profession to which they belong. Corruption—the canker of Chinese official life, has eaten so deeply into all ranks, that it would seem to have completely destroyed the sense of duty. It is impossible for the public service to be ably administered so long as self-interest is the ruling motive. The moral sense of the nation has become so numbed through centuries of official oppression, dishonesty, and extortion, that it is with difficulty officials can be found to administer the public service with clean hands. Here and there, amidst a perfect chaos of maladministration, we find men who seem to be actuated in some dim sort of way by public spiritedness, but these exceptions are rare indeed, and their path is a thorny one. A reformer meets with little thanks in a country where all are corrupt, and where extortion and dishonesty are recognised means of augmenting the official salary. And then, the high officials have extremely unpleasant methods of snuffing out subordinates who display an officious zeal for the public welfare, and it is soon found to be easier and pleasanter to pull with the stream than to try and stem it. Until a marked change takes place in the views of the officials generally in matters connected with the service of the State, we cannot reasonably expect the naval branch of it to be honestly administered.

The large increase which has taken place lately in the armaments of Japan, with a view evidently to carrying out a more spirited foreign policy than has obtained of late years, taken in connection with the restlessness of the people, and their determination sooner or later to measure their strength against their colossal neighbours, gives an additional interest at the present time to any inquiry into the naval resources of China. If the writer was asked his opinion as to the probable result of a struggle between the two nations, he would be inclined to award the palm of victory in a naval engagement to the Japanese. But supposing the Japanese to be victorious, what then? They would derive but small advantage from the supremacy of their fleet. The real issue would be as far off settlement as ever, having but a remote connection with the command of the sea. Indeed, it is doubtful whether, even with this advantage, Japan could inflict any serious wound on her huge adversary. Destroy a few seaport towns would have about as much effect on China as sticking pins into an elephant, irritating her without seriously injuring her constitution. The loss of a limb or two, even, would scarcely impair the vitality of this colossal Power. One can only express the fervent hope that Japan will not be rashly led on, by statesmen of the Olivier type, to enter on a war with her continental neighbour with a light heart. It may serve the interests of certain foreign employés to persuade Japanese statesmen into a belief in their country's capacity for carrying an enterprise of this nature to a successful issue, but all well-wishers of the country would hesitate before advising her to measure her strength with China. Foreigners have done harm enough already to Japan by their injudicious flattery, without egging her on to mad schemes of this sort. The Japanese have only too much reason just now to exclaim, "Save me from my friends." Gathering clouds in the direction of Tonquin are attracting increased attention to the East just now, and speculation is rife as to the measures Chinese diplomacy will resort to with a view to maintaining her rights. China's foreign policy has not been aggressive of late years, and it would seem to aim just now at the somewhat novel but peaceful method of conquering by colonising. This great colossus of a nation, with its four hundred million of patient toilers, is becoming a factor in international politics which cannot much longer be ignored; while, by reason of their pertinacity and quiet dogged industry, backed up by sheer force of character, the Chinese are acquiring an easy ascendancy over every other Eastern race. Problems are arising in connection

with the extraordinary colonising tendencies of the people, before which the petty squabbles of European states sink into insignificance. It is a fact worth noting that the only two great races which impress their own peculiar form of civilisation on others are the Anglo-Saxon and the Chinese. They are also at present time the two great colonising races. It requires no large amount of prophetic insight to see that the great struggle for ultimate supremacy will lie between these two races; and appearances are not delusive, it would seem as if the problem of the survival of the fittest was already beginning to press for solution in the Western States of America, and other parts.

The writer trusts that the facts herein briefly stated, the result of personal observation and inquiry on the spot, may help to throw a light on the question as to China's capacity for meeting and overcoming the difficulties which seem to be looming ahead of her.

Our Own North-West.

BY C. F. GORDON CUMMING.

on has of late been largely directed towards the
 and Highlands of Scotland—an attention awakened,
 stance, by those symptoms of disaffection which so
 ested the commencement on our own shores of
 s now desolate the Sister Isle.

thus aroused was next riveted by the discovery of
 condition of extreme destitution to which a very
 our countrymen have this year been reduced, by
 e of all their ordinary means of subsistence. So
 ance was possible, these people, ever averse to
 o let others suspect their poverty, endured their
 ce; and it was not till they were reduced to despair
 y of the Isles appealed to the world—i.e. to us,
 Great Isle of Britain, to send help to our starving

pitiful indeed, and such an one as may well move
 rts of all who value the comforts of their own
 s, to lend their aid in the relief of the present
 the need is great and widespread, and large sums
 d to meet the monthly expenditure from the present
 est brings some measure of relief.

ion Committee for the Isle of Lewis state that they
 £1,500 a month to supply the necessary meal; as
 ricts, one of which numbers upwards of 6,000
 y found ninety per cent. of the population absolutely
 e all over the Isle the majority of a population of
 300 persons * are in extreme poverty.

ist be said of the whole of the Long Island (a com-
 which includes the Isles of Lewis and Harris, and
 ain of isles to the southward, which, at low tide,
 one with another by wide fords—namely, North
 , South Uist, and one or two out-lying isles likewise
 , and which possess a population of about 15,000

* The population of Lewis in 1881 was 28,339.

persons in addition to the aforesaid 28,000). These are generally accounted to be fairly well off for Hebrideans; so if they are starving, the prospect of other isles must be poor indeed.

And truly the record from one and all is alike distressing. No sooner was the piteous cry from the Long Island heard, than its echo arose from every hill and glen in Skye, which, till then, had only attracted notice from the unwise manner in which some of the crofters had sought to compel attention to their grievances regarding pastures. Now it is found that the men of Skye are as deeply stricken as their neighbours. So, too, are the people of Mull. Indeed, neither isles nor mainland have escaped. From Ardnamurchan to Cape Wrath, from Barra to the Butt of Lewis, comes the same sad tale of utter destitution. All say advisedly that this is the worst season on record.

From the hundred and thirty inhabited Isles of the Outer and Inner Hebrides, from the western shores of Ross, Sutherland, and Caithness, from parts of Inverness, and from many another quarter we hear the same low moan. Very low, for these are people accustomed at all times to endure hardship such as we know nothing of—who face storm and tempest, and cold and hunger, and who account themselves in luxury where a Southern working man would deem himself on the brink of starvation. So long as there is oatmeal to make cakes and porridge, and a few potatoes for a midday meal, these men are satisfied; and if milk and occasional fish be added thereto, they are well content. “Contented wi’ little and cantie wi’ mair,” as says the old song.

Such diet, however, leaves small margin for reduction. A failure in the fisheries, a harvest just a trifle below the poor average, or a deficiency in the potato crop, at once creates a serious difficulty. This year all these three causes have combined to produce a season of such distress as has never before been known. There have been several years within the last half century which stand out in dark remembrance because of the sore distress occasioned either by the failure of the potatoes, or of the kelp trade, or of the capricious herring. The famine of 1837 and that of 1848 were due to total failure of crops. There has been a gradual deterioration in the produce of the land; and the fields which eighty years ago yielded fifteen and even twenty-fold, now yield an average of five-fold for a barley crop and three-fold of oats.

But never till this last sad year of 1882 have all these troubles been crowded into one sorrowful season. Its story is like that of Job’s trials, so quickly has blow followed blow; and assuredly Job

himself could not have been more patient under tribulation than have these frugal, hard-working people—"patient, industrious, God-fearing people," as they are described to be by some who have dwelt long amongst them. So long as they can by any means earn their own living, they will leave no stone unturned, no shift untried. So, knowing that they cannot extract even a bare subsistence from the land unless they supplement it by reaping the harvest of the sea, the bulk of the whole population combine the various works connected with the fisheries with their regular agricultural toils; and, at the regular fishing seasons, nearly all the able-bodied men go off in the boats, to follow the herring wherever they may lead—perhaps as far south as Aberdeen. So essential to these small crofters is this combination of toils by sea and land, that out of the 1,780 occupants of land in Skye, there are not more than sixty who are not also fishermen. This double profession is not altogether advantageous however, as most of the work is crowded into the summer, and one labour interferes with the other. Necessary care for the land detains the men, so that they start late for the fishery; and then, again, they often have to leave the fishing-ground too soon, lest their agricultural work should suffer, and so they miss the finest shoals, which perhaps come just after they have left. Thus great labour is often expended for small profit.

Regular fishing stations are established at various points in the Isles, as, for instance, Stornoway, Barra, and Loch Boisdale; and at these upwards of a thousand boats may perhaps meet, to land their silvery cargo, which they hand over to the fish-curers to be prepared and packed for the market. A vast multitude of men and women find employment as labourers and gutters, and in a good season their toil is highly remunerative, and they earn a sum sufficient to supply the deficiencies of their scanty crops.

On the other hand, the herring occasionally seem to take counsel and agree to forsake their accustomed waters. Vainly do the boats go forth—not a silvery fin is there to reward their toil. Sometimes, on the other hand, the fish are there, but for some reason incomprehensible to the uninitiated, there is a very small demand for them, as is the case when, from any cause, the export is checked, as, for instance, when during the Franco-Prussian War, the usual demand from the Baltic ceased. Whatever be the cause, the result is the same to the poor fishers, who have to return home empty-handed, having utterly lost their summer.

Here, then, is the first cause of distress in the dark annals of 1882—indeed, we must look back to November of the previous

year; for then, and again in January 1882, our northern shores (including the eastern coasts so far south as Berwick) were swept by terrific gales, which, in the Isles, were accompanied by unprecedentedly high tides. Many of the boats and much of the fishing gear, on which the people are dependent for their subsistence, were utterly destroyed. Subscriptions were, however, set on foot, and this loss was in some measure made good before the herring season set in. Alas! this fishery, which is, as it were, the backbone of insular prosperity, utterly failed, and the men who had borrowed money from the fish-curers to enable them to start for the East Coast fishing, had to borrow afresh to obtain the means of returning home, so absolutely penniless were they left.

These men are not easily disheartened however, and, once at home, they were ready to make the best of their straitened circumstances, and trusted that their poor little crofts would yield them sufficient crops to carry on existence for the year. But alas! with the lengthening summer days, came unmistakable proofs that the cruel blight had settled among the potatoes. The blackening shaws,—the noxious, too familiar smell betrayed the evil; but the worst fears were more than realised when the time came for lifting them; and in place of an abundant crop of nutritious food, they obtained a miserable supply of worthless diseased roots, mere watery “blobs” the size of a pigeon’s egg, not worthy to be called potatoes.

The Chamberlain for Lewis tells how, in one parish, he sent out two men to dig, in order to raise as many potatoes as possible. They wrought for six hours, and only obtained a basketful of poor trash. One man states that he planted eight and a half barrels of seed potatoes, and only raised two barrels and a half. Another man gives evidence that his ground generally yields thirty barrels, but this season he only obtained five barrels. Others found their crops so worthless that it literally was not worth turning over the ground on the chance of finding a few wretched roots.

The next hope lay in the ling fishery. Once more the boats started, hoping to recover some of their losses. But the ling, like the herring, seem to have forsaken the coasts, and this fishery likewise proved a failure.

At least one point of consolation remained. The grain crops promised well—that is to say, they promised to yield fully the low average which has now become chronic—namely, a return of three times the amount sown. The hay crop also looked well, but soaking and long-continued rains utterly ruined it, so that it was not worth carrying. The peats, too, cut with so much toil, as the

ple supply for winter fuel, were so saturated by the summer rains that they never dried, and could not be carried home at the right season, so had to be left standing on the peat moss.

But autumn promised one gleam of comfort. The weather brightened, the crops ripened, and hope revived. It was not a rich harvest indeed, such as gladdens the farmer on many parts of the mainland. This is far too gay with the bright scarlet poppies, white and golden daisies, and blue corn flowers which betray the fertility of the soil, and the corn is poor in grain and short in straw, but none the less precious; and anxiously did the reapers go forth to their work—not to follow any modern reaping machine, but to work with sickles in the old simple fashion.

The time of harvest in this bleak north-west is always uncertain, and generally very late. Even on the mainland I have seen crops still green at the end of October, and only fit for fodder. But last autumn the corn was ready for cutting in September, and the small stocks stood in the little fields all ready for carrying and stacking; when, on the 1st of October, an appalling gale swept over the whole north country. From every corner of the land came tidings of its ravages; but in its first force it burst over these unsheltered isles, sweeping all before it. It caught up the unharmed stocks, and sportively whirled them in every direction, scattering them over the hill-sides, with all the grain thoroughly crushed out; the sea-beach was strewn with yellow straw, and much was blown out to sea. Boats were destroyed or sorely damaged; and the winter store of peats, which still stood in small stacks on the moor, was finally lost, for the gale whirled them in every direction, and the greater part fell back into the black bog whence they had been cut.

When the storm subsided, the sorely-tried people went forth to see what could be rescued—indeed, they did not wait till then, for through all its fury they struggled to carry home what they could of their poor harvest. Thus one man, who on the morning of the day owned three hundred stacks of barley, succeeded in recovering thirty. But most saved little indeed. One, who may be taken as a type of many, states that whereas he can generally count on rearing seven bolls of barley meal, he has this year been unable to make one pound, and has not had wherewith to darken the door of the mill.

Then came the last drop which overflowed their bitter cup. Sometimes the winter haddock fishing is very successful. It had been so in the winter of 1881, so this opened up a ray of hope, and again the fishers went forth, sorely under-fed, yet still striving

to keep up brave hearts. But the haddock followed the example of the ling and of the herring, and the winter fish proved as unsatisfactory as those of summer and autumn.

So that the last hope failed, the adverse forces of nature triumphed, and the poor struggling human beings have succumbed for the present, and are compelled to look to their more prosperous neighbours for such help as shall tide them over the evil day. They do not say much, being well trained to suffer silence, and having an amazing power of endurance in bearing troubles which they believe to be ordained by God. No Mahomedan submitting to the irresistible will of Allah can show more fortitude than do these simple Christian folk. "Our people," as one writing from Ross-shire, "are not over-ready to complain."

Norman Macleod has recorded how, in a year of terrible destitution in the Highlands, he was present at the first distribution of meal in a remote district. A party of poor old women approached their clothes patched and repatched, but very clean. They had come from a glen far inland to receive a dole of meal. Never before had they sought alms, and sorely did they shrink from approaching the committee. At last they deputed one woman to go forward as their representative, and, as she advanced, they hid their faces in their tattered plaids. When she drew near, she could not find words in which to tell her tale, but she bared her right arm, reduced by starvation to a mere skeleton, and stretching it towards the committee, burst into tears, and her bitter sobs told their own tale of anguish.

That scene might be enacted again this day in a thousand districts in the Highlands and Isles. Heart-breaking is the testimony of the clergy writing from their several parishes, and giving pitiful details of the deplorable destitution around them and of the sufferings already endured by their people, and which must assuredly intensify but for external aid.

They say that nothing approaching to the present distress has been experienced in the Isles for thirty years. Nevertheless they have had some difficulty in obtaining accurate statistics, as the people with proverbial "Highland pride," are very reluctant to reveal the depths of their poverty. On the contrary, they strive to hide it.

But these pastors of the flock cannot fail to perceive the misery which lies on every side of them. They tell of wide districts in which for many weeks the families have subsisted on one meal a day, and that consisting only of diseased potatoes. Thank God for the people who have been able to secure a load of coarse turnips

intended for the cattle. Till the Relief Committees were fairly established, letters from the Isles told of homes in which lay aged and dying persons, whose sole provision consisted of perhaps a creel-full of small diseased potatoes. The clergy have had to visit in houses where worn and wasted mothers watched by dying children, but their wails were not for the dead or dying, who no longer hungered, but for the living who would be healthy and strong could they be satisfied with bread only, but who were actually starving, for there was *absolutely nothing in the house* that can possibly be eaten. Teachers in the schools gave evidence that many of their children (some of whom have to journey a weary distance from their homes every morning), had actually been obliged to start without tasting so much as a bit of oat-cake, because there was not even a handful of meal in the kist.

Mr. Macdonald, Free Church Manse, Kilmuir, on the 8th of March, told the story of his own district :—

The civil parish has a population of over 2,500—460 families in all. Of that number 150 families are in extreme destitution now, needing immediate relief. Many of our crofters, who tried to reserve some little corn for seed, are now obliged to use that seed in order to keep their families alive. This will not last long, and I quite expect that in a few weeks the half of the families in this parish will be without food, without any way of procuring food, and without seed to put into the ground, unless large supplies shall come to them from without.

From Lewis the report was still worse. Mr. Mackay, the agent for the entire island, so far back as January, published an appeal. A local relief committee was started, and Mr. Mackay and a banker from Stornoway had gone as a deputation to Edinburgh and Glasgow to ask subscriptions; and it was in consequence of their visits that the relief committees had been formed in Glasgow and Edinburgh. That gentleman mentioned that the state of matters in Lewis even at that time threatened to be worse than it was in 1846.

In a letter to the Glasgow Committee, dated 8th March, he stated that there were upwards of 12,000 persons above the pauper class in a state of great destitution in Lewis, and that in the next few months that enormous number was likely to be augmented by at least 5,000 more.

A clergyman, the Rev. Angus MacIver, Uig, Stornoway, wrote on the 9th March to the Lord Provost of Glasgow :—

My parish is the extreme western part of the island, some parts of it upwards of forty miles from Stornoway, where people have been supplied with meal hitherto. . . . I gave lines to some thirteen or fourteen heads of families lately. Many of them, I believe, were at the time facing starvation. Some twelve of them trudged away thirty miles to Stornoway to get food for their families. They left on Monday morning and only returned on Friday morning, without getting anything for

themselves or their families, walking in the streets of Stornoway the most of the time with very little food. There were only two out of the fourteen who had got any supplies before.

Of course all districts are not equally badly off. Those which suffer least are the people within reach of the sea-coast, where they can gather a wretched diet of dulse* from the rocks, and limpets, and small crabs, truly an unsatisfactory meal for hungry men and women, when such morsels form its staple, and not the mere relish. The most abundant supply awaits those who dwell near the wide fords, where at every low tide the inexhaustible supply of shell-fish is daily replenished, and all seekers may be sure of filling their creels with something edible. Cockles and mussels are there in amazing quantities, gleet clams and whelks, perriwinkles, and the long razor fish, commonly called spout-fish, because, by his spouting like a miniature whale, he betrays his hiding-place deep beneath the sand. Small fishes also are captured in the little pools; and altogether these wide sands form a precious harvest-field for all who can glean its treasures.

These, however, are comparatively few. Even of the Isles, many have no shore, only precipitous cliffs, where, during the long winter months, not even a white sea-bird nestles. And of course in the districts on the mainland, where the destitution is well nigh as terrible as in the Hebrides, most of the people live far inland, and for them the harvest of the sea is strewn in vain.

The shrinking of the people from applying for poor-law relief, is evident from the reports which have been forwarded to the Relief Committee, showing what pinching of poverty multitudes must have endured rather than apply to "the Board." But while all are very poor, there is much more positive destitution in some parishes than in others almost adjoining. Thus, in Ross-shire, while four-fifths of the 4,594 inhabitants of Gairloch are living on credit, the neighbouring districts of Applecross and Loch Carron (which taken together have as large an acreage as Gairloch—about 200,000 acres and 8,695 inhabitants) reported themselves in spring as not yet in extreme want. Lochbroom, with its population of 4,191 persons to 261,021 acres, and Lochalsh, with 2,050 persons to 49,582 acres, did not then complain of unusual poverty, and only stated that they had no seed-corn nor potatoes, nor the means of procuring any. On the other hand, from Ullapool and Coigall in Ross-shire, and from Assynt in Sutherland, came tidings that the people were in great straits.

So, though there are diversities of shade in the general gloom,

* *Dulse*, a leathery, claret-coloured sea-weed.

there is no disguising the fact that the dark presence of Famine now overshadows the whole north-west of the British Isles; and what is true of one district, is in a measure true of a thousand others. Of course each differs in detail, but in all, the outline of trouble is the same. The people, through no fault of their own, are left absolutely without the means of existence. They have no potatoes, no meal, no fish. Those who possessed a few head of cattle or a small flock of sheep have been compelled to sell them, and are living on the produce. When that is consumed, they have nothing left to fall back upon. Those who possessed the excellent luxury of a cow, have had to part with her to buy meal, and the bairns greet* in vain for their accustomed milk.

In addition to hunger, the bitter cold of winter has been faced beside dreary hearths, for, as we have seen, the peats were lost in October, and months elapsed ere there was any possibility of cutting, or in any case of drying, fresh supplies.

It would be easy to multiply individual instances of distress, each one a heart-rending picture of want, but the tale is painful and unnecessary. Suffice it to say, that this great multitude of most innocent sufferers, require continuous aid from the present time till a better harvest may once more make them independent. But they had to depend on charity for even the means of obtaining that harvest; and seed potatoes, oats and barley for the future, formed a prominent feature in their necessities.

As a matter of course, this state of matters was no sooner made known in Edinburgh and Glasgow, than subscriptions were set on foot, and the Lord Mayor of London likewise invited contributions. These flowed in in sufficient abundance to enable Relief Committees to begin their work well, but the supply has proved by no means equal to the emergency of a need that will require steady relief for months to come. In the end of March, the Lord Mayor of London issued a second appeal for funds to relieve the widespread distress, the extent of which he fears is by no means realised by the general public. His lordship has received letters from the Rev. D. Mackinnon, minister of Strath, in Skye, and personal assurances from Lord Dunmore as to the terrible distress prevailing, and he urgently appeals for adequate and prompt aid to avert a famine among these distressed and heart-broken people. Mr. Macdonald, the agent of some of the principal landlords in the island, and secretary to the Skye Destitution Committee, Portree, wrote on March 12th :—

I can vouch, are doing their very utmost, but local resources

* To greet, to cry.

are quite inadequate, and a great part of the ground in Skye will be left unsown this year."

A petition for aid was presented to the House of Commons, signed by the Lord Provost and Chief Magistrates of Glasgow, containing an authoritative statement of the circumstances which have brought about the present destitution in the Western Isles.

A Bill was also introduced into Parliament to enable Government to advance supplies of seed for the most necessitous districts in the Isles and Highlands. It was, however, withdrawn, in consequence of the strong feeling that Scotchmen would wish, if possible, to avoid soliciting Government aid till the necessities of the case proved altogether beyond the power of individual aid. The principal proprietors, such as Lord Macdonald, Macleod of Macleod, Fraser of Kilmuir, Lord Middleton, the Duke of Sutherland, Sir Kenneth Mackenzie, &c., accordingly intimated their intention of providing their tenants with seed corn and potatoes for immediate use, either as a free gift or as a loan, as may seem best in different cases.

But though the proprietors may do their utmost to tide over the present troubles, they cannot hope to meet this emergency without large and continuous aid from benevolent friends in more prosperous districts.

So great a crisis would of itself claim special attention from Government, even were it not for the sore feeling which has recently been aroused in some districts by agitators, only too ready to stir up discord between class and class. Hence the appointment of a Royal Commission to inquire minutely into the actual condition of the people in the Highlands and Isles of Scotland, with a view, so far as may be possible, of ameliorating their lot—a lot, however, which, from the very circumstances of the case, must ever be a hard one.

A distress so wide-spread, and in a greater or less degree so of recurring, does indeed offer a serious problem for the consideration of all who are interested in the prosperity of the country. It is a problem hard to solve, and strangely contradictory are the suggestions offered by men, all well versed in their subject, but whose opinions are in many cases unconsciously tinged by self-interest, and who accordingly see the question chiefly from their own standpoint. So, while some counsel wholesale emigration, and point to the flourishing colonies of Highlanders who, in previous years of famine have left our hungry shores to make for themselves new homes in far countries, and have succeeded so admirably, others contend with equal warmth that Britain ought not to be deprived

of her strong sons, that this constant bleeding¹ weakens the mother country, and that by granting the people larger farms, and training them to systematic cultivation on scientific principles, the produce of the land might be vastly increased without the loss of its human sinews.

The advocates of the latter course point to the days before the tide of emigration commenced, when these patriotic clansmen, no longer required to do feudal service to their chiefs, supplied the British army with many a brave officer and gallant soldier. Dr. Norman Macleod, speaking of the tacksmen or leaseholders (who in the early part of this century formed so important a class throughout the Highlands, but who were amongst the first to set the example of emigration when rents were raised and the system of large grazing-farms introduced), says that these were the very men whose families had heretofore supplied the Highlands with clergy, physicians, and lawyers, and the army and navy with many of their officers.

He says that in his youth he could look down from one hill-top on farms which, during our wars with Napoleon, had contributed upwards of sixty officers to the British army and navy. He states that since the beginning of the last wars of the French Revolution the one Island of Skye has sent forth from her wild shores, twenty-one lieutenant-generals and major-generals, forty-eight lieutenant-colonels, 600 commissioned soldiers, 10,000 soldiers, four governors of colonies, one governor-general, one adjutant-general, one chief baron of England, and one judge of the Supreme Court of Scotland. Not a bad contribution from one Isle to the general brains and sinews of the group. But now, with the tide of emigration all this has changed, and though the Isles still furnish a noble contingent of about 1,600 men to the Naval Reserve, the Highlands are far behind old days in their support of the army. For one thing, military ardour no longer receives such substantial encouragement as it did in the early part of the present century, when, in 1803, Lord Macdonald apportioned his crofts among such families as had sent a son into the army, whereas the men of peace who objected to be enlisted were rejected from the favoured list.

Now the military element of the Isles is almost entirely confined to a body of militia, who at present are annually summoned to the mainland for drill at Fort George. It has, however, recently been suggested, that as the Naval Reserve men are found to have improved greatly since they stopped going to drill at Greenock, and had their own head-quarters in the Isles, so it would probably be

greatly to the advantage of the Hebridean militia to have been of their own—probably at Stornoway.

Although comparatively few Hebrideans now enlist in Army or Navy, the Mercantile Marine is, largely recruited from the seaboard parishes of the north-west, and it is a matter of complaint to the tax-payers of these districts, that when sailors have expended all the best of their lives (periods of twenty to forty years) in thus serving their country, they nevertheless swell the heavy poor-law burdens in the villages where they were born, but in which they have never worked. The rate-payers very justly think that such support should be provided out of the national fund.*

The tacksmen to whom I have alluded were gentlemen and often kinsmen of the proprietor from whom they held the land, much of which they sub-let to small farmers in portions varying from £20 to £50 per annum. These men had no lease, and paid much of their rent in kind. Hence there was generally "plenty" about the home of the tacksmen, whose kitchen-fires smouldered, for all comers, rich or poor, were sure of a welcome to the hospitable board.

Some of these small farmers clubbed together to hold joint farms rented direct from the proprietor, to whom they paid a lump sum, while they divided rent and profits among themselves. These co-operative bodies worked their arable land on the system known as run-rig, whereby land was divided into minute portions,—high ridges built up, with wide intervening furrows, a very wasteful method of cultivation. All these portions were periodically changed hands by lot, among the members of the co-operative body, who were each responsible for the cultivation of the portions thus assigned to them, a system devised to prevent any member being idle. The hill-pasture was held in common, though each member of the community paid his proportion according to the number of sheep or cattle he had to graze, and which were managed by a common herdsman. On each of these farms a certain portion of the land was generously set aside as a sort of self-tithe to be cultivated for the poor and afflicted, for the orphans and other helpless members of the community; for this ungrudging generosity to all in distress, has ever been a characteristic of the people.

The mass of the population were of course the cottars, crofters, the former being in fact "squatters" who, with a

* It is stated on very high authority that there are districts in the Isles where the rates and taxes now amount to 9s. 4d. in the £11

out permission, took up their quarters on the very small portions of land which formed the crofts of their neighbours. The word *croft*, or "cropped" land, was originally applied to the small patches of ground which each man reclaimed from the moor, by removing the superficial peat and rock boulders; little draining was ever attempted, but the land was so far brought into order that it would yield crops of some sort. The men who had thus cleared the ground were allowed to hold it rent free for a given number of years, and were allowed the right to pasture their cows in the neighbourhood and to cut peat from the moss for fuel. Here, then, they built their turf huts and established their homes; but, as they could not make a living out of their tiny fields, they took to fishing on a more systematic principle than had hitherto been done.

Those living on the sea-coast were also able to increase their little store by the manufacture of kelp, a toilsome work of very uncertain profit, inasmuch as a heavy shower of rain falling on the half dried sea-weed would effectually destroy the produce of many days of labour. However, these patient folk were so used to toiling for small and insecure returns, that so long as their kelp found any market, they persevered in its manufacture. So when (owing to the increased importation of potass and Spanish barilla) its price fell so low as no longer to pay for the time and labour expended on it, the loss was very severely felt, both by landlords and tenants. In some cases the tenants were able to pay their whole rent out of the profits of the kelp. The right to collect sea-weed was made a distinct item of rental; in some cases the shore and the rocks were let separately from the land. Of late years, however, the manufacture of kelp has been almost entirely abandoned by the Skye men; nevertheless, we are told that in some districts of that Isle an annual payment for sea-weed is still exacted, though it is only used as manure for the hungry soil—a manure so necessary, however, that when the foreshore is let separately, the tenant sometimes has to carry sea-weed for several miles either by boat or on his own back.

Other changes crept in. Hitherto, as a general rule, the co-operative system above referred to, had been found to work well, and illustrated the old story of the well-bound faggots. But presently the faggots were unbound, and then weakness crept in where comparative strength had been before. The club farms were broken up, and divided amongst the small farmers, each of whom became practically, hereditary lord of his own little scrap of ground, though without holding any lease (the advantage of ~~spring~~ leases being considered dubious, inasmuch as it was

found that though the diligent man might thereby be encouraged to still greater exertion, the idler would rest securely on his idle oars. Small wonder, therefore, that every man holding land on such a tenure should seek only to extract from the soil the utmost that it can yield, with the smallest possible outlay, so that the cultivation continues to this day to be of the most superficial character, and no adequate drainage is attempted. Under the new system, hill-pastures were still held in common, but various advantages hitherto derived from co-operation were sacrificed.

Every portion of land thus assigned to an individual was, in the first instance, sufficient for the maintenance of his family, and in a good year there was even a margin of profit. But when, in later years, it was found that the establishment of great sheep-farms would vastly increase the value of estates, wholesale clearances were effected, in order to leave great tracts of uninhabited land; and innumerable colonies of small farmers were evicted from their small holdings, and in lieu thereof received smaller and generally very inferior allotments clipped from off the crofts of their neighbors, sometimes a strip of peat-moss, sometimes small patches of land scattered among rocks.

While this artificial crowding together of the people was naturally productive of much distress, their natural increase soon proved a further source of difficulty, for, as a new generation grew up, without a thought or wish but to live and die in or beside the parent nest, these tiny farms came to be sub-divided, so that the land originally assigned to one family was required to support several.

If the proprietor endeavoured to check this system by refusing to allow more houses to be built, the married sons and daughters all contrived to find shelter in the original home, and any attempt to induce them to go further, in search of new means of living, created so much real anguish among these very affectionate families, that they were generally left in peace, to find out by dire experience how impossible it was for so many to extract a livelihood from such limited ground. Hard, indeed, oftentimes must be the struggle to contend with such a climate and such poor and ungenerous soil, whether the little holding lies in the dark peat swamp, or in the unfertile ridges on the rocky mountain side. Still it is *home*, and therefore loved.

At the same time the several portions of crofts thus subdivided were made to pay higher proportions of rent than the whole had done, consequently rents actually increased under this pernicious process; of which, by the way, a fairly average example is afforded

by the much-talked-of "Glendale Crofters," one of whom states that whereas in his father's and grandfather's time the township was occupied by only eight crofters, it is now divided amongst twenty-one, and the rents have increased from £54 to £71. The spokesman states that his own croft consists of about three acres of arable land ; which has been tilled consecutively for thirty-seven years ; that he has eight sheep and three cows, which are fed on the hill-pasture common to all the crofters. His rent is four guineas, and his taxes come to twelve shillings more. There are no horses in the township, and all field-work is done by manual labour, of which the women take full share, working with the most primitive implements.

Anyone who has carefully followed the evidence given day by day before the Royal Commissioners during the last few weeks, with all the details therein revealed of long-endured hardship and suffering, must have learnt some strange facts concerning the possibilities of life in the British Isles in the nineteenth century.

It must not be supposed that the proprietors of the land have looked on, unmoved by the struggles of the people. Many a time have their minds been sorely exercised how to ameliorate their condition, and various experiments have from time to time been tried in the hopes of bringing about a better state of things, but the results have invariably been discouraging. I may instance the case of the island of Raasay, near Portree, which, about forty years ago was purchased by Mr. Rainy, who resolved to improve the property and at the same time help the people, of whom there were about a thousand on the isle ; of these 104 were crofters, who paid an average rent of £4 10s. There were also sixty-five families of cottars, and unfortunately one of the first steps towards improving the property lay in clearing fourteen townships to make one sheep-farm,—not a very popular act ! Mr. Rainy and his family lived on the island, taking the greatest interest in the people. He gave them ample employment in road-making, trenching, draining, and fencing, and at the end of four years found that his expenditure was £1,672 in excess of his revenue from the property, while the condition of the people had not improved] one wit, and he calculated that to keep them in moderate comfort he would have to continue to lay out his money at the same rate.

He therefore decided on parting with so unremunerative a property, which accordingly, in 1876, passed into the hands of Mr. E. H. Wood, together with the Isles of Rona and Fladda. It appears that during the six years that Mr. Wood has held the estate, he has expended on it a sum of £92,500 in excess of any rental

received, while various outlays for the benefit of the people (such as replacing lost boats, gifts of seed-corn and seed-potatoes, &c.) have amounted to fully £500 more. Happily his position as resident landlord, and his keen interest in the welfare of his people has secured a place in their affection, but the property can scarcely be considered a lucrative investment!

In like manner, but on a far larger scale, did Sir James Mathe attempt wholesale improvements in the isle of Lewis. Vast sums were expended on the endeavour to convert moor and moss into arable land, but the work proved merely a sink of money. Every sort of benevolent scheme was tried to aid the people, who have indeed, well-nigh trebled in numbers, but who (after the expenditure of £100,000 on the mere attempt to reclaim peat-moss, &c.) are as much more on the general improvement of the isle) are now poorer as ever; in fact, the weight of pauperism is overwhelming.

So, too, on the property of Kilmuir, in Skye, the present proprietor, Major Fraser, has expended about £29,000 on road-making and many other improvements, but the returns have borne a very poor proportion to the outlay.

On the other hand, it appears that where the people have been encouraged to work for themselves on good terms, their condition has improved, and in various districts the old system of club farms has been restored, with the additional right of pasturing sheep, &c. It is stated that *where these club farms exist, there are no paupers*. There are two such farms, at Fassafree and at Stein, on the estate of Captain Macdonald, of Waternish, where the tenants possess about 600 sheep, managed by two trustees chosen by the co-operative body. The township of Bernisdale, on the property of Macdonald of Skeabost is similarly managed. Edinbane, on the Grishornish estate is another example; here the people have about 800 sheep. Similar farms are held from Lord Macdonald at Glenmore and Muggary. There are others on Kilmuir. Most of these lie inland and are worked by a class of men called "litt drovers," who collect cattle for the markets and sell them to large dealers.

The Clachan of Achintee in Lochcarron, Ross-shire, has been quoted as a fair example of the working of such a club farm. Here ten families, each paying a rental of £20 a year, cultivate 100 acres of arable land in common, and likewise share the hill pasturage which is the chief source of their prosperity. Their mixed stock of sheep, cattle, and horses, maintain the pasture in good condition, as cattle and horses will feed and flourish on coarse grasses quite unfit for sheep; they also prevent the heather from encroaching on

grazings, and their heavy tread and manure, encourage grass to spring up in new places.

These farmers work the arable land on a five-course rotation. They produce larger agricultural and pastoral results than a single tenant could produce from the same space, and they pay to the proprietor a larger rent than a single tenant would care to do. These tenants give no trouble, are never in arrears, and never require assistance from the proprietor. Nearly all have their little deposits at the bank, and the majority have well-to-do sons and daughters, who have gone forth to make their own way in the world, in Britain or her colonies. There is not a pauper in the community.

The secret of their success lies not only in co-operation, but in holding sufficient pasture land to fatten their own flocks and herds, the Isles and Highlands being of so essentially pastoral a character that in these lies the chief source of wealth, as is too well proven by the miserable failure of such poor crofters as seek to extract a living from capricious crops only.

Here is an instance in which ten families are comfortably supported on land which, if let as a sheep-farm, would probably be left in charge of a single lonely shepherd.

To return to the condition of the North-West in the earlier half of the century.

There came a time, not in the Isles alone, but throughout the Highlands, when proprietors began to realize that large farms were more advantageous than small ones, and that the new system of sheep-farming would assuredly bring in far larger returns than any hitherto dreamt of. So large tracts of pasture land were converted into sheep-runs, and the small farmers were displaced to make room for fewer but wealthier men. The more energetic among them emigrated, with heavy hearts but brave purpose, and have founded prosperous families beyond the seas. Many of the poor, and weak, and old were compelled to leave their dearly-loved homes among the green hills, and were crowded together into towns or villages, there to bemoan their hard fate till the hour of their death. But in most cases the families who were thus dispossessed of their crofts and pastures were, as we have seen, unceremoniously settled on the land already tenanted by other men; these were compelled to submit to seeing the crofts, which just kept their own families in comfort, sub-divided into infinitesimal allotments, insufficient to allow of any profitable farming. Thenceforward began the struggle for a bare existence, which year by year has become intensified till it has reached the present climax.

Then the hateful big Southern sheep came to take the place less remunerative though far more attractive Highland breed, attractive to the artist for their beauty, to the spinner for the fineness of their wool, to the consumer for the delicacy of mutton. Those little Highland sheep were personal friends to people, and the tending and milking of the ewes formed the subject of many pathetic ballads, as for example, "Ca' the Ewe the Fauld, Jamie's wi' me," or, "Sae sweet the lassie sang Bucht, milking the Ewes," or, "Will ye come to the Ewe-brother Marion?" or, most musical of all,—

Ca' the ewes to the knowes,
Ca' them where the heather grows,
Ca' them where the burnie flows,
My bonnie dearie O!

Now these sweet old pastoral ballads speak of a dead past. Still the shepherds tend Lowland sheep on the green hills, whence once the blue smoke from the homes of a generation who, with laments and bitter mourning, were driven forth to begin life in far distant lands. So intimately were those sad, compulsory separations associated in the minds of the people with the introduction of the strange sheep, that on one occasion a minister in having exhausted rhetoric in describing the joys of heaven, cried all by touching a deeply sympathetic cord, when he declared "as no evil thing could enter the blessed kingdom, there assuredly be no big sheep there"!

It is to the connection of the hated Lowland sheep with unhappy clearances, that allusion is made in the old, sad song

The flocks of a stranger the long glens are roaming,
Where a thousand fair homesteads smoked bonnie at gloaming;
Our wee crofts run wild wi' the bracken and heather,
And our gables stand ruinous, bare to the weather!

It is strange and pitiful to learn that many of these grievous evictions actually occurred within the last thirty years, and these too true tales of woe were enacted in our own Isles, to the memory of men now in the prime of life. On the other hand, those who look only to the general prosperity of our country find comfort in the knowledge that throughout the Isles and Highland flocks and herds, such as were never dreamt of in the days of our ancestors, now fatten peacefully on mountain pastures covering millions of acres, which heretofore were of small account, but now represent large sources of revenue to their proprietors.

There are, however, certain districts on the mainland, notably Kintail, in which it is affirmed that (whereas the cattle which hitherto pastured on the hills had helped to keep the land fit

the sheep have so utterly exhausted it that it is now deemed advisable to let the ground lie fallow for a term of years. It is said that where sheep alone occupy the land, the grazings deteriorate to such an extent (notwithstanding heather-burning and drainage) that farms which, in former years, have supported, say five thousand sheep, will now barely yield pasture for four thousand. The decrease of half a million, reported in last year's returns of the total number of sheep in Britain, is said to be partly due to this cause.

To allow the land to recover from this exhaustion, is the reason now assigned by one proprietor for a considerable extension of his deer-forests in part of Ross-shire, though it might well be thought that those already occupied their full share of land; inasmuch as the twenty-five deer-forests of Ross-shire cover one-third of the whole country. It is stated that deer-forests and sheep-runs together occupy two-thirds of the Highlands! Of the former it has been recently said: "They extend in an almost unbroken line from the southern borders of Perthshire to the shores of the Pertland Firth, and embrace an area of over two million acres of some of the best pasturage in the Highlands. Within this vast space absolute silence reigns. Sheep and cattle are of course rigidly excluded, and the only human occupants are a few gillies." The writer might have added that the artist, the poet, and he who would seek new bodily and mental strength in those beautiful and health-giving mountain regions, are alike jealously excluded, lest their human presence should disturb the wild deer, and spoil the sport of the few.

The writer whom I have before quoted goes on to say, speaking of the twenty-five forests of Ross: "If we apportion three sportsmen to each forest (which is above the average, for the very essence of the sport is its exclusiveness), we have seventy-five persons, who monopolise, for a month or two's recreation in the year, an area of country that is capable of furnishing happy homes to about three thousand peasants, affording pasture for an immense stock of sheep, cattle, and horses, while the ancient sport of deer-stalkers would remain as before." He adds the opinion given by the late William Mackenzie, of Achindonia, "than whom there was no higher agricultural authority in the north," to the effect that, were these sheep-runs and deer-forests converted into moderate-sized holdings on the club system (which is in practical, successful working on the estates of Sir Alexander Matheson), the county of Ross alone would maintain in comfort twice its present population, and result in a vast increase of agricultural and pastoral good to the nation, while all reasonable sport would remain as in former times."

This is, of course, but one view of the question. The owners

of the forests maintain that they give employment to a number of keepers, watchers, gillies, and other dependents, who are better off in thus receiving regular wages than they could be were they toiling on their own crofts for exceedingly uncertain returns. This is doubtless the case, but whether it is necessary that the deer should be allowed undisputed possession of all the pastures is another question, and it may well seem hard to the man who is struggling to rear his young family, as he exists himself chiefly on oatmeal, to know that he can by no means obtain grazing for a cow on the green hills which lie around him so invitingly.

I suppose that one touch of such a privation, affecting oneself personally, enables one to realise it far more thoroughly than can be done by any mere picture of imagination; and I have thus realised it, in one district, where we were surrounded by pastures rich and abundant, but could not procure one drop of milk, because the grass was so wholly devoted to deer that there was none to spare for cows. So the children had to do without, and I scarcely think that it was our fancy which made them appear to us punier and more sickly than those which were better provided in this respect. In truth, the local doctors bear witness to the amount of suffering due to this cause, and to their manifold difficulties in treating infantile complaints on account of the impossibility of obtaining this natural food. The women, too, suffer sorely from dyspepsia, which is attributed to the extravagant innovation of drinking tea, whenever they can (by selling their few eggs) earn the wherewithal to buy a little! Truly a grievous extravagance—a little tea without milk and often without sugar, to wash down their daily diet of either oatmeal or indifferent potatoes! The men also, to whom porridge and milk is second nature, have likewise just to eat their porridge dry; and if anyone is inclined to think lightly of such a privation, I can only recommend him to try it as his sole diet for one week.

The only available substitute is whisky, which can always be obtained by those who can afford it, who, however, are by no means the majority; though, as an instance of how readily supply creates demand in such matters, I may notice that in the Isle of Skye where the whisky distillery at Tallisker annually turns out 45,000 gallons of "Barley Bree," 20,000 gallons are now consumed in the Isle of Skye itself.

It may be due to the abundance of this supply that the men of Skye seem to have so entirely abandoned the illicit business of preparing whisky of home manufacture, whereas their neighbours in Ross-shire still glory in

The stream in the starlight
That King's dinna ken

The untaxed, double-distilled draught of true mountain-dew, which *connoisseurs* assert to be beyond all question superior to any known to the exciseman, the "Gauger" as he is called in the Highlands.

In the silent solitude of many a dark glen in the wilds of Western Ross, these unrecognised distillers find their secure hiding-place beside some sparkling stream, and work in secret, fully convinced that there can be no harm in transforming their own barley into whisky for their own consumption. Within the last year, however, the "gaugers" have made so many seizures of these private stills, that their number must now be seriously reduced. Last year Sir Kenneth Mackenzie of Gairloch brought so much persuasive personal influence to bear on his tenants, that they voluntarily surrendered their distillery apparatus at the request of their chief. Doubtless, however, many more continue in full action, and the revenue officials did a stroke of business eminently satisfactory to themselves last February, in the course of which they first tracked and seized a skilfully concealed still in Kintail, and then made a raid into the well-nigh inaccessible solitudes around Lock Monar in the parish of Lochalsh, where they found two large smuggling bothies, one for distillery, the other for malting, and both in first-rate order.

It certainly must be difficult for these sons of the mountain to accept a regulation declaring that it is *not* lawful for them to do what they will with their own!

As regards Skye, the only other factory on the isle is the excellent woollen manufactory at Portree, which gives employment to many persons, and supplies good woollen cloth for the comfort of many besides the Islanders. It seems a pity that more works of the same sort should not be established in other parts of the Isles, affording a home market for the island-grown wool, and regular work for the people; and if the ground in the neighbourhood of such factories could be apportioned to each family in such lots as to provide grass for a cow, and a garden in which they should raise for their own consumption the vegetables found to be best suited to the climate, every such establishment might become a centre of comfort and content. As yet, the idea of growing any vegetable save potatoes does not seem to have entered the insular mind.

One could almost wish that a few Chinamen could be imported, just to test what *can* be grown, and whether the land is incapable of supporting the inhabitants. In all countries they are the most successful of vegetable growers, and contrive to live in comparative comfort where other men starve; but in point of frugality, industry, and perseverance, the Highlander abroad, where circumstances are

not all dead against him, is equal to any Chinaman, and though it is rather the fashion to speak of him as too easy-going and lacking energy, in his own country, he might develop new life were his condition more hopeful. At present he has little to cheer him, a year after year he delves the same morsel of wretched land with his crooked spade, and then goes off in search of fish that so often fail him, and returns to watch the crop that will not ripen; and at the time he and those he loves are under-fed, never knowing the luxury of one full meal such as *we* deem necessary at least thrice a day. How can men be expected to work energetically under such circumstances? Put these same men to work on navvies' food of abundant meat, and it will soon be seen that no men in Scotland can work better, and that the many accusations of insular idolence rest chiefly on the simply physical question of insufficient food.

Latterly the Hebridean peasant—be he crofter or cottar—has found his means of earning a pittance in any other manner growing smaller and smaller. A few years ago many of the islanders earned fair wages by going to Argyllshire and other parts of the coast to do harvest work, but this is now done by machine. It is the age of progress, and they begin to realise that unless they too progress they will assuredly go to the wall. Why should they not profit by machinery,—the machinery of the swift steamship which might carry to southern markets the produce of dairy-farms worked by co-operation? If the land is not suitable for cereal cultivation, it is assuredly fit for pasture, and well-worked dairy farms and poultry-rearing may, after all, prove to be the best source of wealth for the isles, as well as that most in keeping with the natural tastes of the people, whose one desire is to be allowed to exist on the ground which gave them birth, and to whom the very idea of emigration is utterly abhorrent.

They know how, in days of old, their chiefs would have gloried in the increase of their numbers, which meant an increase of fighting men, and it is a hard lesson to have to learn that they are now accounted an encumbrance, instead of being "the clan," the strength of the land, whose interest was one with that of the chief.

No race is more averse to learn the lesson of the bees, and yet by year to send forth their swarms to begin honey-making on their own account in fresh pastures. Yet, like the bees, they undoubtedly increase and multiply in such a ratio as to render it physically impossible for all to find room in the old hive. And unfortunately with all this increase, there is a lamentable neglect of the simple

laws of prudence in the matter of close intermarriages. First cousins (whose parents, and probably grand-parents, were first-cousins) marry, and the process is repeated generation after generation. The couples marry very early in life, with no provision for the morrow, and often have a hard struggle to earn their daily meal of herrings and potatoes. It is almost a matter of course that the tone of health must be low, and that the children of such marriages must suffer. Consequently, it is only natural that scrofula, consumption, and insanity, in greater or less degree, should be lamentably prevalent amongst them. That rheumatism should abound in such damp surroundings is a matter of course.

I do not know how far the physical difficulties of supporting life may account for the gravity which is so marked a characteristic of the Islanders. Men and women alike have a solemn look, not exactly care-worn, for in truth they are generally ready to accept their hardships with amazing philosophy, but a far-away look, as those whose life-long teachers have been the winds and waves and mists, solemn spiritual influences which have sunk deep into their souls. As are the physical surroundings, so is the reflex on the character of a race, strangely sensitive to all that can suggest dreamy visions of the unseen, a people whose cradle songs have been the wild lays of Ossian, sung to eerie Gaelic airs, pathetic and mournful as the mingled sounds in nature which they so faithfully reproduce—the moaning of the winds, the wild cry of sea-birds, the deep booming of the waves, and the thunder echoing amid the mountains.

Faithfully do these Nature-taught Islanders live in harmony with her lessons. As the influences of Nature in calm are ever soothing, and those of storm are solemnising, so the tendency of the people is to quiet thoughtfulness; many, indeed, have a depressed, melancholy look, as though life were altogether too grave and sad. Yet at a pleasant word the whole face brightens with a beaming smile, just as does the face of their native moorland, when glorified by a gleam of radiant sunlight. But anything of the nature of boisterous mirth would seem utterly out of keeping with the character of the place or people, well-nigh as jarring as a sound of laughter in a cathedral.

Those who know them best, tell us what depths of tenderness, and of strong passionate love for kith and kin and country, lie beneath the dreamy, seemingly apathetic surface,—what open-handed generosity inclines them to share their poor pittance with poorer kindred, and even to show what hospitality they can to the passing stranger.

Strangers sometimes speak pityingly of the wearisome monotony

of a life lived in these isles. I cannot myself think that any life so encompassed by the ceaseless varieties of ocean can compare with the dull, depressing sameness of existence in any agricultural or mining district on the mainland, where, from one year's end to another, all goes on in regular mechanical order, each day recalling the last, and the ugliness of all around knowing no change.

Here, even the black peat moss (which, when sodden by prolonged rains, is so unutterably dreary) changes as if by magic in the clear shining that comes after the rain, revealing a wealth of rich colour, of purple heather and golden lichens, silken-tufted grasses and delicate moorland flowers, dear to the busy humming-bees, but dearer still to the human children who, all unconsciously, drink in those sweet influences which tend to mould their character for life. He who knows the delight of roaming alone in such wild regions, of watching the tremulous white mists float upward from the dark peat bog to enfold and spiritualise the great sleepy hills, can perhaps realise why it is that these Children of the Mist are so dreamy and unpractical as compared with their Anglo Saxon neighbours.

But of all influences which combine to produce the Hebridean as he is, none approaches the ever-present power of the ocean, which, as a living inspiration, is for ever and for ever whispering its messages to man, woman, and child, from their cradle till the hour they are laid beneath the green turf within sound of its ceaseless dirges. It claims the right to keep watch over the Islanders, in death as in life, and steals quietly inland that it may leave none unsought. Even the great Isle of Skye is so strangely indented by countless sea-lochs, that there is not one corner of the island which is more than four miles distant from the coast—few places are more than two miles from the sea-board. So, whether in calm or in storm, when wild winds carry the salt sea-drift far over the hills, or when earth, sea, and sky lie bathed in that unutterable peace which is so entrancing a characteristic of these isles when seen in summer sunlight, Ocean asserts its sway, and teaches its own lessons in its own fashion.

There is no monotony in its teaching. There are days when not a ripple disturbs its glassy surface, which reflects each distant islet as in a mirror—a silvery-blue mirror which blends with the cloudless sky on a boundless horizon. And perchance on the morrow the great calm is followed by a mad raging tempest. The spirits of the storm have awakened; dark clouds tower above a sullen sea, and wild winds blow so mightily that the very sea-birds are swept inland. In place of the little silver-tongued wavelets which yester-

terday murmured round the base of the crags, there are to-day huge green billows sweeping shoreward, to dash in wild fury against the dark cliffs, throwing up clouds of spray which bathe green pastures in salt brine.

A few days of such boisterous weather seems to churn the whole sea. Even the sea-lochs are tempest-tost, but beyond every head-land the ocean sweeps with inconceivable force, and the sea for miles is all upheaved in range beyond range of crested breakers, while the wind off the land sweeps back their spray in snowy drift. Very beautiful is that expanse of mingled foam and green water to the eyes beholding it from some safe niche in the rock, but awful indeed to the vessel whose evil star has brought her within reach of dangerous currents, which may at any moment drift her on to sunken rocks and reefs, or on to a shore well-nigh as fatal.

While such are the moods of Ocean round the more exposed head-lands, there are some isles where it creeps gently and silently, as an anxious mother watching the slumbers of her sick child. Such are the fiords of North Uist, which stretch inland in such strange ramifications, that they have been well compared to the thousand branchlets of some delicately dried sea-weed. This is especially remarkable at Loch Maddy, which actually only covers about ten square miles, whereas its coast-line exceeds three hundred miles! Here no tempestuous waves breathe exhilarating life and action—all is still and well-nigh pulseless. These desolate sea-lochs, intersecting the low flat land, are as dreary and monotonous as the innumerable and brackish or fresh-water pools which lie scattered over the moorland—shallow pools with sedgy shores. Indeed, nothing drearier can well be conceived than such a scene on a dull misty day, or after prolonged rains, when the peat-moss is so sodden as to become little better than a dismal swamp; and miserable indeed must be the lot of those poor creatures whose wretched hovels are planted in such districts as these.

There are some such huts (unworthy the name of homes) to which wretched families have been forced to migrate from comparatively good crofts in healthy situations—miserable peat huts, which in wet weather become as thoroughly saturated as the morass on which they stand. They are built without any sort of foundation to protect them from the perpetual ooze of the boggy soil, and the soaking rain drips through the thatch of decaying turf, and falls with dull splash on the broken earthen floor, forming muddy pools even beside the hearth where (if anywhere) a dry corner might be expected. The ground on which some of these hovels are built becomes in wet weather merely a quagmire, and the

wretched inmates, who seem to have no heart left to repair their own thatch, have at some period so far roused themselves as to place boulders of rock to act as stepping-stones across the swamp from house to house. No wonder that the poor little half-naked unkempt children reared in such homes as these are sickly and miserable, and that their parents look hopeless and sad. How can they be otherwise where even cleanliness is impossible? But if this is their condition in seasons of average plenty, what must it be in such a year as the present, when dread Famine has overshadowed all the Isles?

Happily the majority of the homes in Skye and Lewis are of a better type than these. They have thick walls built of rough stones and turf, with the interstices filled in with clay. But instead of protecting these walls by an overhanging thatch, the heavy roof (thatched with bent, broom, heather, bracken, or straw, as the case may be) rests on the *inner edge* of this thick wall, which accordingly acts as a reservoir for all the rain which pours from the roof, saturating the clay and turf of which the wall is half composed. The net-work of stout straw or heather ropes weighted with heavy stones, which covers the roof, tells of the violent gales which make such protection needful, and but for which the thatch would assuredly be carried away.

If the house is respectably old, its thatch has certainly acquired a canopy of velvety moss, and is perhaps also adorned with so rich a crop of grass as is positively valuable to the thrifty gude-wife, who, mounting on the roof with her rusty sickle, carefully cuts it all for her cow. Furthermore, the thatch is so saturated with peat-reek, that it acquires a rich brown hue dear to the artistic eye. There is, indeed, a hole somewhere in the roof, by which the smoke is intended to escape, and some tidy householders even set up the old herring-barrel to act as a chimney; but often the film of blue peat-reek may be seen rising from the thatch, almost like steam, and then you may be sure that the whole roof has attained that stage of rich oily sootiness when it becomes a valuable prize as manure for the hungry little fields, which otherwise might starve but for an occasional pony-load of sea-ware, which is carefully dug in with a hand-plough.

A well-to-do-house probably has a window at the end where the family live. It cannot, however, be very efficient in the way of admitting light, since it is merely a hole from twelve to eighteen inches square, and only partially glazed, about half the space being filled up with turf. A misty gleam, however, streams through the opening by which the smoke ought to escape, but the interior is

ieflly dependent for light on the ever open doorway. To enable
: door thus to do double work, it is generally made in two halves,
: lower half being frequently closed, while the upper half stands
en.

If you approach such a dwelling, a kindly voice will assuredly
you welcome in the Gaelic tongue (for they "have no English"),
I, as you stoop to enter the low doorway, you become aware that
: peat-rock which saturates the thatch likewise fills the interior
the house with a dense blue cloud, stinging and choking to
accustomed eyes and lungs. Then you perceive that half of the
use is devoted to the cattle—is in fact the byre, and a *very* dirty
re to boot. Here stand the cow and her calf, and may be a goat
two, kept for milking.

The rough pony is grazing near, with his fore-legs hobbled, to
event his straying. The pig, should there be one, likewise takes
re of itself and roams about outside. It is by no means a wel-
come inmate, though it does occasionally find its way indoors.
at this "gentleman who pays the rint" in the Emerald Isle (or
ther, who did so in by-gone days) is by no means a common pos-
session in these Scottish Isles, where the domestic pig has ever been
ld in abhorrence well nigh as deep-seated as among the Hebrews.
Strangely enough, though the wild boar has bequeathed its name
many a hill and valley throughout the land (such as Beinn-an-
irc in Cantyre, where Diarmid, Fingal's mightiest hunter, slew
grim old tusker which had long ravaged the land; and the wild
w has Sloch-Muick, the swine's pass, and Sron-na-Muich, and
en Muich Dhu, and Muckerach, and many another mountain
d glen, to say nothing of the green isles of Muck or Mouach
d the Eilan-na-Muck), and although such mighty hunters as
ngal and his son Ossian feasted on the wild boars they had
uin in the chase, notably on the celebrated boar Scrymner,—the
Scottish Celt has ever held the domestic pig in utter detestation,
d a man of the true old type would sooner have starved than have
ten pork or pig's flesh in any form. Now the old prejudice is so
r modified that a certain number of "advanced" Celts tolerate
e unclean animal as a marketable article; but they are still in a
minority, as may be judged from the fact that in the statistics of
ne Isle of Lewis we find that amongst four thousand families
here are only one hundred and fifty pigs.

Another departure from old tradition is shown by the presence
of poultry, the use of which for food would have been as repug-
nant to an ancient Celt as would have been that of a goose or a
hare, though the sacrifice of a red cock in cases of illness (more

especially of epileptic fits and insanity) was accounted a sure remedy, a propitiatory sacrifice to the evil spirits which Christian teachers could by no means induce their converts to forego, and which is known to have been offered in various cases in this present generation. The late Sir James Simpson has recorded several instances of this remarkable superstition as having occurred within his own knowledge.

Now, however, the "croose tappit hen" is in high favour, and the gude wife's poultry share with the cat and her kittens, and the handsome collie-dogs, the privileges and honours of the inner chamber. The mother-hen and her chickens seek for crumbs of oat-cake that may have been dropped by the bairns on the earthen floor, while the venerable cock and the other members of his family roost on a well-blackened rafter, rejoicing in the warm smoke.

So also, apparently, does the smoke-dried but kindly-looking old crone in the large clean white cap, bound round her head with a rusty black ribbon, who bends over the peat fire, turning the well-browned oat-cakes on the flat iron girdle which hangs from a heavy chain suspended from the open chimney, down which streams a ray of light which glances on the blue bonnet and silvery hair of the old grandfather, who sits in the corner quietly knitting his stout blue stockings, and perhaps indulging in a pipe at the same time. A tidy woman, dressed like all the family, in thick warm homespun, is spinning at her wheel—the most picturesque of all occupations and the most soothing of sounds. Possibly the home also owns a loom in which she can weave the yarn of her own spinning, and so, indeed, clothe her household in the work of her own hands.

Probably the baby is in a rough wooden cradle at her side, the bigger bairns being away at the school; and wonderful it is how the baby intellect survives the terrible shocks of such rocking as is administered by the maternal foot, working in sympathy with the busy hand. Near the fire are a heap of peats, drying for future use, and perhaps some tarry wool, and a coil of rope and fishing nets; for here farming and fishing are generally combined professions, greatly to the detriment of both.

In one corner of the dark room, faintly discerned through the blue smoke-haze, are a couple of wooden box-beds, stuffy and very suggestive of the probable presence of noxious insects; but the wooden backs, following the angle of the roof, protect the sleepers from the possible rain-drip and certain draught, and the bedding looks warm and clean.

A few plates and bowls, spoons, and wooden porringers stand on

the rude dresser—a rickety table, a few stools and benches (all probably made of worm-eaten driftwood) complete the furniture, always excepting the *kist*, or seaman's chest, which contains all the Sunday garments of the family, and perhaps, too, the carefully-treasured winding-sheets prepared by the good-wife for herself and her husband against the day when they will surely be required—a day that is often in their thoughts, not as the end of life, but merely as an incident in the journey that will take them safely to the only land that is more to be desired than even their own dear Western Isles—the only home that could be dearer than this, in which they have dwelt so lovingly and so contentedly ever since they can remember, and where most likely their ancestors for many generations have lived and died.

Many a joyous family gathering have they seen round their hearth in the long winter evenings, when the lads and lasses, who have been at work all day, assemble for their simple evening meal, and then, drawing close round the fire, and heaping on dry peats till the ruddy glow lights up the house, they settle to work and to chat. Then is the time for laughing and chaffing, for singing of old national songs, patriotic songs, love songs, songs of the sea, or of the milking and of the mountain shielings, those summer homes where the young folk were wont to camp when herding the kye, and making cheese and butter for winter store, in the good old days, before the hill pastures were turned into sheep-farms.

Although those happy days are past, perhaps never to return, and though only scattered heaps of stones mark where the shielings (once centres of so much joyous life) formerly stood, Sandy or Donald may still be sure of a sympathetic audience should they strike up such an old song as the Gaelic equivalent of—

Come all ye jolly shepherds that whistle through the glen.

I'll tell you of a secret that courtiers dinna ken—

What is the greatest bliss that the heart of man can frame?

To woo a bonnie lassie when the kye cam' hame.

And bright-eyed Mary and bonnie Kirstie will reward the singers with as pleasant looks as those bestowed lang-syne by their mother in the love of her youth.

Great, too, is the praise that awaits him who can tell the best story—perhaps a legend of the olden times, full of dreamy poetry, or adventures of heroes in war or in the chase; or perhaps a story of the present in some far country, picked up from the school-master, or related by some talkative fellow at the fishing—all is eagerly listened to by an attentive and intelligent audience, craving for information on every possible subject.

To such men and women as these, *home* is indeed a locality—not merely the roof which, for the time being, shelters the family, but a place to which their hearts are bound by a thousand tender associations—not human ties alone, but love of place—a deep passionate devotion to the green hills, the roaring cataract, the rarely-trodden glens, the utter silence of the awful mountain summits where the white mists float so eerily, the dark crags where the eagles and ravens build their nests, and the sea-cliffs where the beautiful sea-birds with the wild fearless eyes hover like falling snow-flakes.

Perchance, as deepest memories are oft awakened by the breath of some long-remembered flower, the brightest image may be connected with the scent of "sweet gale," the humble bog-myrtle of the peat-moss; or with the early walks across the dewy pastures, when the delicate bee-orchids looked up from the emerald grass, and the fragrant white clover and the blue-bells and sea-pinks grew so luxuriously on the green headland overlooking the sea; or with the honeysuckle that trailed over the grey rocks: these and a thousand kindred details in their natural surroundings strike deep root in the hearts of these people—roots that abide for ever, even should an irresistible tide of change compel them to emigrate to far distant lands. There they may prosper, and all material comforts may increase around them to an extent never to be dreamt of in the old country; but still the undying love remains unchanged, and the true Celt will ever remember his childhood's home, as a faithful son cherishes the memory of his mother. Rightly has Wilson expressed this truth in his emigrant's song—

From the dim shieling on the misty island
Mountains divide us, and a world of seas;
But still our hearts are true, our hearts are Highland,
And we in dreams behold the Hebrides.

Doubtless this poetic love of nature and real patriotism, so characteristic of the Celt, is considerably strengthened by the general use of the Gaelic language, which, while it cuts off these people from general communication with the outer world, keeps in habitual use a phraseology peculiar to themselves, full of images drawn from the world of nature.

At the present moment, though so great a multitude of Scotland's sons have emigrated to all parts of the world (there to form Gaelic colonies in which no other tongue is spoken), there remain in the four counties of Sutherland, Ross (which includes Cromarty), Inverness, and Argyre, upwards of *one hundred and eighty-four thousand persons who habitually use the Gaelic language.*

Out of a total population of 3,735,573, it is found that 231,594 of our Scottish people still use the old Celtic tongue. Of these 151,244 represent all parts of the Highlands, while the remaining 80,350 abide in the Western Isles, in most of which English is still an almost unknown tongue. This in itself explains one great secret of the aversion felt by the Islanders to going forth to seek work on the mainland, where they are well aware that they will have to fight life's battle amongst men who are to them a foreign race, and to whom their tongue is an uncouth incomprehensible jargon. No more genuine act of charity was ever devised than that which recently led a daughter of Dunvegan Castle to make her home for several years in the very unattractive town of Greenock, solely in order to minister to the many Skye folk whom she there found stranded—many in dire poverty, many sick in hospital—to whom her words, spoken in their own dialect of the beloved mother-tongue, proved indeed the sweetest and most inspiring of music, rousing many a poor lonely creature from the lowest depths of despair, and awakening hope once more.

It is somewhat remarkable, by the way, to learn that at five-sixths of the 200 Board Schools attended by the 20,000 Gaelic-speaking children, there is actually no provision for teaching them to read their own language, nor does there appear to be any reasonable prospect of such teaching being provided. Even in the remaining one-sixth, the provision is very inadequate. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to understand what advantage the children are to derive from compulsory school attendance, unless the art of reading English like parrots be accounted sufficient. For all instruction given in such form as they can understand, they are dependent on the voluntary exertions of the Gaelic School Society.

Doubtless many Southrons, to whom this Gaelic tongue is nothing more than "a combination of savage gutturals," may think that by ignoring it in school teaching a useful blow may be struck at its existence, and the time hastened when it shall cease to be a distinctive language. Little do such judges know of its amazing hold on the love of the people, such a hold that even in far countries to which Gaelic-speaking Islanders and Highlanders drifted two or three generations back, not a word of English is spoken to this day—indeed, so carefully have the children been taught their mother-tongue in its purity, that the descendants of Skye men, Harris men, or men of Argyll, can still recognise one another by the peculiarities of dialect, only to be detected by their own keen ears.

I know of at least one such village in the province of Auckland

in New Zealand, and am told that many such exist in the Southern Isle. Far in all parts of the wilds of British North America such colonies are settled. Three thousand Gaelic-speaking Canadians have named their capital town Stornoway. Canada has no population more intensely loyal than her true Highlanders, all born on her shores, and who probably have never left them, but are none the less whole-hearted Scotchmen, keeping up all old customs, singing the old Gaelic songs in the old style, and ready to welcome with ecstatic delight the stranger who can accost them in their mother-tongue, thereby proving it to be his own, for it is a language that few have been able to acquire save those to whom its accents come as a birthright.

One of the principal colonies of Gaelic-speaking Canadians is that of Stornoway, a flourishing town, so named in memory of the green shores of Lewis. Here 3,000 Highlanders, strong in ancestral tradition, are ready to welcome fresh colonists from the old land, for whose behoof large tracts of land have been laid out in lots of a hundred acres, offered for sale at £1 per acre, payable in the course of ten years. On each of these lots ten acres have already been cleared, and are ready for crops; the remaining ninety acres are still in forest, and furnish abundant timber for the lumberer.

Perhaps the strangest instance of the survival of the Gaelic tongue and Highland sympathy is to be found in the American State of South Carolina, and where we should have supposed that the American nationality, which swallows up all others, assimilating them to itself, would assuredly have likewise absorbed the Celtic colonists. But here, on the contrary, so strongly has the line of demarcation been kept up for upwards of a century, that to this day there are about fifteen Presbyterian churches filled by congregations born in South Carolina, and who, understanding no language save Gaelic, are instructed solely by Gaelic pastors born in the colony. Every circumstance of life has altered; independence and comparative wealth have taken the place of the poverty which drove their fathers from the loved Isles or Highlands; yet the new country in which they have found these blessings has but a secondary place in their love, for they are still Highlanders at heart, and they still speak of the moorland, which their own eyes have never seen, as—Home.

India under King Baboo.

By MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. H. COXE.

WE had begun to hope that a period of rest was opening out for India, and there were good grounds for entertaining that expectation. The excitement connected with the Afghan expedition had subsided, and there were no *present* fears of the question being re-opened. The Egyptian campaign had terminated, bringing with it no small amount of satisfaction to the people of India, at least to those who were interested in the conduct of our troops; and to them—no insignificant quota of our Indian populations—the honour Indian soldiers had won, their association on equal terms with the best troops of the Empress, and the high consideration with which their representatives were treated in England, must have tended in no small degree to soften the feelings of race jealousy which affect so seriously the welfare of the country.

There were no burning questions to be dealt with, no new taxes to be imposed, no frontier threatenings, no famine impending; a satisfactory, or at all events a not unfavourable, budget was expected. All things seemed to promise a social and political calm, such as India has not enjoyed within the experience of a generation.

It has been repeated over and over again by politicians of all shades of opinion that India wants rest:—rest for the development of trade, rest for the progress of education, rest for the gradual assimilation of Oriental modes of thought to Western civilisation.

A prospect of such a calm was, as I have said, opening upon us. At such a moment the Government of India has thought fit to fulminate, like thunderbolts in a summer sky, three projects, which, if they had been selected by the bitterest foes of both Indians and English alike, could hardly have been better fitted to stir up all the class prejudices and race antagonism of the two peoples.

The Self-Government Bill, and the proposed alteration in the

Criminal Code, the latter apparently a corollary of the former, contain all the elements of political combustion.

The Bengal Rent Bill threatens an entire subversion of the social fabric in that unhappy province.

This latter measure is the unfortunate, perhaps necessary, offspring of the Permanent Settlement in Bengal. It would be useless, as well as unsatisfactory, to go over old ground now, and repeat the arguments which have been urged against fixity of rent in a country like India, liable to so many political convulsions, and where the value of money has been subject to so many fluctuations. I only notice the introduction of this Bill deprecate the adding of fuel to fire, by bringing the social interests of the Zemindars and Ryots of Bengal into direct antagonism, at the time that has been selected for intensifying the far more formidable race opposition between natives and Englishmen.

The two measures first-named proceed on the assumption first, that the natives are qualified to govern themselves; and secondly, that they are fit to be entrusted with the Government of Europeans.

Now at the introduction of the Self-Government Bill, and subsequent speeches, the Viceroy has been compelled to admit that the measure is a tentative one, and that some degree of failure may be looked for at its first introduction.

If so much is granted by the promoters of the scheme, what results may not be anticipated by its opponents?

It would have been well, indeed, if the Viceroy had listened to the temperate and forcible remonstrance of the Bombay Government, for then an easy way might have been found for the gradual withdrawal of the measure; but the supreme Government, by its dictatorial rejoinder, has committed itself still more deeply to this unpolitic undertaking.

I venture to think that the adoption of these schemes by the Government has proceeded from an unfortunate misconception both of our own position in the country and of the real wishes of the people of India.

It has been taken for granted, because a body of clamorous Baboos and aspiring youths of the "Young India" party has sounded the note for self-government, for the increased employment of natives in the Civil Service, and for an enhancement of their powers, that, therefore, the general voice of the country responds thereto. But it is no paradox to assert, that the educated portion of the native Indian community does not

any appreciable degree represent the general opinion of the people; and it will be well to remember this in connection with the petitions got up in the towns for the extension of Lord Ripon's term of Viceroyalty. I believe that if a plebiscite could be taken, the mass of the people would pronounce, by an overwhelming majority, that they would rather see the European element in the civil administration increased, than have its ranks augmented by native recruits.

In support of this proposition I may mention the often alleged circumstance, that it is a common thing for native suitors to apply for the transfer of their cases from a court of native to one of English jurisdiction.

This statement is not made heedlessly. Whether this preference for English over native justice obtains in Bengal and within the limits of Baboodom I cannot say; but I can state from personal experience, that in the Punjab the applications for transfers of suits from native to English courts were of not infrequent occurrence. I have seen this made the subject of remark in English newspapers, as if the practice were general, and it is not, therefore, I presume, confined to the Punjab.

With all our national faults of exclusiveness and standing aloof from the people, English judges are uniformly true and upright in their decisions. It is impossible to warp their judgments by any considerations of money or favour; and I imagine that the hardiest supporter of the Government scheme will scarcely venture to assert the same of all native judges at present.

One of the worst features in the case is, that the natives who are most likely to qualify for the Civil Service, and for the higher judicial posts, are the persons of all others who are the least fitted, both from general influence and from force of individual character, to govern the people.

The candidates for employment in this branch of the administration are composed chiefly of Baboos and residents of the presidencies and other large towns, whose sole recommendation is their capacity for mastering the educational tests; and it would be difficult to find in the whole range of the empire a class more obnoxious to the manlier and more independent members of the body politic, than these creatures of the schools.

Professor Max Müller,* no hostile witness, remarks of this class: "The native element in such towns (Calcutta, Bombay,

* *Contemporary Review*, Nov. 1882.

and Madras), contains mostly the most unfavourable specimen of the Indian population."

I do not wish to say anything of their possible vena and lack of uprightness; but it is a fact, too well known and acknowledged to require argument, that the great majority of Baboos and educated natives of the towns have neither courage nor the manliness of character to enable them discharge properly the duties of a judge or magistrate, especially in trying times, when the possession of those qualities is of more essential than intellectual ability or a "judicial mind."

What kind of support, for instance, could we hope for, in a crisis like that of 1857, from men of this class, who, whatever their judicial attainments may be, are notably deficient in qualities which go to make a soldier or a ruler of men?

In dealing with the natives of India, and especially with the many races of them, respect for the character and moral position of their ruler is a far more necessary attribute than the consideration due to legal or departmental knowledge, and the people themselves would generally have more in common with an Englishman whom they could respect, than with one of their own colour who lacked the qualities they are used to look up to. I am far from wishing to assert that the natives of India will never be fit for self-government. On the contrary, when we may be called the backbone of the country, the hardier and manlier races, have been educated, not intellectually only, but in a social and political point of view also, up to the proper standard, then by all means give them a share in the administration; for then you may expect something like an honest expression of opinion, and opposition, if opposition there may be, of a bold and outspoken character. But do not trust the absolute existence of our rule in India now, to the hands of a class who are as feeble in action as they are audacious in speech.

The Government has ignored, or, perhaps, has not been able to realise, the fact that in India there is no nationality properly so called. The peninsula is divided and sub-divided into many races, sects, and classes, that no one sect can speak for itself and claim that it represents the nation. What sort of an entertainment, for example, would a Baboo patriot be likely to encounter at the hands of a Pathan, a Sikh, or a Rajpoot, if he came to them with the cry, "Am not I a man and a brother?" or how would Bengalis and Madrassesees appreciate being handed over to the tender mercies of a Sikh or Afghan governor?

It should never be forgotten that the differences among the people of India are not merely social or political, but they amount in effect to difference of race; and their respective aims and objects are utterly conflicting and opposed. As Professor Max Müller, in the article already referred to, remarks: "There is a greater difference between an Affghan, a Sikh, a Hindustani, a Bengali, or a Dravidian, than between an Englishman, a Frenchman, a German, and a Russian."

There can be, as matters are at present, no sort of unanimity between races so widely divergent, and therefore no genuine public opinion. If an attempt were made to raise a national cry, the Sikhs would shout "Gooroo ji ki futteh"; the Mahomedans, "Deen Deen"; the Rajpoots would clamour for the restoration of their ancient dynasty; and each and all would laugh to scorn the claims of the Bengali Baboo.

In England we know what we mean when we speak of the good of the country. Opinions may differ, according to our Radical or Conservative proclivities, as to how that good may best be attained, but we all aim at the same object, the welfare of England; while in India the good of the country, in the mouths of those who are now clamouring about it, means simply the benefit of an individual class.*

The self-government scheme will set all the agricultural population at loggerheads, and go far to destroy the influence of those much-vaunted bodies, the village communities.

I am not going to decry those institutions in any way, but it will be admitted that they are purely selfish in their scope and action. They seek the good of their own community and of that alone, and the endeavour to mix them up in a general governing body will detract from all their individual usefulness.

It may safely be assumed that the attempt to impress upon the village population, in their present state of enlightenment, the maxim that "to the public good private respects must yield," is doomed to failure. Then the election to the Board or Committee will form a fertile source of feud and bitterness among the agricultural communities.

* Since the above was written, accounts have been received from India reporting the assembling of 10,000 natives in Calcutta to denounce the Government, in consequence of the action of an English judge, who had an idol brought into court, its destruction being necessary for the decision of a suit then pending. Mr. Norris is reported to have acted entirely on the advice of Hindoo authorities of high caste and position, but the occasion has been seized by the Baboos to stir up disaffection among the lower classes. It is to be hoped that this will enlighten the Government as to the temper of the people they have to deal with.

In the comparatively simple arrangements that take place in the periodical settlements, the appointment of the village officials causes often a great amount of rancour and ill-feeling, especially when the village community is composed of representatives of different creeds or castes, and these feelings will be greatly intensified when it is understood that the powers of the village notables will not be confined to the collection of the revenue as heretofore, but that they will be endowed with greatly enhanced means of patronising their friends and injuring their enemies. When it is found that the successful candidate cannot give the promised parts of village barber, washerman, or watchman, or whatever their equivalents may be under the new régime, to all his expectant followers, wrath and opposition will encounter him on all hands, and I suppose that even the framers and promoters of the self-government scheme are hardly sanguine enough to believe that the elections will be carried on on pure and enlightened principles.

Some fears of the result are already apparent in the scheme of self-government introduced for Bengal, where provision has been made for a court of appeal, to consist of one English officer and two native subordinates. According to this scheme, the native committee and local boards are to manage their own pounds, schools, and roads, and to be responsible for their own sanitation.

All this sounds plausible and reasonable enough in English ears, but to those who have lived among the natives of India, and know their powers of passive resistance, and their utter apathy regarding education or sanitation, so long at least as it depends on their own exertions, the whole scheme verges on the ridiculous.

It would be a searching test to apply to the working of this measure, if the Government would leave it optional with the people to pay the cesses from which the funds for education, road-making, &c. are derived, and which are now collected with the revenue by Government officers. The Government has not, however, ventured on this hazardous experiment, knowing that the result would be a beggarly account of empty boxes; and thus the inevitable conclusion is arrived at, that though the people are capable of governing themselves, they are not fit to be trusted with their own money,—surely a *reductio ad absurdum*—

The thought has doubtless suggested itself to the authorities, that if the people were trusted to manage their own financial affairs, the income tax would fare but badly, and untaxed ~~Man-~~

chester goods would no longer be suffered to drive native manufactures out of the market.

I have noticed above that the Bengal Government has shown apprehensions of the working of its new scheme, by the appointment of an English officer as Chairman of the Central Board; and the irony of the elective process is still more apparent in the appointment of the village committees.

"In some few cases it might be necessary to nominate these members," and, in the constitution of the local boards supposed to be elected by the village committees, "one of the members would be elected by the Government," and "it would be necessary to retain the power of nominating a certain proportion of members so as to insure the representation of minorities." The passages between marks of quotation are taken from the resumé of Mr. Macaulay's speech introducing the Bengal Local Self-Government Bill.

From all this it is evident that the elective process is a delusion. It shows also that the Government looks askance at its own bantling; and while more than enough is done to unsettle the community, the ruling Power's attempts to hedge against the consequences of its own temerity demonstrates clearly enough its conviction that the Indian people are not yet ripe for self-government in the true acceptance of that term. If, as I have endeavoured to show, the natives of India are not yet fitted to govern themselves, what is to be said of the assumption that they are worthy to be entrusted with the interests of Englishmen?

When the general subject of conferring enhanced powers on natives was under consideration some years ago, the Duke of Argyll made this very forcible remark: "There should be no hesitation in laying down the principle that it is one of our first duties towards the *people of India*, to guard the safety of our dominion." The italics are mine.

If the present rulers of India, representing or supposed to represent the same political views as the Duke of Argyll, had only kept this principle in view, it can hardly be credited that they would have ventured on a scheme which, of all others, would be most likely to jeopardise the security of our position in India.

The only plea for the present Government's transgression of this principle, and it is not a complimentary one, is that its representatives are unconscious of the real state of opinion in India, both in its native and its English bearing. This has afforded grounds for much hostile comment, which I do not wish

to repeat; but it is a self-evident proposition, that whatever knowledge the Viceroy and Mr. Ilbert may have on the subject, must have come to them at second-hand.

Sir Ashley Eden is credited with being the author of this happy measure, at least that his recommendations formed the ground of Mr. Ilbert's Bill. If this be so, it would have been well that Sir Ashley should have stated his "objects and reasons," according to the approved formula, as his views, if they be, have been directly traversed by his successor in the Lieutenantcy of Bengal, who denounces the Bill as unnecessary and unpatriotic.

Much stress has been laid upon the support given to the Bill by Lieutenant-Governors and others of high official position. It must be remembered, however, that many, perhaps most of these officials, have earned their promotion by a long service in the Secretariat Department. I am very far from wishing to assert that any of these gentlemen would record opinions contrary to their judgment, and their sense of what was right; but it is a wish of the Government would naturally commend themselves to men who had so long promulgated, in many instances probably originated, its policy. At any rate it will hardly be denied that a long tenure of office in immediate connection with the Supreme Government, is not the best training for the proper appreciation of social questions such as those under consideration, and that the real exponents of native views on the subject would rather be sought for in officials of low position, especially the district officers, who are in constant and intimate communication with the people.

On this part of the subject important light has been thrown as showing the opinions of officials of all grades. When the proposed amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code were under consideration before the Legislature, the opinions not only of governors of provinces, but of other officers concerned in the administration of the criminal law, were sought for. More than 150 reports, several from native officials, were received in reply. "Among these," I quote from an article in the *Howarth Mail* of 24th April 1883, "were fifteen reports from High Court Judges, thirty-two from sessions and assistant sessions judges, fifty-seven from district magistrates, four from presidency magistrates, thirty-two from commissioners of divisions, seven from judicial commissioners, six from chief commissioners, five from inspectors-general of police, besides others. On one of these reports, that of a native not belonging to the

Covenanted Civil Service, who was then acting as Chief Magistrate of Calcutta, advocated the abolition of the existing rights of European British subjects."

This almost unanimous verdict by the persons best qualified to judge should have settled the question, so far as Mr. Ilbert's Bill was concerned. We observe with regret that it has not done so, and that this festering sore is to be allowed to rankle on and gather fresh humours for the next six months.

It has been stated that Mr. Ilbert's Bill has been suffered to incubate from the date of its first reading till November next, in the hope that the European non-official community will become used to it, on the old post-horse principle, I suppose; and that, by the time the second reading of the Bill comes on, their withers will have become accustomed to the yoke. If such an idea has been entertained, it may be promptly dismissed; for even supposing such an impossibility as that Englishmen would uncomplainingly acquiesce in native domination, the Baboos of the native press will be sure to keep the "raw" open by their constant reference to the subject, and by their insisting, as they have already done, that the measure does not go far enough.

I suppose that there can be no difference of opinion as to how the proposal is entertained by non-official Englishmen in India. The universal outburst of indignant remonstrance when Mr. Ilbert's Bill was announced shows clearly what their sentiments are; and it remains to be seen if the Government will pay proper heed to this unanimous denunciation of their policy, so far as their own countrymen are concerned. And that this demonstration is no transient display of feeling may be gathered from the remarks of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, in his speech opposing the Bill: "I feel that in my whole experience of India this is unmistakably the strongest and most united and unanimous expression of public discontent that I have ever known. I believe that the last stage will be worse than the first; and if there is any thought that this is a transient ebullition of feeling, I believe that view will in the end be proved to be wrong."

The possible complications which may ensue on the carrying out of Mr. Ilbert's Bill have been forcibly depicted in the newspapers. The withdrawal of English capital and enterprise from India, and the deadly opposition of non-official Englishmen to native authority, which may find vent in dangerous outbreaks, are of themselves serious enough to deter us from enforcing unwise and unnecessary legislation;

but there is a more serious element still, and that is the hostile feeling to our own Government which this legislation will engender, and this will hardly be confined to the non-official class. The commander-in-chief and the military member of Council have done well in protesting against the army being mixed up in this question while it is under discussion; but if this Bill becomes law, it is impossible but that the feelings of English soldiers will be excited by seeing their own countrymen subjected to native intrigue and native domination.

The consequences of that excitement may well be regarded seriously; and of all dangers to our rule in India, that of disunion among the governing class is most to be apprehended. What was it that, under Providence, carried us safely through the terrible crisis of 1857 but the united front presented by every body of Englishmen in India? The bundle of fagots was bound together firmly then, and all the vast forces brought together against it failed to loosen the well-compacted bond; but if these conditions should be reversed, and discord take the place of union, what then?

Let Mr. Ilbert and his supporters furnish the answer.

I have said above that the natives who are most likely to qualify as judges over Englishmen, under Mr. Ilbert's proposals, are quite unfitted for so grave a responsibility. I will go further, and say that, from a perusal of the sentiments expressed by their representatives in the native press, there is a foregone determination to take up a hostile position—a manifest bias to make judicial power a means of injuring Englishmen.

Take a few choice extracts from the native journals:—

The *Rais and Rayat* describes the English citizens of Calcutta who met to protest against Mr. Ilbert's Bill as "a needy and greedy lot of adventurers"; and adds, "It is all over now with the last pretence of peace—the possibility or hope of an *entente cordiale* between native and European."

Another native paper, the *Amrita Bazaar Patrika*, has a long article entitled "The Empress v. the Privileges of Cowards"—the cowards, of course, being the members of the European community. This same paper, reporting an occurrence at the Indian Club in Calcutta, which was instituted with the special object of encouraging social intercourse between natives and Englishmen, speaks of the treatment experienced there by Raja Shiva Pershad, one of the members of Council, and one of the few native gentlemen who had the sense to see the dangers of Mr. Ilbert's Bill, and the courage to protest against it. Regard-

ing this gentleman the *Amrita* writes : " Some looked upon him with contempt ; others shunned him as if he had been something loathsome, untouchable ; others in very loud language called him a traitor ; while some hot-blooded young men were, we are assured, determined to assault him."

The same gentleman is called by another native paper " a traitor " ; his speech against the Bill is termed " a screaming farrago " and " a blasphemous adoration of injustice " ; and the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal and Mr. Evans are treated with Billingsgate of the same description.

It would be easy to multiply instances of silly vituperation and scurrility like the above a thousand-fold. Anyone who cares to read the reports of the *Times* correspondent from Calcutta, or the columns of the Anglo-Indian newspapers, can satisfy himself that the above quotations are, by comparison, rather favourable specimens of Baboo journalism ; but we may well pause to ask if it is in favour of a class like this that it is deemed desirable to incur the risk of a revolution.

Is the Government prepared to hand over not only the welfare, the very existence of Englishmen in India, but the interests also of vast numbers of natives well affected to our rule, to a body of silly scolds like these ? Are we suddenly to forget that we hold India under a mighty responsibility before God and man, and that when, if ever, we do abdicate our functions in that country we are bound to do so in favour of a people represented by upright and independent principles of government, by power of character as well as by physical force ? Will anyone dare to say that these conditions are fulfilled by those in whose favour we are now asked to concede so much ?

But besides and beyond exciting class against class and race against race, Mr. Ilbert's Bill will exercise a most injurious effect upon missionary work in India. I am among those who think that our duty in India goes far beyond the developing the resources of the country, and giving good government to the people ; and that we are very nearly concerned in endeavouring, by all lawful and peaceable means, to spread the knowledge of our own blessed religion among the people of India.

Of course we cannot effect this by the *sic volo sic jubeo* of Government authority, and offer *The Book or the Blade*, like our Mahomedan predecessors ; but we are bound, at least if we recognise our responsibilities, to avoid throwing any let or hindrance in the path of those who are doing their best to propagate the truth independently. The passing of Mr. Ilbert's

Bill means the lowering of English influence throughout India, and whatever legitimate help the missionaries might have derived from that source, and it probably was considerable, will be lost to them.

I shall hardly be misunderstood as implying that the missionaries ever derived any support or encouragement from the Government of India. On the contrary, from the time that Marquis Wellesley drove one of the earliest missionaries from Calcutta to take refuge in Burmah, and exiled Carey and Marshman to Serampore, mission work has been persistently discountenanced, to use the mildest term, by our rulers, and we have presented the singular spectacle to the world of a strong Government being ashamed of its own religion.

It is the fashion of many people in India, and elsewhere, to depreciate the work which has been done by the missionary body, and to minimise the result of their labours. Because native Christians are not often met with in daily life, or in ordinary society, therefore, so apparently proceeds the argument, the work of missionaries is a failure, and no perceptible influence has been created by them. Of course those who hold these opinions are content with negative evidence, and they do not trouble themselves to ascertain if there is any movement outside the circle of their own experiences. But even writers holding these opinions as regards the religious aspect of mission effort, have been compelled to admit that a great work in the cause of education has been effected by missionaries in India.

On this question, I quote the following from the *Pioneer*, an influential paper in the North-West Provinces, and certainly not a favourer of missions :

As educators, Protestant missionaries have in India attained eminent success. To compare their schools with those under State supervision would not be a fair test of what they have accomplished. We have to look back through the last thirty years, and trace the course of the educational movement which has spread over India. We shall find that the leaders of the movement have been either missionaries, or those who have been their warmest supporters. In this indirect way the enlightenment and civilisation of India may be said to be largely owing to missionary labours.

To this I may add an extract from Professor Monier Williams's book on India. Treating of the work of education effected by the missionaries, he remarks that "he has been impressed more than ever with the benefits which India derives from the active efforts of the missionaries of all denominations," and he considers that "the European missionary is daily becoming a more important link between the Government and the people."

This is not the occasion to enter upon a discussion as to the results, in a religious point of view, of missionary labours in India. To those who expect the instantaneous conversion of so many millions, the returns will doubtless be disappointing; but to those who are content to wait God's time, only being assured that the seed is growing, the statistics furnished by the various missionary bodies will afford strong hope and encouragement. I have only one recent report to refer to, that of the Church Missionary Society, and from these I find that the number of their converts has been just doubled during the last twenty years, and that it now reaches 100,000.

Be it remembered that these are not men of straw. They are not like the slipshod individuals who take service with Englishmen, and from whom, I fear, many of our countrymen derive their views of native converts, who call themselves Christians on the ground that they "drink beer, same as master."

The Missionary Societies do not readily admit native converts to baptism. They organise a long initiative process: the testimony of a virtuous life; a thorough conviction on the part of the convert that the doctrine he has been taught is the true source of life; the abandonment, if necessary, of all natural ties—a consequence, be it added, very frequently entailed on native converts. When men comply with requirements like these, there should remain little doubt of their sincerity.

I have just quoted the number of converts in the Church Missionary Society's communion. Besides, there are vast numbers of native Christians in Southern India—Tinnevely and Travancore have become a wonder. In Bengal the people of Chota Nagpore, a small nationality, have in great numbers adopted the Christian faith. In Burmah the Karen Christians number some 30,000. It is not well to exaggerate in this matter, but, with these facts before us, we can hardly deny that mission work in India is steadily progressing, and we may fairly assume that the number of native Christians does not fall very far short of a million souls. Is it well, we must ask once more, to incur the risk of destroying this great influence for good by race legislation?

To sum up. These measures are unnecessary. As regards the Self-Government scheme, the village community system, which it would displace, has been working as well as any method of local administration could in the present state of development of the native races, and, conjoined with the Municipal Corporations, it meets sufficiently the wants of the people.

As regards the alteration of criminal procedure, I do not remember that any of its advocates have pleaded its necessity, and the plea of "administrative convenience" appears to have been dropped as untenable.

Further, both schemes are uncalled for. It has not been set forth, so far as I am aware, in favour of local self-government, that the people themselves have asked for the introduction of the new system. By the people I mean the real representatives of the different races, for we decline to accept the "dicta" of the Baboos as representing in any degree the real wishes of the people of India. As regards Mr. Ilbert's Bill, assuredly the opinions and wishes of those most nearly concerned, namely non-official Englishmen, have neither been consulted nor heeded. Finally, as has been abundantly demonstrated by what has transpired since the introduction of the last-named measure, it will renew and intensify all the bitterness of race antagonism, which the glimpse of better times, alluded to above, might have induced us to hope was dying out.

These remarks have not been penned in any spirit of partisanship. In India we have, or ought to have, no party; but the time appears to have arrived when Englishmen who have had long personal experience of native habits and native feelings, and who have brought away with them a sincere regard for the people, the *real* people of India, and an earnest desire for their welfare, should in the presence of such dangerous innovations, make their opinions known; and I trust that better and abler hands than mine may be drawn to the work of impressing upon the present rulers of India, that "it is our first duty to the people to guarantee the safety of our dominion."

Since the above was written, I have seen two articles in the Reviews for June, one by Mr. H. G. Keene, of the Bengal Civil Service, on the subject of "Local Self-Government in India," the other by Sir Arthur Hobhouse, in support of Mr. Ilbert's Bill.

The former, as I gather from a cursory perusal, supports the view that the natives of India, at least as regards the rural communities, are not yet ripe for local self-government, pure and simple, and that the constituencies would probably elect their own English district officers as Superintendents of the Board, a course which would directly traverse the Government idea at first pronounced.

Sir Arthur Hobhouse, of course, supports the Government view of Mr. Ilbert's Bill, and speaks slightly of the able speaker

the principal non-official opposer, one Mr. Branson, as Sir A. Hobhouse calls him.

But we may generally conclude that a cause is weak when its advocates resort to long extracts from ancient authorities to support their views. Sir Arthur Hobhouse has quoted Sir Thomas Munro, Mount-Stuart Elphinstone, Macaulay, and others, to show that it is desirable to give increased power to the natives of India, and to allow them equal jurisdiction with English judges over our countrymen.

Allowing the weight with which Sir A. Hobhouse's authorities may be supposed to speak, that gentleman has overlooked one important factor in the question, and that is, that between their times and our own the mutiny has intervened. That disastrous event caused for a time an entire disruption of our relations with the people of India, and the amalgamation of the scattered fragments is not to be compassed within the term of a decade or two. Attending and following the mutiny, have come a new régime and the adoption of many western innovations, including among them new laws and new systems of taxation.

It is a moot question whether the people of India are gainers by being governed from Whitehall or from Leadenhall Street, but there can be no doubt that the introduction of English laws and English systems of taxation has resulted in grief and trouble to the country.

The time and attention of the Government, I venture to say, would be more profitably employed, so far as the people are concerned, in modifying or removing, if it may be so, the pressure of legal or financial measures which are unpalatable to the natives of India, than in adding to the trouble by the introduction of fresh elements of discord.

Sir Arthur Hobhouse winds up his article by remarking that "we may feel confident that we are acting most wisely, when we advance towards the ideal by the most cautious and well-considered steps."

Carried *nem. con.*—and it is just because the great majority of Englishmen connected with India are of opinion that the present steps are "incautious and ill-considered," that they enter their protest against them.

The Navy Estimates for 1883-84.

BY MARK FYTTON.

THE discussion of the Navy Estimates for 1883-84 has suffered from the circumstances to which we drew attention last year. The subject has been brought before Parliament at a period when the minds of Members were not worn out by the effects of a heated and exhausting session. This is more as it should be, for, as has been repeatedly pointed out in these pages, no estimates sanctioned by Parliament are of such vital importance to the country as those which affect the Navy. Lord Henry Lennox, who last year did good service by keeping to the unsatisfactory condition of the *matériel* of the fleet well before the eyes of the country both in pamphlets and speeches, showed that his interest in the subject had in no way abated, as the recent debate he subjected the Government ship-building policy to a most searching criticism, which placed our shortcomings in a very unpleasant light. He commenced very properly by showing that while our maritime interests, and colonies, carrying trade and commerce, had enormously increased of late years, our naval strength on the other hand had not only failed to grow in proportion to the interests it had to defend, but had not maintained its position relatively to that of other powers, such as France, Italy, and Germany. Thus in the year 1881 the gross tonnage of the commercial marines of the whole world was about 6,700,000 tons, of which 4,200,000 or nearly 65 per cent., belonged to this country, while the proportion belonging to France was only 420,000 tons, or just one-tenth of our own. Thus our floating interests at sea were ten times as great as those of our neighbour, and nearly twice as great as those of all the rest of the world put together. These figures are striking in their way, but they do not tell the whole tale. We have also to take into account the enormous relative size of our colonies and foreign possessions, and the large proportion of our daily food which comes to us by sea.

When all this is considered, no candid person will be found to deny that the fleet of this country should be maintained in a condition of strength superior to that of the two most powerful European navies put together. But what are the facts? How is the Government showing that it is alive to the situation, and what steps is it taking to maintain our supremacy at sea? It has been already shown in the pages of this magazine* what was the relative state of the navies of France and England last year. Full particulars were given of the names of the ships built or building for the two countries, and of their size, armour, armament, power, and speed. It was shown that while we possessed thirty-nine non-obsolete sea-going and coast-defence ironclads, either built or building, the French owned thirty-eight; while the largest of the French ships were superior in all fighting qualities to our own. This was of itself sufficiently alarming; but, as events have shown us, it has proved quite insufficient to stimulate the Government to action.

In the meantime matters have become much worse, for to the twenty vessels building by France last year they have now added two more first-class ironclads, the *Brennus* and the *Charles Martell*, which are each to be armed with four 64-ton guns, together with eight armoured gun-vessels of great speed; while we in this country have not yet made a serious beginning with the two new ironclads of the British Admiral class, viz. the *Camperdown* and the *Anson*, which were promised in the Estimates for 1882-83. Nothing was done to the latter vessel, and only 237 tons built into the former during the last financial year; while no new ironclads, properly so called, are promised for the current year, but only two protected vessels, modifications of the *Polyphemus*, one of which will not even carry guns.

Last year the French laid down four new ironclads, viz. the *Magenta*, the *Neptune*, the *Hoche*, and the *Marceau*, which were to be advanced to the following extents:—*Magenta*, 14·5 per cent.; *Neptune*, 16½ per cent.; *Hoche*, 17½ per cent.; and *Marceau*, 30 per cent. These vessels are of the same size as the later vessels of the British Admiral type, viz. about 9,864 tons; the armour round the guns is about fourteen and a half inches, and the armament consists of three 48-ton and fifteen 2½-ton guns. The same year our own Admiralty proposed to commence four ironclads of the British Admiral class, viz. the *Howe*, *Benbow*, *Anson*, and *Camperdown*, which were to be

* Vol. iv., pp. 460 and 566.

advanced as follows :—*Howe*, 13 per cent. ; *Benbow*, 7 per cent. ; *Camperdown*, $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. ; and *Anson*, '003 per cent. before stated, the *Anson* was not even commenced, and work done on the other three fell considerably below the Estimates. From these figures we may deduce that the numbers of new ironclads built by the two countries in the financial year bore to each other the following ratio :—From 1896 to 1897, *i.e.* our neighbours were advancing their work more than three times as fast as we were. These figures take no account of the work done by either side on ships which had been commenced prior to last year. During the current financial year the French are going to add 17,200 tons to their armoured fleet, while we have estimated for only 12,300 tons. It is known that neither Government adheres strictly to its programme, but in estimating which will most approximately carry out its intentions we must remember that the French have got 23,000 hands in their dockyards, and are in addition building three ironclads by contract, while we have only 18,000 hands in the yards, and are building but one ship by contract, added to which is the known fact that the British Admiralty invariably falls very much short of its intentions, the deficiency in the ten years from 1872–73 to 1882–83 having been no less than 21,665 tons out of a total of 88,471 which was estimated for.

To sum up, we may assert that when the present building programmes of the two countries are completed, each fleet will contain the same number of non-obsolete ironclads, while the largest French ships will be superior to the largest English in both size, speed, armament, and armour ; and at the present moment our neighbours are adding to their armoured fleet annually half as much tonnage again as we are. This is anything but an agreeable prospect. It means that very shortly France will share with us on equal terms the dominion of the seas, and that a combination of France with Italy will be able to overwhelm us. It must never be lost sight of that such a combination is not only a possibility but exceedingly probable. Italy is known to have ambitions in the Mediterranean, which France could afford to allow her to satisfy at England's expense ; and the Italian fleet, though not a very large one, is invaluable for purposes of co-operation, because it possesses the most powerful war-ships in existence. The *Italia* and *Lepanto*, in conjunction with two French ironclads the *Amiral Baudin* and the *Formidable*

will, when completed, be able to sweep the Mediterranean clean of any other ships in the world which might be brought against them, while their immense speed will make it impossible for any merchant vessels, no matter how strongly convoyed to enter the same sea. One of the most alarming features of the present state of our own navy is the complete absence of really first-class ironclads. With the single exception of the *Inflexible* we do not possess a vessel which approximates to the first class, and even she must, on account of her comparatively low speed and lighter guns, be put in a distinctly lower category than the four vessels named above. Even if the Admiralty wake up at last to the dangers of the situation—and at present they show no signs of doing so—it will take many years to make up for lost time, and to overtake the start which the French and Italians have already got of us.

It will be interesting now to glance at the official view of the situation. Sir Thomas Brassey, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, was the first speaker on the Government side of the House to reply to Lord Henry Lennox. Sir Thomas Brassey is known to be an advocate of vessels of restricted size. His favourite hobby is the too many eggs in one basket theory. In other words, he thinks it to be prudent to build vessels which must, from their small size and consequent deficiency in every fighting quality, fall an easy prey to first-class ironclads. Looked at in another way, he advocates that the eggs (*i.e.* sovereigns) be distributed in a number of frail baskets, in which, under certain circumstances, they are perfectly certain to be broken, rather than that they be grouped in larger quantities in receptacles which are tolerably certain to carry them safely under all contingencies. We leave our readers to form their own conclusions as to the wisdom of this policy. It is the natural outcome of another favourite delusion, *viz.* that the proper object which the Admiralty ought to keep in view is, how with most advantage to spend a given sum of money. Now we protest earnestly against the adoption of this view of the situation. The proper object which the Admiralty should keep in view should be how best to secure the efficiency of the navy and the safety of the country. The given-sum-of-money element should not exist. If the navy cannot be made efficient, and fit to cope with all comers, for one sum of money, then another sum must be asked for and obtained. It will be given, and with no grudging hand by the country, no matter what the Treasury may say or affect to

The above being Sir Thomas Brassey's views, it will not surprise our readers to learn that he takes a very rosy view of the situation. Official views on such questions somehow always are sanguine. What will surprise our readers to learn is, that in order to make the official view acceptable and palatable, the speaker, if he was correctly reported, did not hesitate to strain even official veracity to its utmost limits in order to prove his case and score off an adversary. With the accurate descriptions of every ship built or building for the two navies, which have been recently published in the pages of this magazine, before them, our readers will have no difficulty in making up their minds as to the truthfulness of what follows. Sir Thomas Brassey groups in the first class ships with armour of not less than nine inches and a displacement exceeding 8,500 tons, and tells us that we had in 1882 ten ships ready for sea, with an aggregate displacement of 96,000 tons, whilst the French had three ships with a displacement of 22,000 tons. Now, we have never denied that our fleet is at the present moment much the stronger of the two, nor did Lord Henry Lennox, or any of the other critics on the Opposition side of the House, ever deny it; therefore Sir Thomas Brassey might have saved himself the trouble of giving these figures. Nevertheless, as he has given them, they are fair game for analysis, and will serve as an example of the style of official explanation as practised by the present Government. Sir Thomas Brassey fixed upon the limit 8,500 tons and nine inches of armour because by so doing he was able to exclude four French ships which just fell the merest trifle short of one or other of these qualifications, though they possess other qualities which fully entitle them to rank with some of the English vessels which he has included in his list. The names of these vessels are the *Friedland* and *Richelieu*, of 8,651 tons and 8½ inches of armour, which fall short of the standard by only *one-third of an inch* of armour, a microscopic quantity, and the *Colbert* and *Trident*, the tonnage of which is, according to some authorities, slightly above, and to others slightly below the limit, and the armour is 8·5 inches, or half an inch less than the standard at the thickest part, but these vessels possess higher *average* thickness of armour than two of our own iron-clads which he includes. On the other hand, he included in the English list, as then ready for sea, the *Thunderer*, which was undergoing repair, and leaves out the *Monarch* of 8,320 tons and 10-inch armour on turrets. With these corrections,

his statement should have run as follows:—We had in 1882 ten first-class ironclads ready for sea, with an aggregate displacement of 94,140 tons; and the French eight vessels, with a displacement of about 72,180 tons—which reads slightly differently.

Next as to the future. Sir Thomas tells us that in 1885 we shall have fifteen ships (first-class ironclads) of 140,000 tons, against the French six ships with 61,000 tons. The absurdity of this statement lies on the surface, as the French have already, as shown above, seven ships of 62,700 tons; but let us examine its accuracy a little more closely. The division of ships into first and second class according to their mere displacement and thickness of armour is purely ridiculous, and would oblige Sir Thomas to exclude from the British list the *Conqueror*, which is the most powerful ship of her size in the world, carrying two 43-ton and two 6-inch B. L. guns, and provided with twelve inches of steel-faced armour round the guns; while he includes the comparatively antiquated *Hercules* and *Sultan*, which could both be destroyed by the *Conqueror* single-handed. He would also have to exclude the *Ajax* and *Agamemnon*, because they do not quite come up to his limits of tonnage. Let us, however, include these vessels, and add them, together with the *Thunderer*, the *Edinburgh*, and the *Colossus*, to those now ready, and we shall have, by 1885, sixteen first-class ironclads ready for sea, having an aggregate displacement of 144,950 tons. No other ironclad now building will be ready by the end of 1885, nor yet by the end of 1886, unless exceptional progress is made with the *Collingwood*. By the end of 1885 the French will have added six new ironclads to their fleet, of which four, viz. the *Caiman*, *Indomptable*, *Requin*, and *Terrible*, are included in the first class for the same reasons that applied to the *Conqueror*. They are vessels having each a displacement of 7,200 tons, 18-inch steel armour, and two 72-ton guns. Perhaps, however, Sir Thomas Brassey would like to put them in a class below the *Hercules*, *Sultan*, *Alexandra*, *Superb*; though probably on mature deliberation, and when freed from the necessity of lulling the suspicions of the House of Commons to sleep, he will change his opinion. The aggregate displacement of the fourteen French vessels by the end of 1885 will be 123,300 tons.

By the end of 1886 the number of English first-rates will be seventeen, and their tonnage 154,100. At the same period the French will have added four more powerful vessels to their fleet,

viz. the *Magenta*, *Hoche*, *Marceau*, and *Neptune*, so that the total will be eighteen, having a displacement of 162,000 tons about 8,000 tons in excess of ours.

The above figures amply justify Lord Henry Lennox's act but what can be thought of the assurances of the Government when one of the members of the Board of Admiralty condescends to the shabby trick of dividing the two navies into classes by an arbitrary line, chosen with such cunning as just to exclude a number of French ships, and just to include a number of English vessels, all of which, as he knows perfectly well, are practically on a par with one another. Had any other representative of the Admiralty thus spoken we could have found an excuse for him; we should charitably have supposed that he had been primed with facts of which he was himself ignorant, by some over-zealous official of the department. But for Sir Thomas Brassey there is no such excuse; he knows too well what he is talking about. He has lately compiled a work which gives an accurate account of all the navies in the world, and out of this work he can, whenever he feels disposed, confute his own statements. These statements may deceive the bulk of Members of the House of Commons, they may be received with feelings of satisfaction in the country, where they will engender a sense of false security, but they will not deceive the rivals of England.

The condition of the sea-going fleet is not the only ground to have for complaint of the Admiralty. To whatever department we turn, we find the same want of preparation, the same inability or unwillingness to grapple with the facts of the situation. Our coast-defence ironclads are, as has been pointed out by John Hay, greatly inferior to those of the French. The fleet is still armed almost throughout with the old-fashioned Woolwich gun, which became obsolete four years ago. The limited amount of re-arming which was promised two years since has not been carried out. We are without an authoritative statement as to whether the new heavy breechloaders are a success or not. The 63-ton breechloaders for the *Baron* Admiral class have not even been commenced, and mean while other Powers have actually got 100-ton guns afloat. For torpedo vessels, we are told on Sir Thomas Brassey's own authority being largely built for all the principal navies of Europe, that he admits that the provision in the present estimates for vessels of this class is confined within somewhat narrow limits but postpones till next year the remedy for this state

things. Now the position which first-class torpedo-boats will take up in future wars is every day engaging more fully the attention of naval officers. Some of these vessels, having displacements of from fifty to 100 tons, are capable of steaming 1,000 miles at speeds of from ten to twelve knots, and can also stand exceedingly rough weather. They will undoubtedly prove dangerous antagonists to ironclads under certain circumstances in closed seas like the Channel, the Baltic, or the Black Sea. Their attacks can only be successfully warded off by the use of similar torpedo-boats accompanying the ironclad fleet. Nevertheless, though these opinions meet with general recognition, and though the Civil Lord of the Admiralty confesses that foreign Governments are rapidly supplying themselves with this type of boat, and that our own navy is deficient in them, no effort is to be made till next year to put things right, and when next year comes we may have new representatives of the Admiralty in the House, who will not consider themselves bound by, or who will have forgotten the flimsy promises of, their predecessors.

We have thus far only compared our own navy with that of France. If we compare it with that of France and Italy combined, we should have grounds for feeling not merely alarm, but almost despair. Two of the Italian first-rates, the *Duilio* and *Dandolo*, though a little smaller than the *Inflexible*, are superior to the latter ship in armour, armament, and speed, while the other two, the *Italia* and *Lepanto*, which are expected to be ready for sea by the end of 1886, will be as superior to the *Inflexible* as the latter ship is to the *Devastation* or *Thunderer*. It is no exaggeration to say that a fleet composed of these four Italian vessels, and the three French first-rates, viz. the *Amiral Duperré*, the *Amiral Baudin*, and the *Formidable*, could not be confronted by any other fleet in the world.

In order to make the relative future positions of the two fleets of Great Britain and France apparent at a glance, the subjoined table is placed before the readers of this magazine. The ships are divided into numerous classes, and not merely into two great divisions—as was done by Sir Thomas Brassey—each division including vessels of widely different power. The weakest types of vessels included in the list are those of the *Flotilla* class for England, and of the *Colbert* class for France. No ships are included except such as will be ready at the end of 1890. The first class comprises only vessels of over 10,000

tons displacement, having guns weighing more than eighty tons, and armour of not less than fifteen inches. The second class includes vessels of not less than 7,200 tons displacement, and this only when the armour and armament is exceptionally powerful. In this list are included the English turret-ships which rank after the *Inflexible*; the powerful French "barbette" ships of the *Hoche* type; their very formidable turret-ships intended for cruising in the Channel and Mediterranean, and for coast defence, of the *Terrible* class; and their central battery ships of the *Dévastation* type, which it will be noted are more powerfully armed than our large turret-ships. The third class includes all vessels which are not powerful enough to enter the second class, but which do not fall below the limit fixed by Sir Thomas Brassey and modified by ourselves. The only vessel put down in this class, whose rightful position is at all doubtful is the *Conqueror*, of 6,200 tons, 12-inch steel-faced armour, and two 48-ton breechloading guns. Though distinctly inferior to the vessels included in the second class, this ship will, on account of her powerful armament and excellent armour, be vastly superior to any other vessel included in the third class.

The following short table gives a summary of the position, and also takes into account the effect of an alliance between France and Italy against this country:—

Class of Ships.	France.	Italy.	France and Italy.	England
First .	2	4	6	1
Second .	11	—	11	9
Third .	5	—	5	7
Total .	18	4	22	17

This table shows that the serious want of our navy is the more powerful type of line-of-battle ship. In both first and second-class ships we are inferior to France alone, and vastly inferior to her and Italy combined. It is not till we get to the third and lower classes of vessels that we are superior in numbers.

We trust that the table given below, containing, as it does, information drawn from the best sources, may have the effect of dissipating the uncertainty on this subject which has been produced by the official generalities of the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, and that it may have some effect in awakening the country to a sense of the dangerous position which it really occupies.

1st Class. Indefatigable.	11,400	8,000	14	24	14	Four 80-ton guns	1st Class. Amiral Baudin Formidable.	11,441	8,500	15 estimated	21½	13½	Three 100-ton and twelve 24-ton guns. Ditto.
2nd Class. Dreadnought. Thunderer. Devastation. Neptune. Edinburgh. Colossus. Ajax. Agamemnon. Collingwood.	10,820 9,320 9,380 9,170 9,150 9,150 8,400 8,480 9,150	8,200 6,270 6,680 9,000 6,000 6,000 " " " " 7,000	14-82 13-4 13-84 14-65 14 " " 13 " " " "	14 14 14 13 18 18 18 " "	10 10 10 8 14 16 " "	Four 38-ton guns Four 38-ton " Four 38-ton " Two 12-ton and Four 43-ton " Ditto Four 38-ton and Two 6-in. guns Ditto Four 43-ton and Six 6-in. guns	2nd Class. Amiral Duperré. Magenta. Hoche. Marceau. Neptune. Dévastation. Foudroyant. Calman. Indomptable Requin. Terrible.	10,670 9,864 " " " " 9,639 " " 7,200 " " " " " "	{ 6,000, or 8,000 with forced draught } " " 6,400 { 4,300, or 6,000 with forced draught } " " " " " "	14-5 " " 14½ " " 15 " " 14 to 14½ " " " " " "	21½ 17½ " " " " 15 " " 19½ " " " " " "	9½ 13½ " " " " 9½ " " 15½ " " " " " "	Four 48-ton and four- teen 24-ton guns. Three 48-ton and fifteen 24-ton guns. Ditto. Ditto. Ditto. Four 48-ton, two 20½- ton, and eight 24-ton, [guns]. Ditto. Two 72-ton and four 4-in. guns. Ditto. Ditto. Ditto.
3rd Class. Conqueror. Alexandra. Téméraire. Monarch. Sultan. Superb. Hercules.	6,200 9,400 8,540 8,330 9,290 9,100 8,680	4,600 8,610 7,700 7,840 8,680 7,430 8,530	13 15 14-5 14-94 14-13 13-8 14-69	12 12 11 10 9 12 9	8½ 6 8 4 6 7 5	Two 43-ton guns Ten 18-ton and Two 25-ton guns Four 25-ton and Four 18-ton guns Four 25-ton, two 12-ton, and one 6½-ton guns Eight 18-ton and Four 12-ton guns Sixteen 18-ton guns Eight 18-ton, two 12-ton, and four 6½-ton guns	3rd Class. Redoubtable. Colbert. Trident. Richelieu. Friedland.	8,840 8,450 8,300 8,220 8,180	6,071 4,632 4,632 4,006 4,428	14-66 14-5 14-5 13-11 13-30	14 8½ 8½ 8½ 8½	9 7½ 7½ 7½ 7½	{ Eight 20½-ton and eight 24-ton guns. Eight 20½-ton, one 14-ton, and six 24- ton guns. Ditto. { Six 20½-ton and five 14-ton guns. Eight 20½-ton and eight 24-ton guns.

* The displacements of these four ships vary according to different authorities. The figures given below are taken respectively from Sir Thomas Brassey's and Mr. J. W. King's well-known works:—Sir T. Brassey: Colbert 8,617, Trident 8,614, Richelieu 8,790, Friedland 8,916; Mr. King: Colbert 8,183, Trident 8,183, Richelieu 8,481, Friedland 8,684

A Modern Eclogue.

FAIR is the Park when Spring's light veil is *drawn*
 Over green thickets set in velvet lawn,
 Where on their shining palfreys galloping go
 The tight-braced Amazons of Rotten Row;
 Where, from the Gardens up to Grosvenor Gate,
 In low-hung landaus Beauty sails in state;
 Where bronze Achilles in his corner sprawls
 To where, beyond the red Prætorian walls,
 Albert the Gilt confronts his marble halls
 (There Art and Science hold united sway
 Over the ancient realm of bright D'Orsay);
 Or where, revealed in all its graceless line,
 Unskilful oarsmen plough the Serpentine;
 Town's country, sedentary labour's cure,
 Home of the homeless, pleasure of the poor!

Here, as Alphonse and I, up Buck-hill-walk
 Strolled, idly met, we drifted into talk;—
 Alphonse, with whom (before the century gained
 Half its third quarter, and Badinguet reigned)
 I lounged the Boulevard, shared the Bois' delights,
 Saw the Elysian fields alive with lights;
 Then at the Variétés, in gorgeous dress,
 Applauded Schneider as the Grande Duchesse;
 Or, in a still more thoughtless long-ago,
 Ate bisque with Cora at the Provençaux—
 Now we met here, each powdered with Time's frost,
 To ask what Life had gained, what Life had lost.

"All things are for the worse," my friend began,
 "First woman, doubtless, but then, also, man;
 Behold, I pray, those pale, sad-visaged girls,
 With Florence fringe and mediæval curls,

Penance and peccadillo all combined !
Ma foi ! no wonder Love is painted blind.
 And see the men that raise fantastic hats,
 Their razor-collars and their white cravats !
 I swear I never saw—but no ! ahem !
 I only mean *they* are good enough for *them*."

"*Bêtise, mon cher !*" I hastened to reply
 (And if the word was hurried, so was I ;
 For six o'clock was striking, and I knew
 I was engaged to Shentpershent, the Jew),
 "That golden age of which the poets tell
 Is each man's youth, and Time abates the spell :
 Keen memory, baffled hope, bring us *ennui* ;
 But ask the careless youngsters that you see,
 Ask if the life we led they'd care to live,
 And let me know the answer that they give."

Alphonse was mute. But do not think to stay
 A Frenchman's eloquence by aught you say ;
 As soon control the " Flying Dutchman's " pace
 By smiling in the engine-driver's face ;
 As soon arrest the Hansom's furious course
 By holding out a biscuit to the horse ;
 As soon—for similes why need I fret ?
 Alphonse but paused to light a cigarette !

So I went on, more calmly, " You and I
 Are fogies, fools of Anno Domini ;
 Remember Balzac's often pilfered tale,
 " Critics are only those who try—and fail.'
 That pair who passed, he on the chesnut cob,
 With golden trinkets jingling at his fob,
 She in the cuffs and collars epicene,
 With black pot-hat, and habit all of green,
His father made a million by his toil,
Hers in America has a mine of oil ;
 Would you deny all merit to a time
 When humble birth has ceased to seem a crime,
 When patient Merit, rising from the dust,
 Can beautify the Planet's upper crust,
 And comes your Emperor's adage to fulfil,
 " The quarry opened to the labourer's skill' ? "

" Once rank was rank," he answered, " each man
 knew
 What to another, to himself, was due ;

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"Once rank was rank," he answered, "each man
 knew
 What to another, to himself, was due ;

Then, for the slang and liberty of Now,
You had the compliment and courteous bow;
Then, impudence by looks was soon repressed,
Or, if they failed, the pistol did the rest;
Then lords were lords; and then the sons of earth
Obeyed the laws decreed by men of birth.
What have you now? *De fond en comble* tossed,
All grades confounded, and all order lost;
Chaos is come, and Russia soon will be
The only place for men like you and me."

But, while we argued, Fashion left the Park,
And lengthening shadows made the hollows dark.
Alphonse went home, to dress and see a play
Where young patricians act—as best they may;
I, to apologise to Shentpershent,
Whose house I hire, but cannot pay the rent.

H. G. K.



Reviews and Notes.

MEMOIR OF JOHN A. DAHLGREEN, Rear-Admiral United States Navy. By his Widow, MADELEINE VINTON DAHLGREEN. With Portrait and Illustrations. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co.; London: Trübner & Co.

AMONGST the many distinguished sailors produced by the great republic across the Atlantic John Dahlgreen will always occupy a conspicuous place. A man of a singularly inventive genius, it may be said that he created the ordnance which proved so effective in the civil war; that he not only built up but put in action a system which superseded that which had previously prevailed. It is not always that the practical finds a place beside the theoretical in the brain of the same man; but it is one of Dahlgreen's great merits that, with all his inventive genius, he was essentially a practical man, and that he was never satisfied with any of the ideas which crowded into his brain, until he had submitted them to the roughest tests. We are bound to add that in America he had an executive which is far more tolerant of inventors than is that of Great Britain, and which is free—to an extent far greater than in these islands—from the shackles of cliques. Dahlgreen had then a fair chance, and he used it to the best advantage of his country.

The memoir before us is one of the most fascinating books we have ever read. It introduces the young Dahlgreen trained in the habits to closely investigate cause and effect. It is well that we should state here that he was lineally descended, on the mother's side, from the once influential Mortimers of the north of Ireland—a family which claimed collateral lineage with the de Rohans of Brittany; that his mother was a lady specially endowed with great natural gifts, especially in the way of designing; and that his father was of a distinguished Swedish

family, and a man of great learning and talent. The subject of this memoir early entered the navy of the United States, in 1826. Here he specially distinguished himself by his quickness, his aptitude, and his genius for scientific discovery. Transferred in 1847 to the ordnance department at Washington, he spent here the sixteen years that followed, rose gradually to be its head, and during that period devoted all his energies to the development of discoveries which revolutionised the science of gunnery.

We have not space here to enter into the details of the process by which Dahlgreen arrived at certain conclusions, or of the mode in which he applied his theories. The story is told with wonderful minuteness, often in Dahlgreen's own words, in the book before us. We have in fact the diary of a man of singularly inventive genius. We trace the several phases of his mind, as conclusions, coming one after the other, prompted him to further investigation. We have never read a book which gives a greater insight into the mind of a man. It is this which constitutes its fascination. We defy anyone of ordinary intelligence to read it without being carried away. Prominently stands out the earnestness, the energy, the application, and superintending these qualities, the divine gift of the inventor—gift, however, which would have been of no avail unless it had been accompanied by the other qualities.

After sixteen or seventeen years of abstruse study, the time arrived again for action. When the civil war broke out Dahlgreen was placed in command of the Washington navy yard, and in 1863, appointed Rear-Admiral. He then succeeded Admiral Dupont in command of the South Atlantic blockading squadron. In this post, of the occurrences in which a complete and most interesting record is given, he proved that the genius of the closet can, when occasion demands, develop into the daring and prudent man of action. In 1866 he was nominated to the command of the South Pacific squadron. He died in July 1870 in his sixty-first year, from the effects of a cold caught from riding in his wet clothes when saturated by a thunder-storm.

Rarely have we laid down a book with greater regret. It appeals to all the truest feelings of our nature, alike to its intellectual and to its sympathetic side. It is a record of the life of a man who was as good as he was great. A descendant of the Vikings, who were the forerunners of the race which dominates the world on both sides of the Atlantic, John Dahlgreen left a name which must ever be dear to both branches of the great

family, a reputation clear and bright as the sunny sky of an Eastern summer, an example and a memory to all. This monument to him, admirably raised by the hands of his widow, formed though it be of paper and ink alone, will, we predict, be immortal!

RECOLLECTIONS OF THE KABUL CAMPAIGN, 1879-1880. By JOSHUA DUKE, Bengal Medical Service, F.R.A.S. London: W. H. Allen & Co. 1883.

THIS book modestly professes to contain only a brief description of places and facts which have come under the notice of the writer while serving with three branches of the native army in India, and for a short time on Sir F. Roberts's staff, during the Afghan campaign of 1879-80. We do not hesitate, however, to pronounce it to be the historical work of that campaign. The story is well told; the scenes are impressively described; and the greater part of the proofs were read by Sir F. Roberts before being submitted to the public. They thus bear to a great extent the official stamp of accuracy. The letter from Sir F. Roberts, which is published in the preface, is very explicit on the subject of the point up to which a subordinate officer writing the history of a war can hope to dive into the mind of the commander, and the point beyond which he cannot go.

The years 1879-80 were the most interesting years of the second Afghan war, and the main interest attaches to General Roberts. Dr. Duke gives us an account of that distinguished officer's campaign; of the preliminary events of the war; of the brilliant march over the Shutargardan; the occupation of Kabul and the deposition of Yakub Khan; of the rising of the clans; of the manner in which General Roberts saved the position; of the concentration within Sherpur; of the second fight at Charasiab; of the brilliant march from Kabul to Kandahar; and of the decisive battle fought near that town. We have called it a description: it is really a history; for not only is it full of the most interesting details, but the narrative never neglects the leading facts which should guide the pen of a historical writer.

We cannot too strongly recommend this work to the general reader. It combines the interest of the romance with the accuracy of history; it pictures in glowing words scenes of which every Englishman is glad to have a record; and, above all, it brings before the public, in a most striking manner, the

character of the most modest, most unpretending, yet most brilliant and daring soldier of our period.

We may add that the work is well illustrated with excellent maps, plans, and sketches. The portrait of Sir F. Roberts, which faces the title-page, is good as far as the likeness is concerned; yet, looking at the enormous length of the scabbard, a hypercritical observer might be tempted to inquire whether it is Sir F. Roberts who is carrying the sword, or the sword which is carrying Sir F. Roberts.

A TREATISE ON SCALES. By Major F. H. DYKE. London: Messrs. Allen & Co., 13 Waterloo Place, S.W.; Colchester: N. B. Mattacks, Head Street.

THIS little work is designed by its author to supply a want long felt by officers and others who are forced by circumstances to acquire a knowledge of map-drawing and surveying, and who have no previous knowledge of the use of scales. Being of moderate size and price, and devoted exclusively to the subject indicated by the title, it will, no doubt, command an extensive circulation. If the descriptions of scales given by the author are somewhat restricted by the necessities of space, this slight defect is amply compensated for by the abundance of examples which the book contains, and which are all worked out. A study of these alone should enable anyone gifted with the most moderate intelligence to acquire a complete knowledge of the subject in a very few days of work.

TO CORRESPONDENTS.

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Reviews of Books and Notes on salient matters connected with the Army and Navy will be continued each month.

THE ARMY AND NAVY MAGAZINE.

AUGUST 1883.

The Battle-fields of Germany.

By COLONEL G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I.

I.—BREITENFELD.

the city of Leipzig lies on a broad and fertile plain watered by three rivers, the Pleisse, the Elster, and the Parthe, which unite in its vicinity. The waters of these rivers and of their many arms have made the broad plain so rich and fertile, that, within a radius of six or seven miles, many flourishing villages have risen to house the cultivators of the fields, the meadows, and the orchards which cover its surface. To the north-west, for instance, along or near the line of the Magdeburg road, are the villages of Möckern, Wahren, Lindenthal, Podelwitz, Soehausen, and Breitenfeld—the last some five miles from the city. To the direct north lie Entritsch, and, some two miles further, Wiederritsch. To the north-east are Schönhof, Mockau, Neutsch, Plösen, Clenden, Portitz, Plaussig, and Seegeritz. A little more to the east, but in an almost parallel line, a direct road traverses the plain by Volkmandorf and Heiterer Blick to the considerable village of Taucha, six miles from Leipzig. To the east, south-east, and south, are many more villages, the best known of which to students of history are Thonberg, Probstheida, Meusdorf, and Wachau; to the direct west, Plagwitz, Lindenau, and Leutzsch. The extent of the plain, the fact that on it has risen one of the richest cities of Germany, that it is the centre point of many converging routes, that its surface is generally

level, that the banks of the streams which intersect and the villages which cover it, might be utilised for warlike operations, have attracted to it during the many wars which have desolated Germany, the commanders of armies. On many memorable occasions it served as the battle-field on which were decided the most important questions agitating the minds of mankind. In 1631 Gustavus Adolphus fought there to secure to his fellow-men freedom of conscience in matters of religion. In 1813 Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Sweden, combined to rescue the sovereigns and peoples of Europe from the thralldom of Napoleon. The first battle, fought near the village of a manor of Breitenfeld, was followed, eleven years later, by a second, fought on the same spot, by the representatives of the same cause, to assert the same principles. Both these battles though sometimes called after the city on the plain, bear to Germany the name of Breitenfeld. I propose, in this paper, to examine the causes which led to them, and to narrate, as concisely as may be consistent with clearness, the events which preceded and illustrated the first.

The Reformation, in Germany, received the first authoritative acknowledgment of its political existence only when the electors, princes, and nobles of the Empire, assembled by Ferdinand at Passau, signed, the 31st July 1552, the Peace of Religion. Three years later, the 26th September 1555, the main conditions of this agreement were detailed and confirmed by the Imperial diet assembled at Augsburg. But this peace, valuable to the Protestants as a recognition of their rights, did not mean the conclusion of the strife between the professors of the two religions. On the one side the Catholics complained of the secularisation and suppression of foundations belonging to their church. On the other, Protestants raised their voice against the arbitrary enforcement of claims which, in spite of the Peace of Religion, Catholic princes allowed to be enforced against them. Everywhere the Jesuits bestirred themselves to induce those princes to carry out with zeal and vigour a policy of forcible conversion. It thus came about that at the close of the sixteenth century the entire public life of Germany was completely dominated by religious machinations and these machinations led to serious tumults and even, in certain instances, to war. To the feelings thus aroused the occurrence in the town of Donauwörth, 1606-7, gave considerable impulse. In consequence of the forcible prevention by the Protestant population of a procession headed by the Abbot from

the monastery of the Holy Cross, the Emperor Rudolph placed the town under a ban (3rd August 1607), and committed to Maximilian of Bavaria the execution of the sentence. Maximilian in consequence occupied Donauwörth with his troops the 17th December following, and, condemning the inhabitants to pay the entire expenses of the occupation, used all the means in his power to force them to return to the old religion. This act of tyranny roused the Protestant princes. Many of them—the Elector Palatine, Frederic V., at their head—met together, 4th May 1608, at the monastery of Ahausen (in the Bavarian district of Schwaben-Neuburg), and there formed the Protestant Union. To this, besides the Elector Palatine, eight princes and fifteen imperial cities of Germany gave their adherence. The Catholics replied by constituting at Munich, 10th July 1609, a holy league, of whose decrees Maximilian of Bavaria was to be the executor. Meanwhile the Bohemians, two-thirds at least of whom had embraced the reformed religion, had taken advantage of the division* in the Imperial family between Rudolph II. and Matthias, to wring from the former, by letters patent dated 11th July 1609, conditions of almost unlimited religious freedom. These conditions, Matthias, on his accession to the Government in 1611, had confirmed. One of these granted to the cities and to the order of nobility the privilege of erecting Protestant churches and schools. But when, in opposition to the wish and orders of their landlords the Archbishop of Prague and the Abbot of Braunau, the inhabitants of Klostergrab and Braunau ventured to build churches, the archbishop did not hesitate, with the support of the Imperial authority, to have the church at Klostergrab pulled to the ground, whilst the abbot, with the same support, closed that at Braunau. In vain did the aggrieved inhabitants petition the Emperor. But the reply they received was couched in terms so harsh that, acquitting their imperial master, they drew the conclusion that it had been dictated, without his knowledge, by his councillors. When, then, the Estates of the kingdom met in the Hradschin on the 23rd May 1618, the Protestant nobles, headed by Count Thurn, came thither armed, and demanded from the Imperial councillors an account of their high-handed proceedings. Violent words ensued, complaint was answered with defiance, till at last, unable

* Caused mainly by the preference shown by Rudolph for his cousin Ferdinand, afterwards known as Ferdinand of Gratz, whom he not only summoned to his side to aid him in the government of the country, but designated, to the prejudice of his brother Matthias, as his successor in the Austrian dominions.

further to restrain themselves, the Protestant deputies seized the obstructive councillors, Martinitz and Slavata, and their secretary, Fabricius Platter, and hurled them from the window into the dry ditch, some fifty feet immediately below it! This act precipitated a war which had been long pending, and could not, under any circumstances, have been much further delayed. When the minds of all parties are embittered a slight incident will always suffice to bring about resolute action. In 1618 the minds of kings and nobles, of traders and peasants, were in a state of irritation scarcely to be controlled. The incident at Prague removed the barrier which had till then restrained the forcible expression of their indignation.

For the moment Bohemia was virtually independent of the House of Austria. The Estates administered the internal affairs of the kingdom and invested Count Thurn with the command of the army. The Protestant princes of the Union and the nobles of Moravia and Silesia supported them. The Emperor Matthias, a tolerant and well-meaning man, endeavoured, by smooth words and promises of pardon on repentance, to conjure the storm. His action only encouraged the revolters to make further encroachments on the imperial authority. When at last he resorted to force and ordered an army into Bohemia, the Protestants replied by secretly offering the crown of that country to the Elector Palatine, Frederic V.; by inviting the republics of Venice and Savoy to declare war against Austria; and by entering into a stricter alliance with their brethren in the neighbouring provinces.

The death of Matthias (20th March 1619) brought matters between the two parties to a still more direct issue. His successor, Ferdinand II., then in his forty-first year, was one of the most bigoted of Catholics and the most resolute of men. When still in his early manhood he had made a pilgrimage to Loretto, and, prostrate before the altar of the Virgin, had solemnly vowed to re-establish Catholicism throughout his dominions. The period between the death of Matthias and his election as Emperor (28th August 1619) was spent by both parties in the preliminary strife. The Protestants of Bohemia despatched an army into Moravia, formally set aside Ferdinand, and nominated the Elector Palatine as their King. Their efforts, however, were shattered by the dogged resolution of Ferdinand. On the 10th June a mercenary army favouring the Union, led by Mansfeldt, was completely defeated by the Imperial General Bucquoi, at Zlati, near Budweis. Nine days later, however, Thurn,

marching through Moravia and Upper Austria, laid siege to Vienna. Had he been a great general the subsequent fate of Austria had been changed. Whilst his army, marching to the cry of "Equal rights for all Christian churches," had been greatly strengthened in its progress through the hereditary dominions, not a finger had been raised for Ferdinand. The latter had at his beck but a handful of soldiers, far too few, even could they have been trusted, to resist an attack. The population were shouting all around him for Protestantism. That Ferdinand was aware of the danger was proved by the despatch of his children to a place of security in Tirol. But, recognising that for himself flight would be the renunciation of his claims to the empire—abdication of his rights over Bohemia—he refused to stir. Never did the dogged resolution of a man assert itself to greater purpose. Almost alone in his capital, exposed to the bullets of the besieging soldiers, virtually a prisoner in the Hofburg, he yet bade to his enemies a haughty defiance. Had Thurn only pushed into the city and seized his person, it had been all over with him and his pretensions. But Thurn, delaying to take the decisive step, preferred to incite sixteen Austrian barons, with Andreas Thonradl at their head, to compel Ferdinand to sign the conditions on which the Union had agreed. Forcing themselves into his private chamber, the parchment in the hands of their leader, the barons surrounded Ferdinand, and pressed him to affix to it his signature. As he still refused, one of them, bolder than the rest, seized him by the button of his doublet, exclaiming, "Sign, Nandy, sign." Ferdinand was still persisting in his refusal when suddenly a cavalry trumpet sounded on the Place below. In another moment the news spread that five hundred cuirassiers, led by Henry Du Val, Count of Dampierre, had arrived, the vanguard of a relieving army. One by one the rebellious barons sneaked away. Ferdinand's obstinacy had preserved his position for himself, had regained Catholicism for the hereditary states—and for Bohemia!

Thurn hastily retreated from Vienna. Thenceforth the game was in Ferdinand's hands. Though Bohemia, still in revolt, absolved itself from allegiance to Ferdinand on the 17th August, and chose the Elector-Palatine as its King on the 27th, Ferdinand was, the day following, elected Emperor of Germany at Frankfurt. No soon had he assumed this high position than he united himself by the strictest alliance with Maximilian of Bavaria to crush Protestantism throughout Germany. In their efforts to this end the two sovereigns were greatly assisted by

the imprudence of their enemies. A Calvinist and a foreigner, deficient in judgment and possessing no counterbalancing ability, Frederic V. conciliated but little support in Bohemia. It is true that the Bohemians, in concert with Bethlen Gabor, who had proclaimed himself King of Hungary, again (October-November 1619) besieged Vienna. They were compelled, however, by want of supplies and stress of weather, to retreat—and at that season retreat meant demoralisation. The Protestant Union, moreover, was rent by internal dissensions.

In June of the following year the superior organisation of the Catholics had, without striking a blow, materially altered the condition of affairs. The Elector Palatine, foiled in his hopes of foreign aid, but very faintly supported by the other princes of the Protestant Union,—who, either from fear of the Emperor, or from a selfish regard to their own personal interests, affected to disserve the cause of Bohemia from that of their confederacy generally—was doubting whether he had acted wisely in accepting responsibilities which might involve the loss even of his hereditary domains. Saxony and Hesse-Darmstadt had been won over by Ferdinand. Lower Austria, once the focus of Protestant feeling, had submitted. A truce had been concluded with Bethlen Gabor. Denmark had been cajoled, and Sweden had been entangled into a war with the Poles. Venice, Savoy, and England remained inactive. One after another the hopes of the Protestant Party had disappeared! But the Protestant Party had still an army—a powerful army—assembled at Ulm, under the command of the Margrave of Ansbach. Opposed to it was the army of the League, collected at Donauwörth, under the orders of Maximilian. A battle between the two seemed impending. Every consideration impelled the Protestant princes to seek one. Every consideration prompted Maximilian to induce his enemies to disband without daring a fortune which might prove adverse to him. Could he but bring about such a result he could turn upon Bohemia, drive thence the usurper, and re-establish the Catholic faith. Again did the Protestant princes play into his hands. Influenced partly by the interested advice of Catholic France, partly by the fear of seeing another imperial army called up from the Low Countries, on their hands, they signed (3rd July) with the Emperor a peace, in the most important article of which they agreed to renounce all interference in the affairs of Bohemia, and not to afford any aid to Frederic V.—beyond the borders of the Palatinate.

This fatal treaty was at once utilised by Maximilian. He immediately summoned Frederic V. to renounce his pretensions to the crown of Bohemia, and, when Frederic refused, he, after making doubly sure of Lower Austria, and arranging for the simultaneous action of a Saxon army in the Lausitz and a Spanish army in the Palatinate, entered that kingdom at the head of 30,000 men. As far as Prague his march was a succession of triumphs; but on the White Hill, three quarters of a mile west of that city, he found Frederic's army intrenched and ready to give him battle. Guided by one of the most skilled and successful generals of the age, the famous Count Tilly, he at once attacked it (8th November 1620), and, in less than an hour, not only drove it from its position, but so completely defeated it that it was never able to rally.

This battle put an end to the short reign of Frederic.* Another immediate consequence was the complete submission of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia to the Emperor. The religious freedom granted by Matthias was abolished; many of the promoters of the rebellion were punished in life and property. The year following (1621) all members of the sect of Protestants known as the Reformers—a sect analogous to the Calvinists—were forced to quit the country. A similar edict drove out the Lutherans in 1622. In that year likewise the Jesuits were recalled; and in 1627 the exercise of all religious forms, except those of the Catholic Church, were forbidden. It was calculated that these severe measures drove into exile thirty thousand of the wealthiest of the industrial, and two hundred of the noblest, families of the kingdom. The confiscations alone amounted to between five and six millions sterling. A similar policy was pursued in the Austrian hereditary lands, especially in Upper Austria, where the shedding of much blood was required before the old religion could be firmly re-established.

After the conquest of Bohemia the interest of the war was transferred to the Palatinate. On the side of the Protestants appeared the partisan leader, Ernest of Mansfeldt, Duke Christian of Brunswick, and Margrave George Frederic of Baden-Durlach. Frederic V. returned to his hereditary lands and defeated a detachment of the League army at Wiesloch (27th April 1622). The defeat, however, was more than avenged nine days later when Tilly smote the Margrave

* Frederic fled with his children to Silesia, thence to Holland.

George Frederic at Wimpfen; and again, when, on the 20th June following, after having forced the Duke Christian to abandon the Palatinate, he overthrew him at Höchst. The Protestant cause, however, would not have been lost in the Palatinate had Frederic V. displayed ordinary vigour and energy. But this prince, weak by nature, was induced by his father-in-law, James I. of England, to abandon the contest and trust to the tender mercies of Ferdinand. On the 18th July following he dismissed his army, and quitted the country. Thenceforward Tilly could plunder and pillage unmolested. The Palatinate was speedily reduced to the same condition as Bohemia; and at the Diet held at Ratisbon, the 6th May 1623, the electorate was conferred, despite the protests of Brunswick and Saxony, upon Maximilian of Bavaria! Had the Emperor been as wise as he was resolute, it is probable that, victorious in every direction, he might have been able to conclude a permanent peace with the Protestant Party. But the bigotry which was a very part of his nature was spurred on by his easy triumphs to refuse to sheathe the sword until heresy had been rooted out from the land. In vain did the Protestant princes, who had maintained a selfish and foolish neutrality, remonstrate against the continuance of hostilities after the avowed object for which those hostilities were undertaken had been gained. In the opinion of Ferdinand II. the real object still remained to be accomplished.

Under these critical circumstances the emigrants, now grown numerous, and the awakened Protestant princes, earnestly besought the aid of a foreign power. It was their representations which at length induced three nations of the reformed faith—England, Holland, and Denmark—to ally themselves to assist their oppressed brethren. England agreed to send subsidies, Holland to supply troops. The command of the delivering army was confided to Christian IV., King of Denmark (1625). He was to be supported in Germany by the partisan Mansfeldt, by Prince Christian of Brunswick, and by the Protestants of Lower Saxony, who had armed themselves to resist the exactions of the Emperor.

Ferdinand II., after vainly endeavouring to ward off hostilities by negotiations, despatched Tilly to the Weser to meet the enemy. Tilly followed the course of that river as far as Minden, causing to be occupied, as he marched, the places which commanded its passage. Pursuing his course northwards, he crossed the river at Neuburg (midway between Minden and Bremen),

and occupied the principality of Kalenberg.* The King of Denmark was near at hand, in the duchy of Brunswick, anxious, for the moment, to avoid a battle. Tilly, superior to him in numbers, was as anxious to fight one.

As if the position of the King of Denmark were not already sufficiently embarrassing, the Emperor proceeded at this period to make it almost unendurable by launching upon him likewise an imperial army. Whatever minor reasons might have combined to induce Ferdinand II. to such a course, there was one over-riding them all. Up to the period of the complete overthrow and expulsion from the Palatinate of Frederic V., ex-King of Bohemia, Ferdinand had been indebted for all his successes to Maximilian of Bavaria. It was Maximilian who, as head of the Holy League, had reconquered Bohemia for the Emperor: it was Maximilian's general, Tilly, who had driven the Protestant armies from the Palatinate; and it was the same general who was now opposing the Protestants of the north in the lands watered by the Weser. Maximilian had been rewarded by the cession to him of the Palatinate, but it was not advisable that so near a neighbour of Austria should be made too strong. It was this feeling, this jealousy of Maximilian, which now prompted Ferdinand to raise, for the first time in this war, an imperial army, and to send it to the north.

This army was raised by and at the expense of Albert Wenzel Eusebius of Waldstein, known in history as Wallenstein. A Czech by nationality, born in 1583 of noble parents, who belonged to one of the most advanced sects of the reformers but who died whilst their son was yet young, Wallenstein had, when yet a child, been committed to the care of his uncle, Albert Slavata, an adherent of the Jesuits, and by him educated at Olmütz in the strictest Catholic faith. When he had finished his course of studies at Olmütz, Wallenstein spent some time at the University of Altdorf, and then frequented in turn the schools of Bologna and of Padua. His next step was to travel through Italy, Germany, France, Spain, England, and the Netherlands, carefully observing the military condition and tactics of each country. Almost immediately after his return to Bohemia he took service under the Emperor Rudolph, and joined the army commanded by General Basta in Hungary. Soon advanced to the rank of captain, he distinguished himself greatly at the siege of Gran.

* Kalenberg has long ceased to exist as a principality. Since 1705 it has formed a district of Hanover.

On the conclusion of peace in 1606, Wallenstein returned to Bohemia and married there a widow, well stricken in years, Lucretia Nikessin of Landeck, the owner of large properties in Moravia, all of which, upon her death in 1614, devolved upon him. Two years later he raised, at his own cost, two hundred dragoons, to support the heir presumptive to the empire, Ferdinand of Gratz, in his war against the Venetians. It was owing mainly to his skill and exertions that the beleaguered fortress of Görz (Gorizia) was saved from their hands. For this and for other services, scarcely less signal, he was promoted to be a colonel. His generosity, his daring, his quick insight, had made him the idol alike of officers and men. On the conclusion of the war he contracted a second marriage, this time also with an heiress, the bride being Isabella Katherina, daughter of Count Harrach, a favourite of the Emperor Matthias. This union not only greatly augmented his influence, but it procured for him the title of Count. On the breaking out of the religious disturbances in 1618, Wallenstein adhered to the cause of the Emperor, saved for his master, and carried to Vienna, despite the efforts of the Protestant nobles, the contents of the State Treasury, raised a regiment of cuirassiers, and fought at its head with success against Thurn and Bethlen Gabor. In 1620 he was appointed Quartermaster-General of the army led by Maximilian and Tilly against Frederic V.; and although, for personal reasons, he took no share in the battle of the White Hill, yet, on its favourable result, he marched at the head of an independent force into Moravia, and completely re-established there the imperial authority. In the following year he purchased from the Emperor Ferdinand, for the sum of 7,290,228 florins, sixty properties, great and small, which that prince had confiscated from patriots whom he had either executed or banished.

For his faithful services, Ferdinand in 1623 nominated Wallenstein to be Prince, a title changed, the year following, into that of Duke, of Friedland. At this time the yearly income he derived from his various estates, all carefully and economically managed, was calculated to be thirty millions of florins—but little short of three millions sterling. When, in 1625, the invasion of Christian IV. of Denmark threatened to derange the plans of the Emperor, that prince, anxious to find a counterpoise to the influence of Maximilian, turned his thoughts to Wallenstein. But the Duke of Friedland had anticipated his sovereign. It was he, who, divining his master's thoughts, and animated perhaps by ambition, offered to raise and maintain, at

his own cost, an army of 50,000 men, and to lead it against the enemy. Ferdinand, joyfully and without any mental reserve, accepted the offer. Named Generalissimo and Field Marshal in July of the same year, Wallenstein marched at the head of 30,000 men, a number which increased almost daily, first to the Weser, thence, after noticing the positions of Tilly and of King Christian, to the banks of the Elbe, where he wintered.

Of the campaign which followed in the spring, it is necessary to give but the briefest outline. It will suffice to say that Mansfeldt, with the view to prevent a junction between Tilly and Wallenstein, marched against the latter, and, though his troops were fewer in number, took up a position at Dessau in full view of the imperial camp, and there intrenched himself. Here Wallenstein attacked (25 April 1626) and completely defeated him. Not discouraged by this overthrow, and still bearing in mind the main object of the campaign, Mansfeldt fell back into Brandenburg, recruited there his army, called himself the Duke of Saxe-Weimar, and then suddenly pushed, by forced marches, towards Silesia and Moravia, with the intention of reaching Hungary, where Bethlen Gabor had promised to meet him. In spite of his desire to finish the war in the north, Wallenstein recognised the necessity of following the daring adventurer, as the only means of preventing him from carrying the war into the very heart of the imperial dominions. He marched, then, with all possible speed, and pressed him so hard, that, though Mansfeldt did effect a junction with Bethlen Gabor, it was with but the skeleton of his army. Despairing of success against numbers vastly superior, Bethlen Gabor withdrew from his new colleague, and Mansfeldt, reduced to despair, disbanded his remaining soldiers, and sold his camp-equipage to supply himself with the means of flight (September). He died soon after (30th November). His companion, the Duke of Saxe Weimar, followed him to the grave the 4th of the month following. Wallenstein then retraced his steps to the North.

Meanwhile Tilly, left to deal with Christian IV., had followed that prince into Lower Saxony, had caught, attacked, and completely defeated him at Lutter (am Barenberge), the 27th July 1626. This victory gave him complete possession of that distracted province, and, despite a vigorous attempt made by the brave George Frederic of Baden to wrest it from him, he held it till the return of Wallenstein from the pursuit of Mansfeldt. As two stars of so great a magnitude could not shine in

the same hemisphere, it was then decided that Tilly should carry the war into Holland, whilst to Wallenstein should be left the honour of dealing with the King of Denmark and the Protestant princes of the north. Wallenstein carried out his task with great thoroughness. During the two years that followed, he drove the remnants of the enemy from Silesia, took military occupation of Brandenburg and Mecklenburg, then advanced into Pomerania and laid siege to Stralsund. Here, however, he met with his first check. In the splendid resistance which they made the Stralsunders were aided by the genius and the energy of Gustavus Adolphus, the young King of Sweden. Mainly in consequence of this aid, Wallenstein, after a siege of upwards of three months—May to July 1629—was forced to renounce his efforts. A year later he concluded with King Christian at Lübeck a peace, by which the latter bound himself to interfere no more in the affairs of Germany. For his services in the war Wallenstein received in fee the Duchy of Mecklenburg.

Germany lay apparently at the feet of the Emperor. Freed alike from Protestant opposition and from the yoke of Maximilian, Ferdinand began now, in consultation with the Jesuits, to put in action the policy dictated by the fanaticism which swayed his narrow mind. Before even the peace of Lübeck had been signed he had issued (6th March 1629), an edict, known as the Restitution Edict, in virtue of which the Protestants were required to restore to the Catholics all the monasteries and church lands of which, since the peace of Passau, they had come possessed; it further directed that, in the States immediately subject to the Emperor, the Catholic services alone should be performed in all churches, that the Reformers should be excluded from the operation of the Peace of Religion, and that the Catholic princes of the empire should be permitted to constrain their subjects to conform to their faith. This decree was put in force, under the pressure of the sword, in all the Imperial cities: in Augsburg, in Ulm, in Ratisbon, in Kaufbeuren, and in others, and it was plainly intimated to the Protestant princes that they would be required equally to carry it out.

It was not to be supposed that an edict of this tremendous character would be submitted to without opposition. Already the preponderance obtained by the Emperor in Germany by the victories of Wallenstein had given umbrage to the more independent of the Catholic princes. Maximilian of Bavaria especially, who had really given Ferdinand his throne, was resolved in his sense to become that prince's vassal. His views, strong

supported by those of the French court, represented by the illustrious Richelieu, found expression at the Diet held at Ratisbon in 1630. The opposition which developed itself on this occasion forced the Emperor to consent to diminish his army, and to withdraw from Wallenstein the patent of Generalissimo. On the 30th September following, then, Wallenstein's army was disbanded, and Wallenstein himself withdrew to private life in his princely residence at Gitschin.

Before even this step had been taken a new difficulty had confronted the Emperor. Neither the Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony nor the representatives of the Hanse towns had attended the diet at Ratisbon. Almost the sole representatives of the Protestant feeling in Germany able to raise their voice against the new persecution, these champions of the Reformation had secretly urged upon the prince who had saved Stralsund to aid them in devising means to conjure the danger which threatened them all alike. These solicitations, supported by Denmark and by France, fell on no unwilling ear. The very month which witnessed the re-formation of a Catholic League at Ratisbon, witnessed likewise the declaration of Gustavus Adolphus at Stockholm to espouse the cause of the oppressed Protestants of Germany.

The son of Charles IX. of Sweden and of Christine of Schleswig Holstein, born the 9th December 1594, Gustavus Adolphus had succeeded to the throne of Sweden at the early age of seventeen. Nature had endowed him with beauty of form, with the strength that defies fatigue. She had bestowed upon him likewise the still more precious gift of a mind full of intelligence, of noble sentiments, and of courage. These qualities had been developed by a most judicious course of education. At the age of sixteen Gustavus Adolphus was well versed in the science of arms, he knew almost all the languages of Europe, he assisted his father alike at the head of his armies, and in the Council chamber. Called to the throne (8th November 1611) before he had attained the age of seventeen, at a time when his country was engaged in war against Russia, Denmark, and Poland, he displayed a rare prudence. With the advice of his friend, Axel Oxenstierna, whom, his senior by eleven years, he had made minister, Gustavus proceeded in the first instance to strengthen the bases of his own authority. He effected this important object by making concessions to his nobility, by restoring to them the privileges of which he believed they had been unjustly deprived. The good policy of this reform soon made itself practically felt.

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be excluded from the operation of the Peace of Religion, and that Catholic princes of the empire should be permitted to require their subjects to conform to their faith. This edict was put in force, under the pressure of the sword, in all the imperial cities: in Augsburg, in Ulm, in Ratisbon, in Regensburg, in others, and it was plainly intimated to the Protestants that they would be required to carry it out.

It was not the suppression of the edict of Restitution, but the character of the edict itself, which was the most oppressive and the most oppressive in the history of the German Empire.

Before the close of the year following his accession his pop had obtained for him all the assistance in men and necessary to carry on the war. Deeming himself, however, yet strong enough to combat three enemies at the same time, he took an early opportunity to conclude peace with Denmark (January 1613). He found it comparatively an easy task to drive the Russian fleets from the Baltic, and to conquer the Czar, Michael Romanoff, the provinces of Ingermanland, Carelia, and a part of Livonia. A less well-balanced monarch, his own might possibly, at his age, have yielded to the advice pressed upon him by one of his oldest generals, Pontus de la Gardie,* to expel the Romanoffs, and to gain the throne of Russia for himself. Gustavus contented himself with the more safe and solid project of expelling Russia from the shores of the Baltic, and of annexing Finland. He secured these objects by a treaty which he concluded with them in 1617.

The war against Sigismund III., King of Poland, known in Polish history as the sixty years' war, still, however, continued. So fiercely did Gustavus press it, that by the end of 1626 he had conquered the whole of Polish Livonia, and of west Russia as far as Thorn. Before Dantzic, which he proceeded then to besiege, he was wounded, and his troops were repulsed. Gustavus, however, took his revenge by inflicting several defeats on his enemy, and, although twice wounded, he had driven them almost to extremity when Wallenstein, after having expelled the Danes from North Germany, entered Pomerania and laid siege to Stralsund. How the action of Gustavus, aiding the valour of the defenders, forced him to raise the siege and to retreat, has been already related. Gustavus pursued his advantage, capturing Neuburg, Marienwerder, Graudenz, and other places, with the intervention of the Elector of Brandenburg, he agreed to a twelve weeks' suspension of hostilities (8th March to 1st May 1629). On the expiration of this term hostilities were renewed, but the diplomatic action of France induced the combatants to come to terms, and on the 1st September for a truce for six years, very advantageous for Sweden, was concluded at Altenmarkt.

The proceedings at the Diet of Ratisbon the following

* Second son of the renowned Pontus de la Gardie, Baron of Eckholm. He is described as having been a type of those illustrious men who distinguish themselves no less by their great military services than by the protection they afford to letters and art.

the renewal of the league against the Reformers, the solicitations of many leading Protestant nobles, and the promised support of France, determined the young Swedish monarch to take the bold step of declaring war against the Emperor. He felt, as he explained to his Estates, that the step was in reality purely defensive; that he had calmly to look on whilst north Germany was being swallowed up, certain that his turn would come next, or to interfere; that of the two courses interference was the nobler and the more humane. On the 19th May 1630, then, he presented his only child, Christina, then six years old, to the Estates assembled at Stockholm; confided her to their care and to their fidelity as the heiress to the throne, and addressed them in the most touching language. Calling God to witness that he was making this war solely in order to make common cause with the oppressed reformers of Germany in resisting the tyranny of their Catholic persecutors, he added: "I hope to ensure the triumph of the cause of the oppressed; but as it sometimes happens that the pitcher is broken whilst being carried to the water, it is possible that I may not succeed. I, who have exposed my life to so many dangers, who have shed my blood so often for my country, without receiving, thanks be to God, a mortal wound—I feel that, at last, I shall have to pay the sacrifice. That is why I make now my adieux to you all, and express my hope that we shall meet in a better world." Eleven days later he embarked at Elfsnabben.

The fleet collected at that port to convey the army to the shores of Germany consisted of twenty-eight ships of war of various sizes and a large number of transports. Considering the end in view, the might of the enemy, the extent of the country to be traversed, the army itself was ridiculously small in numbers. The three arms which composed it fell somewhat short of twenty thousand. Of these, in round numbers, fifteen thousand were infantry, two thousand cavalry, and the remainder artillery. But the army led by Gustavus was not to be judged by numbers alone. The men, trained to the perfection of discipline by the long wars with Russia and Poland, occupied the first rank in the esteem of military Europe. They were led by officers tried and proved in several campaigns, and the reputation of many of whom was to become an immortal heritage to the generations that were to follow. Amongst them may be named Gustavus Horn, a Swede, who had "made his proofs" under Prince Maurice of Nassau; Banner or Banér, also a Swede, who avenged

himself for the execution of his father by Charles IX. by rendering the most splendid service to the son of that monarch; Baulissin, a representative of the Lusatian family of Luppau; Falkenberg, Mutsenfaul, Ortenburg, Kniphausen, Teufel, and Tott, all men of great ability; Henry Matthias, Count of Thurn, the same who had flung the councillors and their secretary from the window at Prague; the Rhinegrave Otto Ludwig. The list could be lengthened, for there was scarcely a man in that army who was not a hero.

Detained by contrary winds, the fleet cast anchor off the little island of Rügen, separated only from the Pomeranian mainland by the Strela Sound, on the 24th June. Gustavus was the first to leap upon the land. Kneeling, in the presence of his following, he thanked the Almighty for having brought his army and his fleet in safety to German ground. With the utmost expedition, and in spite of a violent storm, he landed his troops, marched upon and occupied Stettin, Damm, Stargard, Cammin, and Walgart, almost without the semblance of opposition. Before the end of July he had become virtually master of Pomerania.

For the moment the Emperor had no army to oppose him. Wallenstein had been dismissed, and the army which Wallenstein commanded had vanished with their leader. A few troops had indeed garrisoned the towns of Pomerania, but these, drawn together by the Imperial commander in those parts, Torquato Conti, were in no condition to make head against the invader. Conti, whose cruelty was surpassed only by his avarice, used then unhesitatingly the only means at his disposal to check the progress of the Swedes. He ordered the laying waste of the country on both sides of his line of retreat, the burning of the more opulent villages; then, to render the possession of Stettin useless to Gustavus, he intrenched himself at Garz, south of that place, on the left bank of the Oder, hoping by that means to sever the communications between the Swedes and the rest of Germany. Further, when he saw that Gustavus had no intention of attacking him, but, leaving him intrenched at Garz, had proceeded to complete the conquest of the province, Conti suddenly quitted his position and made a dash at Stettin. Repulsed with loss, and seeing the impossibility of carrying on the campaign successfully, he sent a messenger to Gustavus to propose a truce during the autumn and winter months, on the ground that it would be too cold to fight. "The Swedes can fight in winter as well as in summer," was the reply of the

Swedish king. It was sufficient for Conti, who resigned his command and left his troops, under the Count of Schaumburg, to make the best of their way into Brandenburg. This march thither they only accomplished with great loss of men, of guns, and of baggage.

The circumstances of the empire, the absence of an imperial army, the knowledge that more than one-half of the people of Germany gave him their sympathies and their prayers, and were prepared, as soon as he should have developed his capacity by beating the armies of the League, to render him their active aid, would have justified Gustavus, being the man he was, to march through Germany and finish the war in Vienna. The idea was considered by his generals and himself. Gustavus rejected it, not because he considered the plan impracticable, but because, were he to act upon it, he would appear to some, and he would be represented to all, as a foreign sovereign whose selfish aim was to expel Ferdinand only to assume his place; whereas, by confining himself to driving the Imperialists from the north and the west of Germany, where they were harassing and oppressing the people, he would occupy the position which he coveted above all others, that of a deliverer. He resolved rather, then, to make himself master, in the first instance, of the strong places in the northern and western portions of the country, to rouse to co-operation with him the princes and people of those portions, to close the Baltic to the Imperialists, to deprive the Emperor of all his allies in the country, and, when this had been accomplished, to deal the House of Austria a blow which should force it, under the penalty of destruction, to abandon the policy of persecution—to respect the rights and the consciences of others.

The resignation of his command by Torquato Conti, and the disorderly retreat of the troops he had commanded, were events which played the game of Gustavus. He took Greifenhagen—a considerable town on the Oder, between Stettin and Garz—by storm, occupied the latter place, abandoned by the Imperialists; then, marching nearly directly eastward, seized Pyritz. Before the end of the year the only places in Pomerania which still held out for the Emperor were Greisswalde, Demmin, and Kolberg, and Gustavus was making energetic preparations for besieging these.

If the Imperial generals were, on the plains in the north of Germany, playing the game of Gustavus, not the less so was Ferdinand II. in his Cabinet of Vienna. It has been already

stated how Wallenstein had over-run Mecklenburg, and how the Emperor, to reward his services, had pronounced that duchy to be forfeited, and had bestowed it upon his victorious general. But the expelled dukes of Mecklenburg still possessed power and influence in their hereditary domains. Gustavus, conqueror of nearly all Pomerania, stood on the borders of Mecklenburg prepared, there could be no doubt, to restore the duchy to its rightful lords. The expelled dukes, however, endeavoured rather to win from their master the boon which the foreigner would have placed in their hands. Through the princes of the Diet, still assembled at Ratisbon, they expressed their determination not only to give no aid, but to offer the strongest opposition to the foreign invader, provided the Emperor would restore to them their rights. But obstinacy was a great characteristic of Ferdinand. Though he knew what a refusal would cost him, he refused. One consequence was that Mecklenburg, the province adjoining Pomerania, was gained for Gustavus and Prince Charles of Sachsen-Lauenburg proceeded to raise troops for him in the province.

In other respects the affairs of Gustavus prospered. On the 13th January 1631, he concluded, at Bärwald, a treaty for six years with France, in virtue of which he was to receive a hundred and sixty thousand thalers on the spot, and an annual subsidy of four hundred thousand on condition of maintaining in the field an army of thirty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry, and of assuring to the princes and people whose territory he might occupy the free exercise of their religion. He opened the campaign in the March following, took Griemwalde, Neubrandenburg, Loitz, Malchin, Demmin, and Kolberg. During the siege of the two last-named places, he took up a covering position in the intrenched camp of Schwedt, on the Oder. He was still in that position when he received information that an Imperialist army under Count Tilly was rapidly approaching to relieve the beleaguered towns.

A short, lean man, with hollow cheeks, a long nose, a broad wrinkled forehead, heavy moustachios, and a pointed chin, Tilly had the reputation of being the most successful soldier of the age. A Netherlander by birth, he had learned the art of war under Alba and, especially, under Alexander Farnese. In the school of that great captain he had learned alike how to obey and how to enforce obedience, to shrink from no measures, however opposed they might be to the dictates of humanity, which were necessary to obtain his end. He was a bigoted

Catholic, and thought all means lawful for the extirpation of heresy. He had made his first military studies in the Netherlands against the Protestants: he had then served in Hungary against the rebels of that country and the Turks; then again in Bavaria, in Bohemia, and in the Palatinate against the Protestants. He had never been beaten. Though not, in the strict sense of the word, a great general, he was yet a man to be feared; for he combined quickness of movement with daring, possessed a very clear military vision, never shrank from striking when he thought a blow might be effective, and his execution was always "thorough."

Such was the man who, at the head of twenty thousand men, hastily collected from the different parts of Catholic Germany, was hastening, in the middle of the winter of 1630-31, by forced marches, to relieve the beleaguered towns of Demmin and Kolberg. At Frankfurt-on-the-Oder he met the shattered remnants of the small army which, under Conti, had endeavoured to stay the progress of the invader, and subsequently, under Schaumburg, had roused against itself, by its terrible excesses and unsparing exactions, the indignation of the people of the provinces through which it had retreated. Leaving Schaumburg with a sufficient garrison in Frankfurt, Tilly pressed forward to Pomerania. But before he could quit Brandenburg he heard of the surrender of the two places he had been so anxious to save. The first object of his march, then, had vanished. There could be no question of attacking, with his comparatively small force, the intrenched camp of Gustavus at Schwedt. But he could still strike a blow under which Protestantism would reel. The very considerable city of Magdeburg, known for its zeal for the reformed religion, had re-elected, as its administrator, Christian William of Brandenburg, a prince who had been placed at the ban of the Empire, had received a Swedish general, Dietrich of Falkenburg, and with him a small Swedish garrison. He resolved, then, that Magdeburg should feel the first vengeance of the Catholic League. Renouncing, then, his march to Pomerania, Tilly struck westwards towards Magdeburg.

No sooner had Gustavus become aware that the direction of Tilly's march had been changed, than, as anxious as his opponent to deliver a blow which should be felt, he quitted his intrenched camp and marched on Frankfurt-on-the-Oder. His troops were on their march inflamed to fury by the tidings which reached them, that Tilly, on his march westward, had stormed the town of Neubrandenburg, recently taken by them,

and had put to the sword every man of the Swedish garrison which had defended it. They arrived before Frankfurt determined to enforce a heavy retribution; attacked the city with vigour and resolution; and stormed it the third day (3rd April 1631). They captured all the enemy's guns and meted out to the soldiers who demanded mercy the same quarter which their own countrymen had received at Neubrandenburg.

Meanwhile, in view of the invasion of Germany, of the declared intention of the Emperor Ferdinand to enforce with the utmost strictness the resolutions of the Diet against heresy, many of the Protestant princes had, on the invitation of John George, Elector of Saxony, met in consultation at Leipzig (6th February 1631). Neither John George nor George William, Elector of Brandenburg—though the latter had been one of those who had invited the intervention of the Swedes, had, up to this time, displayed the smallest desire to aid Gustavus in his enterprise. Both weak men, they were alike governed by their ministers—the Elector of Saxony by Field Marshal Von Arnheim, a devoted friend of Wallenstein; George William by Count Adam of Schwarzenberg, a Catholic and an Imperialist. But the determination of Ferdinand to push to the utmost the Catholic crusade had alarmed them; and whilst the one summoned, the other was foremost in attending, the congress at Leipzig. Besides the Elector of Brandenburg there were present also on the same occasion the Elector of Hesse-Cassel, and all the more important adherents of princely and noble rank of the Reformed connection. In spite of the intrigues of Ferdinand, the assembled notables declared their fixed resolution to maintain their rights; and to summon the Emperor to abrogate the edict known as the Restitution Edict, to withdraw his troops from their towns and fortresses, to suspend his arbitrary executions, and to redress the grievances of which they complained:—should he refuse, to raise an army of forty thousand men to assert their claims.

The alliance which Gustavus had made with France, and more particularly the conditions of that alliance, had contributed more than anything else to the solidarity of the confederation of the princes and nobles of northern Germany. The important condition that the Catholic religion should be respected in all the places which might submit to or be conquered by Gustavus, that religion should be everywhere free, did as much to bind northern Germany to his cause as the reputation of his soldiers and his own fame as a warrior. Even the less bigoted Catholics

who regarded with apprehension the increasing power of the **Emperor**, were ready to fight for a programme which, whilst it **promised** them protection against arbitrary power, ensured to **them** the exercise of their conscientious beliefs.

Meanwhile Tilly was marching against Magdeburg. Commanding a separate army, acting in conjunction with rather **than** in subordination to the Imperial commander, was Godfrey Henry, Count of Pappenheim. Tilly was the general of the **Catholic League**. Pappenheim, subsequently to 1630, represented the Empire. One of the best cavalry officers of the age, Pappenheim had distinguished himself on many a well-fought field. It was when returning from the pursuit of the Duke of Saxe-Lauenburg that Pappenheim received from Tilly notice of his movement against Magdeburg. Instantly he changed his course in that direction, drove in the troops with whom Falkenstein had occupied the outlying points, and had already invested the place when Tilly arrived. The regular siege began on the 30th March.

Gustavus, we have seen, had stormed Frankfurt-on-the-Oder on the 3rd April. Little apprehensive, probably even ignorant of Tilly's designs against Magdeburg, he had marched from Frankfurt against Landsberg, an important town on the Warthe. He captured this place on the 16th April. The same day he learned that Tilly and Pappenheim were pressing Magdeburg hard. A glance at the map will show that to reach Magdeburg from Landsberg, Gustavus would have to march by Küstrin, Berlin, and Spandau, all belonging to the Elector of Brandenburg. Now, not only were Küstrin and Spandau strongly fortified, but the Elector of Bavaria, influenced by his minister, had, some time before, opened the gates of the former to the fleeing Imperialists, and had shut them to the pursuing Swedes. It was impossible, then, that Gustavus should pass these two places to attack Tilly at Magdeburg, unless he were assured of the dispositions of their garrisons. Marching beyond them without such assurance, he would place himself between two fires. He had claims on the Elector of Brandenburg—not claims based merely on common religious convictions, but claims resting on the fact that he had freed his ancestral province from the presence of the enemy, and on the knowledge that he alone stood between the Elector and the Emperor. He sent to him, then, as soon as he had learned the peril of Magdeburg, a proposition whereby he engaged to march at once to relieve that city, provided only that the strong places of Küstrin and

Spandau were placed in his hands. The Elector, George William, who was then at Berlin, hesitated long before he gave a favourable reply. He was dominated by his fears and by his minister. If he should comply, and if then Gustavus were to be beaten, what would become of himself? How could he hope to escape the wrath of the narrow-minded but bigoted and determined Emperor? He was still hesitating, still parrying the requests of Gustavus with evasive answers, when the Swedish hero reached Berlin. At the interview which followed, Gustavus scarcely attempted to control himself. He plainly told the Elector that the relief of Magdeburg was a matter which concerned not himself personally, but the cause of the reformed religion; that if the reformed princes of Germany declined to help him, he would return to Stockholm, make peace with the Emperor, and then, he added, "in what a position would you find yourself?" These arguments, to which the presence of the highly-disciplined and well-ordered Swedish army gave weight, decided at last George William, and he gave orders for the surrender to his ally of Küstrin and Spandau.

But all the difficulties were not yet surmounted. From Berlin to Magdeburg were two roads; the shorter to the west, through a country eaten up and occupied by the enemy, who would be able to dispute the passage of the Elbe: the longer, southward, by Dessau or Wittingen, through a land, easy and unexhausted, and belonging to a professing ally, John George of Saxony. But like George William of Brandenburg, John George, timid by nature and influenced by his minister, refused a free passage to the Swedish troops; and whilst Gustavus was negotiating to induce him to withdraw his objections, Magdeburg fell.

Magdeburg was stormed by the troops of Pappenheim and Tilly on the 10th May. For three days the city was a scene of blood for which, to use the words of Schiller, "history has no description." It was the most barbarous act of, in a military sense, a barbaric age. It is computed that thirty thousand persons, in total disregard of sex, or age, or condition, were ruthlessly massacred. It was not until the 14th, the fifth day after the storm, that Tilly himself ventured into the city. The evil had then been consummated. A deed had been done which rendered reconciliation impossible, which marked in broad and bloody lines the demarcation between Catholic and Reformed!

This sanguinary stroke produced, for the moment, results

ably favourable to the Imperial cause. With the panic which spread throughout Protestant Germany flew also the feeling that the disaster might have been prevented, that the lingering Gustavus at Berlin had assured the triumph of Tilly. For a moment men did not stop to enquire whether the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg were free from blame. The latter prince, far from regarding the matter from the standpoint of religion, seemed in the first instance most anxious only to clear himself from all connection with the Swede. He had made over Spandau to Gustavus that Gustavus might march to relieve Magdeburg. Now that Magdeburg had fallen, he demanded on imperative terms the restitution of Spandau. But Gustavus, who had quitted Berlin, was equal to the occasion. He announced his intention to comply with the demand of the Elector, but to treat that prince as an enemy. Sending, then, instructions to the commandant of Spandau to evacuate that place, he marched against Berlin. Before the gates of that city he declared his ultimatum. He desired, he said, to be treated not worse than the Imperial generals; to be allowed to ensure the safety of his army by the occupation of the places necessary for that purpose, to be furnished with a moderate sum of money and bread for his troops. Were these conditions complied with, he would be the true friend of the Elector, and would engage to protect him against all his foes; were they refused, he would become his enemy. This message, which conveyed likewise to its recipient the conviction that it would be followed by action, decided the Elector, and he subscribed to the terms dictated by Gustavus. Circumstances soon brought about a similar result in the councils of the Elector of Saxony.

The capture of Magdeburg had left Tilly free to direct his arms against the two most formidable of the reformed princes of that part of Germany, the Elector of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse. So long as these should maintain the power of independent action, the triumph of the Catholic cause was still uncertain. Tilly selected the Landgrave as the first object of imperial vengeance. From the ruins of Magdeburg he marched into Thuringen and desolated that beautiful country with fire and the sword. Frankenhausen, the capital of the principality of Schwarzburg-Rudolfstadt, was plundered and reduced to ashes under the very eyes of the imperial general. Erfurt purchased its exemption from a similar fate by a plentiful supply of money and provisions. Having exhausted the Saxe-Meiningen and Schwarzburg principalities, Tilly turned to the

Landgrave of Kassel, and threatened his lands with the fate unless he would immediately disband his troops, renounce the Leipzig contract, receive imperial troops in his castles and fortresses, pay up the contributions demanded, and declare himself a friend. But the Landgrave of Kassel was much firmer stuff than many of his colleagues in the princely families of Germany. "I will not," he answered, "admit foreign soldiers into my cities and fortresses; my troops I reserve for myself; if I am attacked, I shall know how to defend myself; if Count Tilly requires money and provisions, he had better get them from Munich." More than that, he rejected two detachments which Tilly, on receiving this answer, sent into his lands, and prepared to defend himself to the death when the movements of Gustavus forced Tilly to renounce his intentions.

Gustavus, in fact, having concluded his arrangements with the Elector of Brandenburg, prepared to move forward. Glogau, the last place in Pomerania which had held out for the Emperor, had fallen; a reinforcement of 8,000 men from Sweden, and a corps of 6,000 Scotchmen, led by the Marquis of Hamilton,* had arrived. Thus strengthened, Gustavus marched against Pappenheim, who still held the country about Magdeburg. It was Pappenheim's call for aid which saved the daring Landgrave of Kassel from a collision with Tilly. The latter, hastening back to Magdeburg, forced marches, effected a junction with Pappenheim, and took up a position at Wolmirstädt on the Elbe, between ten and twelve miles north of Magdeburg, and not much farther from that occupied by Gustavus on the same side of the river at Werben, near the junction with it of the Saale. In the skirmishes which followed, the Swedes invariably gained the advantage. At last Tilly issued from his position, marching to within cannon-shot of that occupied by Gustavus, and offered him battle. But, with an army inferior in number, one-half to that of the enemy, the Swedish king was too prudent to accept the invitation. Knowing his position to be untenable enough to resist attack, he remained behind his intrenchments. After a fruitless cannonade and some skirmishes, which were again favourable to the Swedes, Tilly then returned to his camp, losing in his retrograde movement many men by desertion.

Whilst Gustavus was thus watching the main imperial army, his lieutenants, General Tott and Duke Adolphus Frederic

* Afterwards, 1643, the first Duke of Hamilton.

Mecklenburg-Schwerin, had re-conquered almost the whole of Mecklenburg, and Adolphus Frederic had resumed the government of the Schwerin division of the dukedom. Just then Tilly fell back in the moment already related, and Gustavus thought the moment opportune personally to re-instate the other duke, John Albert, in the Güstrow portion. He rode for that purpose to Güstrow, and, surrounded by a retinue of princes and nobles, amid the heart-felt rejoicings of the people, replaced the dispossessed prince upon his ducal throne. On his return to his camp of Werben, he welcomed with great joy Landgrave William of Hesse Kassel, the first of the princes of Germany who had offered, of his own free will, to make an offensive and defensive alliance with the invader. The alliance was concluded then and there.

This action on the part of Landgrave William produced in the mind of Tilly the fear lest it should become contagious. If Saxony, for instance, were to declare for Gustavus, his own position at Wolmerstädt would become dangerous in the extreme. He resolved to conjure this peril by making demands upon the Elector John George, the answer to which would be decisive. He required him, therefore, to admit the imperial army into Saxony, and either to disband the Saxon army or to unite it to his own. John George, knowing from experience that the tender mercies of the Emperor were cruel, embittered by the treatment dealt out to Magdeburg, and encouraged by the proximity of Gustavus, refused point blank. Upon this, Tilly broke up his camp at Wolmerstädt, and pressed on to Halle, devastating the country as he marched. Thence he despatched another and more threatening message to the Elector. Its effect was directly the contrary of that which he had intended. It forced John George—who till then had regarded Gustavus with jealousy, distrust, even aversion, and who had preferred the sacrifice of Magdeburg to union with him—to throw himself into the arms of the King of Sweden. He had, on the receipt of the first message, despatched Arnheim to treat with that prince. The second message made him still more eager for an alliance, and he concluded one on terms dictated by Gustavus (3rd September 1631). The King then crossed the Elbe, and effected the day following, at Torgau, a junction with the Saxon army.

Tilly, far from endeavouring to prevent this junction, had pressed on to the important city of Leipzig, and had summoned it to surrender. As the commandant hesitated, Tilly reduced

the suburb, called the suburb of Halle, to ashes. This severe measure, the recollection of the fate of Magdeburg, and the bad condition of the fortifications, combined to influence the commandant to yield. On the second day, Leipzig opened her gates. The city and inhabitants were mercifully treated by the conqueror.

The news of the occupation of Leipzig reached Gustavus and his allies at Torgau. They held at once a council of war, and resolved, at the pressing instance of John George of Saxony, to set the fate of Protestant Germany on the issue of a single battle. The order to march was then given, and early on the morning of the 7th September the Swedish-Saxon army came in sight of Leipzig.

Tilly, who was daily expecting the arrival from Italy of Aldringer and Tiefenbach, at the head of 12,000 veterans, was very anxious to avoid a battle until those reinforcements should reach him. He had therefore originally taken up a position close to and resting upon the city of Leipzig. The earnest representations of Pappenheim, backed by Fürstenberg and the younger generals, induced him, against his better judgment, to quit this unassailable post, and to move forward to the fair champaign plains of Breitenfeld. The ground which he selected for his new encampment is diversified here and there with small elevations and declivities. In front of two of these elevations, south-west of the village of Podelwitz, Tilly now ranged his army. He placed his guns, consisting of forty pieces, on the heights, in such a manner that their fire would pass over the heads of his right, commanded by Fürstenberg, and of his centre, commanded by himself. Behind the heights, in rear of his right centre, was likewise a very thick wood. His left, commanded by Pappenheim, and consisting of cavalry, was free in front and in rear. Notwithstanding that he had relinquished his advantageous position near Leipzig to post himself in the open plain, Tilly was secretly resolved to avoid a general action till his reinforcements should arrive. But the rashness of Pappenheim disconcerted his plans. To take up the position marked out by Gustavus, the Swedish-Saxon army had to cross a little rivulet called the Loder, near Podelwitz, to the north-east of the imperial army. The opportunity to harass the enemy whilst they should be engaged in this operation was so tempting that Pappenheim proposed to Tilly to attack them. Tilly gave a most unwilling consent, and only on the condition that Pappenheim should employ no more than 2,000 cuirassiers, and should not bring on a

Pappenheim so far conformed that he charged the advancing obliquely across his front, with only the of men specified. But he made no impression on the carried ranks. Gustavus had noted the possibilities, listened to the point of danger, and, present there, Pappenheim swooped down, had first broken his attack, ally forced him to retire badly smitten. Pappenheim, in heat, had set fire to the village of Podelwitz to check the advance. It did not check it, however. The gallant of Gustavus traversed the burning village, and reached a which enabled them to form up fronting the enemy's line. coming to the main body after his repulse, Pappenheim his entire cavalry to form, with the intention of falling force upon the enemy whilst they should be still in motion. allies had too well employed the interval to grant him d chance. Their whole army had, under the fire of the d guns, cleared the dangerous point, and had taken their opposite to the imperialists: the Saxons, numbering of whom one-fourth were cavalry, were in two lines. e Fürstenburg; the Swedes, counting nearly 20,000, in nes, including the reserves, opposed to Tilly and Pappenheim. Of the front line, Gustavus Horn commanded the left, Teufel the centre, and Gustavus the right. The cavalry t massed in one compact body, as with the imperialists. nes between each regiment, sometimes between every two e regiments, was posted a regiment of musketeers, trained with the horsemen. The centre was composed of four s of pikemen. The guns were ranged immediately in f the first line. The second line consisted of five ts of cavalry, immediately behind and supporting s brigades of pikemen. On their right, behind the mmanded by Gustavus, were three regiments of horse- Banner. The centre of the third line, or reserve, was ed of three brigades; two of which were British, under n. It was flanked on the right by four regiments of nder Baudissin; on the left by three regiments under and supported in the rear by two more at Hepburn's l. It may here be stated that there was no great dis- between the numbers on both sides. The imperialists l but few more than 35,000.

more compact formation of the allied army gave the lists an apparent advantage, for it enabled their longer outflank that of their enemy. Tilly was so impressed

with this, that he was anxious to await their more forward movement. But Pappenheim and Fürstenburg forced his hand. Smarting under his repulse from Podelwitz, Pappenheim had, as I have said, returned to his camp, and ordered out all his horsemen, with the view to renew his attack in full force. Fürstenburg likewise no sooner viewed the Saxons formed up in front of him than he charged upon them with seven regiments of cavalry. These two attacks were made almost simultaneously, Pappenheim on the King's troops, Fürstenburg on the Saxons, the latter having perhaps a slight, but very slight advance.

By a special arrangement made by Gustavus, who had had no experience of, and who therefore was inclined to doubt the discipline and steadfastness of his allies and the capacity of their general, a considerable space separated the Saxons from the Swedish army. This isolation was not, perhaps, calculated to increase the confidence of young troops having in front of them a serried line of infantry, on their left flank strong brigades of cavalry, and whose eyes were blinded by dust and smoke—for the wind blew strongly from the south. The result was just that which might have been anticipated. Attacked with great fury on their left flank, the Saxons made but a feeble resistance. Their Elector, John George, was the first to give evidence that the practice of war often differs vastly from its theory. He fled with all speed in the direction of Torgau, and first drew near at Eilenburg, about midway between that place and Leipzig. In the space of twenty minutes the Saxon half of the Protestant army had disappeared; the Croats were engaging in pillaging their camp, and couriers were on their way to Munich and Vienna to announce a great victory.

For, at that supreme moment, Tilly never doubted but that victory was within his grasp. The only enemy still remaining on the field was inferior to him in numbers by nearly one-half. Pappenheim was engaging them on their right. He had only to push forward his numerous infantry, and assail them on their front and their now exposed left, to crush in Germany, for a long time to come, the cause of freedom of conscience.

But the Tilly of that day was not the Tilly who had triumphed on many a well-fought field, who had never known defeat. "The determination," writes Schiller, "which had never left Tilly before, failed him on this day." Certain it is that he allowed a grand opportunity to slip from his hands.

Another moment, and it was too late. Pappenheim, always in the front of danger, had launched, as already stated, his whole

cavalry against the Swedish centre. Here, we have seen, the king commanded in person. Under him was an officer worthy to serve under such a chief, the cool-headed and daring Banner. The Swedes met the charge with so much steadiness that Pappenheim, unable to make any impression upon them, fell back baffled. Seven times, however, did he renew the charge, but seven times was he driven back. It was on the occasion of the last of these charges that Gustavus, noting the rout of the Saxons, and feeling certain that in a few minutes he would have them in his hands, turned the repulse into a complete defeat by anchoring his own cavalry from his right wing and forcing Pappenheim to quit the field.

This, then, was the situation after a hand-to-hand engagement which had lasted about half an hour: Tilly had disposed of the Saxons, and Gustavus had driven Pappenheim from the field. If the left flank of the King was uncovered, his front was exposed, and the traversing by the enemy of the space which he had designedly left between him and the Saxons would give him an opportunity, with his troops well-trained for movements of celerity, to form a new front to the enemy.

Before even the Saxons had been completely driven from their ground, and before Pappenheim's repulse had been changed into a decisive rout, Gustavus, noticing the disorder of his allies, had strengthened his left flank, where Horn commanded, by attaching to it, from the centre, three of his best infantry regiments. On receiving this welcome reinforcement, Horn had distributed the pikemen, of which it was composed, in companies or sections between each squadron of cavalry, the pikemen slightly in advance. He had but just made this disposition when the imperial cuirassiers, their swords dripping with Saxon blood, dashed upon him. The Swedish pikemen received the shock, however, with the same firmness and resolution with which, but a few minutes before, they and their comrades had met the charge of Pappenheim. The cuirassiers were drawing back, baffled, with the intention of renewing the attack, when Gustavus appeared on the scene, and, launching his own horsemen against the retreating imperialists, completed their discomfiture. They fled from the field, not again, that day, to appear.

Having thus disposed of the enemy's horsemen, Gustavus, wheeling his troops and making a long sweep to the left, reached the extreme and now uncovered right front of the enemy, immediately below the high ground in front of which

Tilly's army had been posted. To hew down and disorganise imperial infantry, to charge the high ground and to drive the gunners, to capture the guns, to turn them against the work of a few minutes. A moment later and Horn's advanced from the front to deal the finishing blow to imperialist infantry, assailed now on three sides, had left to continue the battle. Four famous regiments they broke and fled. The four regiments alluded to belonged to the force which Fürstenberg had brought from Flanders, where they had "grown grey with victory," and were now fighting to the wood of which I have spoken, in their right centre, and eventually, after losing more than half their numbers, succeeded in effecting their retreat. The rest of the imperialist army fled, I have said, in confusion. They were, on the order of Gustavus, hotly pursued by Swedish cavalry till night-fall. Their losses, when the battle ceased, had been enormous. Of the thirty-five thousand men who marched out of their camp that morning, one-fifth lay dead on the field; one-seventh were either wounded or prisoner. Complete was the defeat, that Tilly, who was badly wounded and who had narrowly escaped capture, could not muster more than six hundred men to accompany him in his retreat to Haldensleben; whilst even Pappenheim only rallied about a hundred horsemen. The Swedes lost only seven hundred men, the Saxons about two thousand.

On his knees, amidst the dying and the dead, Tilly returned thanks to God for his great victory. He then withdrew from the field, took possession of and occupied the still unoccupied camp of the imperialists, near to and resting on Leipzig. The same evening, the Elector of Saxony reappeared to confront the conqueror. Gustavus received him with the greatest courtesy, thanked him for having so earnestly urged him to fight, and entrusted to him the task of recovering Leipzig. The next day he himself marched to Mersa, defeating on his way thither a body of five hundred imperialists. At Halle he was rejoined by the Elector, and recovered Leipzig without striking a blow.

Such was the first great encounter on the field of Battle. If the greater battle which was to follow it, at an interval of a hundred and eighty-two years, may be truly called the "Völkerschlacht"—the battle which delivered people from tyranny—this, its forerunner, may as truly and as

designated a battle which freed Germany from the thralldom of religious intolerance. It was necessary, certainly, in both cases to follow up the victory, to supplement the first great initiative battle by others. Breitenfeld was, in fact, the first of a series of battles which brought about the great result of allowing Catholics and Protestants to live together in harmony, of ensuring to every man freedom of conscience, of rooting out and destroying the principle which gave one man the right to say that because he himself believed certain dogmas therefore all the German people should be compelled to believe them. This was the principle which Ferdinand II. had introduced into Germany. This was the principle which Gustavus Adolphus invaded Germany to destroy. These two men were the embodiments of those opposite ideas. The one, trained up from his earliest childhood to hate the Reformers with the most bitter hatred, viewed all the affairs of State through spectacles of extreme Catholic prejudice. To force other men to believe as he believed was the aim of his life. To effect this aim no instrument was too vile. Persecution, confiscation of property, banishment, sentence of death, torture, were all legitimate weapons. From Ferdinand there issued no rebuke for the slaughter of thirty thousand unarmed people at Magdeburg. He read, on the contrary, with sympathy, the report of Tilly that "since the taking of Troy and of Jerusalem no such triumph had been achieved." The embodiment of the very worst features of the worst form of Roman Catholicism, he was unfortunately in a position, and he possessed, unfortunately, the iron resolution, to give effect to his convictions—and he gave effect to them with a vengeance.

Never, in the history of the world, has the influence of one man been greater upon a people than was the influence of Ferdinand II. on the hereditary states and kingdoms of the House of Hapsburg. At the time of the death of his predecessor, the Emperor Matthias, the reformed religion preponderated, not only in by far the greater part of Bohemia, but in the two Austrias and in Moravia. It was a living force in Hungary, in Carniola, in Carinthia, even to a certain extent in Styria. By persecution, by banishment, by the harrowing of armies, this one man did succeed in rooting out, almost completely, the new faith from those provinces. He tried to produce the same result all over Germany.

The living embodiment of the other principle, the principle of toleration, was a far nobler character. If Ferdinand would have

enslaved men's consciences, Gustavus would have freed them. Firm in his own convictions, he did not, like Ferdinand, force those convictions down the throats of other men. He was willing to grant to the various peoples of Germany the same freedom of thought on questions of religion which he claimed for himself. He loudly declared himself, when he entered Pomerania, the protector of all established religions, even of the Catholic. From that declaration he never swerved.

An age which has recognised toleration as a cardinal principle cannot be indifferent to an event which first breathed life into the scattered materials on which that principle has been built up, which gave to it a power of cohesion, and welded it into a material shape. The battle of Breitenfeld, or, as it is sometimes styled in this country, of Leipzig, was the first effective blow struck in the Germany of the seventeenth century for freedom of conscience. As such it deserves a permanent resting-place in the thoughts and memories of the descendants of those who so nobly fought to free themselves and their children from a yoke which they had found intolerable.

French Colonial Aggression.

By GEORGE C. V. HOLMES.

A GREAT deal of interest has been excited in this country, during the last three or four years, by the energy which the French have displayed in pushing their colonial interests and in making fresh annexations in various parts of the world. The daily papers and magazines have been replete with news and with articles on the subject, and the general spirit of what has been written shows that this new development of the aggressive spirit of our neighbours is viewed on our side of the Channel with feelings of considerable jealousy, irritation, and mistrust. For the cause of these feelings we need not seek very far. A great deal may be set down to the peculiar nervous uneasiness which Englishmen always exhibit whenever a foreign Power is making an advance, no matter in what direction, and which is, no doubt, engendered by the large extent and scattered nature of our own empire, these causing an uneasy suspicion, if nothing more, that our interests may somehow or other be endangered or interfered with. Not only is the empire itself large and scattered, thus exposing innumerable frontiers to foreign attack; but the high-roads between our various colonies and possessions are, to all intents and purposes, more vulnerable than frontiers themselves; and as some of these high-roads lie all along the sea-boards of many of the most important nations in the world, we naturally look with extreme suspicion upon the aggressive movements of foreign Powers.

Though this state of things may account for a great deal of our suspicions towards France, much more, however, must be set down to something far more defined than a mere nervous suspicion. Many steps which France has lately taken, have produced in us not only feelings of doubt and misgiving, but the absolute certainty that our vital interests will, under certain circumstances, be actually imperilled by them. There are two other elements of the question which materially affect our views. One of these is the political aspect of the case. We cannot forget that but little

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more than a century ago France was our rival in every part of the world for colonial dominion and maritime supremacy. was found necessary then to engage with her in a struggle for life or rather a series of such struggles, which commenced in 1744 and continued with but short intermissions till the final overthrow of Napoleon in 1815. The earlier of these wars were waged mainly for colonial dominion and the empire of the seas, and they resulted, as is well known, in the stripping of France of nearly all her foreign possessions. The names of Clive in India, of Wolfe in North America, of Anson, Hawke, Rodney, and Howe, who carried their country's flag wherever there was water enough to float a man of war, will not allow us to forget how bitter and how hard-fought were the struggles which, about the time of the Seven Years' War, we waged with our neighbours for colonial supremacy. We are still paying, in the shape of a large proportion of the interest of our national debt, for the cost of those enterprises; how, then, can it be expected that we should look otherwise than with feelings of traditional jealousy upon this new departure in French politics? We naturally feel that what has happened before may occur again, and that if France reasserts herself successfully as a colonial power, the history of the last century may be repeated in the near future.

All the above-mentioned causes, which account for the present state of the national instinct towards France, are, of course, more or less due to our feelings of self-interest and self-preservation; but there is one other element in the question of a quite unselfish character, which accounts for a great deal of the bitter character of much that has been written. This last is the wantonly aggressive and unjustifiable nature of the recent French attacks upon contented and inoffensive nationalities. Whenever in their foreign expeditions they have kept clear of our immediate interests, and have given us no cause to fear for ourselves, they have managed to estrange from themselves all our good feeling, and to enlist it on the side of those whom they have so wantonly and with such frivolous pretext attacked.

The general motive under-lying all this French aggression is so thoroughly unworthy of a great people, so mean, pitiable, and even frivolous in its nature, that we can hardly avoid feeling as much compassion for the nation that has fallen so low as to act on such motives, as for the helpless victims of its misguided ambition. We are told that France seeks to compensate herself elsewhere for the loss of prestige and territory which she has sustained in Europe, as if the filching of Tamatave were a compensation for the loss of

Alsace, or as though the slaughtering of helpless and half-naked Arabs at Sfax would redeem the honour lost at Sedan, or the disgrace of the thousands who capitulated at Metz. The nation that can seek consolation in such petty triumphs for the loss of territory, political position, and even honour, is easily consoled, and must be bereft of the first elements of greatness, viz. the well-defined knowledge of its own interests.

We cannot avoid here contrasting the way in which our own Colonial Empire has grown, with the method adopted by the French to create dependencies, as it were, ready made. Our own record is not as clean as it might be; there are many pages in the history of our dealings with races now subject to us which we may well wish were unwritten; but never, we may safely assert, have we gone about annexing independent communities for the mere gratification of national vanity, or in order to wipe out the disgrace of defeats inflicted on us by nations of our own size. That we have not done so is perhaps less a proof of the possession of superior virtue than of sounder common sense; for we know well, what the French will probably soon learn to their cost, that the acquisition by force of territories not necessary to our national existence, and peopled by hostile races, is a source, not of strength, but of weakness. Thus the nation that was injured by the loss, in fair fight, of Alsace and Lorraine, will probably be weakened still further by the acquisition of Tunis, Madagascar, and Tonquin.

In our own case, our possessions have, as a rule, grown imperceptibly from small commercial beginnings, often against our will, and by force of circumstances. That this was so in India is a thrice-told tale. We might even now be occupying in that country the position of simple traders, had it not been for the intrigues against our commerce and our influence, and also against the native rulers which were first set on foot by Frenchmen. Certainly it was no land-hunger which led us to increase the cares, the responsibilities, and the expense of Empire, as we have done in that country. In other cases, we have settled on tracts of territory, sparsely peopled by tribes of savages, and in some we have wrested their colonies by force of arms from European nations with which we were at war; but never have we wantonly attacked civilised and contented communities, who in no way interfered with our security, merely for the sake of adding to our national greatness. The French, on the other hand, make annexations—for colonies in the true sense of the word they do not possess—merely for the sake of increasing the area of their dominions.

Having no just pretexts for attack, the preliminaries to the aggressions are necessarily of a character to disgust all fair minded men, and involuntarily recall to mind the old story the wolf and the lamb. We need only mention, in support of this assertion, the trumped-up quarrel with the Kroumirs, so well described by Mr. Broadley in his recent work *Tunis Past and Present*, and which served as pretext for the occupation of Tunis. If we search the whole of history we shall find but one parallel to the treachery and enormity of this political burglary. Only in the records of their own country—in the story of the robbery of Alsace and Lorraine during a period of profound peace—have the French been able to find a precedent for the immorality of their action towards Tunis. Another instance in point is the absurd piece of thimble-rigging by which the adventurer De Brazza induced a Central African savage to sign a treaty with France, the contents of which he could not read, and the significance of which was not explained to him. This latter transaction, had it been carried out in a civilised country, and between private individuals, would have rendered the deceiver liable to a term of penal servitude; but we do not find that France, which boasts of the perfection of her civilisation, disowned the petty swindling of her subordinate; on the contrary, by her acceptance of the treaty acquired by fraud, she put herself on the level of the receiver of stolen goods.

Irritating as are these incidents in French aggression abroad, and aggravated as they have been by such circumstances as those which recently befell our own Consul after the recent bombardment of Tamatave, it nevertheless behoves the people of this country to lay aside all feeling of anger and outraged sentiment, and to view the proceedings of our neighbours strictly and exclusively from the standpoint of self-interest. If the French think that their interests are served, or their national vanity soothed, by continuing on the line of policy to which they seem committed, that is their affair, so long as they do not interfere with us. We may pity them, and commiserate those whom they have injured, but we have no right to thwart them so long as they do not harm us. If, however, the latter contingency should arise, we must act, and act vigorously, and we cannot act too soon. It may therefore, be worth while to examine a little more closely into what France has recently been doing in various parts of the world, what military and naval measures she has been adopting at home to secure and maintain her influence abroad, and how far, if at all, her actions have jeopardised our interests.

Let us first consider her position in the Mediterranean, which, for many reasons, affects the people of this country more vitally than could the extension of her influence in any other part of the globe. The Mediterranean is one of our chief ocean highways. Through it passes an immense proportion of our steam trade with India, China, and our vast Australasian colonies, not to mention the local trade which we carry on with all the principal countries of Southern Europe. Its value to us from the military is not less important than from the commercial point of view, as it is the only convenient means of transit for troops and munitions of war between this country and our Eastern Empire. On the other hand, it is the one spot in the globe where France, by reason of her natural proximity to the sea, is most capable of acting in force.

It is not generally recognised in this country how widespread till quite lately was French influence, and how far-reaching French ambition in the Mediterranean. That they have recently suffered a check is, perhaps, due to the peculiar temper of the French Chambers, at the period preceding the despatch of the expedition against Arabi, rather than to any superior wisdom or diplomatic skill on the part of our own Government. Before that expedition took place French influence was paramount over a large portion of the coast of Northern Africa and the Levant. Algiers had been for years a French province; Tunis had just been conquered; in Egypt the Suez Canal, that jugular vein of British commerce, was virtually under French domination, and the agents of the Republic shared with us, on nominally equal terms, the control which the Western Powers had imposed on the Khedive Ismail; but in reality their share in the administration of the country was far greater than ours. French officials swarmed in every branch of the Egyptian service, and the intrigues set on foot against our influence by the notorious Baron Ring, who is one of the very ablest members of the French Diplomatic Corps, are now matters of history.

Further to the east, in Syria, French power, though less openly displayed than in Tunis and Egypt, was not in reality one whit less menacing than in these latter states; and we have lately seen in the successful opposition to the re-appointment of Rustem Pacha, the Ex-Governor of the Lebanon—a man of whom they could never make a tool—that their influence in that region is as potent as it ever was, and that, such as it is, it is not exerted in the support of our government.

The Mediterranean is of such vital importance to this country—

that is to say, so long as we retain our Indian empire, our eastern trade, and our Australasian colonies—that we can never dare to allow any Foreign Power to acquire a paramount influence between the Pillars of Hercules and the Isthmus of Suez. For the reason we have acquired and retained the chain of fortified posts which dot the Mediterranean and the Red Seas. Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Aden, and Egypt itself are but links in the chain which binds the East to this western isle. These seas, though the have for obvious reasons been chosen as the high road of our Oriental trade, possess, nevertheless, many disadvantages as means of communication which are likely to become painfully apparent in war-time, and which, therefore, require every precaution to neutralise in advance. The many narrowings of their waters afford many opportunities to a hostile naval Power to throttle our commerce, and to cut off our convoys of troops and munitions of war. For this reason we hold Gibraltar and Aden, the entrances of the two seas, in our hands; and for this reason also we have, at immense expense, created at Malta a powerfully fortified naval dockyard. But while all this has been done, there yet remains the curious anomaly, that the most important point in the whole line—the canal which connects the Mediterranean with the Red Sea, and which at present exists almost exclusively for the purposes of British trade and British dominion in the East, remains under the control of a private company which owes allegiance to a foreign Power, and that Power the greatest naval rival which this country has to fear.

The whole question of the Suez Canal has lately caused an immense amount of interest and excitement in the country. Its military importance to us came prominently into view last year when it served as the basis of operations of our army invading Egypt; and also on a previous occasion when its existence allowed us to transport a considerable body of Indian troops with great rapidity into the Mediterranean fortresses. Its commercial importance is now the uppermost question, but it is widely felt and acknowledged that in this instance military and commercial interests go hand in hand and cannot be separated.

For some time past there has been a very lively agitation on the part of ship-owners and merchants interested in the Eastern trade, to bring about the construction of a second canal which should be exclusively an English concern, made with English capital, and managed by English officials. The existing channel has proved totally inadequate to accommodate the immense and ever increasing quantity of shipping which seeks transit, and, in spite of

lequacy, its proprietors were known to be receiving enormous sums. Hence arose a further clamour for the reduction of the enormous tonnage dues and piloting charges, which are felt to be not only unfair and obnoxious in themselves, but which are aggravated by the heavy expenses of demurrage to owners caused by intolerable delays in the transit. The friction between our shippers, who contribute four-fifths of the traffic, and the directors of the canal was still further increased by the local government, which, as alleged, is very defective, and by the unkind and dictatorial manners of the French officials. The result of this agitation was the negotiation between the English government and the directorate of the canal, which has resulted in several notorious heads of agreement which have been recently presented to the House of Commons, and which have provoked a great deal of discontent throughout the country. It is not necessary to discuss this extraordinary agreement from the point of view of politics. The question, in its bearings on the country at large, is almost too grave to be made the mere play-thing of factions, and it seems to be universally felt, for not a voice has been raised by the ordinary supporters of the Government in favour of the proposals. We may, however, very fairly consider the provisional agreement on its merits, and suggest what alterations and amendments would meet the case of the British traders and ship-owners. The agreement as it stands provides for the construction of a new canal by M. de Lesseps' Company, by means of money to the extent of eight millions sterling to be borrowed from the English Government, at the rate of $3\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. interest. It provides for the gradual reduction of the existing tonnage and pilotage dues, for the employment of a fair proportion of British pilots, and for the appointment of an English naval officer of high rank, whose functions are at present undefined, whose title is to be *Inspecteur de Navigation*, whence we may infer that his duties will be to control the traffic through the canal. The Government, on the other hand, in addition to lending the large sum of money at a rate of interest which enables the company to save at least £140,000 a year, compared with what they have to expend if forced to raise the money in the open market, is also engaged to use their great influence with the Khedive in obtaining the necessary concession for constructing the new channel through the isthmus, as well as the needful land, and, further, an extension of the original concession for an additional term of twenty years over and above the time for which it was originally granted.

The weak points in the above arrangement are as follow :—

The reductions on the dues are small, and are contingent upon immense dividends being earned by the Company, so that the period at which any substantial reduction will take place appears to be exceedingly remote.

The extension of the concession for a further period of twenty years is a most unwise provision. The original monopoly is irksome enough, but to place British commerce at the mercy of a foreign Company for any further period is out of the question.

The better representation of British interests in the management of the undertaking has been omitted. Although the new canal is to be built by the aid of the national money, and although we have already four millions invested in the old concern, no provision is made for an increased British representation on the Board of the Company. This appears to be a fatal oversight, but is justified by the Government on the ground that unless we had an absolute majority of directors on the Board no mere additions would be of any avail in increasing our influence. There could not be a greater mistake. What is wanted is, not any addition to the number of Government directors, but that the mercantile marine, and the great trading interests of this country, should be adequately represented by delegates conversant with the needs of their clients, and chosen by such bodies as Lloyds and the various chambers of commerce and shipping throughout the country. These representatives of the mercantile community should not merely have seats at the Board, but some of them at least should be members of the inner circle, the committee of management. The Government representatives are no doubt exceedingly useful, because of the influence which they have behind them, but they have no personal interests at stake, and no special knowledge of the needs of British commerce. Sir John Stokes is a soldier of moderate abilities, and Sir Rivers Wilson was an able civil servant, and afterwards acquired a special knowledge of Egyptian finance; but he has never, so far as is known, had any connection with the mercantile community. Members selected by the chambers of commerce would be in a very different position. They would thoroughly understand their own interests, and would well know how to proceed in order to secure them. Their votes might not count for much, but their influence would weigh heavily; and the mere fact that our commerce was not unrepresented would go far towards securing peace, and a cessation from the agitation which will otherwise become chronic.

The Government cannot afford to neglect the legitimate wishes and needs of British commerce, because our commercial interests have, throughout our modern history, been the ruling factor in our foreign relations. It was the wrongs of British commerce which kept Walpole from office and involved the country in the great series of wars of the last century, which resulted in the foundation of our Colonial Empire. It was the enterprise of British commerce which gained India for us. It is the wealth and extent of our commerce which now renders the empire great and powerful. The influence which has already accomplished so much, will, even left to itself, probably succeed in compelling M. de Lesseps to respect its just requirements.

The errors of detail in the provisional agreement with the Canal Company, serious and even fatal though they be, sink into insignificance compared with the diplomatic error committed by the Government in the conduct of the negotiations, in admitting the aim of the Company to possess an absolute monopoly to construct canals across the Isthmus. Errors of detail can be altered provided the negociator has something to go upon, but this error of principle can never be made good by the present Government, because they have, by an act of gratuitous and incalculable folly, cut the ground from under their own feet, and deprived themselves of the use of the one weapon which was likely to bring their adversaries to reason. In the denial of this monopoly they would have been backed by much of the best legal opinion in the country. By yielding the point, they have rendered themselves of no further use in the matter to those whose interests they are supposed to guard; and, were the matter of sufficient immediate importance, were it, in fact, a burning question of the hour, they would have no alternative but to resign their posts. As it is, we presume the interests of the country will have to be shelved until some other Government, with hands free to act, can assume office.

The country is far from wishing to act in this matter in a manner that would be harsh or unfair to M. de Lesseps. It would much rather settle the question with him than without him; for it can never be denied that the country benefited immensely by his efforts. Without him the canal would never have been made. The difficulties he had to contend with were incredible, and probably no other man of that time possessed the gifts and opportunities for overcoming them. But if he has done much for us, we have also done everything for him. It is our shipping which enabled him to pay the enormous dividends which his shareholders have lately been receiving, and we have a right to enquire

what limit, if any, he proposes to place on these dividends. We have no desire to solve the question of the canal without M. de Lesseps, still less in opposition to him ; but if he persists in only considering the interests of his shareholders, which are already amply provided for, we shall then be fully justified in endeavouring to solve the difficulty in the manner which may best suit us. There appear to be no insuperable difficulties in the way of an equitable settlement. When shareholders are receiving twenty per cent dividends, and traffic is constantly increasing, we may reasonably demand an immediate and substantial reduction in rates. Possessing, as we do, two-fifths of the entire share capital, being about to advance an enormous sum at a very low rate of interest and contributing four-fifths of the entire revenue, we certainly are entitled to a better representation than we now possess in the councils and administration of the Company. The concession which has been so much discussed lately, stipulates that the direction of the undertaking shall consist of representatives of all the nations interested. It certainly never contemplated the possibility of the Board being composed exclusively, or almost exclusively, of the representatives of one nation. If these very moderate demands are conceded, we may anticipate with tolerable certainty that we shall hear no more complaints on the part of British traders, and no more proposals to interfere with the rights, legal or moral, real or assumed, of M. de Lesseps ; and if, in the future, complaints should arise against a new composite Board, they will be merely of the order of the common outcries against most public companies, and will not possess the characteristics of national antagonism which render the present agitation so peculiarly dangerous.

The military aspect of the canal question need not at present give rise to any serious apprehensions. So long as we remain masters in Egypt, and so long as we maintain a sufficiently powerful navy to keep the command of the seas, the canal will be at our mercy in time of war, as it was proved to be last year.

We are now able to review the whole situation as it at present exists in the Mediterranean. France occupies an undoubtedly strong position on account of the possession of a large seaboard and important naval arsenal in these waters. She has further acquired a considerable portion of the North African coast, and can, if she feels so disposed, create in Tunis a very formidable naval station which will be a perpetual menace to our commerce. Her influence in Syria is unimpaired, and her doings in that

require to be carefully watched, and the further spread of
ence checked. There is strong reason to suspect that she
avouring to foment disturbances between the various
sects in the Lebanon, in order that she may have a
for landing an army there, ostensibly to protect the
as, but really in order to effect a permanent occupation.
long been a favourite project in France. M. Thiers
carry out a similar expedition in 1839. The Emperor
actually did occupy the country in 1860. In each case
rior designs of France were checked by the resolution of
merston, but her influence in Syria has never been eradi-
the contrary has been carefully nursed since the occupation.
It of the French action in 1860 has been thus described by
own Englishman at Constantinople—Mr. Frank Scuda-
his recently published work, *France in the East* :—

ucceeded in giving to the Lebanon an autonomy which has virtually
ce predominant in that part of Syria, and has given her a starting-point
extension of her powers. There can be no doubt that at any moment
ess she be checked by England, can raise Syria, and probably Meso-
ainst the Sultan. That she may choose to do so is one of the contingencies
s have to look forward.

e other hand, in Egypt French political influence has
suffered a severe check, if not total ruin, by the events of

The services which England rendered to the Khedive at
od, and the presence of an English army of occupation,
urally resulted in making our influence for the time
it. It is true that a French Company still holds the canal,
apable of being injurious to British trade; but, as has
nted out, the actual ownership of the water-way can
injurious military influence on a strong power holding
s.

st frankly be acknowledged that if France has recently
her territory in the Mediterranean, the English position
correspondingly strengthened during the last few years.
is we possess an excellent base for operations directed
byria, or any part of the Levant; but the most important
h England has taken in her own interests for many years,
the occupation of Egypt, the one piece of dry land which
tween this island and its Indian possessions. The English
in the Delta of the Nile is an unmixed benefit to the
s, as well as to ourselves, securing, as it does, order to
safety to us. For the first time in our history we can be
to the security of our communications with India, and for
time in their records the people of Egypt possess a shield

against oppression, and a chance of prosperity. Let us earnestly hope, having now established ourselves safely in the country, having got rid of dual controls, French intrigues, and all the other conditions of instability which for so long threatened our security and the peace of the world, that our Government will not be induced to abandon a position of such comfort and consequence, a position which they obtained by good luck, and which they may hold for ever to the benefit of everyone concerned, by the most ordinary display of firmness and tact. So long as we are settled in Egypt, and so long as we keep our neighbours from occupying Syria, we need feel no alarm at their recent acquisitions in the Mediterranean. But if, in a moment of weakness, we allow France to extend her power in Syria and to effect a military occupation, the good of all that we have accomplished in Egypt will be undone.

(To be continued.)

Indian Districts during the Revolt.

By H. G. KEENE, C.I.E.

X.

THE Allahabad "Division"—of which the district of Cawnpore is a constituent—forms the eastern extremity of the famous *doab* with which we have hitherto been concerned. In addition to Cawnpore the other sections are the districts of Fatehpur, Meerpur, Banda, and Allahabad. Regarding the two former there is no more to be said than what has incidentally come before us in looking at Cawnpore. Banda and Allahabad, however, will furnish illustrations of some characteristics of the outbreak, though (principally from want of literary ambition on the part of the narrators) the material is not all that could be desired.

The district of Banda contains a little over three thousand square miles, and the population, at the time of the outbreak, may have been something more than half a million, chiefly Rájputs of more or less pure blood. As in the rest of Bundelkhand (which, from a scientific point of view, it belongs to) the physical properties of the soil have had a good deal to do with the state of the people. Studded with isolated rocks, interspersed among tracts of dry basaltic black soil, it is unfertile unless irrigated, and when irrigated peculiarly unwholesome. In the Banda district there are few large estates or rich landholders; but at the chief town there resided, in 1857, a mediatised prince, the *Amír* Ali Bahádúr, representative of a bastard family of *Khattri* origin who had usurped power there in the anarchy of the last century, and had embraced the creed of Islám. The town stands on the right bank of the river Kén, an important tributary of the Jumna, and is about ninety-five miles south-west of Allahabad.

At the time of the outbreak the chief civil officer was Mr. O. Mayne, who—in spite of his friendly *sobriquet* of "Foggy"—

—was a man who exercised considerable personal influence over those with whom he came in contact. Any defect of insight or scholastic culture was more than compensated by rectitude and energy; the power to see the duty nearest to his hand, the will to carry it out. He died some years ago; a handsome building at Allahabad testifies to the respect and regard of his comrades and subordinates. It is to this gentleman's *Narrative* that we are chiefly indebted for the sketch that follows.

Shortly after receiving news of the disasters at Dehli and Meerut, Mr. Mayne found it necessary to strengthen his police force at out-lying stations, and to put an embargo on the ferries of the Jumna by which persons of a dangerous character might otherwise pass into his territory and stir up a rebellious spirit among the people. The roads were patrolled by horsemen, and strong posts stationed at all the approaches to the town. The English officers personally visited the town police-posts by night, and some of the native gentry and traders were allowed to entertain armed men for their own protection. Help was also obtained from the chief of Ajigarh and other places in the neighbourhood; and these measures were for some time efficacious in maintaining tranquillity. The regular troops consisted of three companies of the 1st Native Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Bennett.

But the elements of disaster were too strong. First, there was the depressed condition of the people of the district, "ruined"—it is the Magistrate and Collector who says so—"by over-assessment and . . . half-starving." Then came proclamations issued by the British authorities at Agra, apparently without Mr. Mayne's consent. Released convicts from the broken jails of the neighbouring districts soon poured in, confirming and exaggerating the news of trouble elsewhere. The first outbreak in the district was not a military mutiny but a rural rising; a Tahsili (Sub-Collector's office) was sacked, and the records were destroyed by the villagers, "in order (as they said) that no record of their liabilities might remain to the new government." The process was repeated in other quarters and Mayne saw the tide of rebellion rising rapidly all round him as he sat at his solitary post at Banda; his deputy, Mr. Cockerell, holding a still more lonely watch at the head-quarters of the sub-division of Kirwi. The native officials, generally, showed much staunchness, remaining at their posts as long as they could do any good by remaining; not a few being killed or wounded in the defence of Government property. Still, it

plain that there was not in Banda that backbone of popular energy and good-will which existed in some districts and which enabled Dunlop, for example, to make such short work with revolt in Meerut. A warning against the too frequent practice of treating unpleasant districts as penal settlements for unsuccessful or disfavoured officers, a practice to which was probably attributable the depressed condition of the Banda peasantry. On rare occasions—as in Mayne's own case—a distinguished officer would be sent to a place like this, being promoted for the purpose before his time ; but usually the other course is believed to have been adopted. Men who were not esteemed by " Government " were deputed to these stations ; feeling themselves discredited and ill-used, they worked sulkily and without zeal ; and the people, as of old, suffered for the folly of their rulers, and bore them no affection.

Nor was the condition of the town itself much more assuring. Mutinous talk was heard among the sepoys, though as a body they were still trusted ; Mayne even went the length of sending much of his treasure to other districts under guards of these men, and confiding the balance to the care of the detachment, in whose lines he deposited the specie. An attempt was made to fortify the jail as a place of refuge, but this had to be subsequently abandoned on sanitary grounds.

On the morning of the 8th June, as Mr. Mayne was sitting in his office, word was brought that a body of horse was approaching the bridge of boats at Chilatára on the Jumna. An *émeute* in the town took place at once and plundering commenced. The police were employed with effect, and the ladies were removed into the Nawáb's palace. In the meanwhile it was discovered that the supposed invaders were in truth the English refugees from Fatehpur, conducted by Mr. Sherer ; and this party arrived in Banda the same evening. But unfortunately the native officer stationed at the bridge had thought fit to accompany them ; the road being thus left open, bands of rebels followed, and general demoralisation was soon displayed.

The ladies therefore remained in the palace, which was guarded by some of the English gentlemen, while others—among whom Sherer was conspicuous—took part in patrolling the town. On the night of the 12th, in spite of these precautions, two bungalows were burned, and the English began to make the palace defensible. Whatever they could do against outward enemies they seem to have done ; unhappily some, at least, of their foes were of their own household.

On the 14th the detachment of the 1st received news of the mutiny of the regiment at Cawnpore. The 53rd broke out on the same day at the neighbouring station of Hamirpur and murdered the Christians at that station. Bennett reported his men as being utterly beyond control, and was accordingly put in command of a small body of the Nawáb's men, with whose aid Mayne proposed to disarm the men of the 1st and make them give up the ammunition and treasure in their possession. Bennett showed the utmost coolness and resolution; the Nawáb wavered and vacillated for awhile, but was kept up to the mark by Mayne. The attack, however, proved a failure; Bennett's subalterns, Fraser and Clerk, were chased from the parade-ground with jeers, and esteemed fortunate in being able to join the refugees in the palace. All was over, for the time. The detachment was in successful mutiny, joined by the Nawáb's men; and all that was left for Mayne and his associates was to make the best retreat in their power, hampered as they were by the presence of seventeen women and a number of children, for whose safety they were responsible. Mr. H. B. Webster* with a few volunteers clearing the way, they left Banda at 8 o'clock that evening, reaching the friendly fort of Kalinjar at the end of their first march. They had hardly left the town before the station (European) was in a blaze, which lighted them ten miles on their way.

Meanwhile Cockerell had also left his untenable post at Kirwi. On the morning after Mayne's departure (15th June) he rode into Banda, where he was shot down at the gateway of the palace. The refugees reached Mirzápur after a long but unmolested march; and Sherer, proceeding to Allahabad, joined Havelock's advance on Cawnpore, while Mayne remained for the time watching his opportunity to recover his district.

Meantime the Nawáb had endeavoured to take charge, sometimes obeyed, sometimes opposed by the sepoys. All the remaining Christians were gradually hunted down and murdered. The contagion spread rapidly through the district; old scores were paid, auction-purchasers and decree-holders were ousted, caravans were stopped and plundered, the reign of anarchy prevailed as in the old days before the British conquest. "Never was revolution more rapid, never more complete." [Mayne].

The sepoys marched off to Cawnpore on the 19th with the treasure and ammunition; and the Nawáb, relieved by their

* Since the able Inspector-General of Police, N.W.P.

departure, set to work to form a government, though with a heavy heart, and secret wishes for the return of the British. With them he attempted to open correspondence through Mayne, by whom, however, his letters were not answered. The fort of Alinjar continued to be held by Lieutenant Remington, of the 23rd Native Infantry. The rest of the district became more and more a moral wilderness, though imperfect order was maintained in the precincts of the town of Banda, whose citizens were harried by pecuniary requisitions.

About the beginning of April, 1858, the chief's eyes began to be opened to his false position. While he had been doing his best to guard against small bodies of British troops crossing the Jumna, he suddenly heard of the approach of the Madras column from the south-west under General Whitlock. The first action was fought at Kalrai, twenty-four miles from Banda, on the 17th April, when the Nawáb's troops retreated and saved their guns. On the 19th they were again driven off from a nearer field, and pursued up to the banks of the Kén, on which the town of Banda stands: the town itself was occupied without resistance on the following day.

"In a district," says Mr. Mayne, "in which our prestige had suffered so severely, from which we had been nearly a year absent, and where so many different bands of mutineers from time to time had congregated, and where the rebel government had been so long supreme, it was necessary that our return should be accompanied with a force sufficient to make a strong demonstration, to overawe all opposition, and at once to disarm and disperse the disaffected."

Having this requisite, the magistrate resumed his duties on the 29th April, and at once set to work to re-establish his authority. He adds, however, the humiliating confession that the conduct of the British troops was for several weeks far from what was suited to reassure "the frightened and doubting natives." And there were two chiefs still at Kirwi, retaining possession of the eastern half of the district, with 15,000 men and forty pieces of artillery; moreover, tact and judgment were required in restoring order where the whole district had rebelled, and "there was not a village marked in the map that had not, more or less, committed itself." He therefore wisely determined single out a few of the most guilty in each Pargana, in which the extreme severity should be exercised; contenting himself with levying pecuniary compensation for the offences committed by the others. A column of demonstration swept the country,

being everywhere well received, save in two places which harboured notorious offenders, and where due examples were made. Major Dallas, who commanded this column, was an officer of judgment and intelligence, whose firm yet conciliatory proceedings met with due acknowledgment from the able magistrate. A new police force was organised, the Tahsils were reopened, and on the 1st June the general proceeded in person to the reduction of Kirwi. At the same time the rebels were driven from Kalpi by Sir Hugh Rose; and the tranquil occupation of the entire district quickly ensued. About four-and-twenty villages that had obtained an evil prominence in crime were burned, and their head men hanged or flogged, while a few more armed demonstrations sufficed for the entire restoration of order. Mr. Mayne modestly attributes this rapid progress to all causes except his own great determination and local knowledge; and he concludes his report with the quaint suggestion that "no greater boon could be bestowed on the North-West Provinces than to dissolve the Regulations and Acts altogether." This *saif* aspiration for the substitution of personal government for the reign of Law was fortunately disregarded; it is only mentioned here as an illustration of the absence of statesman-like insight which is not inseparable from great administrative capacity in the ranks of the Indian Civil Service. The concluding words are alike characteristic of the humanity and of the loyalty of the class:—

"Since closing the report the Queen's proclamation assuming the government of the country has been issued. . . . and all prisoners under trial who came under the amnesty have been released, to the number of upwards of 300 men.

"God save the Queen."

XI.

In Book XVII. of his *History of the Indian Mutiny* (Vol. III., p. 399 of the first edition), Colonel Malleison gives some sample sketches of the work of civil officers during the revolt which it has been our present business to study in detail. In speaking of Allahabad, the author mentions, as fully as the proportions of his work allowed, the condition of the town and station; but it will be here necessary to expand those terse and just paragraphs, and to endeavour to give some idea of the only there, but in the outlying tracts of which Allah

the "Division," or Commissionership of Allahabad contains, already stated, a large tract of country divided into administrative districts, in some of which authority was, for a time, completely swept away. The district especially named after the river is of considerable extent—the area being 2,765 square miles—and the population is very various, being marked off with some sharpness by geographical limits. The principal rivers are the Jumna and the Ganges, the latter partly flowing in its borders, partly separating it from Mirzapur and Oude. The total number of inhabitants in 1857 was about one million, not all Hindus; in the Duáb, however, (the portion between the two great rivers,) the estates were largely held by Muslims. In 1857, by them, the people rose in actual rebellion; the Brahmans, however, lived by the pilgrimages to be presently described took the opposite line: a man of obscure origin who assumed the title of "Mahant" (Mollah, or Doctor of Divinity), raised the green flag and preached a crescentade; the district police joined, and a general anarchy was for a time established. Beyond the Ganges, so far as it intersects the district, there were other rivers and other interests. Here the estates were large and held by Rájput clans, some of whom, ruined by their own mismanagement, had been dispossessed by mortgagees and money-lenders; but still maintained their prestige among the cultivating classes, who are believed to have paid them out of which they maintained some degree of comfort and position, supplemented by plunder, even in the quietest times. To the south of the Jumna, where neither set of conditions prevailed, three well-affected chiefs preserved some show of power, one of them especially—the Mándá Raja—taking charge of the public treasure and managing the police.

In the town itself great elements of confusion existed. Although, as a Mughal settlement, it was not a place of any but local importance, it had preserved traditions of sanctity from the days of Asoka, the contemporary of the ancient Macedonian Alexander, whose obelisk still stands in the fort, bearing the celebrated edicts of the reforming monarch. In a grotto close by stands the *Akshai Bat*, representative of the sacred tree of Ashoka, watered by subterranean droppings believed by the Hindus to be the reappearance of the Saraswati, "the lost river" of the Sirhind plain, which, according to them, returns here to join the Jumna and Ganges in their united course to the sea.

Thus honoured, the "meeting of the waters" has for two

thousand years continued, in spite of political, even of religious, revolutions, to be the holiest spot in Hindustan; the "field of bliss," where it is more meritorious to bestow the smallest copper coin in alms than it would be to lavish the largest sums elsewhere. Naturally, such a place would be the hunting-ground of religious mendicants, the scene of some of those bathing-fairs that form, in so many sacred river-sites, the combined resorts of pleasure and piety among the simple folk of Hindustan. As at Hardwúr, Muttra, Benares, so here, numerous gatherings take place on various festal days; while in the pleasant season of Indian winter the plateau between the Jumna and the fort is frequented by a special attendance that collects on an average little less than a quarter of a million of human beings. To minister to the zeal of the pilgrims, to slake their thirst for instruction, and to initiate them into the accurate observance of rite and mystery, a large confraternity of idle friars has been formed whom ignorant Europeans are in the habit of designating by the name of *Fakirs* (borrowed from Mahamadanism), but whose special description is *Prágwals*, or "Brothers of the Confluence."

Mention has been made of the fort. The obelisk and grotto point to the conclusion that the place was considered important as far back as the days of the Palibothran Empire. But the present structure dates from A.D. 1575, when the great Mughal monarch, Akbar, was engaged in the final struggle with the *Sharki*, or Eastern, dynasty of Afghan kings. It was then that he saw the advantage of establishing a place of arms at the spot where his dominions in Hindustan were most open to invasion, and whence they could most profitably direct the channel of attack. The old castle has lost much of its mediæval aspect in being adapted to the purposes of modern warfare under its present masters, the British. In the words of Heber, "the lofty towers have been pruned down, the high stone ramparts topped with turf parapets, and obscured by a green sloping glacis." Massive barracks and magazines conceal or even replace the council-halls and seraglios of the Mughals; whose great gateway—still a splendid relic in Heber's days—is now completely masked by the modern stucco-and-brick-work of "the Wellesley-Ravelin."

In the spring of 1857 the garrison comprehended a wing of the Sikh "Regiment of Ferozpur," and the 6th Native Infantry; two troops of Irregular Cavalry, under Captain Hardinge and Lieutenant A. Alexander, came in from Partabgarh, by order of

Sir H. Lawrence; and—most valuable of all—sixty British artillerymen were sent for from the invalid depôt at Chunar, under command of an old Haileybury man, Lieutenant the Hon. C. J. D. Arbuthnott, who afterwards did excellent service with the levies in Bahár.

The morning of the 6th June dawned in apparent quiet. Some of the white folks had sought safety in the fort, which was garrisoned by the invalided gunners and the Sikhs. These latter were not yet trusted. It was known that men of that class had misconducted themselves at Benares, where indeed a sister regiment had just met with punishment, as will be shown hereafter. It was not known that the Sikh nation, and the people of the Punjab in general, were to make common cause with the British against their old enemies the Hindustanis. It is even stated by Mr. Fendall Thompson, the writer of the official *Narrative*, that the authorities of Allahabad had been warned against trusting their Sikh sepoy by Sir Henry Lawrence himself, the friend of that race. The treasure, therefore, was not entrusted to the Sikhs nor brought into the fort, although one hundred and ten volunteers had been armed from the arsenal and added to the strength of the garrison.

The chiefs of the British administration were Mr. Charles Chester, the Commissioner, and Mr. M. Court, the Magistrate. On the latter devolved, in virtue of his office, the responsibility of not moving the treasure and the whole details of preparation. The day passed on. In the afternoon a parade was held in cantonments for the purpose of reading to the men of the 6th the letter of thanks addressed to them by the Governor-General in Council on their volunteering to march against their insurgent comrades at Dehli. At 8 P.M. the different detachments of the garrison marched to their respective batteries, and sentries posted on the ramparts kept a brisk look-out. They had not long to wait. At 9 o'clock a rocket was seen to rise from the bridge of boats, answered by a similar signal from the lines of the 6th Native Infantry in cantonments. Shortly after firing was heard; and presently a note was brought from Lieutenant Harward, R.A., announcing that the sepoy had carried off two guns, and that he had gone in pursuit with two troops of Irregular Cavalry under Lieutenant Alexander. The rest is well known. Alexander was shot in charging the guns; Harward and others swam the river twice and got into the fort; five officers of the 6th and eight unposted cadets were murdered in or near the mess-house; the jail was thrown open, the

station was fired, plunder and slaughter raged ; by morning thirty-nine persons of Christian blood had perished.

At the inner main-gate of the fort—near the above-mentioned Wellesley Ravelin—a company of the 6th remained, sympathising perhaps with their comrades outside but afraid to follow their example. These were at once disarmed by the volunteers and expelled from the fort. This measure was ably carried out by Lieutenant Brasyer, of the Sikh Regiment, one of the veterans almost peculiar in those days to the East India Company's service, who had risen from the ranks, and was destined to rise still higher. But it is not my part to dwell on military merit, however conspicuous. I return to my own subject. The disarming being happily accomplished without bloodshed or accident of any sort, the English in the fort began to breathe freely. On the 9th some confusion was caused by the misconduct of some of the volunteers who, being sent to remove stores from the Steam-Agency premises, took to plundering and drunkenness on their own account. But this was not followed by any serious consequences at the moment ; and on the 11th Colonel Neill, arriving from Calcutta with forty men, at once assumed command, and began to restore discipline among the volunteers and the Sikhs who had followed the example of disorganisation. In the meantime the mutineers of the 6th Native Infantry had crossed the river with their plunder ; but they had thrown away their arms for greater convenience in carrying bags of specie, and as soon as they crossed the river they were set upon by the villagers and spoiled of their ill-gotten gains. Disarmed and demoralised, they dispersed and became tramps, so that, as a body, they were never heard of more. Of the Irregulars many remained faithful ; and, being sent out into the district, rescued a party of beleaguered Christians—Major and Mrs. Ryves and some railway employés—all of whom were safely conducted into the fort with the exception of the lady, who unhappily sank under her fatigues.

At this time the city and suburbs were in open rebellion under the Maulvi already mentioned, whose preaching had commended him as a leader to the disaffected population. His head-quarters were at the Khushru Garden, opposite the railway-station, whither he had conveyed the two guns taken from Lieutenant Harward on the night of the outbreak. Having first secured the bridge of boats, Neill organised an expedition against these rebels. On the 13th the suburbs near the fort were cleared ; on

the 14th the steamer *Jumna* arrived with further reinforcements; on the 17th a party of volunteers, under Mr. H. D. Willock, the joint magistrate, supported by some men of Neill's famous regiment, the Madras Fusiliers, and by two howitzers under Harward, proceeded up the river, and, in co-operation with another party headed by Neill, drove the rebels from the town. The Maulvi and his followers abandoned their guns and fled; Mr. Court, proceeding to the chief police-station, restored his authority over the town and reinstated his officers; on the 18th the "station" (White Town) was occupied, and the cantonments were penetrated.

Unfortunately, the exposure and licence of the past began to tell, in the shape of a violent outbreak of cholera, to which no less than forty of the priceless Fusiliers at once succumbed. Neill immediately thinned the population of the fort by ordering out all non-combatants, and (the re-occupation of the station and cantonment rendering this easier) the epidemic disappeared as suddenly as it had broken out. Drafts of men now arrived daily, and soon nothing remained to hinder the advance upon Cawnpore but the difficulty of procuring transport in a locality that had been so scourged and ravaged. On the 30th, Major Renaud was able to start with a small column. Alas! Wheeler had already capitulated—with consequences that we know.

On the 1st July General Havelock reached Allahabad, and on the 11th joined Renaud at Khága with a strong column of foot and three guns. Next morning they had their first brush with the enemy, headed by Hickmat-Ulla, revolted deputy-collector of Fatehpur. Mr. Willock, being with the "faithful" Irregulars, was put to flight by a charge of the 2nd Bengal Cavalry, no doubt owing to the sympathising of his men, who were soon after disbanded by order of General Havelock. Let it be mentioned, however, that the British officers displayed their usual gallantry, and that the Risáldár (native captain) of the Irregulars was killed bravely doing his duty.

Mr. Willock may now be left, as he has proceeded beyond the limits of his district, and we return to Mr. Court at Allahabad. Here the work of retribution and restoration was in stern progress. Numbers of those who had taken an active part in the disturbances that ensued upon the mutiny of the 6th were in hiding in and about the town, and it was upon them that vengeance was in the first instance directed. On the 22nd July "special commissions" were issued to certain individuals, one of whom was a well-known railway contractor, and the work of

reprisal began in fatal earnest. "The result of these measures," writes Mr. Thompson, "was soon visible in a wholesome fear pervading all classes of natives—plundered property was cast into the fields and roads by those who felt that its possession was unsafe." The sentence contains more than, perhaps, was meant. Fear, whether "wholesome" or not, was certainly felt by "all classes"—whether criminal or not. A *terreur blanche* was set up. "Zealously," writes an observer who was present,* "did the commissioners use their powers; and, in the short time which elapsed before their recall, one of these private individuals had sentenced sixty, the second sixty-four, and the civil-surgeon fifty-four, to the gallows. No record remains of crime or evidence, but we gather that one man was hanged for having a bag of new copper coin in his possession. . . . Thirteen were hung another day for a similar offence. Six were hung for plying a ferry for the convenience of the rebels" (by whom they must have been shot if they had refused). Mr. Cust, however, adds that the proceedings of the trained officials, sensible of responsibility and accustomed to balance proof and disproof, were more deliberate. Indeed, it is to be hoped so.

At all events, Allahabad was now safe. But the country was much disturbed. The usual agrarian outrages set in; landmarks were removed, new proprietors evicted, vendettas enforced, Europeans hunted down. The Prágwál Brahmans spread over the villages, abusing their supposed sanctity and their personal influence to mislead the simple credulous villagers; and the Maulvi flaunted his green banner. When authority recovered the upper hand these tracts were entirely deserted, and great difficulty and delay were experienced before the operations of peace could be renewed there.

It has already been mentioned that the tracts beyond the Jumna had escaped the general demoralisation. Here three chiefs, the Rájás of Mándá, Dáhía, and Barra, had frowned upon all attempts at misconduct, and were prepared to receive the Government officers with open arms and a clear conscience.

Beyond the Ganges, on the other hand, the Rájput clans had seized the opportunity to sweep away all that opposed the resumption of the power that they had forfeited by a long career of idleness and extravagance. Strong in the sympathies of the tenantry, they long continued to maintain a guerilla warfare against the Government that had, in their opinion, caused their losses. They were assisted by escaped convicts and, doubtless,

* Cust's "District during the Rebellion."—*Calcutta Review*.

mutinous sepoys ; and it was not till the beginning of 1858 that serious measures could be taken for their suppression. In January a force, under Brigadier Campbell, left Allahabad, driving all opposition before it, occupied the Grand Trunk Road and surrounding country, as far as Phulpur. Then came punitive troops from Oude, flying before the column commanded General Franks,* and causing fresh disorganisation. "Order not," concludes Mr. Thompson's *Narrative*, "he said to have been effectually restored until Brigadier Berkeley took the stronghold of Dehion (Dahán) on the 14th of July. With that event the turbances consequent on the mutiny may be said to have been ended in the district of Allahabad." [*Vide* Malleson, iii. 280.] Some pictures of civil administration in this troublous time have been extracted by Colonel Malleson† from Mr. Cust's most valuable paper. In addition to his other powers, Mr. Court was trusted with authority for the levying of fines upon offenders, individual and corporate, and for the confiscation of estates. Lord Canning went to Allahabad in the beginning of 1858, and took over the local government from Mr. J. P. Grant, who, having ministered firmly during a most trying time, returned to Lucknow to take up the post of President of the Supreme Council. When the Lieutenant-Governorship of the province was vacant, and Allahabad became henceforth marked out as the future seat of government.

Supported by the immediate presence of the Governor-General (no longer fettered by any assessors), Mr. Court proceeded with arduous duties. In all things he displayed the moral and intellectual resources of a well-born and well-trained English officer. His work was varied and complicated to a degree bordering on distraction. Unadjusted items, of the smallest as well as of the largest amount, swelled his inefficient balance, arising from payments that had often to be made on the spur of the moment, and must sometimes have been unsupported by vouchers. Thus, it is asserted by Mr. Cust that spies and emissaries had to be occasionally rewarded by being allowed to put their hands into a bag of silver and appropriate as much as they could grasp! Supplies of cash, and not of cash only, had to be constantly made to advancing columns, and assistance promptly rendered to officers of the commissariat and ordnance departments. The writer calls to mind a case in which one of these items remained unadjusted for nearly ten years. At the same time, though treasure was continually pouring in from

* Malleson, ii. 328-9.

† Vol. iii. pp. 442 ff.

Calcutta, revenue had in due course to be realised from the villages, wasted by war and rapine, and from fields often deserted by their cultivators; or, where not realised, formal proceedings of suspension, equally of course, had to be recorded. For, as Mr. Cust (himself a high revenue authority) most justly remarks, it often became "a grave moral question how far a government is justified in demanding the payment of taxes when it has notoriously failed in its duty of protection." Other features of the district officer's care-ridden career will be found most graphically pictured in Mr. Cust's pleasant paper, among which may be noted the keeping of an unpaid hotel. For his house at Allahabad became known as the rendezvous of visitors; and many survivors, officials and travellers, must still recollect the rough but ready hospitality of "The Red Lion."

"No wonder," concludes Mr. Cust, "if some grey hairs showed in his beard, if his heart sometimes palpitated from over-excitement, and his liver sometimes troubled him. . . . He had much to bear; and the rebellion fell heavily on his estate, his family, and his health. He was mentioned in no despatches,* the thanks of Government reached him not; and, when he saw that the tide had turned and that the country was saved, he hurried to England, on the chance of rest bringing back tone to his body and change of scene restoring equanimity to his mind."

Mr. Court is, I believe, still enjoying the *otium cum dignitate* of a country gentleman in his native land. If the labours of other officers were more martial and, so far, more conspicuous, few of his contemporaries exceeded him in those equally useful exertions by which the work of the sword is supported and rendered possible.

* *Vide* Extract from Dunlop in introductory remarks.

Our Old and New Systems.

BY C. J. STONE, LATE 85TH REGIMENT.


Twelve years ago an administrator appears to have been selected for the army upon the principle that he was absolutely without acquaintance with military matters. But he was too great and lucid intellect to bear upon the requirements of the profession of arms. The dull, stagnant, or pre-conceived ideas of starched martinets, or pipe-clayed officials, were dispelled, and light and life infused into them. The army was to participate in the progress of the age, and, at the bidding of schemes intelligently formulated on paper, the young manhood of the country was to volunteer for service with regular precision.

It was delightful, at the great manœuvres of 1871, to see the first-class man and ex-President of the Board of Ordnance at Aldershot as head of the army. In civilian attire, on a pony, he rode amongst the plumed staff officers, the perfection of Intellect amidst the gallant and brilliant but dull-scarlet and gold-laced galaxy of war. And forthwith great and small were brought into operation. The elements of the service were to be "welded" together. The qualities of the civilian were to adorn the valour of the soldier. Regiments were to become quite domesticated in their quarters as their pride and delight; and desertion, drunkenness, and disorder were to disappear with the abolition of the indignant lash. Conservative Governments revised but did not execute the Liberal changes. At vast expense handsome buildings were erected for the reception of the new brigade depôts. Yet, all this, it has to be confessed that, notwithstanding increased numbers and supposed advantages, our small army is unable to stand up to its standard; while the militia is also deficient in its arms.

The history of our army would seem clearly to demonstrate that we possessed, before the late changes, a system admirably adapted to the requirements of a nation which refuses to accept of universal conscription. A system of brigade depôts, established

in counties, would, of course, be exceedingly useful if a general levy of the district were demanded. But it was most unreasonable to suppose that recruits would respond to the requirements in equal proportions throughout the country. It was also obvious that a man who had enlisted especially to serve in the regiment of his county would be more likely to be disgusted at being transferred to another corps, than a man who merely exchanged the 24th for the 25th.

Our regiments had, for the most part, the attraction of county titles, without being allowed that familiarity with the county which is capable of breeding contempt. As has been urged, a regiment, with the inspiring accompaniments of music and military glitter, must present attractions, if military ardour has not absolutely decayed. But a dépôt usually affords by no means an exhilarating spectacle of the pomp and circumstance of war. An old sergeant attending to the barrack garden, a small batch of recruits standing on one leg in the goose-step, and a party of officers and ladies playing at lawn tennis, present a picture of what may have been lately seen in our expensively constructed brigade dépôts. Formerly it was wisely held advisable not to let our "marching regiments" become too strictly localised, for fear lest the barrack should become too home-like. We have been accustomed to associate the military spirit with the vagrant love of adventure. In the militia, intended only for home defence, we offered a purely local service; and, from the middle of the last century to the Crimean war, the histories of our regiments show that the militia continually operated as a feeder for the Line.

According to the valuable list of officers appended by Captain Trimen to his *Memoir of the 35th Royal Sussex Regiment*, eighteen ensigns and lieutenants of militia were gazetted to ensigncies, and one to a lieutenancy, in that regiment in the year 1799, when strenuous efforts were made to increase our army; and a corresponding number of militia privates raised the regiment to two full battalions. It is an old story that Waterloo was largely fought by militiamen, who still wore their old uniforms. Yet it has been considered by our doctrinaires of the day that the connection could only be secured by vast expenditure, and all sorts of alterations in names and uniforms. For instance, there was the 3rd Middlesex, or Royal West-

 Light Infantry, which was called by the men the
 Stingers, from its head-quarters at Turnham Green: its
 ment was very popular amongst the costermongers.

and others of the purlieus of Westminster. If in the old days they had wanted to associate it with the 57th or 77th, the Middlesex regiments of the Line, they would have adopted the simple expedient of quartering them together. Now the Royal Westminster has been converted into the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers (City of London). It would certainly seem probable that, in the event of extended war, a Londoner might be deterred from enlisting lest he should find himself actually in the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers, and ordered on foreign service. Our militia has formed an excellent army for home defence. Conscription might be ordered for it at any time by Parliament, without that injustice which conscription for our lengthy foreign service would seem to entail. Yet our militia has been converted into sham battalions annexed to the Line. Their position seems sufficiently doubtful to deter any patriot from enlisting, who is dubious about going so far as to become an actual soldier liable to foreign service.

In fact, the Line and Militia were formerly friends, but the late endeavours have been directed towards making them man and wife. From the diverse nature of the duties expected of them, it would appear to have been better to have let their connection remain thus pliant. Our noble marching regiments, proudly bearing their county, royal, or other titles, retained their local sympathies, but found their actual homes throughout the world. The *esprit de corps* was promoted by the sense of completeness in the individual establishment, of which the number was often the proudest appellation. But certainly the county connection was not forgotten. When the 35th returned from the Mediterranean, in 1818, it was ordered to Sussex, and in its own county the Duchess of Richmond, wife of its Colonel, presented it with colours.

Of late years the idea of quartering a regiment in its county never seems to have occurred to the authorities. It has been lately held that the association could only be maintained by spending a great amount of money in these local establishments. If they had only given the soldier the amount of pay under the old system which he now obtains, and advertised the regiment in the county, recruits would doubtless have been procured in greatly increased numbers, without expenditure in building, &c. In regard to our terms of service, it is, of course, absolutely in accordance with justice that the inhabitants of a country, when all are compelled to serve, should only be retained with the colours for a short time. When all have to spend three years

or so in the army, as on the Continent, no unfair start is obtained by one young man in his vocation of life over another. But would any one of our advocates of short service recommend the son of his own gardener or cottage tenant to pass from three to six years voluntarily in the army, instead of at once embarking in the study or practice of his intended vocation? Must he not necessarily lose in the race of life with other young men by passing some years in military service? And no one practically acquainted with a barrack-room can say that it is likely to be a valuable school for morals in our service for many years to come. Of course his army experiences will benefit him in many ways, but the disadvantages would seem to preponderate. The mere vagabonds will not be injured, but why not endeavour to keep them? Why should not a man enter upon the career of a soldier for life? The pay of non-commissioned officers, also, ought to be augmented so as to offer prizes in the career. If a young man enters upon the business of a blacksmith he usually has to make up his mind to remain in it; and such was formerly the case in embracing a military career. If it can be shown that pensioning old soldiers would be more expensive than our present system, it would at least give us an army of veterans. And surely fifty rather than forty ought to be the limit of age considered efficient; or, rather, ought not each individual to be held efficient or otherwise upon his own merits, instead of a hard and fast line being drawn to include the strong and weak constitutions in one general average?

In regard to officers, that retirement should be permitted on half-pay after twenty years' service, and on full pay after thirty years', would seem reasonable. That they should be compelled to retire, however full of zeal and energy, and be pensioned off by their country at the early age at which officers have lately had to leave the service, seems curiously preposterous as a system. As for promotion, it is not likely to stagnate too long in our essentially active army. Promotion purchased upon such terms only occasions more discontent than temporary stagnation. What, then, ought to be done in this latter case? It would seem reasonable to allow officers to serve so long as they are efficient, as in other professions; and to permit promotion to find its own level, as in other walks of life. Temporary measures may be made to relieve such stagnation as may threaten the general efficiency of the service.

In regard to the men, ask them to make the army their pro-

mission also, so long as they are efficient, then discharge them with pensions. Give them increased pay after certain periods of service. Find for them places as porters in Government offices and the like. Let a superior class of non-commissioned officers have increased pay, grant occasional commissions to educated soldiers. While strictly enforcing discipline, remove as far as possible, after careful consideration, the constant petty restrictions and annoyances which have so harassed our soldiers; and give them increased leave of absence when on home service. In fact, endeavour to render the military life as slightly irksome as possible. And why should not a soldier under long service, fully acquainted with his drill, be even encouraged to earn money at such a trade as carpentering? The efficiency of the battalion in war need not be injured by its losing somewhat in appearance upon parade in peace. The efficiency might be fully promoted by allowing drilled soldiers to do something besides continually going through the old movements and inspections.

By restoring numbers to the double battalion regiments which have been organised, and quartering one of the battalions as often as possible at its county depôt, districts may learn to take a pride in them. But if the county connection is to be conserved, the greatest care ought to be taken to avoid drafting from one regiment to another. Better allow the regiment to sink from a double to a single battalion regiment, if its county floods little military ardour, than maintain its strength by ringing involuntary reinforcements from another regiment. And let the militia, again, be distinctly separated; so that the soldier for foreign service, and the militiaman for home defence, may be perfectly aware of their respective situations. An efficient militia will always form a reliable reserve, as has been demonstrated in our past; and it was, in fact, our only real reserve in the late war, for our so-called reserves were sent to the front with the first troops employed.

As it would seem that many would prefer not to enlist in their own districts, let perfect freedom prevail in the choice of regiments by recruits. Let a man select his corps or county, just as a gentleman purchases an estate and endeavours to become incorporated with his new locality. It may be doubtful whether it could not have been better to have simply allowed regiments on home service to have been quartered as often as possible in their own counties; then to have linked depôts of regiments on foreign service in battalions, selected so as to be stationed near

their respective districts—returning in some measure to the system of some years ago. But as we have constructed the dépôt brigades, we ought, of course, to endeavour to make the best of them; and it would seem that a return to number and to long service rendered as attractive as possible, may again give our regiments the old sense of home which they appear to have lost in the estimation of both officers and men.

Why should a commanding officer be removed after five years just when he has become thoroughly acquainted with his duties? Surely a more stringent inspection to ensure that only efficient officers remain would be more reasonable. And essentially care ought to be taken to procure the maintenance of discipline without the perpetual worrying or even bullying which has so often been the curse of regiments, and the fruitful cause of desertion.

If it is untrue that our comparatively small army of about 180,000, including English and Anglo-Indian armies, is several thousands deficient; if it is also untrue that the standard of the Guards has been reduced to 5 feet 7 inches, and that of the Line to 5 feet 4 inches, with a chest measurement of under 33 inches; and if it is the case that crime and desertion are not materially lessened; finally, if what we have called reserves were not employed to raise to a war footing the first line of regiments ordered on foreign service in the late war: then ought apologies to be made to those styled doctrinaires. The aspersions cast upon them for inducing large expenditure for useless aims, contrary to the bulk of military opinion, ought to be humbly withdrawn. But apparently neither officers nor men are at present contented; and the popularity of the army in the country is not manifested by any accretion of recruits. In fact, common sense seems to recognise the absurdity of any man's voluntarily entering upon a career which shall endure for only a few years of his life. Unless, indeed, he should cherish the ambition of becoming a commissionaire, it is difficult for the less subtle military intelligence to see what ultimate advantage he can attain. And then the possible loss of life or limb may deter even the adventurous spirit from risking so much for very doubtful benefits. On the other hand, if pensions are to be given they ought to be earned by the best years of a life.

The Morale of the Recruiting Question.

BY J. H. LAWRENCE-ARCHER.

governing Class, and not alone in England, has viewed satisfaction—tempered, however, with that “cast of thought” wisely checks the otherwise over-sanguine—the activity displayed by the great and good, the rich and the actual, the enterprising and the politic, in casting the apples of Hippomenes before the merciless and encroaching Atlanta, who, in these latter days, is known to us, as “Mary” Every reasonable concession has been, from time to time made to the impulsive and unwise masses in Europe; even in Asia, we are already contemplating the early of a premature (if, indeed, ever possible with regard to our safety) experiment in the same direction. Magnificent entertainments invite, at small cost, the lovers of sensuousness to forget homely cares, and the periodic visit of the collectors of revenue. Marvellous exhibitions of Art and charm those, in easier circumstances, who have had to develop more intellectual tastes. Living chess-men, military precision, have made their startling moves, at the command, on the chequered floor of “the Circus.” Countries innumerable draw the *residuum* from their dens, to the visible presentment of that greatness and opulence of which they are invited to regard themselves as an integral part; the latest, and, perhaps, the most really important idea, in the form of an International Fisheries Exhibition, is a vital question, and, appropriately under the warm and genial auspices of the great “Sea Queen” of the age, reveals the bountiful harvest of the sea, as the natural source of food supply, for the insular people, at present painfully dependent on foreign supplies. In short, there is nothing wanting in our modern materialism, but the reality of mortal combats on the stage, or in the arena, to provoke the sentiment of pity amongst those who

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are, perhaps, too comfortable to realise the full import of human suffering, without such a stimulus.

But in the midst of our prosperity, some political Wilhelm Meister may say, "This gaiety afflicts me, for they are not happy;" and it is in vain that we dismiss to "Stygian cave forlorn" the rabble of croakers, alarmists, and pessimists, when it is undeniable that, look in what direction we may, obscure and portentous objects seem to be in motion. Here it is the conflict between Democracy, and Oligarchical principles, there the rapprochement between Imperialism, and Democracy against Constitutional Government, or between either against the third; while a forced education of the masses beyond their actual requirements, unites a dangerous knowledge with poverty, and science with crime. Moreover, under such circumstances, emigration, or revolution, are the outlets for a population surcharged with a highly artificial civilisation, which interferes with their natural wants, and which the poor, regarding as a despotism, yearn to cast off by one or the other alternative; while, at the same time, the means taken by the benevolent, to increase the comforts of the lower orders without a corresponding exertion on their part, tends to that state of enervation and dependency, or, on the other hand, Communistic presumption, that, despite the most strenuous efforts, on the stage and elsewhere, to keep alive and enhance the martial spirit, certainly and injuriously affects the sources whence armies are drawn, and prepares for conscription. Indeed, it is a curious paradox that, with the increase of knowledge and civilisation, armies are more than ever necessary, to prevent overwrought progress (as regards the multitude) completing the cycle, in the gradual course of time, to what may be pardonably termed primordial imbecility, as may be inferred from the exhausting although noble efforts made to educate the rising generation to a higher standard than its physical powers perhaps justify, and the slightest relaxation of which, as teachers know, may drive even apparently the most promising from the path of success, and upon that downward incline that suggests degeneracy.

Thus, while the political world is exercised with the question of "bloated armaments," a writer in one of the daily papers, on "Education or Death," discusses the other high pressure problem, warning us, like the soothsayer, that the age of universal competition is "come," but "not gone." Looking to the history of progress, few will deny that the world, after all, owes more to native talent, than to the scholastic attainments of "the full

man," whom Bacon nicely distinguishes from the "wise" man, and, also from the equally serviceable "man of action."

Under these circumstances, a variety of panaceas have been suggested by the public, and, in some cases, tentatively accepted by the authorities—always laudably anxious to experiment on theories, from whatever source derived—and most of these have been based upon the alternative principles, that, "food," or "money," are the prime attractions to the service, and that an additional "quarter of a pound of meat" daily, "free vegetables," or an equivalent in pay, and particularly in "deferred pay," are amongst the chief incentives of patriotism, and the best means of solving the recruiting difficulty; which latter, moreover, has been even unhandsomely attributed to the women of England, who have been charged, in the lower orders, with lack of enthusiasm, where the call of honour and glory to their sons to join the standards of their country has, it is said, been prudentially weighed against the home prospects of the future, when, the exigencies of war having ceased, the soldier returns to his original calling, only to find himself "locked out."

A Major-General, writing in the daily papers, says:—

I have been pained and grieved by appeals from old comrades in the ranks who, having completed twelve years' service with the colours, are thrown adrift on the world, and, seeking employment in civil life, find the gravest difficulty in obtaining even the necessaries of daily existence. I fear hundreds of these young, able-bodied, war-trained soldiers are in this serious strait.

Only yesterday, a fine young man, twenty-nine years of age, fitted in every way for a long renewal of his late calling found out his old Colonel, and gave me the details of a hard story, the truth of which I see no reason to doubt. He told me, in no whining spirit, but with manly confidence, that his twelve years had expired just previous to the late Egyptian campaign, for which he was compulsorily retained, and served with his distinguished corps in every engagement, winding up with the rush at Tel-el-Kebir. He is in possession of a certificate of education, two good-conduct badges, and his certificate parchment of discharge notifies his conduct as "very good," sustained in this special feature by a private testimonial from his Commanding Officer.

Only twenty-nine, in the very prime of manhood, he told me that nearly one hundred and fifty men like himself—nearly all holders of good-conduct badges—were cast adrift at the same time, and though desirous of serving on, their appeal to do so was repudiated by the home military authorities. I ask, why were this thoroughly efficient soldier and his comrades ousted from the Service, when their discipline and valour had done its work for the honour and interests of England, and when their retainment would have been of such value?

The inference to be drawn from the above is, that there is either no real "line" or no real reserve, but that the two, on the slightest occasion, become interchangeable, and that practice swamps theory, and in turn is swamped by it.

Another writer, who claims the experience of an old adjutant and recruiting officer, complains of woman's *selfish* influence, and proposes, virtually, the principle of military apprenticeship, and the exclusion of civilians from civil employment under Government, where such a monopoly may be practicable, thus constituting a privileged labour market, scarcely compatible, however, with the principle of "Free Trade," and likely to be opposed by the great body of the taxpayers, although, within bounds, not objectionable, as, to some extent, may be inferred from the experience of Germany, which, however, unlike England, has but a few small imperial outposts to protect.

"Raising the pay," says the same writer, "is not the secret; the private soldier is already well enough paid—paid far and above his civilian brother, who belongs, perhaps, to the Volunteers, and who lives a life of drudgery from morn to night, badly paid and badly fed." But his hope is still in the future. By steady industry, he may look forward to his own "*domus et tellus, et placens uxor*," whereas he feels that, by joining the regular forces, the expectations one day built up by the necessities of Government, and guaranteed by seductive circulars, may, by the same means, when the occasion has passed, be equally easily pulled down; and, after all, this is but the natural want of confidence in systems which, in their inception, seem to be ephemeral, with the result of a suspicion of *mala fides*, which, however unreasonable, many recent circumstances have seemed to justify.

The idea, again, that a remedy might be found in military apprenticeship, at public schools established for the purpose, is but that of an expansion of the Duke of York's school. Yet it does not seem to be impracticable, under a return to the old system of long service and pension. But such exclusive training in youth, as regards the sons of civilians, would be sure to be regarded by certain political parties, as an attempt to establish in England, a dominant military caste, ready at any moment to be employed by a despotic government against the liberties of their countrymen. This, however, it may be observed, would be no real objection, since, under the name of "liberty," Democracy has always aimed at the worse despotism of "disorder," with the object, more or less remote, of placing arbitrary power in the hands of successful demagogues trained on the principle of self-aggrandisement, rather than on those higher principles which, as a rule, influence citizens who have a real stake in their country.

Another writer on this subject remarks that the impression of those in authority seems to be that, by reducing the term of service, they would make the army more popular; and he asks, "Is it to be supposed that any sensible and provident youth"—the very class so desirable for the army—"with an eye to anything beyond the enjoyment of the immediate present, would deliberately enter a profession which, at the end of a few years, would turn him once more adrift on the world to make a fresh start? The man who once gets thrown out of his 'groove,' frequently finds it impossible to re-enter it, and remains a sort of outcast on the skirts of society to the end of his days."

What, it is asked, would be thought of an employer who pursued such a system; and the answer is at once given in the following apocryphal, but nevertheless instructive dialogue:—

Fancy a foreman of, we will say, thirty-five or forty years, steady, reliable, thoroughly at home in all the details of the situation, sent for one day to the "master's" Room.

"Oh, Mr. Jones, you will please find another situation. I give you notice you will be discharged at the end of this month."

The unhappy foreman gasps out, "Why, sir? Have I done anything wrong? Have I ceased to give satisfaction?"

"Oh no! I am thoroughly satisfied with you. You are a perfectly trustworthy man, and thoroughly experienced in the business; but that is the very reason you are discharged. I want none but young and inexperienced hands on my works!"

The Duke of Cambridge, a soldier of the greatest administrative experience, and a statesman without the name, but not the less remarkable, has recently touched upon one of the fundamental defects of the present system, and points out in a few pregnant words the fallacy of those theorists who would deal with soldiers as mere insensate automata, manufactured from the raw material to a uniform pattern. His Royal Highness says that if *suitable* inducements were held out, men would remain with their regiments and go all over the world, as they like to stay with those whom they have made friends of, and do not like change."

The moral instincts of the man are thus shrewdly recognised, against the *materialism* of those who in the hour of need, as we have seen in the case of our army in India, are obliged to resort to the uncertain expedient of what may be termed "panic bounties," to remedy by successive re-engagements the radical error of original enlistment.

But the Royal Duke, although oppressed, has not been subdued by the incubus which for the last decade has tormented the country; and, at length, its agents are beginning to lose

heart. In a recent debate in the House of Lords, this fact came prominently forward, despite the attempt to make it appear, that the urgently demanded return to the *long* service system, would be a "distinction," but no real difference from the *short* service.

As Lord Morley judiciously observed, in reply to the opponents of the present *régime*, "It is not very easy to give figures that require no qualification"; but his lordship, nevertheless, expounded the logic of the case with considerable ingenuity. Thus, he stated that "the *deficiency* of the army amounted to 6,300," and that "at present . . . between 6,000 and 8,000 men were *deficient*"; but that, irrespective of the *increase* of population and other circumstances, "from 1863 to 1873, there was in each year a large deficiency in the *establishment* of something like 4,000 men," and that "from 1873 to 1882 there was in every year a *surplus* of strength," showing a "greater success in the short system than in the long." Satisfactory as this statement may appear, it nevertheless seems as though the speaker had proved too much; for, if there has really been a greater success, why should he farther on have spoken of the "depletion of the army," when, by his own argument there were more men than ever? And, again, that "the principal cause of the present deficiency" was an outflow of 46,000 men whose term of service [from 1870 and 1876] had expired. Yet the general complaint of these men has been, that their offer of farther service has been rejected. Another cause is attributed to "raising the age from 18 to 19," and the greater "stringency of the medical examination," leading to the increased rejection of recruits. But the experiment of raising the "age" has been regarded, either as evidence that the authorities had not sufficiently taken into account the circumstance, that lads of 19 are more likely to "look before they leap" than those a year younger, at so critical a period of life; or that, perhaps, something might also have been due to the numerical oscillations which generally precede the presentation of the estimates. But we must look elsewhere for an explanation, since it is not to be found in "age."

The standard of height and chest measurement has been lowered, and yet without the result anticipated. But this reduction, at the same time, tells against the argument that the supply of recruits has increased under the present system; while, as regards "medical examination," it is probable that there is no greater stringency than in the antiquated period of "Brown

s," when a defect in his front teeth was sufficient to ensure recruit's rejection.

But, having increased the ration, supplemented the pay, provided luxuries in barracks, with every reasonable means of recreation, and accommodated even discipline, to a certain extent, to the changes of times and manners, the cry is still "they [do not] come!" And on "an average of 450 men able for duty, 250 are sent to India, leaving 200 at home."

Then, two years ago, the then Secretary for War laid before the House his proposals, for improving the position of non-commissioned officers, and men, he took it for granted, that the changes proposed, would add largely to the popularity of the army. That expectation has not been realised, and, according to Sir W. Bartlett and others, neither the men nor the regiments are efficient, in proof of which is cited the case of two regiments at Aldershot, which were "unfit to take their share of duties" of that camp.

Under the pressure of so many failures, a change has appeared imperative; and Lord Morley, while protesting that all was "right," has admitted that provision has been made for something notoriously "wrong." Accordingly Lord Hartington, influenced by the obstructive obstinacy of mortified theorists, not insensible to the danger of allowing the best men to leave the army, at the very time when their services are of the greatest value, has announced his intention of practically reverting to the long-service—or, as Colonel Stanley has aptly said, a "permissive long-service system," under which men will be able to engage for twenty-one years' service, and a pension, subject to a few modifications, sufficient to obviate the necessity for an admission, that the short-service system has collapsed, since "permissive long service" is said to be only the natural outcome of "short" service.

The truth is, it matters little under what name the change comes, since it is generally welcomed. But it is never easy in any circumstances to restore confidence, once rudely shaken, and even now it is to be feared that the community at large may not feel sufficiently reassured to give full effect to a salutary reform for which there is no absolute guarantee of permanency, in the midst of instability in which interests established one day, may be abolished the next, on the plea of public convenience or financial necessity, as has already happened in the last thirteen years, in more cases than one. Moreover, as the education of the masses increases, and luxuries are

multiplied, it is not to be expected that men who receive wages, and can afford to take a pennyworth of politics smoking the pipe of peace, after the day's work is over accept without a close scrutiny offers, however tempting, to their homes. But were they absolutely convinced that so would be held *personally* responsible for any breach of there can be no doubt that the majority would prefer dedicate the best years of life to the service of their country, to remain at home under "contract" with an employer of labour.

Yet it is undeniable that a feeling seems to prevail among the lower orders more especially, that in joining the although the inducements to do so appear fair and above there is some element of deception in the background, nevertheless, they cannot attempt to define; and the attractive these inducements are made, the more are they, rently, regarded with suspicion.

Nor is this altogether surprising, when we consider the villainous way in which ideas are disseminated, not alone press, but orally from class to class, by listeners behind scenes, at mess, in quarters, or in private houses, who away, to be repeated with every possible colouring, the history of scandals that it might be indecorous to mention a whisper.

Thus, the busy gossip surprises his obscure audience to be retailed with appropriate comments) with the revelation some act of incomprehensible injustice, as it seems to his tortured mind. Old soldiers, too, retired from the service, and amongst themselves, with their friends in private life, warrant, or order, which may virtually have seemed to be professed object, the general terms of which appeared to be some sinister design, and which was abrogated when it had filled the intended purpose. Thus, impressions are created spread abroad, that neither merit nor services, are sure of reward; and that in order to reach a favoured few, the obvious enactments are made, which include the many, who are ignorant of the true cause of their promotion or supersession, in that the general public may not detect their origin. Moreover it is said that, in either case, so carefully are such rules elastic, that, without any appearance of injustice, any particular individual may eventually be isolated, for good or for evil.

Of course, there can be no substantial foundation for gossip, and yet it carries conviction to the simple-minded believe that no one can be safe, where the Minister is but

tical representative of the Government, while the real power of his department, is virtually wielded by an unseen oligarchy, where the "veto" of one binds the whole, and any independence, as in secret societies, is indirectly punished as an offence against the compact body, which thus becomes, through what has been called the "Initial system," quite unassailable under ordinary circumstances. The idea of so powerful a secret combination, takes the dramatic fancy of the vulgar, as it did in the time of the Venetian Republic; and, it is argued, that, where such inquirers do not hesitate to destroy those of their own order, what must the chances of a poor man be, who comes by accident, misfortune, or even venial offence under their condemnation, since with *them* really lies the power of legislation—for Parliament, as a rule, only discusses *pro forma* the dry figures of the annual estimate, which is passed as a foregone conclusion, without any real critical analysis.*

These, as already observed, are the prevalent misconceptions of the *profanum vulgus*. How they originate is evident, but, although gross fallacies, it is difficult to suggest any means of eradicating them, save by the almost impracticable course of establishing a homogeneous organisation, under which it would be clear to the meanest capacity that, for equal service there was an equal recompense, according to plainly defined grades of rank, so that there should be no question about the equitable appropriation of the army votes; and under which the soldier should feel that the army was a reliable profession, in which no man would be cast adrift, to find a precarious livelihood in the civil community; that in the event of death, there should be no escheat of his estate or "balance" through imperfect advertisement or other defect of the system; and that, whether man or officer, no one should be liable to the infliction of a wrong through any legalised fiction.

On this question some intelligent remarks have already appeared in a military paper, from the pen of a non-commissioned officer, who shrewdly observes, that, the last thing a recruiter should ever name to the candidate for enlistment is, the prospect that awaits him, on the expiration of his term of

* A recent debate (July 9th) in the House of Lords, on the motion of the Earl of Wemyss, that the militia be "recruited up to its full establishment," &c., elicited from Lord Truro the remark, that he was "not sufficiently acquainted with the finances of the army, to explain the curious circumstance, that there was a larger vote for the militia every year, with a diminution in the strength of that force"; and that it was "hardly satisfactory" that "so large a sum remained unaccounted for."

service, under a system which, as regards all ranks, is not *one*, but *many* loosely bound together, and under which there is no guarantee of permanence, or any regard for the vested interests of those who are not able to enforce a respect for them, while negative injustice, may be relatively made as crushing to the individual, as positive and undisguised injury.

Where such impressions prevail, from the "Major-General" already quoted, down to the intelligent non-commissioned officer, can we be astonished at the fact, that no material advantages promised will induce a superior class of recruits to enlist, who must, at best, have a misgiving of the *bona fides* which is so candidly offered as "security" for the value received of the best years of a man's life?

A Few Facts from the Desert Camp.

By HENRY HAYMAN, D.D.

is a man like in a desert without meat or drink?" was a able conundrum to which most of us know the answer. are, however, many degrees of privation short of that extremity, which weaken or incapacitate all but the ardened and seasoned troops; but as in the Egyptian n the period of such privation was not prolonged, and ult was a success, few probably will care to inquire how e privations were avoidable. Still, this inert acceptance at intervened, for the sake of the end which it led up to, ntly unfair to the sufferers. My object in writing is to be inquiry by showing the existence of facts which call for ierely assume that the exposure of troops to avoidable gs carries an economic blunder with an administrative on its front, and partakes in some measure at once of a and a crime. But I wish this to be understood as al remark only. Let us look at the facts.

istance from Ismailia on the Suez canal westward to our np at Kassasin is from nineteen to twenty miles, and o Tel-el-Kebir is seven miles further. The whole of this s an arid desert, save a narrow belt on the edge of the ater canal. At Tel-el-Kebir the fertile area of Egypt there, on the desert edge, with the resources of cultiva- his rear, the enemy made his last stand. But our camp- asin was dependent on supplies from Ismailia, from lace there was a native railway running parallel to the ater canal right through our position. The native rail- en in British hands, worked, as I shall further show, so hat—at any rate in the earlier days of our occupation at n—it took six or seven hours to do the twenty miles, and r a single train a day. As organisation improved, this locomotion mended, and we hear of two, three, and

finally four trains coming in daily, which enabled the *grand coup* at Tel-el-Kebir to be delivered. But on the whole, the picture is rather a forlorn one, and therefore the public prefer to exclude it from their view. That view is mainly filled with the showy-picturesque of the "own correspondents" of the daily papers, and the "own artists" of the weekly ones, who naturally skip all details non-conducive to graphic effect. But history is not made for the benefit of "word-painters" in print, or for the weekly peep-show of the illustrated serial. I therefore invite the reader to study the dry monotony of genuine records from this desert camp.

The evidence lies at first hand before me as I write, in the form of an officer's journal, written merely to inform and interest friends at home, and transmitted in successive letters as the exigencies of service and the postal arrangements admitted. It sketches the successive situations with frank outspokenness, as in the freedom of private intimacy, and without a thought of a larger audience, exactly as they arose. There is a cheery and lively tone, which is unbroken in the earlier part, and makes it very pleasant reading; but as soon as Kassasin is reached, there mingles an under-current of hunger-bitten repining, which would probably have been much louder in the case of civilians plunged by official duties into the desert on half rations for man and beast, and not seldom going whole days without any rations at all. Imagine the War Office and its staff of clerks in such a position! Suppose them even turned out upon the South Downs with short commons and bog-water, but with full rations of red tape and foolscap, to spend a few weeks of such sultriness as this climate sometimes, in one of its semi-tropical fits has been known to afford. Or imagine the Metropolitan Board of Works with all its retinue of vestries on a similar sojourn in the Bog of Allen, with half a bad breakfast, half a worse supper, and often no dinner in particular; and let their dignified sufferings be further aggravated by the knowledge of abundant supplies just half a day's journey out of reach by rail, and crawling up to them by driblets only. The picture of civilians under such a penance is too absurd to dwell upon at further length; but it is just what our brave fellows were exposed to, with all the stinging and sickening additions of Egyptian climate, Egyptian insect-plagues, scorpions, drought, shallow graves, sun-swollen corpses, and that fluid Tophet, the "Sweet-water" canal. My business, however, is rather to let the journalist speak for himself. After only touching Alexandria

on the way, he reaches Port Said on the 20th August. Here is his peep at one of the battered forts at the former place:—

English soldiers on sentry everywhere! Egyptian officers were shewn round the ruins by a sergeant and man. It seemed odd to think of the different position these people occupied before our occupation of the city. Passing on through the palace and the hareem, we came to the Lighthouse Fort, which was a scene of the wildest confusion. Guns of seven to ten inches calibre were dismounted and smashed everywhere; the pieces of the huge carriages scattered like paper. The defensible barrack-rooms and destroyed magazines were just as the troops had left them. It was a dreadful sight. Five bodies lay under one big gun, the weather having begun to dismember them; masonry and iron carriages were scattered everywhere; ammunition and stores of every sort lying about broken and destroyed, just as they were on the day of the bombardment. I could not have credited that such destruction could have been worked by artillery.

I propose next to string together a few passages, under different dates, from the journal, showing how privation gradually told upon our officer, until, after Tel-el-Kebir, foul air and worse water knocked him over with dysentery for a while. There was just enough of him left upon his legs to enable him to struggle into Cairo with his corps. He seems to be a man gifted above the average with that toughness of the fibre which enables him "to keep in any climate." It will be seen, however, that his staying power was well-nigh exhausted when the successful close of the campaign brought him a sudden respite from exhausting duties, and his constitution plumped out again. It seems as though this came just in time—or not much more—to prevent a collapse. I will take first those notices of actual hunger and thirst which form the substratum of the situation, and may have to repeat under the same dates the context of other sufferings further on.

Ismailia, August 24th.—I am off to the front to-day, after two days of hunger and misery and thirst. . . I shall be glad of some nice tea or cocoa. . . Anything for a change from this place. Oh! the filth there is to drink. I cannot go into a description of the horrors of the Sweet-water canal. An open sewer is a polite description of it. My filter is invaluable so long as it lasts, but it is too small, and gets loaded with a coat of slime which prevents its acting except with great difficulty.

Kassasin, August 30th.—[After describing how on the previous day they had a long and wearisome, but desultory combat with the enemy, he adds] After a very hard day we got back to camping-ground at half-past eleven. *We had all been without food or water the whole day.* . . We are on half-rations, and there are no arrangements for supply or hospital.

Kassasin, September 3rd.—The same old song—waiting for supplies! Half-rations for man and beast, bad water, and canal falling. . . *Our rations have been cut down by a half to-day. We had little enough before, and that little very bad. Bread is issued in lieu of biscuit. It is baked at Ismailia, kept there two or three days, sent upon the line another twelve hours, and issued to the troops here after three whole days lying in the sand and filth by the railway. It is bitter, hard, and full of sand. The biscuit is much better, as it is fairly crisp. We get fresh meat, as they want to keep the preserved for rations on our next move. Our ration of*

rum has been knocked off, as also our lime-juice. Vegetables have as yet been issued twice a week; now none are to be got. These are compressed, not fresh. . . . *So little fuel is there that food can barely be cooked, much less water boiled; and at the same time an order is issued that, as the troops are now supplied with fuel, no more foraging is to be permitted.* . . . It is rather heart-breaking to see a train once a day only, with barely half-rations for one day, when we know there are heaps of trucks and three engines at Ismailia. . . . You would smile if you saw us tucking into soup and biscuit, neither very good by themselves, but very nasty when messed up together and eaten in a most promiscuous manner. A sort of stew for breakfast, tea or cocoa for lunch, with some biscuit, and then tea or coffee for dinner, with a fresh stew made from meat or any food we can raise. September 4th.—The intense thirst that was so overpowering at first has passed off, and I rarely or ever have any water or coffee between meals. September 10th.—I got your letter yesterday evening after coming in from the desert, *where we had been for twenty-four hours without our food, repulsing Arab's second attack on the camp.* . . . I went out again as soon as I had fed the horses, and we all got in at sunset, after a very severe day's work, without either food or water. We had no breakfast before starting. After seeing to the horses and men, we had our own dinner at seven o'clock—twenty-four hours* without food or drink, except some canal-water, which none of us liked to drink as it was. September 11th.—I am getting very thin, as are most of us. Days off and on with nothing to eat are not conducive to putting on flesh.

Cairo, October 24th.—“Shaved and pipe-clayed,”—such is the order. At the same time men and horses in this camp are on half-rations, because there is a break in the line somewhere. I must tell you of my journey from Tel-el-Kebir here. I was lying ill on my bed, when I heard there were some empty trucks coming down the line, and that the Captain of ——— had “boned” them. I darted down, and I seemed to get stronger every moment. I got down, interviewed the staff-officer, and asked to whom he had made over the trucks? He answered, “To the officer commanding ———.” I replied, “I am the man”; and so I turned out my reluctant junior, and gave him a fair share, and proceeded to load up. . . . Off we went, oh! so glad to leave the charnel-house of Tel-el-Kebir! I know if I had remained I should have been very ill.

The reader will perceive that, in order to preserve the continuity of the officer's personal narrative, I have here digressed from the strict rule of keeping by themselves the passages which deal with the “bread and butter question” only, and touched upon the general one of health so closely connected with it, and therefore difficult in the journal to disentangle from it. Here, then, after the fight at Tel-el-Kebir, in which he had his innings with the rest, duly giving the score of killed, wounded, and *hors de combat* from his own immediate command we find our friend laid on his back at last, and just able to “get a rise” out of himself in time to vindicate his right to the “trucks” which took his command on to Cairo. It is interesting to note that, as soon as the backs of the enemy have been fairly and finally seen, and vidette and outpost work against them

* The same “twenty-four hours” as above mentioned is intended, not seven days. They had been on picket all night, and Arab's second attack.

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is done with, it becomes necessary to keep a sharp look-out upon friends, comrades, and enterprising "juniors." As they go on to Cairo the men are still, it seems, hungry; for—

At Zagazig we were encountered by a seething crowd of natives—black, brown and yellow, with hard-boiled eggs, figs, bread, &c., for sale. *They drove a good trade with such of the men as had any money left.*

Having brought him thus far, and touched the general sanitary question, I will now go back on such passages in the journal as relate more expressly to it. He writes, just before disembarking at Ismailia:—

August 21st.—I hope we shall not meet with much resistance, as I do not believe in our fighting capabilities in this country. The climate is so hot, and these young soldiers are going sick in dozens. What we shall be after a month's work I don't know.

Ismailia, August 24th.—I am afraid the sickness and mortality will be very great. Men will drink the beastly water without having it boiled. I bought a bottle of beer for 2s. yesterday I was quite played out, and, though it cost so much, it did me good.

On August 30th, he records how, after a hard day's fighting, without food or water the whole day, the horses rushed madly at the water. We nearly lost two from falling into the mud, but got them out in time. . . . I am awfully well and fit and ready; but as for boiling water, it is impossible to do it always, as we can't get fuel.

The lack of this last requisite is further illustrated, as follows:—

August 31st.—I went out into a village close at hand to cut wood. We got a lot out of the deserted houses from roofs, ploughs, doors, &c. September 8th.—In the afternoon I went down to Mahsarah with W—— to get fire-wood. We got an old building near the railway station pulled to pieces, and then I found some beams on an Arab village, which seemed to be deserted. I began pulling them off, and went into the mud hovels and found a young Arab woman unveiled. She was rather good-looking, and seemed in an awful fright, but recovered herself as soon as I explained by signs that I would not remove her father's house.

We have seen already, in an extract dated September 3rd, how an order issued that "as the troops were now supplied with fuel" no more foraging was to be allowed. The above, five days later, is an instructive commentary on the value of such "orders." The necessity of boiling all the water imbibed at any rate by the men, caused a consumption of fuel which was inadequately measured at head-quarters. Water for the steam locomotive was also probably a serious demand. Thus to stop foraging was probably impossible, and, of course, the wretched huts of the natives would suffer. But far better that they should suffer than our men be poisoned or parched with thirst. The former loss might have been compensated, and the huts thus wrecked seem to have been at least temporarily deserted.

Again, after the battle recorded August 30th, I read :—

S—— and I, with six men on horseback, went foraging. We had nothing to eat, and I have not changed my clothes for three days, not even taken off my boots. We got about thirty fowls.

As a happy illustration of the effect of "orders" on an officer's personal comforts, and the surprises consequent thereon, I will quote some remarks under date of September 1st :—

I was told that it was an order that every officer should lighten his kit to the last degree. I did as the order bid by packing away my clothes into a piece of sacking to send to the base with the men's kits. I hope to get my bed up soon, as I don't like lying on the ground with no spruce boughs to ease my bones.

The bones of our gallant friend obtained ease some days after by the arrival of his *impedimenta*. It may be added that the Egyptian desert is not a choice camping-ground in which to lie on native earth. To say nothing of the queer little lizards with wonderfully square elbows, who scuttle about with unexpected speed, there are snakes and scorpions, which make it unpleasant for the skin, besides the uneasiness of bones above referred to.

September 3.—A hard day's work I was on the sand-hill superintending, and got a beastly headache in my eyes. I got in a bit of a funk, as G—— has just gone to hospital with ophthalmia. I am very sorry for him ; it seems to be so depressing in its action. If I got it, I would do my best to get sent straight home. I don't think I could stand the long days in hospital all by myself. . . . There is nothing in the way of comforts for the sick and wounded at any of the advanced camps, not even clean water. They get the filth from the canal just the same as others in health. . . . Our general and staff are in Ismailia enjoying themselves. We are on half-rations with no appliances for sick or wounded.

September 4th.—The camp had to be shifted from the first site, owing to the fearful smells from the shallow graves. Here it is bad enough. But to-day a large party out at the battle-field of the 28th ultimo burying the Egyptians. Fough! I should not care for the job. . . . We are so much confined to camp, and the days are so sultry, the nights so cold and dewy, that the men are going sick with dysentery and fever. I am wonderfully well, only I hate the idleness, heat, and dust more than I can say. . . . I expect this delay will make people at home a little alive to the atrocious lies which were promulgated about the forwardness of our transport and hospital preparations. I see the St. John's Ambulance Society are going to help the Egyptians. God knows our poor sick and wounded are having a bad time of it here.

September 10th.—[After a day's fighting.] Our own loss was heavy. I know over fifty-five wounded were brought in, and of course several were killed. Last night trains were going the whole night, taking the wounded down to Ismailia. We are losing at the rate of thirty a day from sickness.

September 11th.—Everyone who is scratched here is sent away, as we have no appliances for the wounded, and up till quite lately there was no medicine.

The arrival of a distinguished personage, long expected—the reader must guess who—is noted as follows, under the same date :—

At last he has arrived [at Kassasin] with seventy tents for himself and staff, with several tons of baggage and heaps of wine cases.

now resume the date of the arrival at Cairo narrated on the 24th, as above.

At last we slowly steamed into Cairo railway station. After waiting a long time I was told by a staff officer that we were to remain there all night, that our trucks could not be moved till morning. I then fell my men in by sub-divisions on the platform, got them their blankets and made them lie down. In the middle of the night I found my trucks were being moved. So I got my men up and we were on to a siding. I will not enumerate the horrors of the next eighteen hours, we remained anchored first all night and then all day, with no space to lie and no sort of cover, and with a rubbish heap of the whole population not ten yards away. Well, I was at last shunted out to Abassieh, and found that . . . the staff had never told any of our people of our arrival. I was very ill those two days and could eat nothing. I fortunately had a pitcher of cold water (filtered) and brandy, so I kept going on that and some biscuit. Next day I was at work in the morning, and by the time I had finished I thought I should have had to go to hospital. But I pulled round again, though the pain in my eyes frightened me. I got the goggles that evening [spectacles sent to him]. . . . I was awfully seedy, but determined to go into Cairo and get something to eat.

Never victors arrive in the flush of triumph at a vanquished enemy as I was in such plight before? They seem to have wholly relied on the arrangements made by somebody on the Staff-Quarters-General's staff. He took no thought, gave no orders, and they got no quarters. Thus were a number of our best soldiers, who had borne the burden and heat of the desert campaign, treated with what looks like calm neglect by those who had been carefully exempted from those fatigues and perils themselves, and were shunted as if they were so much "rubbish" "might be shot" anywhere, down among the unspeakable insanities of the offal heaps of an Oriental suburb. Their commander, who had stuck to his men through thick and thin (*i.e.* thick rations and thin rations), and was now in an almost sickening condition, has to share the dismal penance with them. If their discipline and self-restraint had not equalled their valour in the field, these men would have speedily made easy accommodation and decent quarters for themselves at the expense of some astonished natives; who probably lapsed speedily from admiration at their position into contempt at their tameness and endurance of it. The officer whose sufferings we trace was not only too vigilant. Had he slept through the alarm of moving trucks, he and his would at any rate have been in possession of the station-platform with room to lie and stand, and of being subjected to rigors of an unutterably worse character than would have been their lot at home if every one in the rank and file had been guilty of drunkenness and disorder. A handful of Arabi's beaten troops had so far held together that an officer as to reach Cairo with any remnant of organization.

zation, would they have been content to wait in such quarters, with such refreshment for eye and nostril, as was the lot of their conquerors? It is the indignity of being so miscared for which stings more lastingly than the discomfort. The latter passes off with the next turn of comfort, but the former remains branded on the memory, and forms the nucleus of a cherished grudge against the country and the service which can allow its best servants to be thus scurvily treated with perfect impunity, without a censure passed or a voice of question ever raised. It is, I believe, an authentic story that an officer commanding a detachment by train for Cairo, after Tel-el-Kebir, foolishly flung a tent out of the train while in motion, which fell on the line and lay there, it being no one's business to pick it up. The train next in succession was wrecked by the obstacle, and the engine and tender were visible lying just off the rails some days later. Possibly the "half-rations" in Cairo may have been due to some such cause as this, or simply to some mere blunders of officialism—a red-tape tangle somewhere—which bring the penalty on the long-enduring stomachs of the officers, the ram and file, and the horses who follow—all empty alike. Hence to go to the Royal Hotel "and get something to eat!" was the first happy thought of those who could afford it. These heroes on half-rations, with a population of more or less full-fed civilians swarming round them, who yet respected, so far as we know, the rights of *meum* and *tuum* as regards these latter, form a study of ethics only enhanced by the business-like brevity with which the fact is stated. I am glad to extract the last notice which has any bearing on the knife-and-fork aspect of the campaign. He had received orders to accompany his General of Division to an old fort in the Nile. He had been instructed before starting—

To do some particular work, but the General changed his mind. . . . I got a note from him saying that he hoped I would be ready at 2.30 to start back: so I had to make haste and get on board in time to get a very good lunch—such a difference to anything I had eaten before in Egypt! It did me good, and after making three or four hasty sketches, I am ashamed to say, I fell asleep!

We leave him, then, at last, well-fed and comfortably forgetful of desert fare, like another hero, of earlier fame, on the galley's deck,—

δὴ τότε γ' ἀτρέμας εἶδε λελασμένος ὅσσα περὶόνθαι.

Of the wisdom of trying such sustained and repeated stomach experiments on young troops in such a climate, I invite the military authorities to consider and decide. The extracts to

which I have drawn attention seem, however, to have a bearing on the opinion ascribed, as follows, to the medical officers, in some of the public prints on November 18th, by a telegram from Alexandria :—

The latest returns from the hospital at Gabari and the *Carthage* show a diminution in the number of deaths amongst the troops. Out of 600 sick, the average rate of mortality is now one per diem, whilst last week it was about six. The medical officers express the opinion that the germs of typhus fever, from which the soldiers have been suffering, were generated on the battle-field, and that the dysentery was mainly caused by injudicious living.

The "living" was no doubt "injudicious," if our officer's journal represents the average state of facts, as I believe it does, and not an exceptional case. But *whose* judgment was in fault? Not, I take it, that of British Private Smith, who would have been only too glad to have kept out the "germs of typhus," if he could have fortified himself by a bellyfull against them, but that of vastly more elevated personages, known in mess-room gossip by the undress title of "big-wigs," who order Private Smith's bill of fare. The indulgently mild censure passed above on the venial human weakness of "injudicious living," under the circumstances, is a masterpiece of diplomatic astuteness. The medical officers know evidently of whom they are speaking and to whom; *quid de quoque viro et cui dicas sæpe videto!* Perhaps the facts thrown together above may lead to the "saddle" being some day or other "put on the right horse." It may some day pass into an axiom, Feed your soldier well, especially if young and his constitution not yet set. Don't turn him into a desert on half-rations, with a filthy canal, fermenting with the compounded *débris* of camels, horses, and human beings under a tropical sun, on one flank, and the shelterless wilderness raining sun-strokes and scorching the bare flints into lime on all the other sides of him. It may be estimated that a mile of that "Sweet-water" (suggestive name!) would contain "germs of typhus" sufficient, if duly fostered, to overtax all the fever hospitals of the world. Whether these facts will ever come before the commission which has, I believe, been obtained to inquire into the state of the hospitals and accommodation for sick and wounded during the campaign, is not absolutely certain. Those commissioners may limit their labours to ascertaining the state of hospitals, and their adequacy of provision for the treatment of their inmates when brought in. They may thus exclude any inquiry into predisposing causes, and by so doing never reach to the root of the mischief.

I will now give a few passages which bear on the difficulty

which formed that root, that, viz. of transport. Our officer writes, on the 3rd of September, at Kassasin :—

Some speak of a disaster overtaking this expedition, if we do not move and that soon. The enemy gains confidence, and we lose it. We are being weakened, they are strengthened, both in men and provisions ; and, what is more important, time is given them to throw up these huge works which it will be very hard to turn him out of. After each success we have had to stop, as our transport is ail. The flourishes in the English papers about the forwardness of the preparations for supplies, &c. are and were absolutely untrue. . . . How HE expects to accumulate food for his advance, if he does not hurry up his transport, I can't say. But I should think each day's delay will prove a serious matter. . . . S— says there are heaps of troops at Ismailia which are waiting to get to the front, but there is no transport for supplies. . . . I have just heard . . . that there are 60 guns in the fortress of Tel-el-Kebir itself, and that our guns are to be moved up to take their place ; but that will not be for some days, owing to the want of transport.

September 4th.—I expect this delay will make people at home a little alive to the atrocious lies which were promulgated about the forwardness of our transport and hospital preparations.

And, as a prime factor in the question of transport, the working of the railway laid from Port Said to Ismailia, nearly parallel to the Suez Canal, demands special notice. It may be well to remind the reader that our morning papers announced, on August 8th :—" A hundred miles (!) of railway has been provided as an accessory to the military operations in Egypt. . . . The ships by which it is to be conveyed are not to stop at Alexandria, but to proceed direct to the Canal and land the rails and other plant at Ismailia. A railway corps has been specially trained for laying and working the railway, consisting of No. 8 Company R.E., who will embark with the plant this morning in the *Canadian*. Three locomotive engines go in another steamer." Compare with this the following from our officer, under date beginning sixteen days later :—

Ismailia, August 24th.—The railway is not yet in working order, so the supplies go up the Canal.

Kassasin Lock, September 1st.—A siege-battery came up by train yesterday, the first which has been run through, and very glad we were to hear its whistle, as ourselves and horses were in want of grub.

I have already cited, under date September 3rd, a statement that there was then but one train a day, and that it then took six hours to do twenty miles. Our officer adds under the same date, "the railway is in the most ticklish condition." On September 4th he records "two trains a day" as "coming in," so we hope there may soon be enough rations and forage to warrant a forward movement." On the 5th this has risen to three trains, with "crowds of provisions coming up and being stored for an advance." On the 7th he announces "a lot of

railway material came up, I believe for a siding to be made from our camp to facilitate debarkation of stores, &c." On the 10th, "trains are arriving at the rate of *four* a day." Thus, supposing the trains into the Kassasin Camp Station dependent on the stock and plant exported from this country, it seems to have taken nearly five weeks to get that supply of material through and into full working condition from the base to the front. I will add that the daily papers published on August 26th the receipt by telegram of "a requisition from Sir Garnet Wolseley for railway plant and rolling stock to be sent out as soon as possible," coupled with a statement that "the *Kent*, laden with railway stock, will leave [England] to-day." The cargoes of the *Kent* and her probable consorts must have arrived too late for any purposes of the actual campaign; indeed, I believe the fact to be—at any rate, as regards the last branch from the base to the front at Kassasin—that no English rolling stock, whether locomotives or trucks, was seen on the line, and that from first to last weak engines and an insecure rail hampered the efficiency of the railway on which all at the front depended for supplies; but, at any rate, the railway being the main artery relied upon for transport, the troops were a week in the desert station before the first train came through, and ten days more before the transits became at once rapid and frequent. In such a railway-producing country as ours, one would have thought that this requisite, taught to be so in the Franco-German war of 1870–1, and the Turco-Russian war of 1876–7, would have been the foremost article ready. In point of fact, it was the latest. There were the men, there were the stores: the former on half-rations under severe duties; the latter at Port Said, or creeping slowly up the Suez canal to Ismailia; but the railway which was to bring the stores within reach of the men was unavailable, and on this really all depended. I believe that of the "hundred miles of railway" not one was laid between Port Said and the camp until the campaign was over. I also believe that in fact two railway locomotives from England reached Ismailia, and that when there it was found impossible to disembark them. Sometimes when transport is thus at a standstill, critical events are not. Had there been an enterprising enemy to take due advantage of this defect, it must have gone hard with our gallant "young army." No wonder their officers held a serious conference, and looked longingly for the signal of the opening up of supplies. "Very glad we were to hear [the train's] whistle, as ourselves and horses were in

want of grub." These homely words will, I hope, speak to the hearts of Englishmen through their stomachs—perhaps the surest access to that higher organ in our countrymen. The general at Ismailia telegraphing earnestly for more "railway plant and rolling stock," perhaps about the time that the first consignment of that material reached him—if, indeed, it ever did—is a further significant commentary on the state of facts at the time. The net result of the first fortnight of the actual campaign is briefly told in the words of our officer: "After each success we have had to stop, as *our transport is nil*." The first requisites of life and activity did not reach the troops in sufficient measure to make a decisive advance possible for full three weeks. Meanwhile, the enemy was near and numerous enough to keep them constantly on the alarm, and, if that enemy's vigour had borne any proportion to their numbers, to have swept up their remains to augment the "sweetness" of that Elysian duct, the very name of which our men, I should think, would never recall without a loathing shudder. The plain lesson which this journal tells is that of short rations, and thereby lowered vitality, preparing the way for dysentery and typhus; and of occasional fits of sharply-pining hunger and intense exhaustion tempting men to take any method of filling, and, if they could snatch an occasion, of overfilling, that vacuum which of all others nature most abhors. I have shown how hunger haunted them throughout, even to the last hour of triumph, and how our officer with candid frankness confesses that, on partially picking himself up from the overstrain of forced marches, prolonged vigils and "shuntings," and that "last straw" which broke his much-enduring back—or rather stomach—the mounting a guard of honour over a "rubbish heap" (euphemistic and suggestive term!) in Boulac, his first convalescent impulse led him to the Royal Hotel. No doubt his experience and temperament both favoured self-control: but of how many of the young troops under his command was the same prudence to be expected? They would hardly wait, and, if they had waited, would not have the cash requisite to enable them to encounter the "flesh-pots of Egypt" in the less questionable form of the "Royal Hotel" in Cairo. They would probably be tempted to rush in and regale their crude organizations with snatches of whatever coarse luxuries came within reach of their pockets. Here is the source of the "injudicious living" with which they appear to be patronizingly taxed. The blue-bottles of science will doubtless buzz over the facts and produce an

de volume as "blue" as themselves, throwing the light of latest medical research on the relations between cause and effect; but, when all the dust they shall have raised is settled down, there will remain above its level the salient points of a big army scantily fed in a climate exceptionally trying, with inadequate water-supply within reach, save of such water as no farmer would use to wash out his stables withal, unless he had a copious supply of carbolic acid to follow. As regards this defect, I may add that the following notice appeared in one of the London papers on September 8th: "A telegram was received by the War Department yesterday from Egypt, asking for more pumps and artesian wells, with additional driving apparatus for their use, might be forwarded with as little delay as possible. As in the Abyssinian campaign, this mode of procuring water is found of great service in the present war." One would like a little light thrown on the questions which this statement suggests. There were pumps and wells in the Egyptian Expedition camps. The Head-Quarters enjoyed the Royal Engineers another. Were there any more? is a question which I hope some one will ask and press in the right quarter. There may have been some at Alexandria or in its neighbourhood; but in the camp of the advanced force and among the troops on whom fell the brunt of watching, checking, and eventually crushing the enemy, I believe it will be found there was none. The public may take it as a fact that those who did not, unless on quite exceptional occasions, obtain any benefit from the two Artesian wells above named. The Royal Engineers certainly kept theirs to themselves, I believe, exclusively. I know an officer who declares he applied more than once to obtain water for his command from the Royal Engineers' wells, but was refused each time, and could not even obtain the use of a water-cart. This may have been a stern necessity; but if so, it illustrates the terrible pressure laid on the price of the necessities of life by the exigency of the situation. It ought to have been no more difficult to send out to the advanced camp a dozen wells and pumps than a couple. The circumstances were such that British officers found it their duty to refuse their comrades water in the desert, under a climate the terrors of which no thermometrical register can adequately measure, and to expose comrades men night and day to the harassing alarms, not actual attacks, of a far-outnumbering enemy. Such a situation is almost like pushing a surviving straggler from one's sinking plank in the ocean, when it is not strong enough to

bear the weight of two. But the question which needs to be urged is, who was responsible for the circumstances? We have been told with jubilant self-complacency that the very square league of desert, and the very day of the month within which check-mate was to be given to the enemy, were all noted by the Commander and known to the home authorities. Thus it seems inconsistent to plead unforeseen contingencies, and circumstances beyond control. Whilst, as regards experience, the oldest desert campaign recorded in history, that of Cambyses against the same Egyptian frontier, but coming from the Syro-Arabian side, finds its most interesting passage in the arrangement which that monarch made with the Sheikhs of the wilderness to ensure the water-supply of his troops in their advance. It looks as if the administrators of the British Empire, in this old age of the world's experience, were put to shame by the foresight of a barbarian despot five hundred years before Christ. The only alternatives for our forces to fall back upon were boiling or filtering the atrocious water of the canal. The former was, we have seen, impossible through defect of fuel, to say nothing of the tax upon the officers' watchfulness in seeing that the boiling, had it been possible, was duly performed. As regards filtering, the supervision necessary to insure it would have been even more minute and harassing than that of the boiling. Indeed, I venture to submit the question whether on actual field service the use of filters for a large body of men would not become impossible. But, again, the supply of filters was certainly not general, even if it was not rare, capricious, and arbitrary as that of wells and pumps. I have heard of one corps, and there probably were others, which had them in the proportion of a single filter to eight men. These were "suction" filters, and soon got lamentably foul. The filth of the canal stuck about the india-rubber tubing with noisome pertinacity. The weak point of the filter arrangement is, that the fouler the water is, and therefore the greater necessity for their constant use, the less serviceable the filters are apt to become. Even supposing the eight men to keep up with their filter-bearer amid the scattering tendencies of outpost duty in the desert—which is, perhaps, too much to assume—would it be possible to wait till the filter, fouled by its last use, is cleansed, and all have had their suck at it? I am no military critic of such matters; but it seems to require a very low rate of pressure of exigency, to make the pursuit of such hydraulic studies an impossibility. Filtering is generally a slow process, and modern war is a quick one. However valuable the resource in itself, we know it takes

and time is often the one thing which those most lavish in expenditure of men and beasts, stores and cartridges, cannot afford to spend. Imagine the weary, jaded, sun-sickened men, struggling back to camp from the thirst-fever of a day in the desert, and waiting till water was boiled or filtered! I doubt the British soldier is yet machine enough for that. Next in the order of suffering to the men came, of course, the horses. We have seen how, under the pitiless exhaustion of a twenty-four hours' outing, these poor creatures "rushed madly at the water"; and previously how welcome was the engine's whistle to man and horse "in want of grub." Shortly before that, viz. on September 1st, our officer records that he had been out, cutting a large quantity of jowary grass for the horses," which he told him "all the morning, and most desperately hot it was." When he "got a bit touched by the sun, but soon got all right." When the first train unloaded, he adds, "we got oats for our horses for the first time for days, and also a little hay. They have been living on chopped straw and a few beans and green food, and were getting rather weak." I will again compare this record with the following statement from a London paper of August 10th:—

There being little or no fodder to be had in Egypt for the large number of horses and mules sent out, thousands of tons of new hay have to be sent in a compressed form. The vast pyramids of hay which had accumulated at the dockyards a few days ago have all disappeared, and ships are now waiting for further supplies to arrive.

These wholesome supplies were probably ready at the base in due time, but for want of transport power they were slow in reaching the scene of demand; and the consequence was, as we have further seen, serious loss of power in the horses.

Assasin Camp, September 4th.—Many of the cavalry regiments have lost a good number of horses. The "Tunbellies," or Life Guards, lost eighty, and several batteries of artillery six to twelve each. . . . General ——— has just been in camp, and decided on reducing the ration of hay; but unless he gets leave for us to go further inland foraging green food, we shall not be able to do without the full twelve pounds of hay per horse.

When next day supplies have reached, and the prospects mend, we witness the grand transformation scene of a pantomime:—

September 5th.—Our horses look ever so much better than they did a few days ago, and, perhaps, if they have two or three more days' rest, they will all get round their legs and galls. September 10th.—[After stating that in foraging he "got large bags of beans."] Our horses are picking up wonderfully; and now the backs are healing we shall do well.

Thus it seems plain that if the railway had only been fit for use, neither man nor horse could have suffered more than the

inevitable fatigues of active duty in such a climate, and that, as soon as it got fairly to work, man and horse resumed a serviceable condition.

Now, in that bad fortnight, with a variable margin running on to three weeks, during which man and beast were ready and supplies were *not*, I ask, would not the least formidable of possible European enemies have probably gained a decisive advantage? "But in the face of an European enemy," it will be perhaps rejoined, "such liberties would never be ventured upon." Still, military events won't wait while you are bringing up supplies, any more than the operations of nature while you are stocking your farm. It *may* be a strategic necessity to fight or occupy certain posts and perform certain operations in the course of a fortnight, for fear at the end of that time there should be nothing left to fight for. Whenever such a military crisis comes upon a general and forces disposed as ours were from August 24th to September 7th, I forbear from stating any opinion of my own as to the probable consequences. I only invite military critics to consider them. But behind all such questions lies the climate, with its ever-whirling vortex of insect plagues, its blinding waste of sandy landscape, its sky of brain-scorching sunstrokes. Over and over again our officer dwells upon such details, but I have not extracted the passages; they may be taken for granted. The Alpine tourist of pleasure pits his own strength and endurance against the tremendous forces of nature, at his sole risk and of his own free will. But in the name of humanity, the protection of which is spread so amply round our worst gaol-ruffians at home, one may point out that our soldiers abroad have not forfeited its rights, that they go on their country's perilous errand of duty, and *not of choice*, and are therefore entitled to all the ampler measure of that protection. As in the days when Captain Farquhar wrote *The Recruiting Officer*—

The Queen commands, and we obey,
Over the hills and far away!

Therefore, to stake their health and lives against such fearful odds of climate, unless it be in the last dread struggle for national existence, is simply inhuman: and, if inhumanity at home is a national sin, it cannot cease to be one abroad. The argument passes out of the range of strategic criticism, and stands on broad ultimate grounds of right and wrong. Of course, the responsibility of any official person concerned depends on how far the sufferings could, in the particular case, have been foreseen, and therefore prevented by ready supplies. But that such

ys can ordinarily be foreseen and prevented admits of no onable doubt. Nay, as above suggested, the prescience n is self-convicting. They are responsible who, forecasting very day of final victory, leave their soldiers staked as mere an units in the struggle against the desert and its putrid-r miasma, its hunger, thirst, pestilence, and vermin. These ghts are the property of no political party, and in the ests of none. They belong and extend to humanity at large. take, of course, upon myself the whole responsibility for e remarks, and for producing the testimony of my friend in rm. That is necessary. No true soldier will, if he can help e his own mouthpiece in such a case. There are other ages in which he weighs the amount of fight to be expected e Egyptians, and candidly hopes that it is not much. But e are speculations of no weight after the event. His record cts under his own eyes is what I rely upon. There may be or inaccuracies, as will happen to a man snatching half s in the wilderness, amidst harassing duties, for letters e, or killing dull days there by unbosoming freely to un- al friends. But if the whole were known, these would ably be balanced, or more, by the deeper accentuation of r facts on which he has dwelt too lightly for their real ht. The lights and shades must both be taken into account. e speaks of matters which it was his business to know, in h he could not easily be mistaken, in which he had no est to mislead. He wrote utterly without any *arrière pensée* ublication. I do not believe that any cross-examination from l-quarters would invalidate or materially shake his testi- y, and its tenour is exactly as I have given it. No doubt e are some hundreds of others who could confirm it, if they d.

ut I must not leave the reader under the one-sided impres- that the journal is a mere tissue of grumbling after creature orts out of reach. On the contrary, the writer seems half- amed at being driven—as one “gravelled for lack of matter” dwell upon them. He says, from Kasassin—

tember 1st.—I feel ashamed of the poorness of my letters, but there is a deadly eass about our life. Our petty quarrels about our food would not be instruc- or interesting, except as memorials of human folly I will try and give you an of our everyday life.

hen follows a sketch, commencing with *reveillée* at 4.30, mental duties till 6.30, return to tents, hot tea, and tubs, d do our washing, which is not a success as a rule, for mine

seem really as dirty afterwards as before." The enemy's cavalry come out to look at them, and can count every horse, man, and gun in the camp, as he mentions elsewhere, at the respectful distance of 3,000 yards. "Then breakfast, compressed meat and tea, with a little jam, which will not last long at the rate these young fellows eat it." He sketches, sleeps, talks, or writes, as inclined, till lunch, interrupted only by watering the horses or "some fellow happening to call in." Then a ride over the desert, "or anything we can muster energy for," or, if nothing, a siesta. "But," he adds, "we get rebuked for going beyond the outposts, who, at most, are a mile from camp, instead of three or four, as they should be." Then duties again, wash for dinner, a ditto of breakfast, "only we have a drop of rum issued to us, or perhaps a spoonful of lime-juice." This, of course, represents a day of full rations and half duties, or, rather, duties which only half occupy. But there follows the tale of days in which these proportions are inverted. The following is a little bit from Alexandria, earlier than all but the earliest of my previous extracts:—

On our left is the palace of the Ras et Tin and the harem of the Khedive, the ladies of which are very skittish, by the way in which they behave on meeting us. I am going to call on the Khedive to-morrow or next day. He likes to see young English officers. He was brought up in England, so perhaps that is the reason. We were berthed alongside a jetty just before nightfall. It was a fine sight, these huge docks, all full of large transports crammed with troops! They cheered us like mad. Immediately behind was the *Iberia*, with ——— on board. The men cheered me, and were so glad to see me. . . . I then came down to our horse-lines, and found an Arab with whom I had made friends. He showed me a splendid well of water, unknown to the Commissariat, where I have watered my horses, and gave me to understand that he had two wives, five children, and that they were all starving. Poor chap, he looked it. I gave him a shilling, and got him a bag full of grub from the ship, and I am told by people who know these men that he is my servant for life. Anyhow, no man could show his gratitude more. I am going to take him some more to-morrow, and feed an English pointer which I found starving in a yard.

Port Said, August 21st.—There were a good many vessels about the mouth of the Canal, several of them being foreign men-of-war. A Russian vessel, I am told, behaved in a very extraordinary manner, yawning about just in front of us, nearly forcing us into the bank. It was the same vessel that tried to get in between Admiral Seymour and the forts at Alexandria; but on being told that, if she continued that game, a shot would be put into her, quitted suddenly.

Kassasin, August 30th.—We marched all night, and found, on arriving at Tel-el-Mahouta, that our people were encamped on the site of the Egyptian camp. The dead were buried there very thick. . . . One place, where we wished to make a trench for our kitchen, the legs and arms were visible on very small digging. We

* "The sand, I believe, does not deodorize or disinfect what is buried in it; and anxious exhalations, so long as they arise, are spread abroad on the wind."—Lieutenant-General Sir E. Hamley, K.C.B., in the *Nineteenth Century*, December 1882.

lay there for two days, and we were then ordered to march up to Kassasin, at eleven o'clock, to drive back the enemy. We marched off at once, and halted at Mahsamoh, where the enemy had had a big camp. We looted a few things. . . . Well, on arriving at Mahsamoh, we found that the action was supposed to be over; but the firing recommenced. . . . In half an hour we came under fire, and the fun became hot and fast. . . . The musketry was terribly fast for a short time. The shell fire was too high to do much harm, and they burst principally to our left and over our heads. . . . Some of our dead, who were left on the ground when the Cavalry Brigade retired, were dreadfully mutilated by the enemy. Oh! the agony of our fellows when they saw the fearful sight! We are here for a few days till the rest of the cavalry come up, and then we move on to Tel-el-Kebir, and then on Zagazig or Belveis, where we expect a severe action. We are on half-rations, and there are no arrangements for supply or hospital.

This was the battle in which the since well-trumpeted charge of our cavalry took place on the night following the 28th August. It had its merits, especially as a picturesque source of illustration for the penny-a-liners and their "own artists." But I believe that the opinion among strategists is that, alike in its effect on the enemy at the moment, and on the further events of the campaign, its importance has been over-rated. It may be remembered that the cavalry on that occasion claimed to have captured guns varying in number from seven to twenty, which on the dawn of light were found to have been "withdrawn under cover of the darkness." I must leave this statement to military critics who can see in the dark. I wonder what our artillerymen thought of the occurrence. As regards the earlier battle of the 24th August, a rather remarkable circumstance has come to my knowledge; but I am not referring now to this officer's journal as my authority for it. It may be remembered that a telegram reached home on that day from Sir Garnet Wolseley, giving an account of an action at the canal-dam between el-Magfar and el-Mahuta, in which "two guns horse-artillery, about thirty Mounted Infantry, and about 1,000 Infantry, and [as added in a subsequent telegram] two Gatlings worked by seamen," formed his force against "10,000 Egyptian troops with ten guns." I venture the statement that that General could have had four more guns at the front by mid-day had he wished it, and further that the said guns were *all* disembarked by the *previous* afternoon at Ismailia, but were left doing nothing there. I may add that the fact was, an announcement by the usual authority that the first guns landed from the canal would be first despatched to the front, induced a brisk competition amongst the artillery officers; but that all efforts were made to insure the *Horse* Artillery the foremost place, by refusing the Royal Artillery the needful transport for their requirements; and that the competition

thus stimulated was afterwards baulked by those who were first ready being kept waiting—roasting, I might almost say—on the arid beach of the canal for twenty-four hours, in a landscape which one might compare with that of Mr. Holman Hunt's "Scape-goat," in order to enable a single division of the Royal Horse Artillery to put in an appearance of being first. This is the reason, I believe, why the scanty British force numbered only two guns (with Gatlings) against the vastly outnumbered forces and ten guns of the enemy on that hard-fought day.

As regards appliances for the sick and wounded, our office we have seen, speaks with military bluntness of "the atrocities promulgated about the forwardness of our transport and hospital preparations." I believe the fact to have been that mere temporary reception-room or rooms was first formed : Kassasin on the 28th August, immediately after the engagement there. It was formed out of the group of rooms surrounding the main living-room of the lock-keeper's house there, which main room was the head-quarters of General Graham. Here at Kassasin were tended the slight hurts which were not serious enough to be forwarded to Ismailia, and those so badly hurt that they could not safely be removed thither. Here, of course, there were no beds, or at any rate none which a hospital would have recognized as worthy the name. I believe there was indeed no hospital "plant" of any sort, save a few drinking-vessels, and that the worst cases lay on the simple military stretchers used to remove them from the field. The whole lay about twenty paces from the lock-gate, and here, I suppose, it was that our officer records that he visited a wounded comrade. Of the more permanent hospital at Ismailia I am unable to speak in equal detail : but I believe that up to a late stage of the campaign its appliances were such as would be deemed defective. These are matters on which it is likely that more light will ultimately be thrown : but probably only at a period when public interest will have waxed faint on the subject, and will be hurrying off in quest of some more novel excitement than the investigation of our soldiers' sufferings—such is the breathless pace at which the modern world lives. It may be presumed that at the termination of the campaign all the patients at Ismailia who were removable were despatched to Gabari, or on board the *Carthage* or else to Cyprus, or sent home. I have already cited a telegram of November 18th, at which date out of 600 sick the average mortality was one a day, instead of six a day of the previous week. It had been for sixty days at the latter rate and no higher—

and rather more than that time had elapsed since the close of the campaign by the march upon Cairo—that makes 360 deaths at Gabari and on board the *Carthage*. But it probably stood higher in the few weeks immediately succeeding Tel-el-Kebir, when the hospitals were probably at their fullest, and the weather more sultry. There was, however, a previous announcement under date of “Cairo, September 21st,” stating that “all the sick and wounded had been removed to Cyprus, to Malta, or to England.” This does not seem reconcilable with the 600 patients at Gabari and on board the *Carthage* on November 18th. The dispersion of the patients into various hospitals may have been a proper safeguard; but it makes it more difficult to obtain accurate information regarding the results. The subject belongs to a class on which all Governments are apt to practise a policy of reserve, until compelled to disclosure by public opinion or parliamentary pressure. An exhaustive inquiry demands time, and time blunts the edge of general interest. This is why it is expedient that such facts as are available at the moment, even if incomplete and one-sided, should not be kept back. The merest tiro in campaigning studies knows the delusiveness of reckoning losses on an expedition by the mere enumeration of killed and wounded on the field. The old proverb of “reckoning without one’s host” does not sufficiently express the absurdity of a calculation which would leave the heaviest items out of sight. If we want to know to the uttermost what stamina our “young army” and “short service men” have developed, we must be content to await the sifting of full official returns from all sources capable of furnishing them, and faithfully and severely study the results. I only wish at present to fix in the public consciousness the impression that there is a strong *prima facie* case in favour of making those studies thoroughly unreserved and exhaustive, leaving those to judge and sum up the question who are professionally capable of doing so.

I will only add that, speaking generally, there can hardly be anything more unreal and delusive than the would-be-picturesque and can’t-be-natural style of the “own artist” of our “Illustrated” contemporaries. I come to this conclusion after examining carefully a large assortment of sketches taken on the actual spots, and equally authentic with the written record which I have punctually quoted. I would particularize, as examples, the rather strongly sensational engravings of the fights at el-Magfar and Kassasin, to which we were treated by those accomplished contributors to the interest of the campaign for the home market.

I venture to say they represent a different country with wholly alien features from those of the Egyptian desert. There was, I believe, not a single tree, bush, or shrub near the localities where these fights took place. The dreary, unmarked desert with its rolling ridges of sand-hills, offers little play for the picturesque imagination; and truth—the naked truth—is so abominably naked in these regions that art will not condescend to it, but must needs do a little draping; in short, must work in the “fig-leaf” style.

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THE ARMY AND NAVY MAGAZINE.

SEPTEMBER 1883.

The Battle-fields of Germany.

BY COLONEL G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I.

II.—THE LECH AND NUREMBERG.

THE victory of Breitenfeld had given Catholic Germany into the hands of Gustavus. With the remnants of his beaten army Tilly had retreated into Westphalia, and between Leipzig and Anna there was no other army to oppose the progress of the conqueror. Had Gustavus marched directly from the battlefield to the capital of the hereditary states of the house of Austria, he might there have dictated terms of peace alike to Ferdinand and Maximilian.

From such a march Gustavus was deterred by the consideration that he would leave behind him, ready and able to reconquer and to harass the states of North Germany, so experienced a general as Tilly. There could be no question but that, left to himself, Tilly, rallying his beaten soldiers and joining to them the garrisons of some of the places still held for the League, would soon again be formidable. Had Gustavus been able to propose of the Saxon army, to place it under the command of a general such as Banner, or Horn, or Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, he might have ventured on the daring step, a step the sound principle of which was, in a later age, vindicated by the genius of a warrior greater even than the hero King. But he was not able to dispose of that army. The jealousy of John George had but little abated, and although in his first moments

Gustavus was offered to use all his influence to have the Emperor's army of the Germans, he soon relapsed into the same state of inactivity to him. Another consideration was that the Emperor was at the moment sitting at Frankfurt, and the Emperor of Austria, and Ferdinand was at the same time engaged to compel the members of that diet to agree to the Emperor's agreement with him. The Emperor's army alone would prevent the passage of a Swedish army through the German provinces—a part of Germany which was then threatened by the armies of the League—thus having a happy effect upon the minds of the Emperor's subjects. Gustavus then charged the Emperor's army with the war into Silesia, Bohemia, and Austria, his other German allies to conquer in North Germany. The Emperor's army was ruled by the princes of the League, and with this plan Gustavus set out for the Thuringen and lower Franconia.

The battle of Muhlhausen had been fought on the 7th September, and Gustavus presented himself before Erfurt, a town on the Gera. Though this town was a Catholic town, the magistrates surrendered to him. Gustavus granted the inhabitants their religion: then, nominating William of Nassau to be governor of the district and of the town, and the Count of Löwenstein to be governor of the town, which consisted of Colonel Fowler's regiment of fifteen hundred strong, he, for convenience, divided his army into two bodies, and pushed forward into the Thuringen forest, which boasted of no great town and no great fortifications, into lower Franconia. The left column was committed to General Bandissin, under the command of General Hapburn: the King himself led the right column. The march was considerable, for there were no roads and the transport of artillery over the rocks and through the forest caused the exercise of much labour and fatigue. Nevertheless on the evening of the third day Gustavus reached the south-west boundaries of the forest. The next day he attacked and carried the town of Königshofen, on

the Saal, belonging to the Bishop of Würzburg. This town contained the magazine and arsenal of the diocese of that prelate, was victualled for twelve months, and was held by a strong garrison. Its easy capture, then, was a matter of great importance to the Swedes. Marching twenty-six miles the day following, Gustavus invested and forced to capitulate the free imperial town of Schweinfurt. Here he came again into communication with Bandissin who, in his march, had mastered the towns of Smalkalden, Meiningen, Neustadt, Hammelburg, Gemünden, and Karlstadt, the latter being the fortified frontier town of the see of Würzburg.

Gustavus now had his army once more united on the right bank of the Main, the famous river which constitutes the natural line of demarcation between northern and southern Germany, within striking distance—for it is only twenty-three miles—of the important city of Würzburg. The bishop of that diocese was absent, acting as ambassador in France on behalf of the Catholic League, but his brother of Bamberg was on the spot to represent him. This prelate was quite equal to the occasion. Whilst on the one hand he offered to treat with Gustavus, on the other he despatched messengers to Tilly, who was hurrying to the relief of Würzburg, urging him to hasten his march. His overtures to Gustavus—overtures in which he offered, in consideration of being left in peaceful enjoyment of his lands and dignities, to pay down a sum equal to £27,000, to furnish monthly to Gustavus the same sum which up to that time he had paid to the League, to recall his forces from the League army, and to surrender in pledge the strong fortresses of Forcheim and Kronach—did indeed impose upon and cause delay to the Swedish king; for when, after having agreed to the conditions, he pressed for their execution, the bishop, who had received certain intelligence of the near approach of Tilly, threw off the mask and declined to complete the bargain.

Tilly, who by means of reinforcements headed by Aldringer, Fugger, and other generals had increased his army to the number of thirty thousand, was indeed approaching Würzburg, but he was still three days' march from it, not so near but that a determined general commanding determined soldiers might not venture an attack upon that town before he could arrive. Comprehending this on the moment, Gustavus, as soon as the negotiations with the Bishop of Bamberg had been broken off, marched directly on to Würzburg and invested it. The next day he obtained a firm footing on the south bank of

the Main, poured in an incessant fire on the fortification during that night and the two following days, carried the gate of the castle of Marienberg and the stone bridge over its ditch on the second day, and the castle itself the same night. The capture of Marienberg caused the instantaneous surrender of Würzburg, for the castle dominated the town. In Würzburg Gustavus obtained large supplies of corn, of wine, and money.

Tilly, after his defeat at Breitenfeld, had fallen back with an army reduced to eight thousand men, into Westphalia. Receiving there a strong reinforcement of cavalry and infantry from the Elector of Cologne, he had marched in southerly direction to Warburg (on the Diemel), and, pushing into Hesse, had joined there the reinforcements brought from Italy by Aldringer and Fugger. He had reached Fulda when he heard of the investment of Würzburg by Gustavus. His army now amounted to somewhat over thirty thousand men, exceeding that of Gustavus by five or six thousand. A brave man, anxious to wipe out the defeat of Breitenfeld, Tilly was about to push on by forced marches to succour Würzburg, when he received an imperative order from Maximilian of Bavaria to avoid a combat if possible, and by no means to attack. The army commanded by Tilly was, in fact, with the exception immediately to be referred to, the only army left to the League, and Maximilian felt, and felt justly, that its destruction would expose the whole of southern Germany to be over-run by the victorious Swede.

The one exception spoken of was the army of Duke Charles IV of Lorraine, a prince who, with the view to win for himself the electoral rank, had warmly espoused the Catholic cause, and who was, at the moment, marching at the head of seventeen thousand men to join Tilly. The boastful character of the Duke and the indiscipline of his army, brought, however, no real assistance to the Catholic commander. Both the Duke and the army disappeared, too, almost as suddenly as they had appeared; for a little later the Swedish cavalry fell, during the night, upon the Duke's camp, and so terrified his soldiers that they hastened back, with all possible speed, to their own country. As, thus panic-stricken, they approached the Rhine at Strasburg, a waggoner, passing on the road, struck the Duke's horse with his whip, calling out: "You must go faster than that if you would escape the great King of Sweden."

Tilly had been forced to allow Würzburg to succumb without

making an effort to save it; but the arrival of Duke Charles had increased his army to nearly fifty thousand men, and he hastened then to the north bank of the Main, nearly opposite Ochsenfurt, at the angle of the very sharp bend made by the river, a bend so strongly marked that both flanks of an army marching on Ochsenfurt from the north would be covered. Gustavus, who was very anxious to save that town, placed in it a Scotch brigade under Hepburn and Monro. Meanwhile, he sent a detachment of cavalry to beat up the Lorrainers in the manner already referred to. Tilly, finding Gustavus prepared at all points and vigilant, made only a demonstration against Ochsenfurt, and then withdrew his army. It was only when the Swedes had, in the manner now to be described, placed a considerable distance between themselves and the Main, that Tilly ventured, in virtue of a secret agreement with the Bishop of Bamberg, to cross the river and occupy the strong places which that prelate had previously offered to Gustavus. There, and in the neighbouring marquisate of Ansbach, he remained for some time, living on the country and watching events.

No sooner had Tilly fallen back from Ochsenfurt than Gustavus, always bearing in mind the real object of the campaign, began his march towards the Rhine. Following the course of the Main, he occupied, without serious opposition, Seligenstadt, Aschaffenburg, and Steinheim. The capture of these places brought with them the possession or the submission of the districts which they represented on both sides of the river. Whilst he was thus advancing, one of his lieutenants had captured, by collusion with its ruling count, Philip Ludovic, the town and citadel of Hanau. Gustavus himself was marching with eight thousand men in a north-westerly direction towards the valley of the Neckar, whilst Tott and Banner were engaged in securing the more northerly districts. The Saxons likewise were still marching towards Prague.

One effect of the influence gained by Gustavus at this period was the adhesion, just as he was quitting Würzburg, of the important city of Nuremberg. Nuremberg, the English rendering of the true name Nürnberg, was a free city of the empire, famous even in those days for the wealth, the order, the industry of its people. Rising from a sandy plain, rendered fertile by the application to it of the waters of the Pegnitz, it was surrounded by a wall having more than a hundred towers, culminating in a castle which, built on rising ground, dominated the city and commanded an excellent view of the country around it. The

beauty of its churches, the splendour of its private houses, its reputation as the home of art, added lustre to a city which then, in the commercial world, occupied a place inferior only to that of Venice and Genoa. It had been famous almost from its birth. In the year 1050-1 it was heard of as obtaining from the Emperor Henry III. the rights of coining money, of holding markets or fairs, of imposing duties. The establishment of these fairs, the worship of wonder-working Sebaldus, the repeated visits, always for a lengthened period, of the emperors, drew the industrial classes to the rising town. With the other possessions of the Franconian imperial house of Germany Nuremberg came, by the death of Henry V. (1125) into the possession of the House of Hohenstaufen; and the representatives of this family, Conrad and Frederic, had, two years later, to defend the castle against the Emperor Lothair. Lothair was repulsed, but the odds against the Hohenstaufens were too great, and, in 1138, Nuremberg was taken by Henry, "the proud," of Bavaria. But the election of Conrad of Hohenstaufen to the imperial throne (1138), restored Nuremberg to its position as an independent fief of the empire. Greatly favoured by the Hohenstaufens, the city soon extended beyond the Pegnitz, and its new boundaries speedily came to be surrounded by a wall with towers and ditches. In 1211 Frederic II., grandson of the famous Barbarossa, granted the city a patent of freedom. In 1324, 1356, and 1390, imperial diets were held within its walls. At the last of these the principle of having one coinage for all Germany was established. Diet assembled there likewise in 1522 and in 1523. On the 23rd of July 1532, the first religious peace was concluded, and six years later the Emperor Charles V. and the Catholic princes formed there a league to suppress Protestantism throughout Germany. The political history of the city had meanwhile undergone a material change. The Hohenstaufens had passed away, to be succeeded by the Hohenzollerns. The latter, after an administrative rule of nearly two centuries, had removed to Brandenburg. Their departure left the city a prey, for a long time, to constant wars, but the independent spirit of the citizens at length asserted itself. They had, at an early period of the Reformation, adopted, in their truest form, the principles of Luther, and, whilst denying a residence in the city to all who were not of the reformed persuasion, had carefully preserved from iconoclastic fury the beautiful churches and symbols which were amongst the precious ornaments of the city. When the thirty years' war broke out, the disturbance of its commercial prosperity

by the discovery of the Cape route to the East had been but slightly felt, and the city still maintained nearly all its old influence and pre-eminence.

This city, on the retreat of Tilly, had declared openly for Gustavus. Its example had been followed by Ulm, Strasburg, and Frankfurt (on the Main). The Swedish monarch considered it, then, advisable to push on to the last-named city, important even then, as the recognised seat of the diet for the imperial election. He had taken Steinheim on the 13th, and joined his lieutenant at Hanau on the 14th November. He pushed on, thence, to Offenbach, some four miles from Frankfurt. Here he concluded an agreement in virtue of which his army was allowed free entrance into the city, the magistrates took an oath of fidelity, and the suburb of Sachsenhausen was placed absolutely in his hands. The following day, the 17th, he made a triumphal entry into Frankfurt with great pomp and ceremony, amid the plaudits of the people.

Three days were occupied by the passage of the Swedish army, its material, its baggage, its sick and wounded, through Frankfurt. Fully aware, as he was, of the impression which would be produced by the surrender of so important a city, Gustavus was determined to utilise that feeling by following up his success. The very evening of the day, then, on which he made his triumphal entry, he sent troops against Höchst, six miles beyond Frankfurt, and belonging to the Elector of Mainz, a strong adherent of the League. Höchst surrendered that night. The day following, Landgrave William of Hesse-Kassel, who had done good service in Westphalia and Lower Saxony, joined the Swedish king with six thousand foot and three thousand horse. Amongst other men of note who found refuge in his camp at this period, was the unfortunate Count Palatine Frederic V., titular King of Bohemia.

The King stayed at Frankfurt only a sufficient time to prepare, at Höchst, materials for crossing the Rhine at Mainz, and for mastering the strong places on both banks of the Main. On the 1st December he quitted Frankfurt, and in three days over-ran the district known as the Bergstrasse*—a district which, in the more comprehensive application of the term, includes the country between Darmstadt and Heidelberg. He

* In its narrow and strictly literal application, the Bergstrasse signifies only the old Roman road, about thirty-seven miles in length, at the foot of the Odenwald, between Bensungen, near Darmstadt, and Heidelberg; but, as stated in the text, it is here used to comprehend the fruitful lands on both sides of it.

then made as though he would besiege the last-named city, with the view of restoring it to the Elector Palatine; but, knowing all the inconvenience of attacking a place whilst an enemy lay on his communications, he turned short off to his right, and attacked Oppenheim, an important town on the left bank of the Rhine, and the strong connecting fortress of Landskron. Whilst his troops were engaged against that place, he secured boats for the crossing of the river at Gernsheim, some few miles higher in the stream. The passage of the Rhine was successfully effected in spite of the opposition of a strong detachment of Spanish infantry, forming portion of a corps which, under Don Philip de Sylva, was serving in the Lower Palatinate. He then, after a very short siege, stormed Oppenheim and its fortress (12th December). The opportune fall of this place allowed Gustavus to march with his main body on Mainz, whilst a detachment secured Worms. Mainz, though defended by two thousand men under Don Philip de Sylva in person, surrendered on the second day. Gustavus made his triumphal entry in the city the day following, the 13th December.

The surrender of Mainz marks the close of the first portion of the campaign which followed the battle of Breitenfeld. Politically it was an event of the highest importance. It secured for Gustavus not only the command of the Rhine, but enormous supplies of every description, the possession of the electorate of which Mainz was the capital, and the submission of two-thirds of the Lower Palatinate. It enabled him to gather up all the threads of the forces of which he disposed, and to strike out such a line as would tend to finish the war.

A glance at the positions of the various forces at his disposal will give the reader a clear view of the position of the Swedish monarch at this moment. Banner and Tott and the Marquis of Hamilton had been acting with the Duke of Mecklenburg and the Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel in endeavouring to clear northern and north-eastern Germany of the Imperialists. Opposed by Pappenheim, Gronsfeldt, Boninghausen, and others of less note, they had nevertheless been fairly successful. Pappenheim, indeed, had maintained his hold on Westphalia, but in the other provinces the Swedish arms had made progress. South of the Main, Tilly, watched by Gustavus Horn with nine thousand men, was asserting the cause of the League in Upper and Central Franconia, and now that the Swedish king had made a decided movement in the direction of Mainz, was threatening Nuremberg. The Chancellor, Oxenstierna,

accompanied by the Queen Eleonora, had marched through North Germany with considerable reinforcements to Mainz, and had there joined the King. On the other side, the Saxons, after much delay, had over-run the Lausitz, and, beating down the resistance of the imperial generals, Tiefenbach and Götz, had entered Bohemia and occupied Prague without resistance. Here the Elector, John George, quitted his army, and left the further conduct of the war to his minister, Field Marshal von Arnheim.

Between Prague and Vienna the road, if not quite open, was at the moment barely defensible; for Wallenstein had not yet re-appeared on the scene, and Tilly's army was in Franconia. Had the Elector of Saxony been a strong man, he might, at this period, have finished the war. But John George, fickle, irresolute, timid, and fond of pleasure, far from looking at the opportunities before him, was at the moment debating within himself whether it would not be more for his ease and advantage to come to terms with the Emperor. The success of Gustavus alone prevented him from taking this course. It may be reasonably asked now, as it was asked at the time by generals of great ability, how it was that, in planning the campaign after Breitenfeld, Gustavus should have allotted to his Saxon allies, whose feebleness and capacity he had thoroughly gauged, the direct and comparatively undefended route to Vienna, whilst he accepted for himself the less decisive road through Franconia to the Rhine. The question was put in so many words to Gustavus by Oxenstierna when he joined him at Mainz. "Sire," he said, at their first private interview, "I should have been better pleased to pay my duty to you at Vienna than at Mainz." The answer of Gustavus, whilst it reveals as much as any act of his life the profound statesman-like capacity of the man, is a thorough justification of his conduct. "I gave," he replied, "the fullest consideration to the question. I recognised that in the Elector of Saxony and in his minister, Arnheim, I had to deal with two men, one of whom was irresolute and bore me no love, the other was insincere and hated me. Such men would serve to keep the Protestant feeling alive in Bohemia and the Lausitz, and hold their own there against the few imperial troops opposed to them, until Providence should afford me the opportunity of striking a second and decisive blow at the enemy. But, suppose for a moment that I had taken the route through Bohemia, and assigned to them that which led to the Rhine. The whole bearings of the question would then

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was changed. In Bohemia there is not a man on whom the Elector of Saxony can rely. For he would be in the very centre of the States who entered into the confederacy of Leipsic. The man who leads him blind-folded, and is a man of soldier, are both timid enough to submit to a treaty, and self-interested enough to sell me and my country for some acquisition of territory. In either case, what would be my position if I were at Prague? The Elector of Saxony is the first Protestant power in Germany, and the first Protestant power of the Union, if he were here amongst them, they would shape their conduct after his. Upon the Elector, then, how could I conduct a retreat from Bohemia, and Austria to the Baltic—the only course that would be left to me, with the Imperialists on my rear and the Emperor in front? No; in the game which Gustavus had to play, Gustavus who must be amongst the Protestant States of Germany—and the first man amongst them too."

Thus, then, was the position. The Saxons, at Prague, had to Vienna but feebly occupied at the moment, but the Emperor was making strenuous efforts, in the course to be related, to occupy strongly, before they could be reached.

Gustavus, largely strengthened at Mainz, and from reconquering the Palatinate: Gustavus Horn watching the other subordinate generals and allies in Germany, and improving the position in northern and north-west Germany. On the side of the enemy, Tilly, after having attempted to surprise Nuremberg, had left one half of his army under Aldringer to watch Gustavus Horn, whilst, with the other half, he had taken post at Nördlingen, an imperial fortress, close to the frontiers of Würtemberg, covered the principal road by which the Swedes entered the former country. Pappenheim, the main imperial force, was being gradually raised to eighteen thousand men, adding his own in Westphalia and on the lower Rhine. The Emperor Ferdinand was, as already stated, making the most strenuous efforts to levy an army which would enable him to re-assert all his former power.

It was in the month of November, 1631, when Gustavus, already at Prague, when Gustavus, after having been victorious at Würzburg, was making his triumphal march into Saxony, that Ferdinand II., driven to desperate measures, resorted to the powerful subject whom

months before, he had subjected to the indignity of a curt dismissal. The story of the previous overtures made by Wallenstein to the Swedish king, their failure, of the solicitations addressed to him by the Emperor, of the first refusal of Wallenstein (November 1631), of the conference held between them at Znaim in the following January, and of Wallenstein's guarded consent to raise an army in three months but not to command it, of the new negotiations conducted on the part of the Emperor by Father Quiroga, by the Bishop of Vienna, and by Count Eggenberg, which resulted in an agreement whereby, on the acceptance without reserve of his conditions, one of which assured him a royal title and a sovereign state* on the conclusion of peace, Wallenstein finally agreed to command the army—he had meanwhile been engaged in raising,—belongs rather to the life of that great commander than to these pages. It must suffice here to state that on the 15th April the final compact was signed, and on the last week of that month the new imperial army, led by the greatest captain of the age, entered into the campaign.

Before these negotiations could be brought to their perfect conclusion, Gustavus had quitted Mainz for Frankfurt, the fortifications of which he greatly strengthened. Having arranged for the levying of fresh troops in Sweden and in the German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, he opened thence the campaign of 1632 by marching to undertake the siege of Kreuznach. Kreuznach, defended by a garrison of six hundred veterans, was one of the strongest places in the Palatinate, one of the few which had not been attempted by the Swedes during the earlier winter months. It was regularly fortified, in the most approved manner of the time. On one side, defence rose above defence in such a way that it was difficult for a besieger to gain a position commanding it. The other side was, though very strong, still open to attack. To this side Gustavus directed his efforts. For a whole fortnight the place resisted him, and it was only when the springing of a mine offered to his troops a small but very steep breach, full of loose rocks, and difficult of ascent, that he ordered a storm. Volunteers from the ranks of the Anglo-Scottish brigade sprang forward to claim the honour of leading the attack. Led by Lord Craven, then very young, Colonel Talbot, and Mr. Masham,

* The conditions actually ran as follows: The Emperor pledged himself to grant upon Wallenstein "as ordinary reward an imperial fief, as an extraordinary reward sovereign jurisdiction in all the lands to be conquered."

they performed this service, supported by the Swedes, with signal gallantry. After a very sharp and obstinate contest, which lasted two hours, the garrison surrendered. The loss, however, of the stormers was considerable. Not only was the number of killed excessive, but Gustavus had to lament the death of one of his best officers, Colonel Halle. Not one of the British officers escaped uninjured. Lord Craven, whose conduct particularly attracted the favourable notice of Gustavus, was wounded by a pike in his thigh; Sir Francis Vane, brother of Lord Westmoreland, was shot in the hip-bone; Masham received a severe hurt from a large stone and a fire-brand; Talbot was killed close beside Lord Craven. Partly to testify his opinion of the gallantry of his English allies, partly in appreciation of the merits of the officers concerned, Gustavus appointed Mr. Alexander Ramsay to be governor of the conquered town: about this time, too, he nominated Sir Patrick Ruthven to be governor of the free imperial city of Ulm, which had just then pronounced in his favour, and had consented to receive a garrison of twelve hundred men.

With almost the sole exception of Heidelberg, the strong places of the Lower Palatinate were now in the hands of the Swedes and their allies. Gustavus was anxious, before marching into Bavaria, to complete the expulsion of the Spaniards from that Electorate; then to deal finally with Cologne, as well to punish the Bishop-Elector of that city as to confiscate the enormous amount of property deposited therein by the princes and nobility of north-western Germany. To attack Cologne, however, would have necessitated a deviation from his true course: and he was, perhaps fortunately, deterred from attempting it by the receipt of information that Tilly had struck his lieutenant in Franconia, Gustavus Horn, a very severe blow.

We left Tilly at Nordlingen, on the borders of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, prepared to protect the former country against Gustavus and his army. But, whilst lying at Nördlingen, Tilly received secret intelligence that Horn, who had recently taken Bamberg, was occupying that city and its neighbourhood in such manner as would, with the connivance of the inhabitants, facilitate an attempt to surprise him. The Bambergers, or people of Bamberg, were as intensely and devoutly Catholic as the neighbouring people of Nuremberg were intensely and devoutly Protestant. Their ruler and bishop, clothed in armour like a common cavalier, was at the time serving in the ranks of the imperial army. By communications initiated by him it was

arranged that the people of the city, aided by armed bands from Forchheim and Kronach, should plan an insurrection, in which they should be supported by the sudden appearance of Tilly and his army. There was some miscarriage in the plan, for the insurrection had already broken out and been repressed when Tilly, at the head of sixteen thousand men, arrived before the place. Horn had nine thousand, a sufficient number, had his orders to concentrate been obeyed, to repel the invader. But his orders were not obeyed. Baudissin, instead of falling back on the city, moved against Tilly. Attacked and overwhelmed, his men drew with them in their flight the newly-raised corps of Count Solmes; and Tilly's veterans, led by Cratz and Farenbach, followed them so closely as to gallop on to the bridge leading into the city pell-mell with them. But here Horn showed himself worthy of his great sovereign. By strenuous exertions he maintained during the rest of the day the barricade at the other end of the bridge, in spite of all the efforts, repeatedly renewed, of his adversary's horsemen. When, however, towards nightfall, Tilly brought up his artillery, and began to place it in position, Horn thought it expedient to retire. He embarked his guns, his ammunition and baggage, on boats, despatched them down the Main, and then, himself commanding the rear-guard, conducted an orderly retreat in a westerly direction, crossed the Main at Eltmann, and, breaking down the bridge there, halted only when he reached Schweinfurt. Thence he despatched a courier to the King, bearing a report of the mishap.

This report effectually dispelled from the mind of Gustavus any lingering desire he might have had to move against Cologne. Leaving Oxenstierna with a division to finish with the Palatinate and to protect the middle Rhine, he marched without delay (4th March) on Aschaffenburg, and, pushing on thence, effected a junction with Horn between that place and Schweinfurt, and then advanced, his army increased now to forty thousand men, to Kitzingen. Tilly, who had been harassing and pressing Horn, on the first information of the King's approach fell back hurriedly on Neuburg (on the Danube), and crossing that river, marched to the town of Rain (on the Lech), breaking down the bridges behind him, two alone, to be hereafter referred to, excepted. At Rain he was within striking distance of Donauwörth.

Gustavus had marched very closely on the track of Tilly, being often in the bed which his opponent had occupied the previous night. At Weissenburg he had halted to storm the castle of Wülzburg, on the west slope of the Jura, about

a mile from the town, which was held for the League. But as the siege of this stronghold seemed likely to involve a longer delay than he had anticipated, and as he judged it especially advisable to secure Donauwörth, not only because that town was the key into that part of Swabia which leads into Bavaria, but because it would afford him a secure place upon which to fall back in case of a reverse, Gustavus decided to leave Wülzburg to its fate, and to hasten on to the Danube. He arrived, then, before Donauwörth on the 26th March.

Donauwörth, a small town on the left bank of the Danube, at the junction of that river with the winding Wörnitz, was held by a garrison of about two thousand men, commanded by Rudolph, Duke of Saxe-Lauenburg. This prince declared that he would hold the place to the last; but after sustaining an attack of twenty-four hours duration, seeing no signs of Tilly's approach, and receiving no communication from that general, he cut his way through the Swedish army and escaped.

During this time Tilly was on the Lech, having his headquarters at Rain. He might undoubtedly have reached Donauwörth, only seven miles distant, in time to enter the place before it could be stormed. But many considerations induced him to prefer to meet Gustavus on the Lech. At Donauwörth he would have fought with the river in his rear. Defeat would have meant absolute destruction, whilst the position on the Lech was very defensible, had been carefully studied, and he had occupied its strong points. He was aware that by not marching to the relief of Donauwörth he left to Gustavus a position assuring him an entry into Bavaria. But it was the lesser of the two evils, and he still fondly hoped that he might prevent him from taking the second step, without which the first would be comparatively fruitless, by erecting a barrier to his further progress on the Lech.

The Lech, a tributary of the Danube, rises in the Rothwand, where that precipitous mountain towers over the Formarin-See in the Voralberg. Swiftly flowing thence in a north-easterly direction, its turbid waters reach, by a multitude of curves and windings—at a distance of fifty miles—the little town of Reute. Leaving Reute, the valley takes a northerly direction, and, widening, affords scope for a broader development of the river, as it flows, still rushing and winding, past the magnificent scenery which intevenes between that place and Füssen.* A very

* Near Füssen are the finest rapids in Germany, and a good waterfall. Füssen is likewise the head-quarters of a lake country of its own.

At distance beyond Füssen the Lech enters Bavaria, flowing north, and until it joins the Danube beyond Rain, almost due north. At Schongau, some twenty miles beyond Füssen, it gains a breadth of over thirty yards, and becomes navigable for boats. Between that place and Landsberg, the valley gradually expands, and thence to Augsburg and from Augsburg Rain the river courses over an open plain with flat but often high banks, its surface covered with many islands. In this plain, however, the Lech still maintains the character of an ordinary stream. So irresistible is the rush of its waters that no dams can stop them; they continually overflow the banks, and even, in their midst, large and constantly changing islands of mud are formed. The same cause produces astounding differences in the depth of the bed of the river, which, whilst it averages about twenty-four yards, amounts at the confluence with it of the Wertach near Augsburg, to more than nine hundred.* The height of the water changes too, continually and quickly, whilst the stream itself offers sometimes the appearance of a considerable mountain torrent, sometimes that of a rapid river. A careful study of all these particulars would give to the defender a considerable advantage over an attacking enemy. Tilly was influenced by this consideration when he decided to leave Donauwörth to its fate, and to meet Gustavus on the Lech.

No sooner, then, had the general of the League heard of the fall of Donauwörth than, anticipating the action which he felt would at once commend itself to the great commander to whom he was opposed, he broke down the bridge across the Danube at Rain, which his position could have been turned between Rain and Augsburg, and destroyed that over the Lech, close to the former town. Occupying then Rain with a portion of his right wing, and Augsburg with a strong detachment, he distributed the remainder of his army at the assailable points between the two towns. Small bodies of cavalry were placed at intervals to give warning as to the movements of the enemy. The distance covered was sixteen miles. His army, strengthened by all the troops which Maximilian of Bavaria, who joined him at Rain, had been able to raise, was forty thousand strong.

Gustavus, immediately after taking Donauwörth, had detached the flower of his dragoons and musketeers to seize the bridge over the Danube between Rain and Neuburg. But, as we have seen, they were too late. He then resolved, if possible, to repair the bridge near Rain, over the Lech. But this opera-

* Vide Brockhaus's *Conversations-Lexikon*.

tion was likewise found to be impracticable. Baffled here, he made, then, a long and careful reconnaissance, examining every bend and every peculiarity of the river. But here, too, he was forced to acknowledge the genius of his adversary, for he found the enemy's troops posted so as to command every likely point. A demonstration, which he made as a test, proved that Tilly was on the alert. Throwing up, then, intrenchments along a portion of the left bank, where the river made a sharp bend almost in the form of a half-moon, the outer rim of which he occupied, he posted behind those intrenchments a strong detachment, whilst with the bulk of his army he encamped in the rear close to the little village of Nordheim. He then erected in the intrenchment three batteries—one on the centre of the half-moon, the others on the two faces, and armed them with seventy-two pieces of cannon. The fact that the left bank of the Lech was here higher than the right bank, gave Gustavus a marked advantage, and when, on the morning of the 1st April, he opened fire, he inflicted great damage on the enemy, who were posted in a wood behind a little rivulet called the Ach, and effectually prevented them from approaching the banks of the Lech. This cannonade, in which, though it was replied to, the Swedes had all the advantage, continued four days. Whilst it was progressing, Gustavus was engaged in preparing, at the little village of Oberndorf, near the place he had selected to cross the river, and which was concealed from the enemy's view by a declivity, on a plan of his own invention, the means wherewith to effect that purpose. These took the shape of strong wooden trestles, of various heights and with unequal feet, which could rest on the bottom of the river supported by piles. To facilitate the driving in of these piles, he caused several fires to be lighted between the village and the river, and had these continuously fed with smoky combustibles. A favourable wind blew the smoke thus caused towards the enemy, and completely hid his workmen from their view.

Having made everything ready, Gustavus, very early on the morning of the fifth day (the 5th April), whilst it was still dark, despatched across the river in two boats which he had managed to secure, covered by a heavy fire, a thousand picked men, amongst whom were the most skilled workmen of his army. These speedily made a lodgment, and proceeded forthwith to throw up a bridge-head. This work had been completed when the rising light of the sun disclosed it to Tilly. That general, without an instant's delay, brought two batteries to bear upon

at the nature of the ground, which just at that point was and swampy, interfered greatly with the efficacy of their

But this low and swampy land told equally in his favour, it lay directly between his own intrenchments and the des, and to attack him they must traverse it. To render an attack more hazardous Tilly proceeded to strengthen his position by hewing down large trees to form breast-works, and their branches to be sharpened and pointed near the top into a form of *chevaux de frize*.

Meanwhile, under a heavy fire from both sides, the bridge was completed, and about noon was crossed by the advanced guard of the Swedes, led by Colonels Wrangel and Gassion. As other detachments continued to follow the advanced parties, Tilly directed Aldringer to move round the swampy ground, charge with the rear of his cavalry those who had already crossed, and seize the rear-head. Aldringer obeyed the order with great alacrity. He turned the marsh, and led his men with splendid daring against the enemy. But the Swedes, divining his intention, had time to form up, and Aldringer, notwithstanding the prowess of his men, failed to make any impression upon them. Falling back, then, for a moment, he rallied his troops, and then charged again at their head with splendid courage. In vain, however; a cannon-ball grazed the temple of Aldringer, and he was carried senseless from the field. His men, shaken, and exposed to a tremendous fire, broke in confusion. Tilly, noticing the catastrophe, and having no one at hand efficiently to replace Aldringer, descended from the wood with a fresh body of dragoons, renewed the attack with indescribable fury, he himself fighting with all the ardour of a boy. The combat had lasted but twenty minutes, and its result was still uncertain, when a

shot from a falconet struck him on the knee and shattered the bone. The old general, who had fallen swooning to the ground, was at once carried off the field, and his troops, now without a leader, gave way. Their retrograde action was hastened by the support of two considerable parties of Finland horse, who, eager for action, swam their horses across the river, and threatened to strike them in flank.

At this time the shades of evening were falling. The Swedes had indeed, secured the passage of the river; but the army of the League still held its intrenched position in the wood behind the Ach. Gustavus, then, decided to content himself with bringing across the remainder of his army, and with maintaining his position on the Bavarian side of the river.

Tilly, meanwhile, had been carried, with the agony of a painful death upon him, to the wood behind the Ach. There, during the fight, had remained his old master, the nominal commander-in-chief, Maximilian, Elector of Bavaria. To a great general there was still a chance, for the position was strong, was unassailable on the right, and covered in its front by the marshy ground.* Under other circumstances Tilly would undoubtedly have made an effort to defend it. But under the influence of excruciating pain his spirit had given way, and he advised Maximilian to save himself as best he could. That same night, then, the army of the League evacuated its position, and fell back in good order on Neuburg and Ingolstadt.

Firm now on Bavarian soil, Gustavus took Rain and Neuburg; then, sending Horn to follow the remains of the League army to Ingolstadt, marched himself with the remainder of his army up the Lech to Augsburg. He arrived at Lechhausen, a village two miles from the imperial free city, and separated from it by the Lech, on the 8th April. Its Governor, Colonel Breda, who held it with four thousand five hundred men, had broken down the bridge; but Gustavus immediately built two others, the one above, the other below, the city, and summoned it to surrender. Breda, hearing that Tilly was dying, that Aldringer was severely wounded, and that no help was to be expected from the League army, complied after a decent interval, and Gustavus on the following day, April 14th, made a triumphal entry into the city, considered then the birthplace of the Reformation,† attended by the titular King of Bohemia, and many other princes of note.

Leaving a garrison in Augsburg, and enlisting in his own ranks five hundred men belonging to the force which he had thence expelled, Gustavus hastened to retrace his steps along the banks of the Lech to Neuburg, and marched thence to Ingolstadt. This town, one of the strongest places in Germany, possessed a virgin reputation. Never had an enemy been able to force his way behind its walls. Not only did it possess a formidable garrison, but Tilly himself was there, and the League army, led now by Maximilian of Bavaria, covered it on the north-

* "If I had been the Bavarian," exclaimed Gustavus when he visited next day the strongly fortified abandoned intrenchment, "never—even if a cannon-ball had carried away my beard and my chin—never would I have abandoned a post such as this; never would I have thus opened a way into my own country to an enemy."

† The Confession, called the Augsburg Confession, had been presented to Charles V. in that city just above a century before—in the year 1530.

than this, Tilly had implored Maximilian to maintain town and Ratisbon at all hazards. The presence of the army forced Gustavus, who appeared before it on the April, to confine his efforts to an attack upon its southern

The following morning, whilst inspecting the outworks, King of Sweden met with an adventure which is thus ded by one of the chroniclers of the seventeenth century. "But all these advantages did not compensate for the fright in which the Swedes were thrown the 20th April, when they just missed receiving a fatal and irreparable blow; the King, having advanced that day to reconnoitre more fully the approaches to the place, mounted, as was his wont, on a grey hackney, the gunners of Ingolstadt, conceiving that something extraordinary was taking place, took so good an aim at the King that a ball carried away the hackney's quarters, and covered the King with blood and dust. All his suite were in indescribable alarm at the occurrence, but their fears were immediately changed into joy when they saw that the King was unhurt."

The day following this incident was memorable for two incidents. A cannon-ball carried off the head of Christopher, Elector of Baden Durlach; and the veteran Tilly expired. On his last breath the old soldier urged upon the Elector two conditions: the first, never to break his alliance with the Emperor; second, to bestow the command of the army upon Cratz. "That officer," he said, "has courage to serve you, fidelity to assist you, and parts to assist you. He will conduct your army with reputation, and, as he knows Wallenstein, will foresee his designs."

Gustavus remained eight days before Ingolstadt; then, finding the reduction of the place would require time which might be usefully employed, he raised the siege, and hastened to the bulk of his army, by way of Geisenfeld, to Moosburg. There he detached Horn to take possession of Landshut on the Rhine, forced that place to pay a hundred thousand thalers to receive a garrison; then, drawing from it eighteen companies, hastened along by way of Freising to Munich. The Bavarian capital surrendered without a blow on the 17th May. Then Gustavus made a triumphal entry, and availed himself of the large amount of treasure and stores found there. From a central point he employed himself, either in person or by generals, in reducing the remaining strong places in Bavaria,

Le Soldat Suedois, or Histoire de ce qui s'est passé en Allemagne depuis l'entrée de Suede en l'année 1630, jusques après sa mort. Published in 1633.

and in sending succours to his generals in the north. He was at length called thence by the movements of Wallenstein.

Wallenstein, I have said, had concluded his final treaty with the Emperor the 15th April of that year. I have also stated that whilst the treaty was negotiating, indeed during December and the three following months, the agents of the Duke of Friedland, who had thoroughly forecast the future, had been engaged in levying troops in his name. It soon appeared that that name possessed a power greater than that of the Emperor. From all parts of the Austrian dominions there flocked thousands to his standard, some possibly enticed by the advantages held out to them, but the greater number drawn thither by a desire to renew the ties which had bound them by reverence and affection to so great a commander. When, then, on the 15th April, the compact was signed, Wallenstein found an army ready to his hand. At the head of this army he entered Bohemia, expelled thence with scarcely an effort Arnheim and the Saxons, and formed a junction near Eger with the remnants of the army which had been beaten on the Lech, and which, after leaving a strong garrison in Ratisbon, had marched northwards, through the upper Palatinate, towards that frontier town. This junction increased the strength of his army to nearly sixty thousand men. Viewing the situation with the eye of a great general, he noted that although Gustavus had conquered the whole of Bavaria, and had occupied its principal towns and fortresses, yet that his position north of the river Main was by no means secure; that whilst the Saxons had been removed by his own action from the scene of combat, Pappenheim more than held his own in lower Saxony and in Westphalia. He perceived, then, that the surest way to force Gustavus to abandon his hold upon Bavaria was to march on some important point between him and northern Germany—a point which his enemy would not relinquish, but would strain every effort to maintain. Could he draw Gustavus to such a point, he would endeavour to hold him there whilst Bavaria should recover from its alarm, and Pappenheim, reinforced should re-establish the Imperial hold on northern Germany. For this purpose he selected as a point of attack the important city of Nuremberg.

Wallenstein had recovered Prague the 4th May, had forced the Saxons to make a hazardous retreat to Pirna on the 30th. He effected a junction with the Bavarian army on the 11th June, and he appeared before Nuremberg the 30th of that

month. There he found Gustavus, with what force he could command, intrenched, and ready to receive him.

Gustavus fully recognised the skill of his great opponent. He had, we have seen, occupied Munich on the 17th May, just when Wallenstein was engaged in driving his allies from place to place in Bohemia. His own forces had, from the despatch of Horn to the Lower Palatinate and other causes, been greatly diminished, and when the junction of Wallenstein with the Bavarian troops near Eger proved to him that that general had given up the idea which, it was supposed, he had first entertained, of following up the Saxons, he had felt certain that he would have to bear the brunt of the next movement. Indications not to be doubted soon convinced him that Nuremberg would be the point of attack. He could not but see how very advantageous to the Imperialists would be the possession of that city. For not only would the moral effect be enormous, but it would ensure the destruction of the allied troops in Swabia, which, under Banner, William of Weimar, and Ruthven, were then on the march to join him. Although, then, he could at the moment dispose only of about seventeen thousand men, he hesitated not for an instant, but hurried with all speed to the threatened city.

Gustavus arrived at Nuremberg the 19th June. His apprehensions that Wallenstein had immediate designs on the place were confirmed by the information which there reached him. Three considerations then forced themselves upon him. The first, how, being as it were in a hostile country, to support his army; the second, how, his troops numbering fewer by more than two-thirds than those of Wallenstein, successfully to resist an attack; the third, by what line to direct the generals, who were marching to join him, to advance so as not to be intercepted. He met all these difficulties in the manner which might have been expected from one of a generous and manly nature, who had confidence in the justice of his cause, confidence in the effect which the same belief would induce in others, confidence in his soldiers and in himself. To meet the first difficulty he appealed with open heart to the citizens of Nuremberg; showed to them the necessities of the case, and asked them to supply his army with food and money until he should have strength to meet the enemy in the open plain. In this dread crisis the citizens of Nuremberg were true to the cause they had espoused. They entered heart and soul into the plans of Gustavus, and agreed to all his proposals. The third difficulty was to the Swedish King the most formidable, because the solution of it

depended very much upon the action of others. All he could himself do under the circumstances was to send messengers to Horn, to Banner, and the other detachments, indicating his own position and the route which he heard from time to time Wallenstein was taking, to warn them to avoid, as much as lay in their power, a decisive conflict with the enemy: he refrained, in a word, from trammelling their action by too precise orders. The second he met in a manner which has stamped his reputation as a great military commander.

Gustavus was at Nuremberg with, at the most, seventeen thousand men. Wallenstein was marching on that place from Eger with nearly sixty thousand. Were Gustavus to quit Nuremberg and fall back on his several detachments beyond the Main, he would save his army, be in a position very shortly to affront Wallenstein, but he would sacrifice the free city which had been the first, south of the Main, to declare in his favour, he would give up conquered Bavaria, and he would deal heavy discouragement, possibly a fatal blow, to the cause of freedom of conscience. On the other hand, by remaining to protect Nuremberg, he would occupy a position materially and politically strong, would give time to his detachments and partisans to rally, and would keep Wallenstein at bay until, either he were strong enough to assume the offensive; or, should he in the end be forced to quit his position, he would have given confidence to Protestant Germany by his long retention of it in the face of vastly superior numbers, and have afforded his lieutenants a rendezvous at a point where a junction was always feasible.

He set to work, then, without delay, to select and fortify a camp which, occupied by his soldiers, would defy Wallenstein. Round the city, at a distance of about thirteen hundred yards from it, he dug a ditch, for the most part twelve feet wide and eight deep, in some particular parts eighteen feet wide and twelve deep. Behind this ditch, at intervals, not fixed, but varying according to the conformation of the ground and the points to be guarded, he erected eight distinct forts, and armed them with his heaviest guns. He connected these with each other by long and thick earthen parapets, strengthened at intervals and wherever required with bastions and half moons, and mounted these also with cannon, of which there were, when the camp was completed, three hundred pieces in position, mostly supplied by the city of Nuremberg. The Pegnitz traversing the camp, divided it into two not unequal parts, and to reunite these, numerous bridges were thrown across the river. The

whole camp, not including the spaces allowed for irregular angles, outlines of defence, intrenchments, and redoubts, was computed to cover two hundred and nineteen square acres. In such a space, it was comparatively easy to concentrate, without delay, in case of attack, a very large number on the decisive point. The whole of these works were designed and completed in exactly fourteen days.

Gustavus had, I have stated, reached Nuremberg on 19th June. The works of his intrenched camp were very far advanced towards completion when Wallenstein and Maximilian of Bavaria appeared before it, the 30th June, with the full intention of attacking it. But the works, though not quite complete, were still so formidable, that Wallenstein recognised at once that the issue of such an assault would be, at the best, doubtful, and made up his mind on the spot, in spite of the earnest entreaties of Maximilian, to endeavour, in preference, to starve out his enemy. When Maximilian pushed his arguments beyond a certain limit, Wallenstein offered, in a cold and haughty manner, that if the Elector would begin the attack with his Bavarians, he would support him with his army. This remark ended the discussion, and the plan of starving out was agreed to.

With this view, Wallenstein took up a position near Zirndorf, about two miles south of Fürth,* upon a low, wooded hill, surmounted by a fortress, now in ruins, and which gives to the hill the name of Alte Veste. Round this, and enclosing a tract of country sufficient to make a circumference of seven miles, he threw up only light defences, surrounding the camp with a ditch of comparatively small dimensions, and covering it with an interlacement of forest trees, baggage waggons, and gabions. Behind these he ranged his army, formed into eight divisions, each about seven thousand strong. Besides these, the camp contained fifteen thousand women, nearly as many carters, sutlers, and servants, and thirty thousand horses.

To support this army and this following Wallenstein had little difficulty. He had with him large supplies of grain; the country behind and on both sides, belonging to the Bishop of Bamberg, was devoted to him; he possessed all the towns and passes in the circle of territories which surrounded him, except that little segment occupied by Gustavus. He received, likewise, provisions and ammunition from Vienna. To make assurance doubly sure, he stationed two considerable bodies of troops in the diocese of Bamberg and the upper Palatinate, and caused his Croats to

* Fürth is five miles from Nuremberg; Wallenstein's camp was only three.

scour the country day and night in a cross line from Bamberg to Munich. In this manner, and by sending daily parties from his own camp to prevent foraging on the part of the enemy, Wallenstein at once increased his own store, and compelled the Swedes to confine themselves to the resources of Nuremberg.

Between the two camps, three miles apart, flowed the Pegnitz, which, after traversing the Swedish camp, formed a sort of bow in front of it. The waters of this river supplied both armies, though the Imperialists were not absolutely dependent upon it, for, flowing to the north-west of, and partly through their position, and parallel with the Pegnitz, was the Rednitz, a small, narrow, unnavigable stream, but still constituting a provision for their camp.

From these positions, for nearly three months, the two armies looked one another in the face: Wallenstein resisting every incitement to attack; calmly asserting his own supreme position; not hesitating to lay waste for the support of his army the dominions of Maximilian of Bavaria, always vainly clamorous for action; occasionally parading his troops in battle array, provoking his enemy, but not going one step beyond. Gustava, on the other hand, eating up the resources of Nuremberg, carefully watching his enemy, in the hope of a false movement which was never made, or of the consequences of a disagreement between Wallenstein and Maximilian which were never manifested; now despatching couriers to his detached generals, with routes for their guidance carefully marked out by himself, yet always leaving them freedom of action*; reviewing his troops daily; endeavouring too, by means of carefully planned raids, to intercept, and sometimes succeeding in intercepting, the enemy's supplies; devising, for the first time, I believe, in military history, a scheme for mounted infantry, by mounting on horse-back the men who carried a shorter musket, and who were called "dragoons," and intermingling them with his light cavalry, so that on an expedition the former could, if necessary, dismount and serve as footmen†; and doing everything in his

* "Your king," it was his habit to add at the close of these despatches, "can only direct his absent disciples in general terms. Incidents will arise which no human foresight can predetermine. Seize the moments, snatch the proffered opportunities which take birth and flight in one instant. I resign into your hands full discretionary power; use it in a manner worthy of me and of yourselves." *Life and*

† This system was found very efficacious in dealing with the Croats, who formed the loose light infantry of the Imperial armies.

power, by a display of his natural gaiety and example, to encourage his men.

It must be admitted that on the Imperial side the courtesies of war were more conspicuously displayed than on the other. On one occasion a foraging party led by Colonel Dubatel had attacked and dispersed a party of Croats, when it was suddenly assailed by a largely superior number of Imperialists, many of its number were slain, and Dubatel was taken prisoner. Wallenstein, who knew the great affection which Gustavus felt for Dubatel, released him forthwith without a ransom. On another occasion he similarly released a Captain Reischel, and sent him back with a complimentary message to the King. A few days after the first occurrence, Colonel Darmitz, an officer high in the confidence of Wallenstein, was captured by the Swedes. Far from releasing him, Gustavus used his opportunity to press him to disclose his general's secrets, and wrung from him the admission that Wallenstein intended to remove into his camp a large convoy which had been collected for him at Freystadt, a small town near Neumarkt (on the Sulz) sixteen miles from Nuremberg on the Ratisbon road. Promptly he detached two parties to secure that convoy. They did secure it, and Gustavus then personally, after a very sharp encounter with the enemy, escorted it safely into his camp.

The strictest discipline was at the outset maintained on both sides, and on that of the Imperialists continued, according to the testimony of their opponents, to the end. But in the Swedish camp, whether from the habit of making constant raids, or from the occasional opportunities of plundering which were offered, a feeling of rapacity began to manifest itself, from general down to the commonest soldier. Gustavus, who knew well that want of morale would soon lead to want of discipline, and that his hitherto invincible army would then soon cease to deserve that epithet, issued a strong order upon the subject, in which, appealing to the nobler instincts of those serving under him, he forbade all personal plundering. When this order did not suffice, he hanged the officer, a lieutenant, who was the first offender after it had appeared. When, a day or two later, a peasant complained that a common soldier had stolen a cow, which was the sole support of his family, Gustavus seized the fellow with his own hands, and, calling for the executioner, commanded him to perform his office. The man was hanged on the spot.

By degrees, the continued stay in one spot began to produce the inevitable result in both camps, especially in that of the Swedes,

who were more shut in than their enemy. The waters of the Pegnitz, too, whilst their volume was greatly affected by the continued drought, became putrified by the carcasses of dead horses and other causes. The consequence was the prevalence of fever to an extraordinary extent. In the Swedish camp, moreover there was an absence, first of green forage, and then of all forage at all. The state of affairs became every day more and more strained. Wallenstein was master of the situation. Apparently he had only to sit still on the Alte Veste and see the army of the Swedes perish from sickness before his eyes.

But the 21st of August brought a change in the situation. On that day four of his detached corps succeeded in joining Gustavus. It will be necessary to devote a brief space to the previous movements of these.

To the commander of the principal detached corps, the Chancellor Oxenstierna, had been committed the care of the Middle Rhine and the Lower Palatinate. Here he had been confronted by the Spanish troops under Don Philip de Sylva. The summons sent by Gustavus from Nuremberg reached him the last day of June. He was not, however, in a position to move before the 11th July. On that day, leaving Horn with a small force to oppose the Spaniards, Oxenstierna set out to join his master.

Not, however, by the most direct route. Taking into consideration all the possibilities of an attack by a superior force he had resolved to unite himself with the second detachment commanded in Westphalia by the Landgrave of Hesse Kassel. This junction would, under ordinary circumstances, have been difficult, for the Landgrave was opposed in that part of Germany by the vigilant and daring Pappenheim. Fortunately, however, Pappenheim had rushed, for the moment, to attempt to relieve Maëstricht, then besieged by Frederic of Nassau, and the Landgrave was thus at liberty to march unmolested to the Main and join Oxenstierna.

Two Scotchmen, Ballandine and Alexander Hamilton, who commanded two regiments of their countrymen, were in the duchy of Magdeburg when the news of the King's danger reached them. Without waiting for instructions they marched at once direct to Halle, met there a portion of the division commanded by the general to whom they were attached, Duke William of Saxe-Weimar. The division then pushed on through Lützen to Zeitz—on the Elster, nearly thirty miles south-west from Leipzig—was joined there by the Duke, who had hurried for the purpose from Lake Constance attended only by his guards, then

g the forest of Thüringen, and strengthened in Fran- the junction of five Saxon regiments, had pressed on to- g, and had met there, on the 10th August, Oxenstierna, ng picked up the Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel on the ear Aschaffenberg, had directed his march to that t town.

; who commanded the fourth corps, was at Augsburg to Cratz, who commanded in that part of Bavaria a of Tilly's old army. On receiving the King's summons d the Danube, and gliding by the western side of the mp at Nuremberg, advanced to the free imperial town aeim, on the Aisch, with a view of giving a hand to na, who would naturally take that place in his route urzburg. To his surprise he found that the King ipated his intention by detaching thither a body of der Bernard of Saxe-Weimar. There, then, the junction detached corps was effected, and these, amounting to : thousand men, marched, under instructions from , by way of Herzogenanrach to Bruck and Eltersdorf, to the north of Nuremberg, at the junction of the ith the Pegnitz. There they encamped and fortified as. On the third day (16th August) Gustavus rode : camp, and five days later led them triumphantly, e very nose of Wallenstein, into Nuremberg.

Vallenstein allowed those reinforcements to pass un- even unthreatened, can only be surmised. He reckoned,

that they were marching to destruction in another : he was aware that the King's supplies were all but l, that he could not feed, even for a week, in the he occupied, the additional number of mouths thus upon him; further, that having detached ten thousand wn men, under Holk, into the Meissen country for he could not bring into the field a number equal to he reinforcements, and that it would be more advisable an attack from them in his intrenchments. He then, simply to maintain the blockade.*

he English biographer, *par excellence*, of Gustavus Adolphus, rates the ts at only twenty-six thousand men, and calculates that Wallenstein uperiority over the increased army of Gustavus of fourteen thousand; gives the number of the reinforcements as about fifty thousand, and fortified by the testimony of contemporary writers; *vide Le Soldat Histoire de ce qui s'est passé en Allemagne depuis d'entrée du Roy de Suede 30, jusques après sa mort* (1633); the author of which gives the numbers he text.

But Gustavus had brought his several detached corps to Nuremberg with the sole purpose of forcing that blockade. The day following, the 21st August, was, then, employed by the King in endeavouring, by means of a brisk cannonade, to force Wallenstein to quit his position and give him battle. But Wallenstein was far too great a commander to allow himself to be forced to do that which his enemy evidently desired. The more persistently the Swedes cannonaded, the more eagerly did he set his men to work on the one side with the spade; on the other to threaten the King's flanks, and to engage his detached parties at advantage, without, however, permitting themselves to be drawn into an engagement which might become general. The orders given to them were to be always prepared to fall back behind their intrenchments. These directions were executed with such exactness of discipline that Gustavus, baffled, was forced to adopt other measures. The next day he brought his guns nearer to the enemy's camp, and for twenty-four hours poured upon it an unintermitting fire. The only result, however, was that Wallenstein fell back a few hundred yards on to the two ridges on one of which was the castle—now the *Alte Veste*—higher than the eminence he had before occupied—the other known as the *Altenburg*. The ascent to these was steep and craggy, and they were covered by a thick forest. Here he covered himself with a three-fold barrier of trees, each rising in a semicircle one above the other. Before Gustavus had ceased the cannonade, the new position had become inaccessible.

Again was the King baffled. But it had now become for him a necessity to deliver, without delay, a blow which should be decisive. His supplies, scanty before, could no longer suffice for his augmented force. The city, though previously well-stored, possessed now a bare sufficiency for its own wants, and low diet, fever, and other forms of disease had already laid low many there and in the camp. All the mills in and about Nuremberg could not grind a supply of corn sufficient for such a multitude, and the bread furnished daily by the town excited rather than allayed the cravings of hunger. Horses in great numbers were dying daily from starvation, and the casualty list of the men was rapidly increasing. Forced, then, to compel Wallenstein to fight, Gustavus quitted his intrenched camp at Nuremberg, and, making over the defence of that city, and the care of his sick and wounded, to its armed citizens, numbering thirty thousand, crossed the *Rednitz* and took up a new position

above Fürth, lodging himself in that town.* Thence he reconnoitred Wallenstein's position. What he saw has been described in language so vividly descriptive by the great German historian that I feel impelled to translate his words :—

"On the two steep heights between the Biber and the Rednitz, called the Alte Veste and the Altenberg," writes Schiller, "rested the chief force of the enemy, their camp, commanded by these heights, spreading, impenetrable to view, over the fields between them. Their entire artillery was massed on the heights. Deep ditches surrounded unscalable earthen parapets; strong and closely laid abatis and sharply pointed palisades added enormously to the difficulties of climbing slopes, already steep and rugged, from whose summits Wallenstein, calm and secure as a god, launched his thunderbolts through thick clouds of smoke. Behind the ramparts lurked the insidious fire of the muskets, and certain death from a hundred open cannons' mouths envisaged the forlorn stormers."

Whether, beholding such a position, Gustavus, pressed as he was by famine, would, in his cooler moments, have made a direct attack upon it, may, perhaps, be doubtful. But after he had returned from reconnoitring, information was brought to him that the enemy had begun a retrograde movement; that only a few regiments had been left in camp to hold the Swedes in check until the guns and baggage should be well to the front. Hastening again to reconnoitre, Gustavus beheld the Imperialist army in motion, and, concluding too hastily that his information was correct, ordered a general advance.

The information was not correct. The whole was a device on the part of Wallenstein to entice the King to attack, and the brisk movement seen by the King was only a part of the same plan.†

Under a very heavy fire from two hundred pieces of artillery the Swedish and German soldiers advanced (24th August), to the attack of the Attenberg hill. Sword in hand, Gustavus, who had ordered his dragoons‡ and part of his cavalry to dismount, directed the assault. This was made by the whole body of the musketeers of the army, drafted from the several brigades, subdivided into battalions five hundred strong, each commanded by a colonel.§ Steadily and in good order did these gallant men advance, undeterred neither by the steepness of the hill, nor by

* In the inn called Grüner Baum in the street still named after the King.

† Harte states that in the general opinion it was Aldringer who purposely threw false information in the way of the King. Other writers state that Gustavus received it from "his prisoners and his spies." Schiller does not mention the

‡ The dragoons were then purely mounted infantry.

§ It is to be noted that before ascending to attack, these battalions left their baggage with the reserve.

the artificial obstacles which impeded their ascent. In a few minutes, the smoke of the cannons hid them from view. Then they were discovered endeavouring to force their way across the ditch which covered the hostile position. Vainly did they try to force those well-defended intrenchments. Man and nature were too strong for them. After a fruitless struggle they fell back exhausted, broken, and in disorder.

Enraged at this repulse, Gustavus then led in person his own Findlanders to the storm ; but neither can his Findlanders, nor the descendants of the Ostrogoths who follow them in the attempt, produce any impression upon that fatal hill. A fourth, a fifth, and a sixth attack meet with a similar result. But still the fight went on ; still Gustavus hoped that pertinacity would at length triumph. Every regiment in his army tried that day to conquer the impossible.

Wallenstein, when he heard that Gustavus had committed himself to an assault, had expressed, it is said, in words peculiar to the age, his conviction of the certainty of his failure. Calm and collected, mounted on horseback, he directed the defence, encouraging his men, even forcing, with the point of his sword, the weak-hearted to return. Whilst thus employed, a cannon ball struck his horse in the flank and brought him to the ground. To mount another, to show himself to his men uninjured, his resolute face as resolute as before, was the work of an instant. Well, too, was he supported. His men, for the most part, displayed in him that blind confidence which leaders of their fellows always attract from the multitude.

For ten hours the battle raged. The King himself never left the front of his line, but stood there calmly directing every assault. Before nightfall there was not a man of his infantry or dragoons who had not been engaged in attempting to storm the position. The nature of the ground forbade action to the cavalry as cavalry. Gustavus, as we have seen, had utilised his in the manner which made them most available for his purpose. On the other side, one imperial regiment, reputed as the best in Wallenstein's army, had been completely shattered in an attempt to break through the sturdy Finlanders. A bullet had struck the sole of the King's boot ; Duke Bernard of Weimar had had his horse shot under him, Banner, von Erbach, de Castell, von Eberstein, de la Tour, and many other superior officers had been wounded ; several, scarcely less deserving, had been killed ; the hill-side was covered with the bodies of the dead and dying ; when, happily, night threw her dark curtain over the scene.

battle was over. For the first time Gustavus had been repulsed. The repulse had but just been recognised when heavy rain fell. It continued all night. The next morning, leaving a thousand dead on the field, Gustavus recrossed the Rednitz. From the first, success against such a position had been all impossible. Bernard of Weimar, who on that day commanded the cavalry, had indeed during the heat of the battle seized a height which, he reported, commanded the Alte Veste, and had sent word of his success to the King. But by that time Gustavus was too much in the toils of his original attack. Not recognising the importance of the post seized by Duke Bernard, he could not, he said, leave his actual position without exposing his army to a double attack from the enemy.

Wallenstein, it is said, lost about a thousand killed and a hundred wounded. The total loss of the Swedes, including the two thousand dead already referred to, could scarcely have been less than eight thousand. But these numbers can only be approximate, as no actual return was ever made.

Gustavus crossed the Rednitz on the morning of the 25th, but he did not return to his old camp at Nuremberg. He took rather, a new position within long cannon-shot of the Altenburg, and from that new position looked his enemy in the face.

Wallenstein, true to his policy of starvation, would not stir. Constant skirmishes ensued between the foraging parties of the two armies, but they led to no action of real consequence. At length, in sheer desperation, Gustavus formed a plan by means of which he hoped to lure Wallenstein into the open. With this

in view, he proposed to detach two small corps under Bernard of Saxe Weimar and Banner to take up a position at Altenau, a strong fort on the Rezat some seven miles eastward of Ansbach, and which was held for the Burgrave of Brandenburg by Scheverlin, a patrician of that town. Had the plan succeeded, the Swedes, by obtaining the command of the surrounding country, would have forced Wallenstein to action or to retreat. But the conduct of one man spoiled it. Scheverlin

proved himself to be a good soldier by repulsing on a various occasion an attack made by a division of the imperial army. But the defeat of Gustavus on the 4th September had served him; and when, after that event, Wallenstein caused Altenau to be again invested, he surrendered it without striking a blow, just at the moment when the two Swedish corps referred to were on the point of setting out to relieve him. Fourteen days had elapsed since the battle of the 24th, and it became

absolutely necessary that one or other of the great leaders should decide to move. The summer had been more than ordinarily hot; the waters of the Pegnitz had become putrid; the stench caused by the carcases of dead horses poisoned the air; a pestilence prevailed in both camps, and in the Swedish camp supplies were exhausted. Under such influences discipline had become greatly relaxed. To move had become a necessity. Leaving, then, Kniphausen with eight thousand men to defend Nuremberg, Gustavus quitted his position on the 8th September, and fell back by way of Neustadt (on the Aisch) to Windsheim. There he halted to watch the further movements of his enemy.

Five days later Wallenstein quitted his camp and marched to Forcheim. So far, the advantage of the campaign lay with him. His stern patience and unbending resolution had given the first check to the victorious career of the King of Sweden.



French Colonial Aggression.

BY GEORGE C. V. HOLMES.

(Continued from p. 336.)

SINCE the first portion of this article was put in print, two events have occurred in reference to Egypt, which render it necessary to recur to the state of politics in that country. The first is, the abandonment by the Government of their provisional agreement with M. de Lesseps regarding the construction of a second Suez Canal; and the second is the announcement, or rather series of announcements, recently made by prominent members of the Government in reference to the eventual withdrawal of our troops from the Delta of the Nile.

The fate of the Canal Convention was foreseen from the moment that the Chambers of Commerce pronounced against the project; and if the whole transaction was a monument to the diplomatic feeblity of the Government, it is at least some satisfaction to know that our hands are now free, and that we have at any rate no chapter of accidents, if nothing else in our favour, to enable us to place our communications with the East in a better condition. As now seems certain, the Government deliberately intend to withdraw the Army of Occupation, the Canal question will again become of vital importance, for, as has been already pointed out, we can only tolerate the pretensions of M. de Lesseps so long as we are in armed possession of the banks of the Canal, but, when we abandon the latter, our relations with the administration of the Canal will have to be placed on a very different footing. When the time shall arrive when the evacuation will become feasible, it will again be possible to open negotiations with France on the Canal question with every prospect of success, for, as is well known, our present position in Egypt is a grievous thorn in the side of our neighbours, and they would probably be prepared to make sub-

stantial concessions on the question of the Canal, provided only our troops were withdrawn. It is, however, too much to hope that the present Government will take a diplomatic advantage of any foreign Power. They are either too innocent to discover their opportunity, or else too sentimental to take advantage of it.

The recent official utterances on the subject of the evacuation have given the utmost grounds for anxiety to all who seriously consider our external relations. It is very evident that there is considerable want of union amongst the members of the Government on the subject. One section of the Cabinet is afraid of the noisy Radical tail, which is always, and ever has been, out of sympathy with the country at large, while the rest are very justly afraid of the indignation which will certainly be provoked amongst the moderate men of all parties by any wanton abandonment of the position we have gained. But from the conflicting utterances this much may certainly be ascertained, that the Government have determined to abandon the military occupation of Egypt so soon as they consider that the new institutions which they have founded in the country have taken root. Hence the matter of most immediate importance for us to ascertain is, what is meant by a new institution taking root. It is too completely absurd to suppose that the native Egyptians, who have been slaves for thousands of years, will suddenly develop sufficient force of character to enable such feeble institutions as representative government to take root. It is equally absurd to suppose that the official Turks, who have been tyrants for centuries, will give these institutions a fair trial, when once our backs are turned. If our Government bear these facts in their minds, and there are doubtless some members of the Cabinet who do so, then their assurances to the extreme wing of their supporters may be regarded as cheap attempts to retain the favour of the non-interference party, and we may rest confident that the British occupation of Egypt will be as permanent as that of Hindostan. But if, on the other hand, they intend to convey, that they mean to leave Egypt as soon as their new notions are in apparently fair working order, we can only say that the sooner the country is stumped by the Conservative leaders in opposition to such a policy, the better it will be for the safety of the Empire. Egypt, if abandoned now by our troops, will resemble nothing so much as the house in the parable which was swept and garnered. It will be a fitting receptacle for seven devils more wicked than Arabi, and more intriguing than Baron de Ring, and we may rest assured that in this case the expedition of 1882 will have been sent in vain, and the millions spent by this country and by unfortunate India, will have been

usted to no purpose. We did not go into Egypt to found free institutions, but to subdue Arabi because his government was proposed to be dangerous to the safety of the Canal. If we now abandon the country, leaving it none the better for our interference, we in the possession of a few exotic institutions, what hope can we have that the Canal will not be endangered again?

There are but two courses of action open to this country in its dealings with Egypt and France. We must either leave the Canal as it is at present, virtually a portion of the soil of France, and counterbalance this disadvantage by remaining in armed occupation of the country; or else, we must acquire a preponderating influence over the Canal Company, and actually establish a military protectorate over the waterway itself. That is to say, we must have warships stationed at either end, and a fleet of gun-boats all along the channel, and stations for troops wherever deemed necessary on the banks. We do not want one acre of Egyptian soil; we are ambitious of no unnecessary influence in the Councils of the Khedive; but we must have exclusive domination over every inch of the highway to India, and if we can get it by no other means, we must fight for it.

Turning from Egypt to another scene of French activity, nearly the other side of the world, it may be prophesied that what is now true of the Isthmus of Suez will in another decade be equally true of the Isthmus of Panama. In that district France is successfully playing the same game which, a quarter of a century ago, she played in the Nile Delta.

M. de Lesseps was then thought to be a wild dreamer by all the world excepting his own countrymen. Not even his ultimate success in the Isthmus of Suez has inspired the commercial world with confidence in his Panama project. His opponents are never tired of relating the difficulties in his way, which he is equally indefatigable in overcoming. The scoffers cast in his teeth his countryman's apt proverb, "*Il ne faut pas répéter un succès*," little understanding, in spite of the proof he has given the world of his consistency, the man with whom they have to deal. He, on the other hand, benefiting by the experience which he acquired in Egypt, and armed with machinery and other appliances infinitely more perfect than those with which he succeeded in uniting the Mediterranean and the Red Seas, undeterred by the fatal climate and the other physical obstacles, is resolutely continuing his great work of joining the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and, when he has accomplished it, the two greatest ocean highways in the world will be in the hands of a country which has but an insignificant foreign

commerce, and which can therefore have merely a political interest in their possession.

There is, however, this great difference between the actual position of France on the Isthmus of Suez and her future position in Central America, that whereas she has no naval strength whatever on the far side of the Egyptian Canal, she will, on the contrary, after the completion of the Panama waterway, not only be the virtual owner of the canal itself, but will be found to possess, chain after chain of important islands in the Pacific, stretching right across the future trade routes.

French annexation in the eastern Pacific has been steadily proceeding almost unobserved by the outside world ever since the time of Louis Philippe. These acquisitions have been regarded as but of slight importance to ourselves, but when once the Central American isthmus is pierced, and the Western South Pacific, instead of being the half-forgotten back of the world, becomes one of its greatest trade highways the fact that France will be found in possession of every coign of vantage in these seas, and that many of her islands are admirably suitable as naval stations, will not fail to give our future statesmen cause for anxiety.

It is true that, in her future control over the Panama Canal, France will have to reckon with a Power which has never betrayed the slightest signs of sentimental weakness in its dealings with foreign states. The new route when completed will form the great means of communication between the eastern and western seaboard of the United States and will be almost of as much political and commercial importance to the great Republic of the West as the Suez route now is to ourselves. In the preliminary negotiations concerning the cutting of the Canal, the American Government has shown a disposition to take very high ground, not only with the French but with ourselves, so that it is extremely probable that, even if French power over the Panama route be diminished in consequence of the attitude of the United States, no corresponding increase of influence will accrue to this country, at least if our future Governments preserve the diplomatic traditions of the present occupiers of office. In any case the Western Pacific is now added to the long list of regions, where the cares of empire require the anxious attention and statesman-like forethought of the Home Government. Will this attention and forethought be bestowed?

The annexations of the French which at the present moment excite most attention in this country are Tonquin and Madagascar. The story of their progress in the Siam peninsula has lately been

told with such detail and accuracy by Mr. Colquhoun, that it would be unnecessary to recapitulate here any of the facts. The effects, however, of the French conquests actual and prospective, upon our political interests in further India, and upon our very considerable trade with many of the native states in that peninsula, and with China, may well form the subject matter for serious consideration. It is in this region that our interests are most likely to come into actual collision with those of our neighbours. It is hardly possible that two great Powers can co-exist amidst a number of half-civilised native communities, without coming into collision, sooner or later. The French are credited with entertaining no friendly feelings for our ally the King of Siam, while, on the other hand, our enemy, the King of Burmah, is reported to have lately endeavoured to enlist the sympathies of the French against us, and to have endeavoured to obtain through their instrumentality the arms and ammunition which we rigorously refuse to allow him to get possession of. Here already are the seeds of quarrels sown, which only await favourable circumstances to spring up and ripen. The modern agents of the French Republic abroad have shown neither the tact nor the desire necessary to avoid misunderstandings, so that we have apparently no grounds for hoping that collisions will be avoided through their good feeling.

That our commercial interests suffer wherever the French arms penetrate is self-evident. Wherever they go they find that English traders are settled already and are doing a thriving commerce, while as a rule their own trade is insignificant. The French occupation invariably dislocates the business of English merchants. When we reflect how often in our history our commercial grievances have been the prelude to long and costly wars, we cannot fail to view this condition of things without feelings of the gravest anxiety. In the case of the French expedition to Tonquin there is, indeed, an imminent risk that commercial interests may cause a serious strain which may at any time become a rupture between the two countries; for if the high-handed French proceedings against a Chinese vassal cause the Peking Government to interfere in the war, and if the French take the only steps in retaliation which are open to them, viz. the blockade of the Chinese ports, the inconvenience to this country would be intolerable.

The recent attack upon Madagascar does not call for much comment except for the alleged insult offered to the English consul, and for the strained relations which are said to exist between Captain Johnson and the French admiral. These incidents, however, illustrate the great danger to peace which is inseparable from

all these expeditions. There is not a region on the globe, in which the French are making annexations, where they do not cause serious injury to the private interests of British subjects. In Tunis, in Egypt, in Madagascar and Tonquin alike, the number of British subjects and the volume of British trade is largely in excess of those of our rivals. The grievances of our fellow subjects abroad naturally excite strong feeling on their behalf at home, and cannot fail to affect the Government of the day, which in this country is peculiarly sensitive to popular impulse. It is not to be supposed that the French will ever be able to occupy Madagascar in sufficient force to enable them to menace from thence the peace of our South African Colonies and dependencies. The climate alone will prevent that, and all their efforts at founding colonies in the island in past times have ended in dismal failure. The time once was when the French possessions in the Southern Indian ocean were a veritable thorn in the side of our Oriental commerce, and a perpetual menace to the safety of our communications with India. This was in the days when the only route to India was round the Cape; but the cutting of the Suez Canal has changed all that, and we can now afford to view without political alarm the re-establishment of French settlements in a region whence we were once obliged to expel them forcibly.

In considering broadly the whole question of French colonial aggression, we have to take account chiefly of two circumstances: first, the capacity of the French nation to found permanent colonies and to people them, and, secondly, the military means at the disposal of the nation for protecting and extending a colonial empire. If upon examination it is found that the French are not a colonising people, that is to say, that the population of the mother country does not increase at a rate which actually obliges the surplus inhabitants to emigrate, we may be sure that France is acquiring colonies, not with the view of providing for her increased population, and of extending her commerce, but with the intention of increasing her military power, and of being able to threaten her enemies from numerous points of vantage simultaneously. If in addition we find that France is spending enormous sums on the development of her navy, and is actually founding a colonial army, on a distinct footing to the overgrown military machine which the necessities of continental politics cause her to maintain, we may be reasonably certain that her designs are not of a pacific character, and that it is her intention eventually to utilise against some other Power the huge and costly organization which she is calling into life.

Now, there can be no two opinions as to the question whether France is, in the true sense of the word, a colonising Power. What are the social conditions which cause a country to found colonies? A rapidly increasing population; the impossibility of supporting the existing population on the soil; the existence of a state of social or political discontent at home, which renders a proportion of the population eager to live under new institutions. Not one of these conditions at present exists in France. The population, according to the latest returns is, if anything, decreasing, rather than the reverse. For though the total population does show a slight increase, this is more than accounted for by the large numbers of foreigners who have temporarily settled in the country, which would seem to show that the home-born population has diminished in numbers.

The country is commonly reputed to be the richest in the world. In ordinary years it is not obliged to import any necessary food products, the soil being amply sufficient to support the whole population, and even to allow of very considerable exports to other countries of food products, such as flour, wine, sugar, dairy produce, and fresh vegetables. Compare this with the condition of things in England, where about half the entire food supply of the country comes from abroad, and where the existing population can only be maintained by the employment given by those who manufacture for the foreign trade. The political and social condition of the French people is one of their own choosing, and they are naturally supposed to be happy under it. They are free from all the bugbears of the modern democrat, viz. crowned heads, aristocratic forms of government, the concentration of the land in few hands, the law of primogeniture, and so forth. The only apparent political evil which they suffer under is the maintenance of a gigantic army, and this they cannot complain of, as it is in their own power to discontinue it at any moment, whereas, as we shall presently see, they are about to augment it.

From all these considerations it is evident that France is not a colonising Power, as none of the conditions which promote the desire for emigration exist in the country, and, moreover, France has not, for at least a century, attempted to found a colony, properly so called, which one fact is sufficient without any further argument to prove the point. Her sea-borne commerce is, as has been already pointed out, quite insignificant; and, such as it is, can be in no way increased by such expeditions as those now in progress in Indo-China and Madagascar.

Hence it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the French

have no pacific objects in view in pushing the flag of their country as they have been lately doing. This suspicion will be confirmed if we consider the naval and military preparations which they are now making. The unparalleled increase in their navy has been repeatedly pointed out in Parliament and in the Press, and has been the subject of several exhaustive articles in the pages of this magazine. Is the last of these, entitled the "Naval Estimates, 1882-3," which appeared in the July number of the Magazine, it was conclusively proved that the French first-class ironclad navy will, by the end of 1885, outnumber our own. It was also shown that the size and power of the individual French ships is great relatively to those of our own vessels. This view has been lately confirmed in a striking manner by the table which Sir Thomas Symonds has just published of the relative strengths of the two fleets, in which he records, not so much his opinions as the actual facts relating to the essential qualities of the rival vessels, so far as he has been able to ascertain them. It requires a violent effort of the imagination for Englishmen to picture to themselves, what will be the condition of their country when this state of things comes to pass. Amongst some of the consequences are these: the food supply and the commerce of our country will be at the mercy of France, and consequently our whole policy must, till we again bring our navy up to its proper strength, conform to the wishes of the French Government. Such expeditions as that of last year to Egypt would be out of the question. We could not undertake them without the consent of our neighbours, and if we attempted to do so the expedition would certainly be destroyed before ever it arrived at its destination. In the same way a disturbance in India or in any one of our remote possessions would find us unable, except at the good pleasure of our neighbours, to send out reinforcements to the assistance of our countrymen. Could we even again restore our navy to full strength if once we allowed it to fall behind? Would not the French regard any such attempt on our part as a *casus belli*? Would they not impose on our naval strength the same insolent restrictions which Napoleon laid upon the armies of Prussia after Jena? And should we be able to resist and defy their dictation? What could we do with our food supplies cut off—with half our population starving—without an ally in Europe? There is only one answer to these queries. We should be obliged to submit, and to obtain peace at any price.

It is not the French naval preparations alone which should us to prepare vigorously without the loss of a moment's
 It is proposed to carry out a military reorganisation upon

a plan which will allow of the constitution of a special army available at all times for service in the colonies. The military organisation which was adopted immediately after the Franco-German war was framed chiefly with regard to European operations. A foreign expedition would have put the entire military machine out of joint. This was amply proved by the practical experience gained in the campaigns in Tunis. The late war minister, M. Billot, sought to remedy this defect by bringing in a bill for the formation of a special army for Africa. The principle of this measure was accepted by the Parliamentary committee appointed to examine it, but it was proposed to develop the main idea by providing at the same time for the formation of special troops for the colonies generally. The drafting of a new bill was entrusted to Baron Reille whose chief proposals are as follow. To each army corps there is to be attached a so-called mobile regiment, destined exclusively for service in the colonies. Each of these regiments will consist of four battalions, and each battalion of four companies. As a rule, two battalions of each regiment will be stationed out of France, while the remaining two are to be at the absolute disposal of the war minister, and are supposed to be ready to go anywhere at a moment's notice. In each artillery regiment one mobile battery is to be established, and of each mobile artillery brigade one battery is to remain in France at the disposal of the minister, while the other will be stationed in the colonies. In this way thirty-six batteries of artillery will be available for service. Seventeen mobile squadrons of cavalry will also be provided. By far the most important proposal of the new measure is the increase of the number of marine battalions, and their transfer bodily from the navy to the new mobile army. There are at present 164 marine companies, and 144 of these in connection with one company from each infantry regiment of the line, will, if the proposal be carried out, constitute seventy-two battalions of mobile infantry.

It is proposed that the African army in Algeria, which is also to be available for all foreign service, shall consist of three Chasseur battalions; four Zouave regiments, each of four battalions of six companies, and two dépôt companies; four Algerian Tirailleur regiments, each of four battalions of six companies, and one dépôt company; two volunteer regiments, each of four battalions of four companies, and one dépôt company; four battalions of Algerian light infantry, of five companies each; four regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique, and four of Spahis, having eight and seven squadrons respectively per regiment, four squadrons of commissariat, twelve

sections of administrative troops, five companies of gendarmes, and twelve batteries of the mobile artillery previously alluded to; in all forty-seven battalions, sixty squadrons, and twelve batteries, besides dépôt and gendarmes companies, and miscellaneous troops. If this bill should become law, the total addition to the French army will consist of 232 companies, seventeen squadrons, and thirty-six batteries, while the full strength of the colonial army, including the Algerian and other native troops, will be very formidable.

Whatever plan may be ultimately adopted, it seems certain that France is bent upon establishing a very large addition to her military power; and, as the reconstruction of her navy is already on the eve of being carried out, the time has arrived when the Government of this country must make such counter preparations that it may run no risk of being taken at a disadvantage. The most obvious preparations which it can make are the increase of the navy, and the strengthening of our military position in Egypt. Frequent reference is made in a section of the Press to the cost of our military and naval services, and it is often urged that the country would not stand any increased expenditure under these headings. We believe, on the contrary, that the country, as a whole, takes a wiser view of this matter than its self-styled representatives in the Radical Press. We believe that it regards the expenditure on the army and navy as an insurance premium to provide, firstly, against risks to the safety of the empire; and, secondly, against an increase to the National Debt; and, if the insurance premium is not sufficient to cover the risks, the facts of the case and the probabilities of the risks have only to be plainly stated, in order to ensure a cheerful assent to its increase. At any rate, all sound financiers will recognise the folly of paying off the debt at the rapid rate to which it is now proposed to pledge the country in advance, at the expense of those services upon which we depend in order to prevent the figure of the debt from being largely increased.

Were the army and navy to break down under strain of war, the capital of the National Debt would, in a very short time, be increased by ten times the amount of the reductions effected in the last half century. Let France and her German war indemnity be a warning to us while yet there is time.

Indian Districts during the Revolt.

By H. G. KEENE, C.I.E.

XII.

nares division, at the time of the outbreak, was of tent, containing over twenty thousand square miles, with ation of some nine millions, of which all but about ten : was of Hindu origin and creed. Taken alphabetically istricts may be thus described :—

AMGARH, 2,565 square miles, with a population of about lion and a quarter. More than a quarter of the area was consisting either of salt-desert, swamp, or ravine. The officer was, at first, Mr. Horne, afterwards relieved by H. Davies. This officer subsequently, as Sir Henry became Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab. Other civil did service of various kinds during the troubles at Azam- the vicinity, but by far the most conspicuous of the non- y leaders were two planters: one, Mr. Venables, uldied of wounds received in action, and his deeds were morated by Lord Canning*; the other, Mr. M. P. Dunn, urvived the mutiny, but no public recognition of his t was ever made, though (as the Commissioner pointed the time) "it was he who first persuaded Venables to; and his courage and daring on every occasion is (*sic*) of by everyone with admiration." †

ENARES. This district is only 996 square miles in area, e number of inhabitants is—and was even then—large area, being three quarters of a million at least. It was re an unusually dense population, living in towns, on ; gardens, and on highly-cultivated farms. The chief or city, stands about half-way between Dehli and Calcutta; e of an ancient Brahmin settlement, and containing some

the Despatch (Canning to Chamber of Commerce) Malleeson, vol. ii. p. 546.
Commissioner's Narrative, dated 6th November 1858.

thousand Hindu temples, in addition to bathing-places and shrines. Besides its sanctity Benares is an important entrepôt, both of manufactures and agricultural produce. The chief civil officers were Messrs. H. C. Tucker, the commissioner; F. B. Gubbins, judge; F. M. Lind, district-officer; and two gentlemen who have since become better known, the late Archibald S. Pollock; and E. G. Jenkinson, at present (1883) the very successful police under-secretary in Ireland. These officers held, as will be presently seen, firm possession of their posts throughout. The English town is at Secrole, some three miles away from Benares.

3. GHÁZIPUR. A district of 2,167 square miles, with a population of about a million and a quarter, is an alluvial plain, permeated by three rivers, the Ghágra, Gumti, and Ganges, the last of which, in the rainy season, is often four miles across from shore to shore. The lands are much exposed to flooding, and the population has long been depressed in character and decreasing in numbers. The magistrate of this district was Mr. Andrew Ross, an officer who is believed to have served in the Royal Navy before entering the service; and among his subordinates were Mr. John Bax—afterwards Bax-Ironside, C.B.—and Mr. Leslie Probyn, brother of the well-known General Sir Dighton Probyn, K.C.S.I. and V.C. As will be seen, the mutiny administration was successful.

4. JAUNPUR. Area 1,555 square miles, and population about one million, had long enjoyed the doubtful blessings of a "permanent settlement" of the land-revenue, under which the following state of things had come about—[the quotation is from an official report of the period]:—

The changes in the ownership of land have occurred in all cases at the instance of the civil courts. Old officials, law-agents, and money-lenders, are still supplanting those of the original proprietors that are left. As a rule they are hard, exacting, bad landlords. . . . Their large profits are not expended in improving the estates. . . . the tenantry are hostile, abject, and thoroughly discontented.

Mr. H. P. Fane was the chief, or district magistrate at the commencement of the outbreak; but his place was ere long vacated, and Mr. Lind, from Benares, took charge of the district. It need only be here added that the country is generally flat and fertile, and that the chief town is a decayed Musalmán settlement.

5. The last district to be mentioned is the enormous country called, from its chief town, Mirzápur. It consists of no less than 5,217 square miles, though the population hardly exceeds

a million in those days. The district abounds in forests and mountain ranges (which is a characteristic more favourable to the sportsman and the lover of nature than to the farmer or merchant), though the town of Mirzapur, being on the bank of the Ganges, has some note as a mart for produce, and for manufactures of carpets and piece-goods, and is also an entrepôt for cotton. The district at the time was in charge of Mr. St. George Tucker.

Another enormous tract, originally attached to the Benares division, is Gorakhpur, a fragment of the ancient kingdom of Kosila, or Audh. But it is not included in the Commissioner's narrative, and was not the scene of any considerable events. It is an alluvial and verdant tract lying at the foot of the Nepalese Himalayas. It was abandoned in August 1857, and, after lying vacant for some time, was occupied on behalf of the Government by Sir Jung Bahádur, the minister of that Alpine kingdom, in January 1858. The district was then for some time made into a separate commissionership. The attempts of Messrs. Wynyard, Paterson, and Bird to maintain order, in the teeth of insurmountable difficulties, are well told by Malleson (vol. iii. p. 447 ff.)

It has been said above that the "Station," or Whitetown, of Benares is at Secrole; this is a village three miles N.W. of the city, containing the public offices, cantonments, and garden-houses, or "bungalows" of the officers civil and military; also, in 1857, a mint. In May the garrison consisted of the 37th Native Infantry, the 19th Irregular Cavalry, and a portion of Sikh Regiment of Ludliána, in all about two thousand troops. About the middle of the month arrived news of the mutinies at Meerut and Dehli, and the terrible sufferings that they had drawn on the Europeans at those places. The people of Benares, as it chanced, were just at time suffering from a dearth of food, and were consequently in a somewhat dangerous frame of mind; and the Hindu sepoys, scarcely concealing their fanatical aspirations for a revolution, sent away their guru or chaplain, lest (as they said) he should sustain harm in the coming troubles. Messrs. Gubbins and Lind at once addressed themselves to these present evils, now patrolling the streets with parties of horse, now trying their powers of persuasion to obtain diminution of the prices demanded by the grain-dealers, or listening to the reports of emissaries who—as soon appeared—gave them truer information of the feelings of the native soldiery than was obtained by the military commanders themselves. The Mint

was fixed on as the *rendezvous* for the Christians in case of serious alarm; but on further consideration this plan was so far modified that the civil residents were to congregate first at the collector's office, a lofty building adjoining the Treasury. Here were amassed not only the cash belonging to the State, but also the jewels of the Ex-Rani of the Panjab (the mother of H.H. the Maharaja Dhulip Singh). It was hoped that the civilians, by collecting there in arms, would be enabled to overawe the guard and save all this property, more than a quarter of a million of money.

It is memorable that this plan, which was crowned with eventual success, was not decided on without opposition from high military authority. The officer commanding the artillery (afterwards to acquire great renown as Major, and ultimately General, Olpherts) concurred with the chief engineer in thinking that the Secrole positions were all untenable, and half succeeded in impressing his strong will upon Colonel Gordon, the officer next in rank to the Brigadier and inducing him to order a retreat upon the fort of Chunar. But Mr. Lind, strongly dissenting, refused to stir from his post without the decision of a council; and when the council met, and Mr. Tucker, the Commissioner, seemed also inclined to give way, Lind and Gubbins used the strongest arguments against the movement. "I," said the Judge, "will go on my knees to you, to beg that you will not leave Benares." "And I," replied Gordon, "am right glad to hear you say so. The move on Chunar would be a false one, I see, and I was persuaded into approving of it against my will."

This amendment, then, being finally disposed of, the original design (as modified) was carried; and the British officers prepared for the worst. That was on the 3rd of June. Next day the council reassembled to discuss the disarming of the 37th Native Infantry, and, while still sitting, were informed of the mutiny at Azamgarh, to be described hereafter. As they were dispersing after having come to a final agreement, the roar of guns was heard from the parade-ground. Obedient to the preconcerted arrangement, the civilians repaired to the Collector's office, well armed, and took possession of the treasure. On their way they were fired at in crossing a bridge; three of them were driving in a carriage, but Mr. Jenkins was on horseback, and with impulsive heroism threw himself in front of his companions, so as to intercept the cartridges intended for them. Such unselfishness is not often heard of, but it rests on the testimony of Mr. F. B. Gubbins, one of those in the carriage.

The firing that had been heard was due to the attack made on the sepoy lines by Colonel Neill, at the head of two hundred of the 1st Madras Fusiliers who had just arrived from Calcutta, supported by Olpherts with his half-battery. The sepoys fought for a few minutes, and the Sikhs, taken by surprise, joined in. But the resistance was quickly overpowered by rapid charges of grape; the sepoys were dispersed with a loss of a hundred, the loss on the British side being only two officers and the like number of men.

Next day the civilians proceeded to the Mint, which was fully fortified; the contents of the Treasury were placed under European guard; and Mr. Pollock, who had gone out into the district on the 3rd, began taking active measures to push on the reinforcements that were arriving by dribblets from Calcutta. Communication with Allahabad was maintained by Mr. Jenkinson, who took charge of the road with a party of Native Cavalry under Lieutenant (afterwards Major-General) Palliser; and special station speedily bore fruit in "a few instances of crime committed after breakfast and avenged before dinner." Jenkinson then proceeded to raise fresh mounted police, whom he sent, under Mr. Chapman, against some Rajputs from a village in the Azamgarh district, who were cutting off communication with Azamgarh. The force returned on 30th June after having inflicted severe chastisement; but the tenacious Rajputs returned for the attack, and marched within nine miles of Benares, only to be again trounced, after which they gave no further trouble. Messrs. Gubbins and Lind, however, continued to feel natural anxiety for the very important post in their charge (on which, indeed, depended the due advance of the troops from Calcutta to the Upper Provinces), and in this interest pressed earnestly on the military authorities the need of some more important —so to speak—aggressive place of strength at Benares than the improvised defences of the Mint. They freely offered convict-labour; and finally obtained sanction to an estimate from the Government, which was not then in a very thrifty mood. The result was the erection of the fortification, irregular and strong, that, standing on the site of an old Hindu castle, commands the approach at Rájghát, whether by water or by land. We must now turn for awhile to Azamgarh.

The outbreak of the sepoys at Benares had been precipitated by events occurring in the vicinity. The troops at Azamgarh consisted of the 17th Native Infantry, a regiment that had been lately brigaded with the 19th Native Infantry at Lucknow,

and had contracted much intimacy with men of that regiment. In the latter part of May, some men of the 19th being on a visit in the lines of the 17th, a small but discreditable breach of discipline was committed on parade, which Major Burroughs, the officer in command, did not feel competent to notice, as he dared not inflict due punishment in the circumstances by which he was surrounded. But he fortified the Collector's office with loop-holed walls and sand-bags, and placed a gun in position guarded by those of his men whom he deemed most worthy of confidence. On the 2nd June, Mr. Horne, the district officer, attempted in vain to detain some treasure which had been called in from Benares. On the night of the following day a convoy was actually despatched with no less than seven lakhs of rupees under a guard of cavalry. This seems to have been too much for the sepoys, who immediately sprang to arms, shot their English quartermaster-sergeant, and put the officers—civil and military—to flight. The jail-guard joined, releasing the prisoners, and the men at the Collector's office murdered Lieutenant and Adjutant Hutchinson and seized the gun.* The remainder of the white people, male and female, found a temporary refuge on the fortified roof; and, when the coast was clear, retreated on Gházipur. The mutinous sepoys meanwhile pursued the treasure, which they brought back with them to their lines, whence they ultimately departed to Faizábád in Oude. On the 16th Mr. Dunn returned to Azamgarh, accompanied by Mr. Venables and some mounted constables placed at their disposal by the magistrate of Gházipur, their primary object being to search for and, if possible, rescue any refugees who might be lurking in the villages. In this they were successful, as also in getting rid of some men of the 13th Irregular Cavalry, who seemed at first inclined to dispute their possession of Azamgarh. They remained, and were invested with magisterial power by order of the Commissioner. Along with them also remained Messrs. Legge, Dodsworth, and Niblett. It is to be remarked that from the 2nd to the 16th Mr. Niblett, who was the Collector's head clerk, had been sheltered by a Muhammadan colleague named Ali Baksh, who had during all these days continued to frustrate all attempts at the formation of a rebel administration, organised a native committee of public safety.

* The sepoy who shot the Adjutant was afterwards taken by a detective (to whom he rashly confided the narrative of his exploit), while serving as a pointman on the East Indian Railway. He was tried before the present writer, and hanged as fine a man as could be seen.

even contrived to send daily reports to the Commissioner at Benares. Ali Baksh was rewarded by promotion. I do not know whether he still lives, but his name deserves to be recorded perpetually as that of a true hero and faithful servant of an alien government whose salt he had eaten.

Indeed, anxious as the writer of these pages naturally is to find no fitting occasion of commemorating the services of his other-officers of the Covenanted Civil Service, he cannot but bear to call attention to the singular spectacle present at this crisis by the district of Azamgarh. Abandoned by all its official guardians and administrators, it was dependent on the courage and vigilance of a few planters and subordinate employes. Venables, though in no degree the superior in moral qualities to Munro, was the better man of business, and assumed the chief authority. It was no sinecure. On the western side the Rajput clans were in open hostility, strengthened by a fortnight's absence. "The police, helpless with terror, the provisional Council unable to rule even the neighbouring villages, had not dared to cope with these audacious plunderers; and Mr. Venables soon found that he must try his power against them in the field, or be forced to save his own life by again abandoning the station." [*Official Narrative.*]* His force was small, consisting of 150 of the 65th Native Infantry, seventy-five mounted gendarmes, and an old gun. The enemy were numerous, and well-provided with fortified places and with military stores. His first attempts against them met with but poor success, and one of them stormed the police-station in broad daylight and released some of their friends who had been captured and confined there. About the 12th of July Mr. Venables, having managed to obtain some more (apparently faithful) sepoys, attacked the Rajputs of the Palwár clan at Koilsa. But the sepoys misconducted themselves, and Venables was forced to retreat back on Azamgarh, pursued by the enemy at a respectful distance. By the 18th they had arrived, however, within two miles of the city. At this juncture, fortunately, Messrs. Davies and James Simson, civil officers, came in, bringing with them ten military officers marching to join the Gurkha force sent down from Nipal; twenty-five sabres 12th Irregular Cavalry, and a levy from Benares under Captain Catania. The bulk of the 65th men at the same time returned to their head-quarters at Gházipur. With the force that remained the attack was

This narrative, by Mr. Robert Taylor, is one of the best of the series; and it has been a pleasure to use it.

resumed, while Mr. Simson remained at Azamgarh with Catania's men for the protection of the public offices, breast-works having been thrown up across the approaches. Some newly-raised matchlockmen were also posted in various parts of the town. Again was Venables doomed to disappointment; he found the enemy too strongly posted for attack. Presently he had to assume the defensive; the defence became a retreat; but for his gun and some of his horsemen he would scarcely have been able to retire, as he did, without serious loss. During the night the question of retreat on Gházipur was seriously discussed, and the only voices for remaining are said to have been those of James Simson, Lieutenant Havelock, and Venable himself; but in the morning the minds of the defenders of Azamgarh were relieved by finding that the enemy had already had their misgivings, and had melted away.

The fight of the day before had been long, and the loss of the enemy turned out to have been more severe than had been at first supposed. The gun had done fatal service with its frequent discharges of grape; the horsemen, led by Venables and Dunbar, had used their sabres well; the Palwárs had retired to their villages with the loss of two hundred and fifty of their best men.

After this matters went on quietly till the 28th July, when news arrived of the mutiny of the 12th Cavalry at Sigaoli; and then it was felt that no confidence could be reposed in the detachment of that regiment at Azamgarh. Next day came news of the mutiny at Dinapore, together with a note from Mr. Tucker, the Commissioner at Benares, authorising evacuation, which was accordingly decided on. It was a dreary march, followed by a long line of carts, in which the townspeople were removing their property. The tide of rapine closed on their departure, and the town was given up to plunder before the troops were well clear of the suburbs. With some difficulties and alarms the column achieved its march to Gházipur; but behind them all was confusion. The faithful native employes having shared the evacuation and retreat, there was no material left for a committee of safety. The police-stations, with two exceptions, were deserted by their occupants; the Palwárs seized the town and levied a pecuniary requisition. It deserves to be mentioned that the native officials of Nagra and Muhamadábád continued to conduct the business of their posts. Their names were Asghar Ali and Muhamad Taki.

On the 20th August the Gurkhas arrived under Colonel Wroughton, followed on the 3rd September by Messrs. Wynyard

and Birch, C.S.; and on the 20th September Wynyard and Venables, accompanied by a Gurkha force under Colonel Shamshir Singh and Captain Boileau, fought the brilliant action at Manori (described by Malleson, vol. ii. p. 317 ff.) in which they killed nearly three hundred of the enemy and took three guns. On this occasion Venables helped to take the first gun, and killed three rebels with his own hand. No wonder if the rebels offered a reward for his head. Mr. Bird soon after took another party of Gurkhas out, who demolished two forts and reoccupied the station of Mahul; and this, for the time, restored the Government throughout the district.

Soon after Mr. Pollock assumed charge, and—while amusing the Palwárs with negotiations—fell upon the Gorakhpur rebels who had been driven towards him by the Gurkhas. Aided by the fire of a gun well-directed by Mr. Hercules Ross, C.S., Mr. Pollock drove them across the river; and then, turning his attention to the Palwárs, set out at the head of a sufficient force, to make a tour through their country. Having made certain examples of them and demolished some of their strong places, he brought them to terms; and although the district was afterwards twice invaded, the Palwárs never gave any further trouble. The remaining operations in the district of Azamgarh were chiefly military; and the successful campaigns of Longden, Lugard, and Lord Mark Kerr have been amply described by the accomplished historian of the mutiny. The town—which had been occupied by the notorious Kunwar Singh—was finally recovered on the 14th April 1858; but the victory was dearly bought by the death of the gallant Venables, who was mortally wounded in the pursuit of the enemy on that occasion. Kunwar Singh was soon after driven out of the district, in which order was promptly and permanently restored.

XIII.

Considerable space has been given to Azamgarh, the events there having been of a peculiar type. The original outbreak there exercised a powerful influence on events in the neighbouring districts, especially Benares; and that most important post itself owed its ultimate safety to the final success of the military leaders in Azamgarh, directed and aided by the fighting planters. We have now to see what had been going on in the remaining districts.

The events in the district of Ghásipur may be disposed of briefly. Of the chief, Mr. A. Ross, the Commissioner—Mr. F.

~~James~~ observes that, "his prudence and firmness as ~~magistrate~~ had a great effect in preserving the peace of his jurisdiction." From the circumstances mentioned in the opening ~~description~~ this had always been a troublesome district to ~~manage~~; and minor disturbances soon broke out. Luckily, in spite of the Treasury being full of cash, the troops—the 65th Native Infantry—did not mutiny as was so generally the case elsewhere. But the mutiny at Azamgarh had its effect there, no less than at Benares. The fugitives from Azamgarh arrived, as we have seen, in safety, but the district rose behind them; by the 6th of June civil war became almost universal throughout the Ghazipur district. "The police were helpless, and robberies were perpetrated to the very door of the Court House itself." The treasure was sent into Benares by steamer; "martial law was proclaimed," implying the subordination of the civil power; and military officers conducted expeditions to the worst-behaved parts of the district where they inflicted exemplary punishment; by the 16th order seemed in a fair way to being restored. On the 7th July, however, Mr. Bax had to take a party (native horsemen and a handful of British troops) for the protection of an indigo factory belonging to a Mr. Matthews, and to destroy a recalcitrant village. On the 14th came news of the outbreak of Kunwar Singh at Arrah, followed on the 27th by the yet more disquieting announcement of the mutiny of the native garrison at Dinapore. The 65th had already announced that their own loyalty was only conterminous with that of their brethren at this station, so that the rising there might be taken as the signal for a rising at Ghazipur. "Still they stood in unstable loyalty; why, no one knows." Mr. Bax proceeded with Vincent Eyre to Arrah, and the news of the memorable relief of Arrah was followed up by the disarming of the 65th, which was effected without bloodshed. Mr. Ross had the satisfaction (in which he stood almost alone among his colleagues at the time) of being able to carry on his duties in comparative tranquillity. A part of those duties was, however, of extraordinary character and exceptional usefulness—namely the collection of stores, supplies, and carriage for the European troops constantly hurrying westward. These modest labours deserved, perhaps, more recognition than they have hitherto received.

In 1858 trouble was renewed. Eastern Ghazipur became ~~the~~ the wake of Kunwar Singh's final retreat. "Far centre station, unpierced by roads, bounded by two

great rivers, by crossing either of which the fugitives would be in another province and under another law, that tract seemed marked out for an Alsatia." The conditions and elements of disturbance that had always characterised it, and under which the police, even in the most tranquil times, had always been unequal to their work, now broke forth in full conflagration. Fugitive sepoys, whose homes were in its inaccessible hamlets, formed so many centres of petty rebellion; the whole region was a very ant-hill of microscopic confusion. About the middle of May serious measures were taken with it; and Mr. Leslie Probyn, C.S., having obtained the aid of a party of troops under Colonel Cumberlege, took the fortified village of Baragáon, and returned to Gházipur, after destroying the houses of the ring-leaders. South of the Ganges, however, order was not so soon restored; rapine and arson raged without repression; every person who had served the State or aided European individuals was murdered with every circumstance of atrocity. The police were thoroughly cowed by this reign of terror; "no language can describe too strongly the utter disorganisation of the end of June."

Early in July Mr. Bax moved out to Ballia. The rebels had broken down a bridge on his line of advance, but he forded without opposition. Ballia was evacuated; and leaving Mr. Probyn there with a garrison of Sikhs, Mr. Bax marched towards the confluence of the Ghágra and Ganges. Here he was in some danger of being surrounded, but was relieved by the advance of Brigadier Douglas. For a general view of this officer's operations the reader should consult Malleeson, vol. ii. p. 484 ff. The story of the civil administration of Gházipur presents no further important features. The *Tahsili* of Zamánia was held throughout August, the north and east were completely tranquillised, by the end of October the entire district was cleared of rebels. Bax was made C.B., the only subordinate officer who (so far as I know) obtained that distinction.

Turning to Jaunpur, we find what Mr. Taylor calls "a strange scene"; of which the opening is easy, though not particularly pleasant, to relate. The conditions mentioned in our preliminary description were sufficient to justify the belief that the district was not likely to escape the contagion of disaffection and disturbance. The estates had largely changed hands; but the ex-proprietors, though ruined, remained on the spot and maintained their local influence. Absorbed in agrarian quarrels the natives of the district seem to have made no preparation for the

coming troubles ; the Christian planters had been more prescient, and had collected together in the chief town as a place of safety. On the morning of the 5th June, the Europeans being all collected at the collectorate with arms in their hands, the news of the outbreaks at Benares and Azamgarh arrived. The Treasury-guard (a detachment of the Sikh Regiment that had been so unfortunately implicated at Benares) was roused to fury by the tidings of their comrades' slaughter. They shot their commandant ; and meeting Mr. Cuppage, the joint-magistrate galloping down to the jail, they murdered him likewise. Each man then helped himself to a bag of the silver coin in the Treasury, and the whole detachment, with arms in their hands, marched off in good order to Lucknow.

The English first sought safety in the house of Rai Hingan Lal ; but being driven thence by a turbulent Rajput clan, they retired upon a factory at some distance in the country, whence they were brought in to Benares on the 9th June by a party of volunteers who went out for the purpose. No sooner had they departed than "the plunder of the Treasury was completed by decrepit old women and street boys, who had never seen a rupee in their lives" ; the bungalows of the English were plundered and destroyed. A committee was improvised by the natives, as at Azamgarh ; and Mr. Fane, returning for a day, formally installed Raja Sheoghulám, the head of the Dubés (the clan mentioned above) as temporary chief. This latter appointment does not appear to have been popular. The peace of the town was disturbed ; in the district at large no vestige of authority remained, anarchy became universal. "Those who had lost their estates under our rule," so writes Mr. Taylor, "thought this a good time to regain them ; those who had not, thought they could make a little profit by plundering their weaker neighbours ; the bolder spirits thought to secure more brilliant advantages by intercourse with the rebel powers in Oudh ; and in this state they remained till the arrival of the Gurkhas on September 8th restored a semblance of authority to the British Government." Charge was then assumed by Messrs. F. M. Lind, and E. G. Jenkinson, C.S., both of whom have been already mentioned in these pages ; with them being Mr. Patrick Carnegie, an "uncovenanted deputy" of whom an account may be found in Malleison, vol. ii. p. 339. Of all these officers it is recorded that they performed the work of soldiers in addition to their own ; accompanying the Gurkhas throughout the campaign that led to the reoccupation of the district, during

which they "exhibited great gallantry in the field, and were most indefatigable in the performance of their duties." (Commissioner to Government, 6th November 1858.) Nor should the names of those persons be forgotten who, though not in the service of the State, came forward in the general trouble to aid in the maintenance of order. Of such were Messrs. Waleski, indigo-planters who, "out of pure loyalty, accompanied the authorities on their return to Jaunpur, and then shared the whole of the subsequent campaign. . . . Hingan Lál, who gave shelter. . . . to the Jaunpur fugitives. . . . Madhu Singh, Zemindar of Bisharatpur, who sheltered a considerable party of planters . . . and has ever since proved a loyal subject of Government . . . Rájá Mahesh Narain, ever since the re-occupation a warm partisan of ours, giving us a number of matchlockmen to assist our police, and rendering every other assistance in his power," and Rájá Sheoghulám Dubé, mentioned above.* Rai Hingan Lál re-established the outpost of Kirákat, and was appointed Deputy-Magistrate and Collector; the forces of the other outposts were strengthened, and strict orders were issued that the officials in charge should engage in no rash adventures; the southern and eastern tracts began to settle down; a reinforcement was even sent to aid the garrison of Azamgarh; and a rebel leader (Írádat Jahán), who had constituted himself *Naib Názim*, was attacked, and made a stubborn resistance. He collected a force, and held out in his house, which he had fortified. Guns had to be employed, on which he surrendered at discretion; and, being sentenced by court-martial, was hanged along with another Muslim chief. This was on the 28th September; and the next day witnessed a similar expedition against the fort of another rebel leader, a Hindu named Amr Singh, who had been planning an attack upon Jaunpur. A fight ensued, in which Amr Singh was killed, with some fifty of his men. After some minor operations, the Magistrate, Mr. Lind, returned to Jaunpur with his force on the 5th October. A few days later, he took the field again with the force under Colonel Wroughton, on the tidings that Mehndi Hasan, a *Názim* from Audh, had collected five thousand men at Sultánpur, with whose aid he proposed to attack Jaunpur. On the 19th October the expedition arrived at Singra Mau, and seized the Zemindar, after a good deal of trouble. The force then advanced cautiously through high autumn-crops, and surprised the leaderless foe, who was routed with great

* Commissioner, *ubi supra*.

slaughter. The rebels evacuated their fort at Chanda, and joined the force under the *Názim*, which, by this time, had reached Hasanpur. Finding that a great number of ex-sepoys were rallying round the hostile standard, Mr. Lind deemed it advisable to hurry up Colonel Longden, for which purpose he left his camp and hastened to Jaunpur. During his absence, however, the Gurkhas attacked the enemy, whom they routed with great loss, capturing his guns, seven in number. This action (fought 20th October) will be found described by Malleson (vol. ii. p. 319 ff). Longden then returned to Jaunpur, from which, however, he again moved on Singra Mau on the 22nd November. Unable to make head against the increased force of the *Názim*—now swollen to 16,000 men—Longden held a council of war, by whose advice he once more fell back on Jaunpur. The ruffians of the neighbourhood took heart; the police were driven from their posts; a loyal native, Pandit Kishn Narain, was beaten at Tigra on the 24th December, and forced to join his superior officers at Jaunpur. No further disaster ensued. The rebels did not pursue their advance; *Rája Mahesh Narain* watched them with his levies; and “no further occasion for military support occurred till after General Franks’s final departure from the district on the 19th February.” The *Nizám’s* motley array was finally attacked and dispersed by Sir E. Lugard, who passed into *Sháhábád* in the beginning of May. The only subsequent event of importance was an attack on the town of Machli-Shahr later on in the same month, but the townspeople defended themselves with resolution till relieved by the civil authorities. And thus ended the troubles in the Jaunpur district, in a manner most creditable to all concerned. Mr. Lind, an officer of remarkable capacity, has since passed away, unrewarded in this world, save by the consciousness of duty well-performed.

While these things were going on in the northern and eastern parts of the Division, it is not to be supposed that the wide tract to the south, between the boundaries of the Benares district and those of the independent State of Rewa, could escape the epidemic. The great extent and wild character of the district of Mirzápur have been already stated. At the time of the outbreak, Mr. St. G. Tucker, the District-Magistrate, had for his military force a wing of a Sikh corps, with which he took post at his cutcherry on the 21st May on hearing the sound of firing to the eastward. It was soon ascertained that the discharges were but a part of the noisy celebration of a

native wedding; on which discovery the officers returned to their dwellings, leaving the Sikhs encamped at the office. On the 7th arrived a portion of the 47th Native Infantry, under Colonel Pott; but by this time the Bengal sepoys had become anything but popular with the British, and the gallant Colonel was persuaded to grant furlough to all but a few trusted men. On the 8th, the Sikhs were called in from Allahabad, and departed with some treasure in their charge, leaving a quantity of arms and ammunition in the magazine. Colonel Pott at once threw into the river the spare cartridges and the nipples of the muskets, thus reducing that element of danger to a minimum; the rest of the treasure was at the same time taken to Benares by a river-steamer. On the 9th the British denizens of Mirzápúr became alarmed by sinister rumours, and fled to the neighbouring fortress of Chunár, leaving Mr. St. G. Tucker to bear the brunt alone. On the 10th he availed himself of the arrival of an exceptional body of sepoys (belonging to the 50th Native Infantry, who had brought in a prisoner from Nagode) to march out a few miles and chastise some marauders who had plundered the property of the East India Railway Company. On the 13th a party of the 1st Madras Fusiliers (Neill's Regiment) arrived, and accompanied a detachment of the 47th in a punitive expedition against an offending village on the right bank of the Ganges, near the border of the Allahabad district. The inhabitants of this village (called Gaura) had been peculiarly daring in their misconduct, and prepared for resistance; but the men of the 47th were well handled; and while the white soldiers attacked the rebels in front, crossed the river with the view of taking them in the rear. Some of the leaders were captured, but the surrounding had been incomplete, and the bulk of the rebels made their escape. The right bank of the river was pacified by this step, and by an almost simultaneous movement under Mr. P. Walker, an "uncovenanted" Deputy-Magistrate; but the left bank required more serious exertions. Here a number of townships that had fallen into the possession of the Rájá of Benares were still the homes of the dispossessed Rájput clan, to whom they had originally belonged; and their chief proclaimed himself Rájá of the Hundred of Bhadüi, and appointed two agents for the collection of the revenue. Not content with this display of independence, he then enrolled a force, with the aid of which he plundered his weaker neighbours, and closed the Grand Trunk Road leading from Calcutta to the North-West. The management of

the Rája of Benares's estates was at that time in charge of Mr. Moore, C.S., the Joint-Magistrate of Mirzápur; and this officer offended the people by doing his duty and vindicating the rights of the Rája. A native agent contrived to obtain possession of the persons of the rebel chief and one of his agents; and the pair, being tried and condemned by a court-martial, were promptly hanged. Sentence of death was at once passed in return upon Moore by the popular *Vehm*; and measures were taken to carry it into effect. On the 4th July this officer arrived at the Indigo Factory of Páli, bringing with him another set of brigands whom he had taken captive. The house was presently surrounded by the followers of the late chief of Bhadui; and Moore and the two managers of the factory, being captured in a sortie, were forthwith put to the sword. Moore's head was cut off and carried to the chief's widow, who had offered three hundred rupees for it; Lieut. Woodhouse and a party of H.M. 64th, who came too late for rescue, had only the moderate satisfaction of burying the bodies. Next day they were joined by Mr. Tucker with some of the 47th Native Infantry, and a planter named Chapman came up from another direction. All was in vain, the murderers could not be surrounded; and they escaped, for the time at least. Their flight, however, accelerated the pacification of the district, which was not again disturbed for more than a month. But on the 11th August disturbance was renewed by the irruption of the Dinapore mutineers escaping from their defeat at Arrah by Vincent Eyre. They remained in the neighbourhood, subsisting by plunder, till the 20th, when they set their faces in the direction of Mirzapur, some fifteen hundred strong. About seventeen miles from the town, they were encountered by three hundred men of Her Majesty's 5th (now the Northumberland) Fusiliers, and were ingloriously routed at the first fire. They fled into the Allahabad district. On the 14th of the same month another part of the district was invaded by a party of mutineers from Hazáribágh, and on the 8th September the redoubted Kunwar Singh also visited its confines. Both parties, however, passed through into independent principalities without doing much damage. Charge of the southern part of the district was then made over to Mr. Mayne, the energetic officer already mentioned in connection with the Banda district, and his exertions were successful in maintaining safe transit on the Grand Trunk Road. October went by tranquilly; an "unpassed" young officer, named Elliott, conducted a successful attack to the north-west, in which, with some Sikhs

and the Benares police-levy, he chastised the people of two notorious villages there; the guns and stores that had been collected at Mirzápur were consigned to the fortress of Chunár. Rebel bands traversed the district; but the popular mind had now righted, and they met with no sympathy. On the 16th December some policemen were murdered on the Rewa border by some villagers who escaped. The magistrate then proceeded to attack the Chandels of Bijaigarh, who had broken out in furtherance of a family feud. A claimant to the chiefship had proclaimed himself "Rájah"; and had driven away the Tahsilár (native sub-collector) who had attempted to serve him with summons to appear and answer for his presumption at Mirzápur. On Mr. Tucker's approach, the pretender fled into the forest, where he was attacked on the morning of the 9th January 1858, after a long night-march. Several of the rebels were killed on the spot, others were taken and brought to justice, a quantity of stolen property was recovered, and the residue of the offenders fled across the river Sone. Soon after this it became apparent to Mr. Tucker that the Rájah of Singraoli was giving them countenance, and preparing to defend the fort of Gahrwár, in which some of them were probably harboured; and a messenger was sent to warn him of the probable consequences. But the proclamation of the amnesty stayed further proceedings; and thus the story of Mirzápur in revolt comes to an abrupt termination. Besides Mr. St. G. Tucker and his assistants Elliott and Walker, the Commissioner's report makes favourable mention of the Rája of Kantit and his brother.

The Employment of Lieutenants of the Navy as Paymasters.

BY RET. LIEUTENANT C. SLEEMAN, R.N.

IN pursuance of some observations contained in my article on the position of the lieutenants of the navy, which appeared in the *Army and Navy Magazine* for June, in reference to the abolition of the paymaster branch of the navy, and employment of lieutenants for those duties, I have endeavoured to sketch out a scheme in furtherance of this object.

This idea is by no means a new one, for it has repeatedly been mooted in the columns of the *Army and Navy Gazette* for the last twenty years, and has also been a favourite idea with many of our principal naval officers; but hitherto no attempt has, I believe, been made to systematise the idea, and work it up into some practical shape.

Amongst other opinions, I will here quote Captain Sherrin Osborn's remarks on this matter, in answering the President of the National Education Committee:—

The only additional remark I would make is, that I do not, in the present state of education of naval officers, see any reason why there should be a special class called secretaries to commanders-in-chief; and several officers have asked me a question which I have been unable to answer. They have said, "Why cannot naval officers do the duties of paymaster of a ship as well as military officers do the paymaster's duty of a regiment?" I would submit that for the consideration of the committee.

By the time an officer has reached the rank of lieutenant, he has cost the country a considerable sum of money for his education alone; but after serving some years in that rank, when he has reached the prime of his life and of his usefulness to the service, a lieutenant is allowed the option of retiring, for which certain specific inducements are held out to him, such as

up in rank, commutation of his pay, &c.; and permission to be is usually accorded to every applicant, irrespective of his abilities as an officer.

One reason of the great number of officers on the lieutenants' list, and the comparatively small chance of promotion, many of these officers prefer to accept the inducements thus held out to them, rather than drag on an existence as lieutenant with no prospect of further advancement, and with no actual increase of pay, until the age for being compulsorily shelved or retired is reached.

That a block of the lieutenants' list must, under the existing condition of things, always occur in a greater or less degree, is an indisputable fact; and this is only prevented from becoming a more serious evil than is the case at present by the vicious and radically-mistaken system of enforced and voluntary retirement, whereby not only those officers of whom it may possibly be said with truth, "good riddance of bad rubbish," are got rid of, but also a large number who have proved their value as naval officers during the whole of their career are lost to the service.

It is only necessary to glance over the list of retired commanders and lieutenants to obtain evidence of the truth of the above assertion.

The mere fact of an officer, during his service as midshipman, sub-lieutenant, and lieutenant, having displayed the qualities which go to make a good commanding officer and a seaman, and of his having passed well in all his examinations, does not afford any real assurance of his ever attaining further advancement (unless it be to commander on the Retired List), or, at the worst, not until he has served as lieutenant for some twelve to fifteen years, and without any increase of pay, except it happens that those qualities are capped by that absolutely necessary quality called interest; therefore those lieutenants who do not find themselves, through want of interest, drifting on the narrow beam which shall float them on to promotion at a reasonable age, and after a fair term of service, take advantage of the inducements held out to them to retire from the service, and thus not only may the navy be denuded of many valuable officers, but also, in numerous instances, these *actually* enforced retirements are but a prelude to ruin.

The necessity of maintaining a greater number of officers on the lieutenants' list than can be employed on active service during peace time, for the purpose of affording an adequate

supply when a sudden need arises for employing an extra number of lieutenants, as in the case of a war, and at the same time securing to those officers a fair and even rate of promotion, without overcrowding the senior lists, has ever presented a most difficult problem, seemingly impossible to solve. The principal reason is, that there exists no outlet for the utilisation of those lieutenants whom it is impossible to promote, if compulsory and induced voluntary retirement is excepted; and the latter means I maintain to be a radically mistaken policy, whilst the former is of but little avail in assisting the end in view.

Though only a small number of lieutenants (twenty-five) are promoted annually, yet the commander's list is found to be inconveniently crowded by even those few annual increments. For unravelling this extremely knotty question, there appears to be but one feasible and possible method, or, at any rate, one which offers, I venture to assert, many important advantages, viz. the employment of executive officers as paymasters.

When considering the possibility of adopting this scheme, it must be borne in mind that it is based on the system in vogue in the sister service, and that the work of the pay department of the army has always been efficiently performed by volunteers from amongst the regimental officers of the rank of captain; further, the duties of army paymasters must be at least as onerous and complicated as those connected with the naval pay department, and accompanied by as great a degree of responsibility. In addition, those officers who voluntarily accept the position of paymasters in the army have previously no special office-training, nor are the ordinary duties of regimental or executive officers such as to fit them in any peculiar degree, for such a position, and therefore, on this score, I fail to see how any practical or solid objection can be raised, for I may with all justice claim for the lieutenants of the navy an equal degree of capability for performing all the duties connected with the pay department, if they be so minded, as for the captains of the army.

Before proceeding further, it will be advisable to state the present position of the pay department of the navy, which is as follows :—

	Pay- masters.	Assistant Paymasters.	Clerks.
Total number on the active list	202	166	96
The „ employed	167	147	86
„ „ unemployed	35	19	9

The number employed as	Pay-masters.	Assistant Paymasters.	Clerks.
secretaries . . .	14	8	none
„ „ in charge . . .	none	34	none
„ „ secretary's offices	none	20	6

The above figures are taken from the January *Navy List* for **this year.**

Besides the above, there are fifteen assistant clerks, of whom **five** are unemployed ; this gives a grand total of *four hundred and ten* officers actively employed in the naval pay department. For secretarial duties forty-three of these officers are absorbed, besides three civilian secretaries. There are many instances of paymasters appointed to the large ships in lieu of assistant paymasters, while the latter officers hold *independent* appointments in charge of the pay department of small ships, which seems rather an anomaly.

The retired list of officers of the naval pay branch comprises the following :—

	Paymasters- in-chief.	Pay- masters.	Assistant Paymasters.
Total number on the list . . .	64	125	111
Number commuted . . .	2	26	66

A considerable difference exists in the number of the officers in the ship and the secretary's office of different vessels of the first class, varying from *three to seven* in the former, and from *two to five* in the latter office. Thus, in H.M.S. *Achilles* there are only three officers in the ship's office, while in H.M.S. *Alexandria* there are found seven officers ; and in the secretary's office of H.M.S. *Minotaur* there are but three officers, to five officers for similar work in H.M.S. *Alexandria*. It is thus seen that for the clerical work on board H.M.S. *Alexandria*, *twelve* officers are required, including one secretary, two paymasters, five assistant-paymasters, and three clerks, while for similar work in H.M.S. *Minotaur* but *seven* officers are apparently necessary, both being flagships.

A staff of writers are, besides, supplied to each vessel, so that an ample, or too ample, I venture to think, clerical staff is provided.

The foregoing briefly sets forth the present status of the pay branch of the navy, from which it is evident that it is, numerically considered, a very powerful body ; that is to say, for every ninety-two men we have one officer of the paymaster branch. I will now proceed to sketch out a scheme for substitu-

ting officers of the executive branch for the present paymaster department, which is based on the system adopted in the army.

1. That officers of the rank of lieutenant be allowed to volunteer for the paymaster department, provided they have served for five years in that rank.

2. That those lieutenants who are selected should serve for the term of one year on probation, when they should be appointed to the larger vessels under the direction of the paymasters.

3. That at any time during the probationary year permission may be granted to any of these officers to return to their duties as executive officers, but this period to be counted as harbour time only.

4. That at the end of the probationary year these officers be examined before an examining board of paymasters as to their qualifications for appointment as paymaster.

5. That those officers who fail to satisfy the examining officers be either re-appointed on probation for a further period of six months, or be ordered to take up their executive duties, at the discretion of the Admiralty, and, in the latter case, the period served on probation to be counted only as harbour time.

6. That those officers who qualify be appointed as paymasters, and shall resign their commissions as lieutenants, receiving in lieu thereof commissions as paymasters, bearing the date of the day on which they entered on their probationary course.

In adopting in this clause the same system that prevails in the army, I do so believing it to be the plan best calculated to ensure the smooth working of this scheme, and the prevention of difficulties which would most certainly arise from the anomalous position of a lieutenant on the paymaster list, but still holding his commission as an executive officer, who happened to be senior to the senior executive officers of his ship; and, further, this scheme is for the purpose of reducing the number of lieutenants on the list, and to provide employment for those who may have, or consider that they have, little chance of advancement in the executive line, and therefore I consider it far more advisable that those officers who accept the position of paymaster should not be liable to be called on to perform executive duties (except in cases of extreme urgency), as this would not be fair to those officers who have preferred to stick to the executive branch and might lead to complications, but they should become wholly paymasters, not half an executive and half a civilian. Exception, I know, will be taken to this view, but I venture to believe

it will be the one adopted should ever this scheme come into actual practice.

Surely it is better to take the position of paymaster than waste one's life as a lieutenant, only to be retired at the age of forty on a mere pittance, or to be forced to retire much earlier, and probably be inveigled into some undertaking by which even the small pittance may be lost. Even though, by accepting such an appointment, the honour and glory of belonging to the executive line is given up, at the same time the fact of having once held the rank of lieutenant can never be wiped out.

7. That the full time due to those officers who become paymasters, for their previous services as lieutenant and sub-lieutenant, shall be counted towards their retirement as paymasters.

8. That there shall be constituted two ranks, namely, "chief paymasters" and "paymasters," and that promotion to the former rank shall be by seniority.

9. That all flagships and first-class ships (carrying 600 men and upwards) shall have one chief paymaster and one paymaster appointed to them, and that all other vessels which at present carry one paymaster or assistant-paymaster in charge, shall have appointed to them one paymaster.

The foregoing may be considered as the main features of this scheme, the other points referring to fuel and retired pay, and retirement, &c. have not to be touched on, as it would be beyond the province of this paper to attempt more than the delineation of this scheme. These points, all important though they are, yet need not receive any consideration until such time as the Government may decide that the scheme set forth in this paper is worthy of being matured and brought into practical use.

Then comes the question of the ship's stewards and writers. The system at present in vogue for the entry examination and rating of the former class might remain, as, for the purposes of this new scheme, the ship's stewards and their assistants would not have their responsibilities or their duties either added to or changed. But in the case of the writers, something more would be required from them, as they would have to carry out the work delegated at present to the clerks and assistant-clerks.

The writers are now entered as "writers' boys," between the ages of $14\frac{1}{2}$ and $16\frac{1}{2}$ years, and are principally selected from the Greenwich School. They are examined on entry in writing, reading, and arithmetic, but though, in the course of time, these boys become writers of the 3rd, 2nd, and 1st class, yet, strange

to say, they are not required to undergo any further examinations.

Then, in consummation of this scheme, it would be necessary to secure the entry of a somewhat better class of boys, who should be required to pass an examination at each stage of their advancement in all that appertains to the work in a ship's office, in regard to the keeping of the ship's books, &c., and there is no reason why they should not be rated as "boy clerks," "3rd, 2nd, and 1st class clerks," which would be a more appropriate term than that of "writer."

Some additional advantages would have to be held out to them in the matter of pay and pension.

Fifty chief paymasters and 200 paymasters under the new scheme would be ample for supplying all the ships with a paymaster that at present have either paymasters or assistant paymasters in charge, and, in addition, the flagships and other of the first-class ships in commission with a chief-paymaster, and, further, for filling up the appointments of secretaries to commanders-in-chief.

By the introduction of this scheme a considerable saving would be effected by reducing the number of officers employed in the pay department, as well as by utilising those lieutenants who, by the present arrangements, are either forced to retire, or do so voluntarily, from the apparent hopelessness of further advancement on the active list, and thus the acceptance of the principle of this scheme would decrease the burden now thrown on the naval estimates, due to the ever-increasing vote for retired pay and for commutation allowances.

There seems no reason why the clerical work of each division of seamen on board our ships should not be entrusted to the lieutenants or other officer in command, assisted by the sub-lieutenants and midshipmen attached thereto, by which means a more thorough acquaintance would exist between the officers and men of each division, tending to greater harmony and more perfect discipline; further, the junior officers would learn the rudiments of office work at a suitable age, which would prove of valuable assistance to those who, in the future, accepted the position of paymaster, and thus indirectly tend to the benefit of the service.

Under the present regime, an officer in charge of a division of seamen has certainly to do some slight amount of clerical work, in compiling slop and clothes lists, but what I would impress is the necessity of so identifying the officers and seamen of each

ion that the latter may look to the former as something more
a mere muster-master and reviewer.

his subject, crudely worked out though it be, is brought to
notice of naval officers in the hopes that some expression of
ion may be elicited from competent authorities; for the
tion discussed in this paper is by no means peculiar to
writer, but has occupied the attention of many eminent
l officers.



The Song of the Rifle Brigade.

BY CAPTAIN CLARK KENNEDY, F.R.G.S., ETC. (LATE COLDESTON
GUARDS).

(Dedicated, by special permission, to Major-General H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught and Stratherne, K.G., K.T., C.B., &c., Colonel-in-Chief of the Rifle Brigade, and Colonel Scots Guards.)

1.

Old comrade, come hither, I'll sing you a lay
Of a corps that is loyal, and gallant, and gay;
For luck to the Rifles I know you will pray;
'Twill cheer up our spirits when marching away!

CHORUS.

Be the foemen from Russia, or Prussia, or France,
Egyptian or Zulu—a fig for their chance
Will I give when our bugles shall sound the "advance,"
And the Riflemen's bullets shall teach them to dance!

2.

The lads of old England are boys who can fight!
Their hearts are aye beating for honour and right;
Whilst the deeds of our fathers to valour incite,
We Riflemen brave shall in battle delight!

CHORUS.

3.

Though dark be our dress, and though sombre our braid,
The deeds of the corps are not hid in the shade!
I'm thankful I've chosen the soldiering trade,
And glad I belong to the Rifle Brigade!

CHORUS.

4.

For, though I'm not Irish, I'm "wearin' the green,"
I'd not for a moment in scarlet be seen!
(No offence to our red-coated brethren I mean,
For they *all*—like the Rifles—would die for the Queen!)

CHORUS.

5.

Should foreigners dare merry England invade,
They'll find it were better at home to have stayed !
Our spirits of old British valour are made,
And we'll lead them a dance, will the Rifle Brigade.

CHORUS.

6.

Than our colonel, The Duke, could a better be seen ?
From Erin he hails, so the uniform's green :
He's a comrade of mine ! don't you see what I mean ?
So I'll fight like a lion for a son of our Queen !

CHORUS.

7.

Be the enemy near, we can growl and will bite,
And when he's in force we're the devil to fight !
His gallant advance shall turn into a flight
When our skirmishers merry pop over the height !

CHORUS.

8.

If ever a foe should our country invade,
He'll find, to his sorrow, of what we are made !
So here's to Prince Arthur, who gives us his aid
As Colonel-in-Chief of our Rifle Brigade !

CHORUS.

9.

A bumper to friends who are loyal and true ;
Good luck to our garb of the bonny green hue !
And when you've a foeman you wish to subdue
Just send for the Rifles to help you pull through !

CHORUS.

†

10.

A health to the lads of whose fame you have read,
To those who for England have gallantly bled !
To the soldiers your fathers so splendidly led,
And remember, my lads, in *their* path we must tread !

CHORUS.

So, come they from Russia, or Prussia, or France,
Egyptian or Zulu—a fig for their chance.

Will I give when our bugles shall sound the "advance,"
And the Riflemen's bullets shall teach them to dance !

Red Men and White.

By MISS C. F. GORDON-CUMMING.

IN the course of many wanderings in lands whose original inhabitants have been well-nigh supplanted by the ever-encroaching Anglo-Saxon race, I have found frequent occasion to regret the indiscriminate manner in which the picturesque and generally descriptive native names of mountains and streams have been abandoned in favour of some new name, which at best is commonplace, and too often vulgar.

Nowhere is this more notable than in some parts of California, where such names as Hell's Delight, Devil's Basin, Gouge Eye, Git-up-and-Git, Humbug Canyon, Quack Hill, Shirt-tail and Greenhorn Canyons, and such-like, have been bestowed on mountain sanctuaries hitherto known to the Indians only as the haunt of shy wild beasts, or possibly connected with some romantic old legend.

This incongruity of modern names often jarred unpleasantly on my ears during a summer's wanderings in the magnificent Californian Sierra Nevada. Happily, in that loveliest and most unique of valleys, where for so many years the Indians contrived to elude discovery by the Whites, the mighty and majestic falls have secured such reverence from all manner of men, that they and the valley have been allowed to retain their native name, and the spirit of "The Great Grizzly Bear" still claims homage from all who set foot in the Yo-Semite valley.

Less fortunate, however, have been most of the other lovely falls which overleap the stupendous granite crags, and the stately rock pinnacles and domes which overlook the valley. The beacon crag, still known to the Indians as Loya, the Signal Station, is now the Sentinel Rock. Tissa-ack, so called after a beautiful pale spirit whom the Indians believe to have rested thereupon, is known to white men only as the South Dome—a granite mountain and nothing more. The two triple groups

towering above the entrance to the valley on the right and on the left, which were formerly Wah-wah-lena and m-pasus, or the Leaping Frogs, are now the Three Graces and the Three Graces.

stupendous crag which guards the entrance to the valley, which is now known as El Capitan, was called by the To-tok-o-nula, in imitation of the wild cries uttered by tok-an, or sand-hill crane, when, flying over the rock, it sought the valley in search of winter quarters. The west side crag was called Ajemu (by which name the Indians call ardy manzanita, a kindly shrub, with smooth dark-red and clusters of delicate wax-like pink blossoms and glossy green foliage, and which contrives to exist on the bleakest ledge, clinging to almost imperceptible cracks and ledges). In absence of more luscious fruits, the Indians collect its berries and have named the great crag in its honour. So, too, Mount now known as Mount Watkins was formerly Juniper, or the Juniper mountain.

Glacier Point was Pa-tillema. The splintered rock, near Great Fall, was Um-mo, or the Lost Arrow. A quiet stream near, was Ollenya, namely, the Frog's Brook, in tune to their ceaseless chorus. In like manner, Lung-oo-ya, the Wood-Dove's Creek (a name strangely descriptive of plaintive note), is now known as the Virgin's Tears. The highest fall in the valley, being about 3,800 feet; and in early spring, while the snows are melting, it is a dream of beauty. The Indian name is said also to convey the idea of something long drawn-out. Some white men call it the Great Fall—a suggestion of millinery doubtless due to the genius who, in defiance of Indian legend, re-christened the Spirit of the Evil Wind, as the Bridal Veil.

Too-lool-weack, or Rushing Water, is known only as the Rock. The Yowi-ye, or Great Twisted Water (a singularly descriptive name), was changed by some Spanish priest to Yoda. But most trying of all is the substitution of the word Vernal for Pi-wa-ack, which means the glittering and exactly describes the dancing, sparkling rapids, as they dash downward from the upper valley.

One of my favourite haunts in the beautiful valley was where the rock-wall forms a sharp angle, ending in a huge mass of very white granite, 2,400 feet in height. The Indians call it Hunto, which means, One who keeps watch. The white men call it Washington Column. •

Beside it, the rock-wall has taken the form of gigantic arches. The lower rock seems to have weathered, and crumbled or split off in huge flakes, while the upper portions remain, overhanging considerably, and forming regularly arched cliffs, 2,000 feet in height. I cannot think how it has happened that in so Republican a community these mighty rocks should be known as the Royal Arches—unless from some covert belief that they are undermined and liable to topple over. Their original name is To-coy-œ—a name dear to Indian mothers as describing the arched hood which shades the head of the papoose in its basket-cradle—a famous nursery for giants.

The perpendicular rock-face beneath the arches, is a sheer, smooth surface, yet seamed with deep cracks, as though it would fall were it not for the mighty buttresses of solid rock which project for some distance, casting deep shadows across the cliff. As a test of size, I noticed a tiny pine, growing from a crevice in the rock-face, and on comparing it with another in a more accessible position, I found that it was really a very large, well-grown tree.

In the early spring, when the snows are beginning to melt, a thousand crystal streams find temporary channels along the high levels, till they reach the smooth verge of the crags, and thence leap in white foam, forming extempore falls of exceeding beauty, which, in their turn, produce pools and exquisitely clear streams, which thread their devious way through woods and meadows, seeking the River of Mercy—the Merced.

So the air is musical with the lullaby of hidden waters, and the murmur of the unseen river rippling over its pebbly bed—the clear, beautiful river, which flows so calmly and peacefully through the quiet meadows, during its eight miles rest, ere it reaches the spot where it resumes its active life and commences a rapid descent, sea-ward, chafing and wrestling with great boulders, rushing headlong on its downward way, raging and roaring, a tumultuous chaos of foaming waters. These rapids extend for a considerable distance, passing by beautiful groups of old pines and other noble timber, and receive the waters of a minor stream, which comes leaping over the cliffs in a succession of broken falls, flashing in and out among the beautifully-wooded crags, till, with one joyous bound, it lands in a small secluded meadow across which it glides in a bright sparkling stream.

At one of the loveliest bends of the river, I came on a most picturesque, but unspeakably filthy, Indian camp of conical

ark huts. It was sheltered by grand old trees, and the mighty granite domes towered overhead. If beautiful, clean nature, could preach her own lessons, she might surely do so here; but a dirtier and more degraded-looking race than these wretched Digger Indians I have rarely seen. Nowhere, in fact, except in Australia, whose aboriginal blacks are, I think, entitled to the very lowest place.

On our way to the valley, we saw several parties of Pah Ute Indians, who certainly did not impress us with any admiration for the old lords of California. Some of the men were dressed in robes of rabbit-skin, of a very peculiar manufacture. Instead of whole skins being stitched together, as in preparing an opossum rug, or an ermine or squirrel cloak, these rabbit hides are cut into narrow strips, as soon as the animal has been skinned, the fur being left on.

Several of these strips are sewed together to make up the length required for the cloak. Each strip is then twisted, till it is simply a fur rope. These are woven together by means of long sinews of mingled material, in which the fur ropes act as "woof," and the hemp or bark is the "warf." Perhaps it would be more accurate to describe these curious productions as being a sort of net-work, inasmuch as the texture is so very coarse that you can pass your fingers through it at any point. At least so I was told!—I should have been exceedingly sorry to experimentalise!

It must require a good deal of patience and trouble to manufacture one of these very unpleasant-looking garments, but, once made, they are very durable, and stand any amount of wear and tear. They are the handiwork of the squaws, who, however, are apparently not allowed to wear such precious robes, but are generally wrapped in dirty blankets, while the fur-robes adorn the braves, who do their part by catching the rabbits.

This they do by netting on a very large scale. They prepare exceedingly long narrow nets, made of wild hemp or willow bark. These are set in the form of a great V, right across some favourite feeding-ground—if possible in a pass or valley. The nets are set on the same principle as a seine for fish—the lower side is weighted, while the upper edge is upheld by sticks.

The favourite season for these rabbit drives is the late autumn or early winter, when the first light snow has fallen. The nets being spread, two or three Indians remain on guard, while the others, men, women, and children, steal silently away, so quickly

as not to disturb the ground. So they proceed for several miles.

Then, forming themselves into a large semi-circle, they return towards the trap, shouting and yelling, beating the bushes, and waving their blankets. The poor startled rabbits, greatly alarmed by this Pandemonium, scamper off towards the net, where the other Indians lie concealed. These suddenly start up with a wild yell, and so bewilder the terrified creatures that they rush straight at the net, which is so coarsely woven as to let their heads well through. And thus the poor conies are held prisoners till their enemies arrive and secure them.

Then follows a great feast, and abundant material is provided for the manufacture of many robes. Indeed I am told that about a thousand rabbits have sometimes been captured in this way in one big drive.

The Indians also wage war on the large grey ground squirrels, which dig holes in the earth, burrowing like rabbits. They are pretty animals with a very large brush, and are said to be very good food.

I must confess that my youthful visions of the noble Red Indians of the Fennimore Cooper type, or even such as are still to be seen in Canada, have received a rude shock from the decidedly unattractive and unromantic specimens we have seen in California. In point of appearance there is little to choose between these Diggers and Pah Utes. Both are under-sized; the tallest men do not seem up to the average standard of white men.

All have a thick mop of the most unkempt long, lanky, black hair. The men sometimes wear long braids. The squaws cut theirs across the forehead in a fashionable fringe. They have square, flat faces, with mouths opening from ear to ear, like night-jars. Some of the men embellish their faces with streaks of vermillion; but where, oh! where are the ideal war-paint and feathers?

Most of them wear dirty, tattered old woollen clothes, probably cast off by campers, and eked out with a certain amount of peltery, filthy beyond description. When in camp they often sit wrapped up in their scarlet Government blankets, affording a welcome morsel of colour to relieve the general dinginess of the scene. Some, however, are dressed in suits of half-tanned leather, embroidered with beads, and a few dandies have Spanish-looking felt hats, and bright coloured handkerchiefs thrown over their shoulders. These are the wealthier members

the community, and ride about on small ponies, the squaws astride like their lords; rope halters fastened round the lower jaw act as efficient bridles.

Some of my friends had the good fortune to witness a Diggerian festival, when about a hundred of these strange beings assembled for a solemn dance. They formed in a large ring and moved slowly round and round. There did not seem to be any characteristic feature in the dance, and certainly no grace.

I failed to find any who could speak a word of English, and my attempts to establish friendly relations with those I met in my solitary ramble were generally met with suspicion; and though the children would occasionally accept apples or sugarums, it was always with apparent distrust.

As regards the heritage of Babel, in the difficulty of making ourselves understood, I am told that there are literally hundreds of dialects, and a very large number of distinct languages, in use among the vast family whom we class as American Indians—in fact there are as many languages as there are tribes, and many of these have scarcely a word in common, so that even friendly tribes, meeting for purposes of barter, are sometimes glad to avail themselves of the services of Spanish interpreters, who have made it their business to acquire the various languages.

The women carry their babies slung over their shoulders in wicker cradles, the whole weight being supported by a strap passed across the maternal forehead. What headaches this suggests! The cradles consist only of a flat back of wicker-work, with a flap down each side, and a projecting hood shaped like that of a perambulator, to shield the head of the little papoose from the sun, and also to protect it from possible tumbles. The little reddish-brown baby is laid naked on its basket, with a mat covering of easily changed moss, spread as mattress and blanket. Perhaps a small shawl is laid over the moss and the baby's arms are tucked down by its side, and then the flaps are spread or braced across the front. Sometimes the arms are allowed to lie loose, but this is exceptional.

The creatures look just like mummies (the outer mummy-case!) and gaze forth at the world with dark eyes as solemn and responsive as if they already realized their heritage of woe. Their long black hair and flat faces, add to their unbabyish appearance, and altogether they are queer little mortals.

When the mother is busy, the papoose in its cradle is suspended like some parcel from a branch of a tree, beside the hanging bear-skins. There it hangs, safe out of harm's way.

especially out of reach of the inquisitive dogs who are always prowling silently about, hungrily seeking for scraps.

The wigwams are of the very rudest description, consisting only of long strips of thick pine-bark, piled up like a pyramid, and with flaps of bear-skin to curtain the door at night, and various old skins pegged down over the bark to keep out the wind. Of rain at this season there is little fear. A fire is kindled in the middle of this bark tent, and the blue smoke escapes by a hole at the top, contrasting charmingly with the rich sienna and brown tones of the bark.

The filth of the surroundings is such, that I have never ventured to peep into one of these picturesque but most uninviting homes, though we visited several little encampments and watched hideous old crones weaving the most beautiful baskets and smoking like chimneys—the ideal of bliss!

The poetic Indian calumet of old stories is unfortunately replaced by the invariable clay pipe, dear alike to men and women. The sole occupation of the men, when not engaged in foraging, appears to be gambling with exceedingly dirty old cards.

In their general antipathy to personal ablutions, these Utes resemble a certain Scottish "bailie" in one of our northern towns, who combatted a proposed expenditure on baths and wash-houses for the poor, and crowned his own testimony as to their superfluity by the emphatic statement, "I thank God that water has not touched my body these thirty years!" The Utes, however, have devised a primitive form of Turkish bath, which they find very efficacious in sickness. They construct a skeleton frame-work of wooden poles, which they cover with fur robes and blankets, to prevent the escape of hot vapour. In the centre of this impromptu tent, they dig a hole in the ground a couple of feet in depth, and fill it with hot stones, roasted in a neighbouring fire. A seat is arranged above this pit, on which the patient takes his place, and pours a bucket of cold water upon the hot stones. The steam thus generated, acts as a beneficial vapour-bath.

They are very successful fishers, and generally camp near some clear trout-stream. The hotels secure a ready market for all they bring, and these Merced trout are certainly most delicious. As these are almost their only marketable property, I fear they cannot often enjoy themselves. Their fishing-tackle does not involve much outlay. A light hazel rod cut from the bank, a casting-line, and a few green grasshoppers or

orms as bait, are all they need to beguile the bonnie trout. The worms are occasionally carried in their mouths, the simplest and safest means of conveyance!

They are too abjectly poor to be dainty feeders, and, as their name implies, they live partly by digging up edible wild roots, with an occasional broiled snake or lizard, or a handful of roast grasshoppers as a relish.

Now and then they organise hunting expeditions, and go off in search of bears or deer, and great is the joy in camp when a prize is brought in. Strips of meat and of fat are hung up to dry for winter use, and the skins are prepared for clothing or for sale. I saw several skins hanging about the trees in camp, and as told there were some bears then in the neighbourhood, but never had the luck to see one.

As a substitute for the too expensive luxury of wheat-flour, these poor creatures manufacture a sort of coarse acorn-flour or meal, and very bitter bread must be the result. As soon as the acorns are ripe, they set to work systematically to harvest them, as the wood-peckers, squirrels, and mice can do so. They construct very tall cylindrical wicker baskets, covered all over with thick thatch of oak or fir twigs. These are called *cachets*, which, I suppose, means a hiding-place, though whether the word was of foreign derivation, or purely Indian, I cannot say). But wherever a cluster of bark wigwams has been erected, there invariably are several of these tall baskets, like most attenuated corn-stacks.

These are the store-houses, the granaries of these frugal beings. When at leisure, they crack the acorns, and pick out the kernels ready for use. When required, they pound them with a smooth, water-worn stone on a flat granite slab, and near every favourite camping-ground there are generally some such slabs, deeply indented with cup marks, very much the same as some of those which puzzle our learned antiquaries, and which may possibly be nothing more than traces of a time when our own ancestors pounded the acorns of British oaks, and made bitter porridge like that of the poor Indians.

One day I watched the whole process of manufacture, which is primitive to a degree, and seemed like a glimpse of domestic life in the stone age. No trace of iron was there, not even a cooking-pot. The girls having prepared their acorn-meal in the oak-cups (the meal being largely mingled with granite-dust), they left it to steep in cold water, to get rid of some of the bitterness, while they were building up a huge pie-dish or bason

of river sand. This they lined with fine gravel, and placed the powdered acorns in this rude dish. Meanwhile, others had filled their water-tight baskets, which are a triumph of art, so closely woven that not a drop of water can escape.

But how were they to boil the water for their cooking? That difficulty, also, was simply overcome. A large fire had been kindled, and a large number of stones, the size of an orange, thrown in to bake. When they were thoroughly heated, they were lifted out by a woman holding two sticks, in lieu of tongs, and were dropped into a small basket of water, which hissed and spluttered and became black and sooty. After this preliminary washing, the hot stones were fished out and deposited in the large water-basket, which acted the part of kettle. Though somewhat cooled by this double process, the stones soon heat the water to a certain extent.

A very small quantity of this tepid, singed fluid was then poured on the acorn-flour, some of which was made into paste, and taken out to be baked as cakes. More water was added. A green fern-leaf was laid over the flour, apparently to enable the pouring to be done more gently, and so a large mass of porridge was prepared, and ladled out in baskets. Then—that nothing might be wasted—the gravel was taken out and washed, to save the flour still adhering to it.

This acorn-paste becomes glutinous, and is eaten in the same way that the Pacific Islanders eat poi, by dipping in a finger, twisting it round, and so landing it in the mouth.

The oak and pine forests yield the principal food-supply of these children of the Sierras. The commonest nut-bearing pine (*Pinus Sabiniana*, commonly called the Digger Pine) grows only on the lower hills, at an altitude of from 500 to 4,000 feet above the sea. It seems to require great heat. We saw a good many of these insignificant-looking little trees on the sheltered slopes of the warm foot-hills, as we ascended from the plains.

At first sight we scarcely recognised them as being pine-trees, so different in their growth from the ordinary stiffness of the family. Instead of all branches diverging from one straight main stem, perhaps 200 feet high, this little pine only attains a height of about fifty feet, the stem having at the base a diameter of from two to three feet. It shoots upright for about twelve or fifteen feet, and then divides into half-a-dozen branches, which grow in a loose irregular manner, generally, but not invariably, inclining upwards. From the secondary, drooping boughs hang tassels of very long greenish-grey needles; these are often a

foot in length, and form the lightest, airiest of foliage, casting little or no shade.

From each bunch of needles hangs a cluster of beautiful cones, which in autumn are of a rich chocolate colour. They grow to a length of about eight inches, and are thick in proportion. Both squirrels and bears climb to the topmost boughs in search of these, well knowing what dainty morsels lie hidden within the armour-plated exterior of strong, hooked scales. The diligent little squirrels manage to extract the nuts by dint of busy nibbling; but the Indians save themselves needless trouble by the help of fire.

They climb the trees, and beat off the cones, or too often recklessly chop off the boughs with their hatchets. Then, collecting the cones, they roast them in the wood ashes, till the protecting scales burst open, when they can pick out the nuts at their leisure, and crack their hard inner shells as they lie round their camp fires at night. It is dirty work, owing to the sticky resin which oozes freely from the cones and branches, and adheres tenaciously to clothes and hands; nor is the cleanliness of the camp improved by every man, woman, and child handling the charred and blackened nuts.

But when it comes to a question of cleanliness, perhaps a little charcoal would be rather an improvement in an Indian camp!

Another tree which bears an edible nut, and so, is valuable to the Indians as an item of food, is the *Pinus Fremontiana*, a stumpy little pine rarely exceeding twenty feet in height, or forming a stem more than one foot in diameter. Its crooked, irregular branches bear a very large crop of small cones, about two inches long, each containing several edible kernels, about the size of a hazel nut, and pleasant to the taste. They are exceedingly nutritious, and are so abundant in certain districts that a diligent picker can gather about forty bushels in a season. Consequently it is a really valuable tree, and the Indians justly regard it as the food provided by the Great Father for their special use; and many a story of terrible revenge has been traced to the wanton destruction of these food-producing trees by the lumberers, and other aggressive or inconsiderate white men.

Like its kinsman, the Digger Pine, this *Pinus Fremontiana* keeps its "toothsome" kernels so securely imbedded in their hard outer case that the action of fire is almost necessary to force open the scales within which they lie concealed. This

pine is found chiefly on the eastern foot-ranges of the Sierras, in the districts where the Carson River and Mono Indians still dwell, and does not seem to require so much heat as the *Sabianiana*, as it bears fruit abundantly at an altitude of 8,000 feet, whereas its larger kinsman is rarely, if ever, found higher than 4,000 feet above the sea-level.

As a matter of course, the neighbourhood of this Indian gipsy camp formed a fruitful topic of conversation among the many visitors to the valley, and I heard many animated discussions between those men who consider all Indians "a race of scoundrels—a nation who must be obliterated from the earth!" and others who see in them a race unjustly despoiled of their heritage, and whose degradation has been certainly not lessened by the invasion of the whites.

I heard many statements made, and not denied, greatly to the discredit of the Indian Agency, which was described as the most unrighteous of the many corrupt official bodies. And it is through their hands that the Government "charity" is now doled out to the tribes whom the white man has pauperized.

It was stated, not long ago, that out of 35,000 dollars a year, voted for compensation to the Indians, not five per cent. ever reached them—the rest either adhered to the hands of the agents, or was squandered by their mismanagement, as it is a well-known fact that the little that does reach the Indians does so in the form of spoilt flour, shoddy cloth, indifferent blankets and fire-arms; and, moreover, that they are much encouraged to purchase from the white dealers a true fire-water, with large admixture of vitriol—a poor exchange for their happy hunting grounds, where the Pale Faces are now reaping their golden harvests. It is even stated that they have occasionally been purposely supplied with blankets which had been infected by small-pox, as a simple means of getting rid of them.

Amongst the gentlemen most keenly interested on all Indian questions, there was one who happened to be visiting the Lava Beds soon after the Modoc war of extermination, and his details of that sad story were most distressing. He went all over the ground which was the scene of the last struggle, his object being to trace the Sacramento River to its source amid the glaciers of Mount Shasta—that magnificent peak whose summit is crowned with eternal snows, while, round its base, hot sulphur and soda springs tell of still dormant fires.

Small, extinct craters cluster round the broad base of the giant cone, and have doubtless done their part in the formation

"the Lava Beds," which formed the last stronghold of the Modoc Indians. They extend along the margin of the great Tulé, or reed lake, so called because of its sedgy shores. It is one of a group of large lakes—Clear Lake, Klamath Lake, and Rose Lake, lying 6,000 feet above the sea. The ground around is white with alkali, and only stunted cedars and uninviting sage-scrub can exist.

When white men saw and coveted the fertile lands in the Sacramento Valley, the red men were driven back further and further into the mountains. Their hunting grounds were taken possession of, and they themselves compelled to retreat to the lands "reserved" for them (grounds too poor for white men to grudge to the proprietors of the soil), where the wretched sage-bush is shunned by the deer, and even the streams are without fish.

Driven back ever further and further, the wretched Modocs last reached "the reservation lands" lying east of the great Klamath Lake—a country so arid that they could not support life. So they ate their horses, and then, driven to desperation, returned to their old haunts near Lake Tulé, resolved thence to make one last effort to recover their lands, or die in the attempt.

Thereupon followed the Modoc War. In old days white men had made a pastime of shooting Indians as they would vermin, and there were some who openly boasted of having shot a hundred or more to their own gun as their season's sport. At this was when the Indians possessed only bows and arrows. Now they had pistols and good breach-loading rifles, which they had captured in various raids; moreover, they were first-rate marksmen, so the case was different; and though there were but a handful of Modocs, numbering about forty-five armed men, the whites failed to dislodge them.

The first attempt was made in November 1872, by a body of thirty-five cavalry, eight of whom fell before the fire of an invisible foe, and the rest wisely retreated.

The Modocs then proceeded to intrench themselves in the Lava Beds, taking with them their squaws and their little ones. The Lava Beds are described as being like a gigantic sponge, solidified to the hardest rock, full of caverns and craters, with jagged cracks and fissures,—in short, a place in which thousands of men could safely lie concealed, and where a handful of ill-armed men might defy an army.

Here they were attacked on the 17th January, by a force of

450 Government troops, who had not realised the strength of the position, and were forced to retire, with a loss of twenty-nine wounded and ten killed.

Matters now looked serious. It was allowed by Government that the Modocs had some cause for complaint, and a Peace Commission, headed by General Canby and Dr. Thomas, was appointed to inquire into their grievances, and endeavour to put matters on a better footing. General Canby was a man of large experience—a just man, and one truly desirous to see those tribes fairly dealt by.

The Modoc chiefs were accordingly invited to attend a conference in the American camp; but vividly remembering deeds of treachery in the past, they refused to come. Finally they agreed to meet the Peace Commissioners half-way between the camp and the Lava Beds, and hold a big talk, though each side mistrusted the other.

All were supposed to attend unarmed, but in the course of the discussion "Captain Jack," the Modoc chief, suddenly drew his revolver and shot General Canby through the head. At the same moment Dr. Thomas was shot and fell dead, and a third white man was wounded.

Then the Modocs retreated to their stronghold.

At the same moment another party had advanced to the second American camp with a flag of truce, asking to see the officer in command. This was refused, whereupon they shot the officer who had come to parley. Doubtless they supposed that they had slain their principal foes, little knowing that by their deed of foul treachery they had actually murdered two of their very best friends. It seems always to be the luck of savage races to revenge the misdeeds done by bad men on the very friends who are most anxious to help them.

In the present instance, the Indians practised exact retaliation for the cruel treachery with which they themselves had been treated some years previously, when a Volunteer American force, commanded by a man called Ben Wright, attacked the Modocs in these same Lava Beds, and was twice defeated. Wright, therefore, proposed to the Indians that they should come to a big dinner, and talk over their disagreements—planning to poison his guests with strychnine. Happily they did not come, but agreed to a big talk, when at a preconcerted signal, Wright drew his revolver—an example followed by all his men. A general massacre ensued. About forty Indians were shot, and Wright was lauded as a hero.

But some of the Indians escaped, and, after biding their time, contrived to murder Wright while he slept.

The Indians were hanged, but gloried in having obtained vengeance on the murderer of their people. There is little doubt that the same motive prompted the later crime, and that the tribe felt they were carrying out a just revenge in thus repeating the deed of treachery.

Very different was the view taken by the white men. Whatever grain of sympathy had previously existed was now wholly extinguished, and a howl for the utter extermination of the tribe arose from every corner of the States. The one thought was for vengeance, and a blood-thirsty craving to shoot Modocs seemed to take possession of all the whites in the country. Henceforth it was war to the bitter end. The general order issued to the troops contains these words: "Let no Modoc in future ever be able to boast that his ancestors killed General Canby."

The Indians now seemed inspired with the energy of despair. They fortified their natural stronghold till it seemed impregnable. Six hundred troops—infantry, cavalry, and artillery, with two howitzers and four small mortars—besieged the Lava Beds for several months without result. Repeated attempts were made to carry the place by assault, but in each case the assailants had to retreat before the fire of an invisible foe.

The Indians, like other races of the Pacific, fight almost naked, and their dark-reddish skin could scarcely be distinguished from the lava around them. They have other peculiarities in common with the Pacific islanders; as, for instance, the advance of an orator, who (in this case carefully concealed) shouts taunts and defiance to the besiegers; and also that the squaws are present during the fighting to encourage the warriors and tend the wounded.

At length the Indians were dislodged from their stronghold by well-directed shells, which were a new experience, and took them by surprise. They still, however, found covert among the rocks, and a few days later dealt a terrible surprise to a scouting-party which had gone forth to try and track them. Seeing no signs of the Indians, the party prepared to return to camp, but first halted for a few moments' rest and food, little dreaming that the Indian rifles even then covered them. A moment more, and, out of the party of sixty, seventeen lay dead, twelve were wounded, and when the survivors returned to camp five were missing.

It seemed as if the Red Men were at least to retain possession

of the Red Rocks ; and so they doubtless would have done, had not traitors finally yielded to bribery, and betrayed their brethren. They showed the Pale Faces the water-springs which enabled their comrades to hold out, and these having been cut off, the handful of survivors were compelled to surrender to the all-powerful conqueror—Thirst.

Fifteen men and thirty-five women were all that remained to march out. They were bound hand and foot, and placed in waggons to be carried prisoners to Fort Klamath.

On their way they were met by a company of the volunteers from Oregon, who had so long been kept at bay by these poor desperate Indians. The Oregon white men stopped one of the waggons, cut the traces, and in cold blood shot four Indians who sat there, handcuffed and helpless.

The chief, and his few remaining followers, were tried by a military commission and hanged.

Thus the white race have improved the Modocs off the face of the earth.

The Indian question is an inexhaustible subject to the dwellers in the far west, and I heard many thrilling stories told by old Californians, as they gathered round the blazing log-fire in the long evenings, and exchanged notes of their early days in the land—days when life was one ceaseless danger, every man being armed to the teeth, and constant enmity existing between redskins and white men.

One would imagine that some sense of fair play might have induced a certain amount of sympathy with the wild tribes who saw their hunting-grounds so ruthlessly cleared, and they themselves driven out from every desirable resting-place ; but this is an idea which apparently never found room in the minds of the encroaching whites. They wanted the land, and its natural inhabitants were looked upon as cumberers of the soil, for whom there was but one alternative—either they must “git up and git” (which is Californian for clearing out), or else they might be shot as wantonly as the wild buffaloes of the prairies, whose wholesale massacre, and literal extermination, has been one of the sorest trials of the Indians, who most justly prize these vast herds as their God-given birthright.

Small wonder if desperate men strove to better such instruction, and from time to time rallied their forces for some fierce onslaught on the intruders. But efforts which in classic story are vaunted as noble and patriotic, are apt to be considered in a very different light when seen too near ; so the struggles of the

wild Indian tribes are invariably spoken of as the unmitigated treacheries of devils.

Of course, in the kind of guerilla warfare that was ceaselessly waged, there were countless incidents of cold-blooded cruelty on the one side, and of reprisals on the other; and after hearing a score or more of such anecdotes, told by men who perhaps themselves bore a part in the fray, it is hard to tell which side most deserves one's sympathy or rouses one's horror. It is all such a pitiful story, and it does seem so hard that the earnest, solemn red men, so picturesque in their barbaric feathers and war-paint, could have been taught no conciliatory lesson by their white brothers—nothing but the oft-enacted deeds of never-ending aggression, by which they have again and again been compelled to retreat further and further into the wilds before the ever-advancing wave of settlers, to whom all pleasant pastures and desirable streams and springs were sites to be coveted, and therefore appropriated.

Some of the most startling stories I heard were of attacks by the Indians on travellers crossing the great prairies, and of wild headlong gallops for life. The Indians had an especial aversion to white men disturbing their hunting-grounds, and resented it accordingly.

Some of their best-planned attacks were on the overland stage-coaches, which were run right across the Continent, before the days of the Great Pacific Railroad, and which might be expected to yield a booty worth capturing. Of course, the driver, guard, and passengers were all heavily armed, and the teams were kept in such first-rate condition as rather to enjoy a gallop, with the wild Indian ponies tearing after them in hot pursuit.

It was found necessary to station troops all along the main road, and a military escort occasionally accompanied the coach from one station to another in districts where danger was apprehended. The stations themselves were frequently attacked, as the supplies of all sorts which were there stored, and the relays of excellent horses, offered irresistible temptation to the wild men.

The military established forts at intervals across the country, and the Indians—never lacking in bravery—attacked them in these strongholds. Some of the fiercest skirmishing took place in the neighbourhood of Fort Laramie, Fort Morgan, and Fort Sedgwick, near to where Julesburg station now stands. On one occasion the Cheyennes and Sioux mustered a body of upwards

of a thousand men, and prepared to attack Fort Laramie, where, as it happened, only about fifty men were then stationed.

The officer in command told off a dozen men to defend the fort and work the two guns, while he rode out at the head of the others to meet the assailants. It was not till they reached a projecting bluff, distant about a mile from the fort, that they realised the number of their opponents. The Indians charged furiously, and the cavalry were compelled to retreat, leaving fourteen of their number dead on the field. They succeeded in reaching the fort, which was quickly surrounded by the foe; but Indian arrows, or dubious guns and pistols, could avail little against artillery, and, when morning dawned, not one red man was in sight; neither were any of their dead and wounded left on the field; all had been carried off, true to their ancient custom—no easy matter, as it was subsequently ascertained that they had lost upwards of sixty men on this occasion.

Unhappily, the savage nature betrayed itself in the terrible maltreatment of their dead foes, who, without exception, were left stripped and mutilated, affording a terrible incentive to vengeance in the hearts of the sad, stern men who, on the morrow, rode forth to bury their comrades.

The barbarous element was, unfortunately, continually presenting itself to stir up and quicken the abhorrence with which the white men ever regarded the wild tribes, and raids for horse and cattle stealing, plunder and burning, such as find many a parallel in our own border warfare, were invariably salted with the one horrible, crowning indignity of scalping the victims, regardless of age or sex.

About ten years ago these raids became so frequent, and so alarming, that it became necessary to take serious measures to put a stop to them. The chief difficulty lay in contriving to bring the slippery foe to an encounter, their policy being to appear and disappear again as if by magic. At sunset a settlement might seem prosperous and secure—no sign of danger near—and perhaps ere dawn only a heap of blackened ruins, and the scalped corpses of the victims, remained to prove that the Indians had visited the spot, but of themselves no trace remained.

The only possibility of tracking these marauders was by securing the aid of the friendly Pawnee Indians, who were familiar with every trail within some hundred miles. About 200 of these men were enlisted as scouts and formed into three organised corps. These wary allies undertook to guide a strong

force of regular cavalry, and started in search of their natural foes, the Sioux and the Cheyennes.

Following dubious trails, winding by turns in every direction—north, south, east and west—passing through valleys and creeks, till they had travelled several hundred miles, they at length tracked them to a ridge of high land, where about 500 men, women, and children were encamped at a place known as Summit Springs, the only good water to be found within many miles.

The difficulty of the matter was for troops to approach without being discovered, so as to prevent the Indians from vanishing as effectually as was their wont. But the Pawnees were as wary as the Sioux, and knew every pass and ravine far and wide, so they were able to guide the white troops by circuitous paths; marching upwards of fifty miles, in order to steal upon the enemy from the only direction which had been deemed so secure as not to require outposts.

So warily did they advance, that no alarm was raised till they were within half a mile of the camp, when the Sioux caught sight of the cavalry. Then, with a wild cry of warning to the women; they ran to catch their horses, which were feeding at some distance, but it was too late. The Pawnee scouts made the very heavens echo with their savage war-whoops as they led the charge, followed by the cavalry, and a short but furious hand-to-hand fight resulted in the total defeat of the Sioux and Cheyennes Indians.

Of their 200 warriors, about 160 were slain; some concealed themselves in a deep ravine with precipitous sides, where they could defend themselves in a close engagement, but their assailants knew better than to approach, and kept up a steady fire till they had reason to believe that none survived. Then, approaching warily, they found one woman and sixteen men lying side by side, all dead. Amongst them was the Sioux chief known as Tall Bull.

The camp yielded large booty on this occasion, as, besides the usual strange Indian head-dresses, mocassins, and buffalo robes, there was much spoil in the form of plunder obtained in the recent forays. About 600 horses and mules were captured, and a considerable number of women and children. These were kept prisoners for a few weeks, and were then sent to other Indian settlements in more civilised districts.

In the camp were found two white women who had been taken prisoners in some of the raids. On the approach of the

rescue party, the Sioux chief, Tall Bull, shot them both, and left them for dead. One was fatally wounded, but the other recovered, and eventually married one of the soldiers who had rescued her. Much property which had been stolen from her father was found in camp, and was restored to her; but the recollection of the insults endured by herself and her sister victim, and of the cruelties practised on them by jealous Indian squaws, evermore abides on her mind as a haunting memory of horror.

This is a topic on which it is scarcely possible to touch; yet herein lies the secret of the unconquerable abhorrence with which white men regard the Indians. Such is their indescribable cruelty, that men who know no other fear yet stand in such dread of the possibility of capture, that they are careful never to expend their last shot, reserving it in order to take their own lives rather than fall into the hands of men to whom the barbarous torture of a prisoner is a delight—the very women showing their ingenuity by devising fresh refinements of cruelty, and gloating over the prolonged agonies of their victim. Deeper depths of atrocious brutality await the female captive, be she Indian or foreign, but the fate of the white woman is invariably intensified in horror.

As a matter of course, such incidents, oft repeated, have stirred up the natural antipathies of race to the highest pitch, and has too often led the Pale Faces to deal with all Indians as though they were all alike—incarnate devils. Witness the resolutions for their total extermination which, some years ago, were actually passed by the Legislature of Idaho:—

“Resolved—

“That three men be appointed to select twenty-five men to go Indian hunting, and all those who can fit themselves out shall receive a nominal sum for all scalps that they may bring in, and all who cannot fit themselves out shall be fitted out by the committee, and when they bring in scalps it shall be deducted.

“For every Buck scalp shall be paid 100 dollars, and for every squaw fifty dollars, and twenty-five dollars for everything in the shape of an Indian under ten years of age.

“Each scalp shall have the curl of the head, and each man shall make oath that the said scalp was taken by the Company.”

So the Indians were first exasperated beyond all endurance, and were then shot and scalped, with as little pity as though they had in truth been dangerous wild beasts.

Small wonder that of the 2,000,000 Indians who, two centuries ago, had undisturbed possession of these vast hunting-grounds, only 300,000 now survive. Still smaller wonder that of these one-third are classed in official statistics as "barbarous," and another third as "semi-civilised." The greatest marvel is that one-third should be classed as "civilised." Nevertheless, Bishop Whipple, of Minnesota, in addressing the President of the United States on the Indian question, has distinctly asserted that there does not exist one tribe to whom the Government has given Christian civilisation.

He points out in the plainest terms that the oft-repeated, horrible massacres, followed by very expensive retributive Indian wars, have invariably been the direct consequence of aggression on the part of the white men, non-fulfilment by Government of the conditions of treaties (conditions made by the whites, but infringed so soon as they were found in any way inconvenient), and, most fertile cause of all, frauds by the Indian agents entrusted with the administration of Government compensation money.

As for treaties, they are apparently only made to be broken; not one is ever faithfully carried out, and those best cognisant with Indian affairs affirm that there is not a tribe in all the great wide continent which has not just cause for well-founded complaints of the way in which treaty obligations have been evaded, and the manner in which they have again and again been deceived by Government promises till all possibility of faith is quenched.

General Sherman's summary of the subject exactly corroborates this statement, when, speaking of the broken treaties and legislative perjury involved therein, he says that "Civilisation makes its own compact with the weaker party. It is violated, but *not by the savage!*"

No wonder that oft-repeated lessons of aggression and violence should have roused and intensified the very worst features of the Indian character, and excited the savages to deeds worthy of the devils with whom they are classed by the invading whites.

But I think that if the same policy had been pursued with any other savage race (the Fijians, for instance), the result would have been identical; whereas, in their case, the devotion of a handful of Christian teachers has transformed a whole race of most barbarously cruel cannibals into a nation of singularly consistent Christians. There can be little doubt that

had these tribes been first reached by such influences, and then honourably dealt with, the Indians in the United States would now be as peaceable and orderly as their brethren in Canada, where they are recognised as the Indian subjects of our Queen, and are schooled, Christianised, civilised, and protected by the laws in full enjoyment of their personal rights and property.

How fully the "savages" recognise the difference of the white men who keep faith with them, and those who do not, is plainly proven by the fact that, whereas the United States have expended five hundred million dollars on wars with the Indians to avenge massacres without number, the Canadian Government has never had one massacre to avenge, and the White man and the Red there dwell together in peace and amity.

It seems almost superfluous to remark that, as a matter of course, the making of the great railroad across the Continent was the signal for never-ending efforts, on the part of the tribes, to hinder its progress. Again and again were the engineers and navvies attacked by Indians, who sometimes succeeded in driving them from their work, when, of course, the savages proceeded to destroy everything in their power. Even after the line was completed, and trains running, the Indians repeatedly contrived to tear up the lines, on purpose to cause frightful accidents. Then, in the confusion that ensued, they swooped down like evil birds of prey to pillage the wrecked train, and scalp the wounded and the dead, and straightway made off with their horrible trophies and booty.

One man who was thus scalped had only been partially stunned, and the sharp cut of the Indian's knife brought him to his senses so far that he instinctively threw out his arms, caught the savage, snatched the scalp from his hand, and succeeded in making good his escape in the darkness. That man survived, and is now employed as an official on the railway.

A favourite point of attack was at Plum Creek, so called after a stream which flows between great rocky cliffs, and finally joins the Platte river. In old days it was one of the principal stations of the stage coaches, and was therefore especially obnoxious to the Indians, who lost no opportunity of giving trouble. In one of their attacks, a dozen white men were killed and many wounded. When, however, notwithstanding all their opposition, the railway was completed, they selected this place as the scene of a villainous piece of work.

Having determined to wreck a train, they deliberately lifted the rails just where a bridge crossed a deep ravine ; of course the whole concern went over, and engines, carriages, and waggons landed at the bottom in one terrible heap of ruin. The wretched fireman and engine-driver were appallingly injured, but their agonies, if intensified, were at least shortened by the fire, which quickly spread from the engine to the broken waggons and carriages, affording a magnificent illumination for the miscreants, who, having concealed themselves in the ravine to watch the success of their little game, now rushed out with frantic yells of delight, and proceeded to sack the train, tearing open bales of merchandise, and especially rejoicing over gay calicoes and bright flannels. Having secured as much as they could carry, they made off in the grey dawn, and when, a few hours later, a relief party arrived, they found only the burning train, but no trace of the route taken by the Indians.

As usual, it was necessary to call in the help of the friendly Pawnee scouts, who were posted in detachments all along the railway track, for the express purpose of guarding it against the Arrapahoes, Sioux, Cheyennes, and other hostile tribes. With the aid of the telegraph to summon, and the railway to bring their horses, about fifty scouts and four white officers reached the scene of the disaster by midnight.

A party of ten men were at once told off to discover in what direction the enemy had started, and though, to the eyes of white men, not a track was visible, the keen-sighted scouts soon struck the trail. They followed it all day, noted where the foe had crossed the stream, and from various indications, which they alone could recognise, decided that the cruel deed had been done by a party of Cheyennes from the south. They thought it probable that these would shortly return to try and do further mischief, and so decided not to pursue them, but return, to lie in ambush, making their own camp in a ravine near the scene of the disaster.

They had not long to wait. About a week later, the marauders were discovered in the distance. The avengers waited till they had taken up their quarters for the night, on the opposite side of the river Platte. When the horses had been turned loose, and their riders had settled down to make themselves comfortable for the night, then the Pawnee scouts, led by their white officers, proceeded to cross the river, and, making their way through the scrub, succeeded in approaching very near the Cheyenne camp ere their presence was detected.

At length the alarm was raised, and, in wild excitement, the Indians dashed off in pursuit of their horses. They had just time to secure these and form in regular ranks when the Pawnees charged through an intervening stream, and, with wild war-whoops, rushed to the attack.

The Cheyennes numbered 150 warriors, and the Pawnees were but fifty; but the suddenness of the attack had un-nerved the former, and at the first charge they gave way, and fled pell-mell, hotly pursued by the scouts, till the darkness of night enabled them to make good their escape, leaving fifteen of their number dead, whereas not one of the attacking party was even wounded.

The Pawnees, of course, carried off the scalps of their fallen foes (to ensure their never reaching the happy hunting grounds), and returned to camp to exhibit these precious trophies and spend the night in wild war-dances of triumph. They succeeded in capturing a boy chief and a squaw, who were subsequently exchanged for six white girls and boys who had been carried off by the enemy in a previous raid.

The Cheyennes seem to have profited by this wholesome lesson, for they do not appear to have taken part in any further attacks on the railway; but the Sioux continued troublesome for some time, constantly attacking working parties, firing at trains, and occasionally endeavouring to wreck them. On one occasion they succeeded thoroughly, and exactly repeated the horrors so ably planned by the Cheyennes at Plum Creek.

This time, the scene of the disaster was a creek near Ogallala. The rails were turned up, the engine fell headlong, dragging all the cars on the top of it. The unhappy fireman was jammed against the boiler, in such a position that the flames could just reach him. For six long hours he endured the torture of a slow death of agony, praying the helpless bystanders in mercy to end his anguish by shooting him. At last they succeeded in extricating him, but he only survived a few moments.

On this occasion the railway officials and passengers were well armed, and made such good use of their weapons, that the Indians dared not approach to plunder, and eventually made off. They were tracked and pursued by the invaluable scouts, supported by two companies of white cavalry; but the latter, unfortunately, neglected to extinguish their camp-fires with due precaution, and the result was a terrible conflagration, one of those appalling prairie fires which from time to time desolate vast tracts of the sun-dried grass plains, licking up farm build-

ings and crops, extending to the forests, and sweeping onward in vast tornadoes of flame.

These bush-fires are of annual occurrence in some parts of the great continent, and terrible beyond description must be the waves of fire, sometimes extending over many miles of country, and rushing onward as if driven by a hurricane, when the whole heavens are black with stifling smoke, and men and cattle flee for their lives, only to be overtaken and swallowed up by the devouring flames.

Of many a hair's-breadth escape from danger such as this can the settlers on the prairies tell; of terrible scenes which they have witnessed—scenes to haunt a man to the last hour of his life, so magnificent in their awful grandeur and horror. Sometimes the draught created by the flames themselves is so great that it carries with it large pieces of glowing charcoal, which flash like meteors through the dense clouds of smoke, and, falling to the ground, perhaps miles ahead of the main body, ignite the parched scrub, and form fresh centres of destruction. Conceive the anguish of finding oneself hemmed in between such walls of living flame. Even if the further fire has swept onward ere the first overtakes it, the scorching smoke is of itself enough to choke all living creatures, and the chances of escape by flight are small indeed.

Under such circumstances as these, it is needless to say that the Indian fugitives, of whom I spoke, were allowed, on that occasion, to escape scot free. However, they seem to have then begun to realise that their attacks on railway trains were likely to call forth condign punishment. So they have abandoned that pastime to the more enlightened white brigands, who, to this day, occasionally amuse themselves pleasantly by heaping stones and logs on the track, sufficient to wreck the train if it refuse to stop in obedience to their signals. The engine-driver, seeing the signal-lantern waved, stops as a matter of course, supposing it to be carried by the authorised signalman.

Then the whole band of masked robbers appears, armed to the teeth. If the officials offer resistance, they are overpowered by numbers, or yield to the persuasive influences of revolvers. The passengers are likewise held passive, and compelled to hold up their hands while their pockets are rifled; ladies are relieved of their jewellery, luggage is broken open and valuables abstracted, and if the safe of the express car cannot be wrenched open by main force, the simple method adopted is to fill the baggage-hole with explosives and blow it open. In most cases

this playful exploit is rewarded with a rich booty in money and valuables.

Should any rash officials venture to try and defend their charge, they are quieted by having the muzzles of revolvers applied to either temple ; and though their lives are, if possible, spared, they are probably stunned by a judiciously applied blow, which keeps them quiet for awhile.

Having secured all they want, these considerate highwaymen then assist the railway officials to clear away the stones and logs, and to start the train again, while they themselves collect their booty, and gallop off into the depths of the forest.

Review.

COLONIES AND DEPENDENCIES. By J. S. Cotton and E. J. Payne. Macmillan & Co., 1883.

MR. JAMES COTTON occupies a good position in London literary circles, and he is so able and industrious, that he may be expected to become more influential yet, as time goes by. Though connected with India by family ties, he has never been in the country. It is therefore pleasant to see him coming forward with a very seasonable little essay in which a good many wholesome truths about India are summarised in a sensible and readable manner. His work forms the larger part of one of Messrs. Macmillans' series, *The English Citizen*, the remaining chapters being devoted to a sketch of our colonial system by another hand.

Mr. Payne's share of the work consists of but three chapters, "Historical Sketch," a notice of the relations of the Colonies to the Empire, and a brief description of Colonial government. Mr. Payne points out that colonisation is the result of maritime power, and that the limit of this process has now been reached. He asserts that "the true measure of the value of the colonies is their trade with the mother-country," and that "the colonies of India take of English goods one-half as much as all her foreign customers together." But "the burden of securing and maintaining its ocean communications, by arsenals, garrisons, and fleets, is a heavy one and is increasing." The illogical outcome of this state of things is that the British tax-payer bears all the expenses of the shop and the police who guard it; "the colonies contribute nothing directly to the treasury of the mother-country, and are permitted to lay heavy import duties on her manufactures." Whereas the colonies ought to pay heavy annual subventions for naval and military purposes and admit our goods nearly free, as India does. On the other hand, it must be remembered that almost all colonial garrisons have now been withdrawn, and that the import duties are, ultimately, paid by the colonial consumers. It is pleasant to have

Mr. Payne's assurance that the colonies "desire, before all other things, a closer connection with the mother-country." A little more than half the colonial population is now enjoying "Responsible Government." Of the rest ("Crown Colonies") two are in the Indian seas and are ruled on the Indian model.

The remaining eight chapters of the work are devoted to British India. Victoria, Queen of England, is "Empress of India," and the difference of the titles emphasises a fundamental difference in the two constitutions. But both are ultimately ruled by the British people; and "ignorant good-will" (which may be presumed to be forthcoming) "may produce as much mischief as calculated selfishness. 'Let us educate our rulers' should be the cry of everyone who desires to promote the practical interests of his countrymen." Mr. Cotton's essay is a valuable contribution to this duty. Under three main divisions he sketches, 1st, The country and its inhabitants; 2nd, The existing system of administration; 3rd, The results of British rule and its probable future. The situation is almost wholly unprecedented. Like the Roman Empire in its palmy day, like Spanish America in the later middle ages, British India continues, and may long continue, to furnish an arena for our military virtues, and a field for the growth of laurels. The "Civil Service" has broken down, the competition system being its *reductio ad absurdum*. But "an English army . . . would probably be required after the presence of English civilians had become rare. . . . A confederacy of states and provinces, each developing peacefully after its own fashion, and united by a common bond to the English name," is Mr. Cotton's "dream for the twentieth century."

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THE ARMY AND NAVY MAGAZINE.

OCTOBER 1883.

The Battle-fields of Germany.

BY COLONEL G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I.

III.—LÜTZEN.

WHILST the two leading actors were occupied before Nuremberg in the manner described in the last chapter, the war had been continued without interruption in Germany north of the Main. The Saxons and Swedes in the Lausitz; Holk, detached with ten thousand men from Wallenstein's army, in the Meissen country, and threatening Dresden; Pappenheim, Baudissin, and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, in Westphalia and Lower Saxony; Gustavus Horn in Alsace and the Upper Rhine; Ruthven in the vicinity of Ulm, and Wrangel in Pomerania; had been asserting to the best of their abilities the cause they respectively represented. The situation, in fact, at the time when Gustavus fell back on Windsheim (8th September), may be summed up in a single sentence. The Swedes and their allies had prevailed everywhere except in those places where Pappenheim commanded. Pappenheim, though he had gained no pitched battle, had made his presence felt wherever he appeared. It might even have gone hard with his opponent, Baudissin, had not the necessities of Maestricht, besieged by Henry of Nassau, withdrawn him for a time from Westphalia. On his return thither, Maestricht meanwhile having fallen, he had at once recovered all the advantages of which his short absence had deprived him.

On the 9th September Gustavus had entered Windsheim; on the 13th Wallenstein had quitted his intrenched position near Fürth to march to Forcheim. Although he had checked the victorious career of the Swedish king, he had not won from him a single stronghold. Gustavus was still in Bavaria, nearer to Munich than he was, his garrisons still holding Ulm, Nördlingen, and Donauwörth. Apparently he had gained nothing. But the keen instinct of a consummate warrior taught Wallenstein that, with so many places to maintain and his line of retreat to preserve, it would be impossible for Gustavus to keep together in one body the army which he had at Windsheim; that policy and the necessities of his position would force him to divide it. He resolved, then, still to keep in play the patient pertinacity of his nature, to wait till the event which he foresaw must happen should happen, then to sweep down upon Northern Germany, and, either crushing or bringing to himself the Saxons, re-establish there the imperial predominance, and bar the way to the return of the Swedish invader. It was a scheme worthy of a warrior.

Not suspecting the thoughts which coursed through the brain of his rival, Gustavus remained some days at Windsheim planning the continuance of the campaign. Far from entertaining the idea of quitting Bavaria, he was anxious to complete the reduction of the strong places of the country, and possibly even to push on to Vienna. The superiority he possessed in numbers over Wallenstein gave him hope that the result might not be impossible. For whilst, according to the best authorities, he still had, deducting the garrison of Nuremberg, from forty to fifty thousand men under his orders, Wallenstein, who had detached Gallas with four thousand men to reinforce Holk, by the most favourable statement counted only, before leaving his intrenchments, thirty-one thousand, and, of these, thirteen thousand were Bavarians, who quitted him at Bruck on his way to Forcheim. On arriving at that place his army numbered but seventeen thousand men.

Every circumstance, then, combined to induce the King to continue his progress eastwards. But, fearful lest Wallenstein, released from his presence, should attempt to recover the strong places he had conquered in Franconia, he resolved—as that commander had foreseen—to despatch half his force, under Duke Bernhard, to dispute with the imperial general the passage of the Main, to march himself against the Ingolstadt which had before repulsed him, and penetrate thence into Upper Austria.

Gustavus had despatched Duke Bernhard, and had set out himself, when news reached him of the movement of Gallas. Leaving his army to continue its route towards Donauwörth, he hurried back with three thousand five hundred mounted troops to Nuremberg. Learning there that Gallas had stormed Lauf, ten miles to the east of that city, and was hurrying on to the Meissen country, Gustavus at once turned, and, proceeding by Ansbach, rejoined his army on the next day at Dinkelsbühl. Thence he marched nineteen miles to Nördlingen—where he was joined by five thousand Swiss levies—and thence, the day following, seventeen miles, to Donauwörth. From Donauwörth he proposed to cross the Danube and the Lech, and to besiege Ingolstadt.

Retaking Rain, which the imperial general, Montecuculi, had suddenly snatched,* but dared not fight an action to defend, Gustavus marched to Neuburg on the Danube (12th October), and halted there, awaiting the arrival of his siege-train from Augsburg and Donauwörth. He was still at Neuburg, endeavouring by the most vigorous exertions to hasten the necessary arrangements, when he received the most pressing solicitations to return to Saxony. Not only, was he informed, had Wallenstein penetrated into that province, but he was employing all his influence, and the influence of the Imperial Court, to detach the Elector from the cause of the King of Sweden; and there was great fear that John George, a weak man, alternately solicited and threatened, and secretly incited by Arnheim, who was devoted to Wallenstein, would succumb.

Wallenstein had, in fact, struck his blow. No sooner had he beheld the King of Sweden separated from him by the Danube, and entangled in sieges, than, after threatening Schweinfurt in a manner which drew to that place the Swedish army which Gustavus had confided to the leadership of Duke Bernhard, he suddenly marched directly eastward, and, passing through Bamberg, took Baireuth, and thence dashed against Culmbach. He took that town, then the residence of the Margraves of Brandenburg-Culmbach, and pushed on to Coburg. Coburg succumbed; but the Swedish colonel, Dubatel,† had had time to throw himself, with his dragoons, into the castle which commanded the town, called the Ehrenburg, and the defence

* Colonel Mitaval, who had basely surrendered the place, on the first summons, Montecuculi, was tried, condemned, and executed a few days later at Neuburg.

† Dubatel was a Scotchman: his real name was M'Dougal. He was a very gallant officer.

which he made was so resolute and so protracted, that Duke Bernhard had time to reach Hilburgshausen, some twenty miles to the north-west of the place. His close vicinity forced Wallenstein, who had already been repulsed in one assault (4th October), to raise the siege.

Disappointed in an attempt which, had it succeeded, would have secured his march across Thüringen and his early junction with Pappenheim, Wallenstein, informing Pappenheim of his change of plan, made again a sharp turn to the east, and proceeded to Kronach; thence, nearly north, through the lands now the dominions of Prince Reuss,* to Weida, on the Elster. From Weida he marched to, and summoned, Leipzig, and whilst the bulk of his troops were engaged before that place, took possession of Weissenfels, Merseburg, and the town, but not the fortress, of Halle. Leipzig held out only for two days. On its surrender Wallenstein marched to Eilenburg, midway to Torgau. Receiving there a despatch from Pappenheim notifying that he was marching on Merseburg, he retraced his steps to that place and joined him.

It was the news of this inroad into Saxony which summoned Gustavus just as he was about to attack Ingoldstadt. The fact that Wallenstein had chosen for his winter quarters the dominions of the German ally who, of all, was the most powerful, the most impressionable, the most easily cajoled, left him no choice of action. Between himself and John George of Saxony cordial relations had never existed. Necessity alone had forced the latter, in the first instance, to an alliance which had placed him before the world of Germany in a subordinate position to a foreign sovereign, and the superiority of Gustavus had never ceased for an instant to jar upon his petty nature. John George, then, was not only of the mould, but he was at the moment in the mood, which rendered him peculiarly accessible

* Forming a portion of what was in those days known as the Vogtland, regarded from the eleventh to the sixteenth century as the direct possessions of the German Emperor, which he administered by means of Vögte (*anglice*, prefects). In that period the Vogtland comprehended the districts which now form the south-western portion of the Zwickau circle, the domains of Weida and Ziegenrück in the Grand Duchy of Saxe-Weimar, the possessions of Prince Reuss, the district formerly known as the district of Hof, but which now belongs to Bavaria, and the present Saxe-Altenburg district of Ronneburg. The office of Vogt soon became hereditary in the House of Reuss. In 1873 the Vögte of Weida sold Hof to the Margrave of Nuremberg. In 1580 Elector Augustus obtained by purchase the districts Weida, Arnshausen, and Ziegenrück, and nine years later the counties of Plauen, Vogtland, and Pausa. It will be seen, then, that Weida, to which place Wallenstein took his army, formed a part of the dominions of the Elector of Saxony.

to the blandishments of the Imperial Court. Added to this, his natural dislike of war, the fact that there stood at his side, as his chief minister, a man once the pupil, now the devoted friend, of Wallenstein, the Field-Marshal von Arnheim, and we have a correct view of the situation as it presented itself to the Swedish monarch on the banks of the Danube.

The position required immediate decision and immediate action. Yet for a great commander such as Gustavus to arrive at a decision required no small sacrifice. He was called upon to choose between the relief of Saxony and the conquest of Vienna. Between him and Vienna the only army, a small force, the highest estimate of which makes it thirteen thousand strong—and it was probably much less—was shut up in Ingolstadt. Gustavus believed he could take Ingolstadt. That fortress captured, the way to Vienna lay open to him. Neither Ratisbon, nor Passau, nor Lintz, nor the fortifications of Vienna would have stopped him. From the capital of the dominions of the House of Austria, from the imperial seat of the Emperor of Germany, he could have dictated terms to Ferdinand II. Undoubtedly he would have had to fight Wallenstein in the spring; but the position of Wallenstein fighting for his own hand, would have been different from that of Wallenstein the agent and representative of the Emperor.

That he could reach Vienna before Wallenstein, had he turned, could reach him, Gustavus himself never doubted. The only difficulty which presented itself to his mind had reference to the Saxons. At the moment John George was pressing him to march to his aid. Had John George been by his side, Gustavus might have convinced him that he could most efficiently aid him by seizing the capital of Ferdinand II. whilst he himself should keep Wallenstein occupied in Saxony. But no messenger, however exalted his rank, could produce the same result as that which might be hoped for from a personal interview, and it was quite possible that John George, stung by the neglect accorded to his earnest solicitations, might throw himself, with all the fervour of a convert, into the arms of Wallenstein. This consideration carried the day. With a heavy heart Gustavus abandoned the prospect of occupying Vienna, when Vienna was in his grasp, resolved to quit temporarily, as Wallenstein had reckoned, the Bavaria he had conquered, and to hasten with all possible speed to the aid of his dubious allies. Once that his mind was made up, there was no uncertainty in his action. Banner, a general whom he greatly trusted, was

suffering from a wound. Until he should recover, then, Gustavus appointed the Prince Palatine of Birkenfeldt to command a corps twelve thousand strong, which he proposed to leave on the Danube; then, strengthening the garrisons of Augsburg, Rain, and Donauwörth, he set out, the 7th October, with the remainder of his army, on his march to Saxony. From Donauwörth he marched direct to Nuremberg, stayed there forty-eight hours to recover Lauf, and, after having forced the garrison of that place to surrender at discretion, pushed on with all possible speed to Erfurt, which he had fixed upon as the point of junction for his several corps. Gustavus reached Erfurt on the fifteenth day after leaving Donauwörth, just in time to prevent its citizens from acceding to an accommodation pressed upon them by Pappenheim. Here he halted some days, as well to rest his troops as to take stock of the actual position of affairs. News of good omen reached him from all parts of Germany. Everywhere his detached generals were successfully asserting themselves. The news of his approach had given the Elector of Saxony courage to occupy on the Elbe the places where that river could be crossed,—Dresden, Torgau, and Wittenberg,—and so to diminish the arena whence the Imperial army could procure its supplies. Of that army he learned that it occupied the triangle formed by Merseburg, Weissenfels on the Saale, and Leipzig; that it was composed of three separate corps, that of Wallenstein twelve thousand strong; that of Pappenheim ten thousand; and that, united, of Gallas and Holk, numbering sixteen thousand, being a total of thirty-eight thousand. The day before reaching Erfurt, Gustavus was joined by Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar. This raised the number of the men under his orders to twenty thousand. His ally, the Elector of Saxony, was at Torgau with fifteen thousand.

The extraordinary speed with which Gustavus had accomplished his march from Nuremberg to Erfurt had prevented Wallenstein from receiving timely intelligence of his approach, and that general, confident that he would for some time to come meet no serious opposition, had, the very day after the arrival of Gustavus at Erfurt, despatched Gallas with twelve thousand men into Bohemia. A division of his troops was at the same time threatening Naumburg, the possession of which would assure to him a position which Gustavus could not assail, for Naumburg covered the only easy approach to Weissenfels. The other approach by way of Camburg, abounded in defiles and narrow passages, and was shut in on one side by the Saale, and on the

other by a mountain chain. In the face of Wallenstein's army it would be impossible to attempt to traverse these defiles and passes with any chance of success.

But it was in difficulties that Gustavus always showed himself great. At Erfurt he acquainted himself thoroughly with the geographical position of the country; at Erfurt he learned that Naumburg had not yet fallen; that, therefore, he might yet, by a sudden spring forward, save that place. Success there would place in his hands the power of occupying an advantageous position until he could be joined by his Saxon allies. For the moment, the idea of attacking with his twenty thousand men the army of his enemy, had not presented itself to his mind. With the sole hope of securing Naumburg, then, Gustavus set out from Erfurt, and, marching very rapidly, reached the neighbourhood of that town before the Imperialists had heard that he had quitted the former place, cut up there a small detachment of the enemy, and, entering Naumburg, at once began to intrench himself. Wallenstein first heard of his arrival there from the fugitives of the beaten detachment.

Let us glance at Wallenstein's position. He still had under his orders twenty-six thousand men; he occupied a strong position on the Saale; in front of him was the Swedish army, inferior to him in numbers; at Torgau, on the opposite side of Leipzig, was the Saxon army, seeking for a junction with Gustavus; Duke Franz Albert of Saxe Lauenburg, with two thousand cavalry, was feeling his way between Eilenburg and Grimma, both on the Mulde, with the same intention. He thus occupied a central position, against enemies who, when united, would outnumber him by some ten thousand men. But those enemies were not united. The most active of them was intrenching himself at Naumburg. His ally was beyond Leipzig. The time was the beginning of November. The belief then forced itself into his mind that the Swedish leader did not intend to attack him, but rather designed to provide his army with safe quarters until the winter season should have passed.

In that view his own position was not very safe. The Saxon army on the one side, the Swedish on the other, very much restricted the area from which he could obtain supplies. He did not even command the great highway to the north, running through Halle; for though he held the town of that name, the fortress was occupied by the enemy. Feeling, then, that it was necessary that that highway should be absolutely in his command, and influenced, also, by a desire he had always had at heart to

draw Gustavus further to the north, and thus to weaken the desire for co-operation with him of the Saxons, whose country would thus be freed from both armies, he determined, whilst Gustavus was yet intrenching himself, to despatch Pappenheim to secure the fortress of Halle,* and thence to proceed to the relief of Cologne, menaced by the enemy, whilst he himself, abandoning the line of the Saale, should distribute a portion of his army in the towns in the neighbourhood, and with the remainder fall back on the little town of Lützen. The plan was not his own, but he was over-persuaded to adopt it.

But Gustavus, far from dreaming of winter quarters, was planning a scheme of union with his Saxon allies. He had, on being assured of the possession of Naumburg, proposed to the Elector of Saxony that, if he would march to Eilenburg, midway to Leipzig, he himself would direct his course to the south of Wallenstein's position, by way of Pegau, to Grimma on the Mulde. Grimma was only fourteen miles from Eilenburg; and there was no enemy near to hinder the junction.

Too eager to await in his position a reply from the Elector of Saxony, Gustavus, leaving a sufficiently strong garrison in Naumburg, set out at one o'clock on the morning of the 5th November for Pegau. But he had scarcely marched the nine miles which constitute half of the journey to that place, when some country gentlemen and peasants of the district hastened towards him with full and positive assurances of the extraordinary action taken by Wallenstein. Their story was confirmed by some straggling prisoners. They informed the King that Pappenheim was well on his march to Halle, that strong detachments occupied Weissenfels and Merseburg, that the remainder of the imperial army lay loosely and thinly dispersed in the various villages of the triangle formed by the two places named and Leipzig, and that Wallenstein himself was at Lützen. Gustavus at once summoned his generals and imparted to them the news; then, being informed that Lützen was but five miles distant—it was in reality nearly nine—he gave his men some refreshments, and, wheeling his army to the left, pushed on towards that village. On his march thither he was joined by Franz Albert of Saxe-Lauenberg, who, on the first intimation of the King's intentions to effect the junction by way of Grimma, had hastened with all speed to meet him.

Not till much later in the evening did the imperial scouts

* Called the Moritzburg, now in ruins.

g to Wallenstein the information that Gustavus was upon . Taken by surprise, his troops scattered, the Duke of dland displayed to the full his wonted coolness and self-ession. It was then nearly five o'clock in the evening. sidering the heavy state of the roads; the fact that Gustavus ld have, in his last three miles, to traverse a morass, sed by a bridge, over which only two persons could pass east; Wallenstein felt [absolutely confident that, whatever might happen, he could not be attacked that day. first care was to send mounted messengers to summon his from the villages in which they were scattered. He then, carefully as the light permitted, surveyed the ground. The road between Weissenfels and Leipzig, by way of Lützen, a continuous ditches on both sides, seemed to offer a good naive position if properly utilised. He therefore at once set work to widen and deepen the ditches and to line them with musketeers as they came up. His men worked at this all night. Early the following morning he posted his left so to be covered by the canal which joins the Elster with the le, and which runs from Merseburg to Zeitz: his right he w up to the immediate left of, and thus covered by, the age of Lützen. On some rising ground to the left of that age, where there were several windmills, he planted fourteen ll pieces of cannon, whilst, to support his advance, which composed of the musketeers in the ditches on either side he road, he ranged on the nearer side a battery of seven vy pieces. The main body of his infantry he formed into massive brigades in the centre, in a sort of irregular allelogram, the second and third being echeloned with that front in such a way that whilst the left-hand man of the ing rank of the second had touch with the right-hand of the rear rank of the first, the right-hand man of the t rank of the third touched the left-hand man of the rear s of the first. Immediately behind the first, but at an rval nearly double its own length, was the fourth. These ades were flanked on both sides by musketeers interlinked i cavalry, and then by cavalry alone. Count Colloredo comided on the left, Holk on the right, Terzky in the centre. se arrangements were completed gradually, that night and ng the morning, as his men came up. Long before the des appeared, the Imperial army was in battle array. That ing Wallenstein wrote a despatch to Pappenheim, direct- him to return with all speed. It is certain, however,

was the messenger to whom he entrusted it did not set out until the following morning.*

Meanwhile Gustavus had found the distance longer and the difficulties greater than he had anticipated. The roads were heavy, the delays caused by the morass were great. They might have been made greater still if the men of an imperial regiment of cuirassiers and if a battalion of Croats, who were posted in the village of Chursitz on the further side of it, had done their duty. But these men, far from harassing the Swedes in their difficult passage, fell back to an eminence in rear of the village, and remained there calm spectators of their enemy's movement. Before the whole Swedish army had crossed. In the morning and just as night the enemy did not occupy a very important position. But before it had been accomplished night had set in. It was impossible to move further. The surprise, in the end, unaccomplished by Gustavus, was no longer possible. The Swedish army, then, after dislodging the cuirassiers and Croats, attacked where it stood.

It was an anxious night. Unlike Napoleon before Austerlitz Gustavus could not sleep. He passed the long hours, says Bunsen, partly in discourse with his generals, partly in profound contemplation. Immediately at his side were Kniphausen and Hans Bernhart. The former, it is said, seeing that there could no longer be a surprise, and feeling intuitively certain that Wallenstein would make every effort to recall Pappenheim; seeing, further, that the army would have to fight unrested and hungry, and no supplies were obtainable where they were: urged the re-passing of the rivulet and the re-taking of the route to Jülich. But Gustavus was resolved to fight. The battle, he reasoned, would be gained before Pappenheim could return; he would march at two o'clock in the morning and engage the enemy before daybreak.

But the extreme darkness of the night, a darkness extraordinary even for the time of year, and the density of a mist which accompanied and obscured the dawn, rendered impossible the carrying out of this plan. Nine o'clock struck before the sun had cleared away the fog. Then the King, sending all the superfluities to the village of Chursitz, addressed a few spirit-stirring words to his men and ordered the advance.

* Otherwise Pappenheim would have received the letter during the night, and been able to reach the field before the battle had begun! Wallenstein's letter is in the Vienna archives. It was found in the pocket of Pappenheim's jerkin, and was stained with his blood.

Gustavus led the right wing, consisting of six regiments of Swedes, supported by musketeers, intermingled with cavalry; the left, composed of cavalry and intermixed infantry, was commanded by Duke Bernhard; the centre, consisting of four brigades of infantry, and supported by Henderson's reserve of Scottish infantry, was commanded by Nicholas Brahé, Count of Weissenburg. The reserves, between each of these divisions, were formed entirely of cavalry, and were commanded on the right by Bulach, in the centre by Kniphausen, and on the left by Ernest, Prince of Anhalt. The field pieces, twenty in number, were disposed to the best advantage between the wings. With the King, on the right, was Franz Albert of Lauenburg, who had joined him the day before.

As the Swedish army advanced beyond the village of Chursitz—which was immediately in rear of its centre—towards the high road lined by the Imperial infantry in the ditches on either side of it, the men were greatly harassed by the fire of the seven heavy pieces of artillery drawn up close to, but on the further side of that road. Their own lighter guns could make no effective reply. Gustavus, most anxious to come to closer quarters, only pressed on the more quickly. His left wing, led by Duke Bernhard, was the first to reach the scene of action. Responding to the call of their commander, the men composing it forced the ditches, cleared the road, charged the death-dealing battery, killed or drove away the gunners, and, without waiting to render the guns useless, rushed, with full fury, on the Imperialist right. Here Holk commanded—a most resolute soldier. But on this morning all the efforts even of Holk to stem the irresistible advance were fruitless. His first brigade was overthrown by the shock of the encounter, the resistance of the second and the third was equally unavailing. Still pressed on the Swedes. Unless some great miracle could be performed, the battle was irretrievably lost.

On such an occasion a great general is divine. At this terrible crisis the individual appeared on the spot to work the miracle which alone could save the Imperialists from disaster. Suddenly, dashing through the three broken brigades, there faced the Swedes, disordered by their too rapid victory, the firm countenances and serried ranks of the fourth, led and animated by the Duke of Friedland in person. Instantly the victorious advance was checked; the fugitives rallied under cover of the solid resistance; the battle was restored; in their turn the Swedes fell back, and an opportune charge of three cavalry

regiments on their flanks hastened their retrograde steps. At length, after a most desperate hand-to-hand struggle, the conquered guns were recovered, many of the Swedes were forced across the road, and the victory which had seemed a few minutes before to be within their grasp now appeared to smile on their opponents. But on the side of the Swedes there was likewise a man whose individuality ever worked an influence more potential than that allowed to the common run of humanity. Whilst Duke Bernhard was combating, now almost victorious, now almost decisively defeated, on the left of the Swedish line; Gustavus, on the right, had forced the road, and, charging the Croats and Poles opposed to him, had driven them from the field. He was on the point of wheeling to his left to take the Imperialist centre in flank, when a messenger reached him with the information that his left wing had fallen back, broken and in disorder, and that his immediate presence was necessary to save his army from defeat. Leaving to Colonel Stalhaus* to press the enemy where he was then fighting, Gustavus hurried to his left at the head of Steinboch's regiment of dragoons. Arrived on the spot, he waved his sword, and calling upon all who loved him to follow him, dashed to the front at a point where his men had not yet been forced across the road, and, riding amongst them, urged them to fresh exertions. By his side were Franz Albert of Lauenburg and a few other followers, but the pace had been so furious that Steinboch's dragoons had not yet arrived. Urging on his broken men, and endeavouring at the same time to discover amid the tumult and the smoke the true bearings of the enemy, Gustavus unguardedly approached too near to the latter, when he was struck in the shoulder by a musket ball. Almost at the same moment the dragoons arrived. Noting the alarm for himself which they displayed at the sight of their sovereign covered with blood, Gustavus called out, "It is nothing; follow me!" and he directed a charge against the enemy. But weakened by loss of blood and almost fainting, he begged Franz Albert—speaking to him in French so as not to be understood by his soldiers—to lead him as quietly and with as little parade as possible from the field. The Duke complied.

* Schiller says, "to Gustavus Horn"; but Horn was at the time far away engaged in Alsace. He had only succeeded on the 28th October, after a siege of eight weeks, in capturing Benfeld, sixteen miles south-west of Strasbourg. It is impossible, had he attempted it, that he should have reached Lützen in time for the battle; but he did not attempt it.

ed the King, accompanied only by his page, Leubelfing, by a letour, towards the road. But Gustavus had scarcely moved a few paces, when he received another shot in the back. Calling out to Franz Albert that it was all over with him, and that he must now save himself, the mortally wounded King fell to the ground. Franz Albert, believing the battle lost, galloped off to report, it has been asserted, the death of Gustavus to Wallenstein, and then rode on to Weissenfels. But the page, Leubelfing, remained. A minute later, three Austrian cuirassiers galloped to the spot and demanded the name of the dying man. As Leubelfing refused to give it, they discharged their pistols at him with such effect that he fell to the ground wounded to the death.* Then Gustavus, in an almost inarticulate voice, declared his name and rank. Immediately afterwards the Swedish cavalry were seen approaching; then the troopers, eager to save themselves, and yet to finish the career of their conqueror, discharged their pistols at the King's temple, stripped him,† and fled. Over his dead body, a little later, a desperate cavalry encounter ensued, and when, on the conclusion of the fight, it was borne away by his own men it was not recognisable, so covered was it with wounds and bruises.

Meanwhile, the battle had been raging with increased fury. The news of the fall of their King, which was carried rapidly through the ranks, far from disheartening the Swedes, inspired them with a firm resolution to avenge his death. Following up the line of attack which their beloved sovereign had indicated just before he was struck, they advanced with the firm step, the dogged resolution, the determined energy which had gained for them so many battles. Their general, the gallant Bernhard of Weimar, seemed to be animated by the very spirit of his dead commander, and in him the men silently recognised a leader whom they would be proud, on such a field, to follow. In vain did Wallenstein, Colleredo, Piccolomini, Mérode, and the other officers who fought under and with them, display tactical skill, bright example, and unsurpassed courage. The progress of that Swedish left wing was not to be stopped. The guns near the windmills were captured and turned against the enemy. Step by step the Imperial left wing was forced back, the centre was assailed in flank and in front, and by the guns

* He died five days later.

† His buff-jerkin, stained with his blood, was taken to Ottavio Piccolomini, the colonel of the regiment of cuirassiers to which the despoilers belonged. By him it was sent to Vienna, where it is still preserved.

from the rising ground, and, after a hard struggle, the centre gave way too. The battle was apparently lost for the Imperialists.

For the centre had been assailed, not on one flank alone, but on two flanks. Stalhaus, who had been commissioned on the right to finish the work of Gustavus, when Gustavus had been summoned to rally his then beaten left, had driven the Imperial left from the field, and had followed up his work by dashing with all his fury against the centre. This attack was aided by the fire, directed by Bernhard of Weimar, of the captured guns. The Imperialists were giving ground, hopeless of victory, when the explosion of one of their powder-wagons added new terrors to the fight. Those more distant from the actual scene of the explosion pictured to themselves a thousand terrible possibilities—an attack in rear—their retreat cut off—a general slaughter. It was now four o'clock. Every moment their vigour decreased, the defence slackened. Complete victory was in the very grasp of the Swedes, when, suddenly, the galloping of horse was heard; the sound approached nearer and nearer; it reached the very spot. Then, emerging from the smoke, Pappenheim, leading eight regiments of Imperial cavalry, rode up at full gallop to restore the fight!

Pappenheim had already attacked the citadel of Halle when the messenger of Wallenstein reached him. To wait until his infantry, engaged in plundering, should be collected, and then to proceed at their pace, was quite opposed to the fiery nature of the Swabian general. He had, however, eight regiments of splendid cavalry well in hand, and at the head of these he galloped at full speed to the battle-field, a distance of at least eighteen miles. As he approached the field he came upon the fugitives of the left wing, the men whom Stalhaus had driven before him. Addressing a few inspiring words to these men, he succeeded in rallying them. Ignorant of the death of Gustavus, and anxious to cross swords with the King, who, he was aware, commanded the Swedish right, he aided the efforts of the re-forming infantry, by dashing with all his force against the pursuing troops of Stalhaus, checking their pursuit, and forcing them in their turn to fall back. The experienced touch of Wallenstein, who throughout that day had displayed all the qualities of a consummate commander, was at once sensible of the relief caused by this splendid action. Leaving Pappenheim to deal with the Swedish right, he rallied and drew to his centre his right, and opposed a fresh front to the advancing troops of Bernhard of Weimar and of Kniphausen. Again did Fortune

seem to smile on the Imperialists. Once more were the guns re-conquered, the Swedes forced backward beyond the road; and it seemed to need only the return of Pappenheim from the pursuit of the Swedish right to change that which had been a defeat into a decisive victory!

Very hopeful now of the result, the Imperial general waited anxiously for Pappenheim. But instead of Pappenheim there came to him a messenger with the fatal intelligence that Pappenheim lay dying on the field; that his men, their horses tired and themselves disheartened, were falling back, that Stalhaus was resuming the offensive, and that he would have to look to himself!

It was even so. Pappenheim, whilst urging on the pursuit of the Swedes, had received two musket wounds through his body. Still keen for victory, still anxious to measure himself with Gustavus, he tried to sit his horse. In vain, however. As had sunk the enemy he sought, five hours before, so did he sink bleeding and helpless to the earth. Whilst lying there, the rumour reached him that Gustavus had been killed. His eye lighted up when, upon inquiry, the truth of the rumour was confirmed. "Tell the Duke of Friedland," he said to the officer nearest him, "that I am lying here without hope of life, but that I die gladly, knowing, as I now know, that this irreconcilable enemy of my faith has fallen on the same day." He survived only a few hours.

The fall of Pappenheim was fatal to the Imperialists. Discouraged, they could not withstand the energy which still animated the Swedes. The message brought to Wallenstein conveyed, indeed, a warning of real meaning. He had to look to himself. The appearance of Pappenheim on the field had procured him a temporary relief. The death of that general, and the discouragement of his men, rendered it incumbent upon him to provide for the safety of his army. All hope of victory had vanished.

Under these trying circumstances, Wallenstein still showed himself a great commander. His right wing and centre had indeed driven Duke Bernhard, the Count of Brahé and Kniphausen across the road, but the men under those leaders were by no means beaten: they still offered a stubborn and solid resistance; and it was evident that they would take advantage of any movement which might be made upon his left flank. That flank, by the falling back of Pappenheim's cavalry, was now uncovered; Stalhaus, his men refreshed by renewed hopes

of victory, would at any moment be upon it, and his own destruction would be inevitable. To avoid such a catastrophe, Wallenstein fell back across the road, always fighting, and always in good order, extending his line to the left to give a face to Stalhaus, and giving the enemy no opportunity to turn him. The sun had set; darkness was fast approaching; if he could but maintain this order for half-an-hour longer, he could render the day—a day which had begun for him so inauspiciously, for he had been assailed when he was not prepared for an assault—at the least indecisive. In this action he was splendidly supported alike by his generals and his men. Whilst the Swedes, eager for the victory once again apparently within their grasp, pressed on with fury, the Imperialists showed the most stubborn obstinacy. Seven times did Piccolomini charge the advancing enemy. Seven times was a horse shot under him. Always re-mounting, he showed himself the type of the cavalier, daring, firm in reverse, unyielding. Nor was his a solitary example. Götzen, Holk, Terzky, Colleredo, Mérode, gave on that day, especially in the last retreat—a time which more than any other brings out a man—evidences of skill, of courage, and of conduct. But above them all towered their great leader. If, under the circumstances, he could not win a victory, Wallenstein gave, at Lützen, a brilliant example of the manner in which to conduct a retreat in the face of a victorious enemy.

At length, both armies exhausted, darkness—such a darkness as that of which it has been recorded that “it might be felt”—set in, and the combatants separated. After fighting for nine hours, each army still occupied the ground it had held before the battle. The result had been absolutely indecisive.

Victory belongs technically to the side which gains the field of battle, and, in that sense, the morning after the fight, the Swedes might fairly claim the honour. For, during the night, Wallenstein fell back on Leipzig, leaving behind him his colours and all his guns. In thus falling back he displayed a precipitation wholly unnecessary, for hardly had he well quitted the battle-field when Pappenheim's six infantry regiments arrived from Halle. Had the Imperial commander only waited for these he would have been in a position the following morning to claim the honours of the day, for, during the night, the Swedish leaders were quite ignorant of their fortune. As it was, the fresh troops, finding no commander on the ground, took likewise the road to Leipzig.

During the hours of darkness, indeed, Duke Bernhard and Kniphausen held an anxious consultation as to whether their army should or should not retire upon Weissenfels, and they only relinquished the idea because, after much argument, they concluded that the attempt would be barely practicable. Nor was it until the early morning light showed them that Wallenstein had disappeared, that they comprehended for the first time the advantages they had gained. So true is it that in war steadfastness counts more highly than sensational valour!

The morning of the 7th November showed, indeed, the Swedes to be the sole occupiers of the field of Lützen and of the Imperial guns. But what were these advantages to the loss of their great leader? The victory at Lützen was but a poor compensation for the death of Gustavus—the hero whose name alone was worth thousands of men, who had initiated the great war for freedom of conscience, and who, from a small beginning, had driven the Court of Vienna to its very last resources. A defeat at Lützen might have been compensated for by a victory elsewhere, but the loss of Gustavus was irreparable!

The battle cost both sides nine thousand men in killed alone; the number of wounded was far greater; indeed, it is said that hardly a man on the Imperialist side remained without a scar. The whole field from Lützen to the canal was covered with corpses. The position of many of these indicated the valour and the discipline with which they had fought. It is said, indeed, that all the men of the yellow regiment of Swedish Guards, known as the Pretorian Brigade, lay dead on the field in the same serried order in which they had fought. The same story is told of the blue regiment, composed entirely of British soldiers. Those severely wounded did not survive the night, for the appliances to relieve them were few, and a hard frost which set in before morning finished the work which the hostile weapons had begun.

On both sides many men of eminent rank were hit. Amongst those killed there were, on the Swedish side, besides Gustavus, Count Milo, the Count of Brahé, Colonel Gersdorf, General Uslar, Ernest Prince of Anhalt, and Colonel Wildessein; on the side of the Imperialists, in addition to Pappenheim, John Bernard Schenk, Prince and Abbot of Fulda, Count Berthold Wallenstein, General Brenner, Isolani general of the Croats, a prince of the house of Dietrichstein, and six colonels. Piccolomini received ten wounds, none of them mortal; Wallenstein was struck by a spent musket-ball; Holk received a severe hurt;

1631. A more desperate was the conflict, that, as already stated, there was scarcely a man in the Imperial army who escaped unhurt without injury.

The question as to who it was who fired the carbine the ball of which killed Gustavus has remained, and will ever remain, one of the vexed questions of history. The famous Pufendorf,* who was born the very year that Lützen was fought, and who, from his position, enjoyed the fullest opportunity of making inquiries on the subject, directly charges Franz Albert of Lauenburg with the murder. That he did commit it was undoubtedly the impression of his contemporaries. It may be worth while to state the question as it has appeared to modern writers.

Franz Albert was the youngest of four sons of Franz II., Duke of Lauenburg. Related on the side of his mother to the royal race of Vasa, he had in his early years been received in a friendly manner at the Court of Stockholm. An impertinent remark with reference to Gustavus, of which he delivered himself in the chamber of the Queen Mother was, it is said, rewarded by a box on the ear, and caused his departure from Sweden. On his attaining years of discretion he professed the Catholic faith, entered the Imperial army, obtained the command of a regiment, attached himself with the fullest devotion to Wallenstein, and obtained apparently the confidence of that general. Certain it is that whilst the negotiations between the Emperor and Wallenstein were pending, Franz Albert was employed by the latter in endeavouring to bring about a secret understanding with the Court of Dresden. After Wallenstein had levied his army, and, advancing to Fürth, had blockaded Gustavus in Nuremberg, Franz Albert, without any assigned cause, quitted his camp and presented himself to Gustavus as a convert to the reformed religion and anxious to serve as a volunteer under the King's orders. By his professions of religious zeal and other flattering ways he managed to win the King's heart; and although Oxenstierna, when he saw him, entertained a profound distrust of him and went so far as to warn the King, the hold he had gained was not to be shaken. After the assault made by the King on Wallenstein's position, Franz Albert quitted the King's camp to raise troops for his services in his paternal lands. He rejoined him, we have seen, though only with his personal attendants, the day before the battle of Lützen, and, though

in command, preferred to act as orderly officer to Gustavus.

Historia de rebus suecicis, ab expeditione Gustavi-Adolphi in Germaniam usque Christianæ; Utrecht, 1686.

attended the King during that battle in that capacity. It is remarked that on that day Franz Albert, alone of all the officers on the Swedish side, wore a green scarf, the distinctive mark of the Imperialists. He was by the King's side when Gustavus received his first wound, and he it was whom the King requested to lead him out of the combat. He was close to him when the King received his second and fatal wound in the back, and he quitted him the moment after the discharge. Everyone present in attendance that day on the King was killed or fatally wounded. He it was, it is asserted, who brought the news of the King's death to Wallenstein; and very soon after the battle he exchanged the Swedish service for the Saxon; and eighteen months later he re-embraced the Roman Catholic faith, and re-entered the Imperial army. It is hardly possible that a case of circumstantial evidence could be stronger.

On the other hand, it has been proved by the evidence of the Duke of Leubelfing that Gustavus, in his eagerness to ascertain the exact position and force of the enemy, had advanced much too far in front of his men, and that he fell in the very midst of the Imperialists' cuirassiers. The chamberlain, Truchsess, has gone so far as to affirm that he saw the fatal shot fired, at a distance of ten paces from the King, by an Imperial officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Falkenberg, who at once turned and fled, but was pursued and cut down by Luckau, squire of Duke Albert of Lauenburg. This story is confirmed by Harte, who, after stating the case very strongly against Franz Albert, says: "To the best of my unbiassed judgment there appears no circumstance in Duke Franz's favour, namely, that his valet, the Horse, who was a gentleman, killed the cavalier who shot Gustavus." Again, in his report of the battle, Duke Charles of Brunswick makes no allusion to the supposed action of Franz Albert. The presumption against the latter seems to rest chiefly upon his subsequent conduct.

The immediate result of the battle of Lützen was to deprive Wallenstein of the winter quarters for which he had striven in vain. Early on the morning of the 7th he despatched his light troops to take possession of the battle-field, if it should be unoccupied by the enemy. But when these light troops returned to report the presence there in full array of the Swedish army, Wallenstein hastened to evacuate Leipzig and to fall back into Bohemia. His departure left the Swedes at liberty to enter into communication with John George and the Saxons.

The Royal Marines and our Coast Fortresses.

BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL A. PARNELL, LATE R.E.

THE time seems to have arrived when, in the interests of the country, some definite and well-matured policy should be adopted in reference to the organisation and employment of the Royal Marines.

It is generally known that the troops composing this corps are available for service both ashore with the army, and afloat, in Her Majesty's ships, with the navy; that their recruitment, organisation, and administration generally, differ considerably from the arrangements in force for the rest of the army; and that they are divided into two branches, viz. Artillery and Light Infantry.

Cannon, in his *Historical Record of the Marine Corps*, says that "the advantages arising from the services of corps trained to the use of arms on board of ship, as well as on land, was found when the British navy acquired a superiority over that of other nations of Europe; and as the safety of Great Britain from its insular position, chiefly depends on the efficiency and excellence of her fleets, the importance and value of marine forces have consequently been at all times acknowledged and appreciated by the Sovereign as well as by the nation at large.

He tells us that the first detachment of marines was raised by Charles II. in 1664, when the war with Holland took place; that from that time till the Peace of 1748 the marines (who embodied) formed a portion of the establishment of the army; but that from 1755, when war with France again broke out, they constituted a part of the strength of the navy, and were placed, as they now are, under the entire control of the Admiralty.

Let us now glance at what may be called the military history of the corps (mainly as narrated by Cannon), bearing in mind that during this first, or military, stage of their existence—from 1664 to 1748—the marines were formed from select

its of the line, and were known either as *Marine Regiments* or as *Regiments of Foot for Sea Service*.

In the first place, it is notable that, when the marine branch of service was first established, only four regiments of the 1st to the 4th) were in existence; and these had only been raised in 1660, or four years before; so that it would appear that soldiers were first raised in this country for sea service practically at the same time as they were first levied for land service.

It was in the great war of the Spanish Succession, from 1702 to 1713, that the marine regiments commenced their active service, and performed their most important actions, and gained their greatest honours. On the breaking out of the war, in 1702, six regiments of marines, and six regiments of foot for sea service (or marines) were raised; and eight of these twelve regiments, including three of marines, numbering 2188 men, and the Sea Service Infantry, numbering 8620 men, or a total of 10808 marine soldiers, immediately formed part of the expedition under Admiral Sir George Rooke and the Duke of Devonshire to the coast of Spain.

The first attempt was first made against Cadiz, and the troops were defeated; but the fortress was found to be much stronger and better garrisoned than had been anticipated, and the enterprise was abandoned.

The success was, however, obtained at Vigo, which was the Spanish stronghold that was attacked. The fleet arrived there in October, and Ormond landed in the vicinity with 10,000 men. A vigorous assault, in which Lord Shannon's regiment of marines took a distinguished part, was now made on the enemy's land-works, and this was followed by an engagement between the ships and the sea fortifications. The result was that Vigo was captured, together with many ships of war and laden galleons. The prize-money obtained amounted to £1,200,000; and, on the news of the victory reaching England, Queen Anne, attended by the Lords and Commons, came in state to St. Paul's Cathedral to return thanks.

In February, 1704, three marine regiments (or portions of regiments) numbering in all about 1,800 men, were on board the fleet of Sir George Rooke in the Mediterranean, and were called upon for any service they might be called upon to execute in conjunction with the great object of assisting the Archduke Charles of Austria to the throne of Spain.

In Lisbon, in the same month, Sir George Rooke received on

board Major-General Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt (lately Governor of Catalonia for the Archduke Charles), who took command of the troops. After an ineffectual demonstration on the 19th May against Barcelona, Rooke and Hesse-Darmstadt, at a council of war held on the 17th July, decided to attempt to capture by surprise the fortress of Gibraltar, which was very weakly garrisoned.

The joint expedition against the rock was admirably arranged and completely successful. The troops (among whom were some Dutch as well as English marines) landed under Hesse-Darmstadt on the sandy Isthmus, and invested the fortress by land; whilst the ships, under Rooke, stood into the sea defences, battered them, landed a naval force, and stormed the New Mole fort and Jumper's Redoubt. The garrison then surrendered, having made a gallant defence; and on the 24th July, 1704, the prince took possession with his marines.

Rooke soon afterwards returned to England with the fleet, Hesse-Darmstadt was left at Gibraltar as its first English governor, whilst the marines formed the first English garrison of the fortress.

Little time was, however, allowed to the troops to establish themselves in their newly-won position; for, on the 22nd October of the same year Villadarias, with 7,000 Spaniards, commenced a spirited siege of the fortress. The defence was conducted in a most skilful and devoted manner. The siege lasted seven months, during the last two of which the besiegers were assisted by the French; and throughout the first two months the marines (aided by a detachment of seamen landed from the fleet to act as artificers) formed the entire garrison. Reinforcements to the number of 3,000 men, including Lord Donegal's regiment of acting marines, arrived from England in Sir John Leake's fleet on the 18th December; and in April 1705, the French Marshal de Tessé (who, much to the disadvantage of the besiegers, had superseded Villadarias) abandoned the attack.

The prominent features of this remarkable siege of Gibraltar were:—

- (1.) The notable attempt by a forlorn hope of Spaniards to surprise the fortress from the east, or precipitous side of the rock; and the frustration thereof by the splendid attack on the party, when they had gained the summit, made by the marines up the west side of the rock.

- (2.) The successful sortie effected by the Prince on the enemy's works five days after the arrival of the reinforcements from England.
- (3.) The Spanish assault on the King's lines, an operation that was defeated by the garrison after a great and gallant struggle, in which the marines, who held the Round Tower under Colonel Borr, performed a distinguished part.

Throughout the siege the marines were the most numerous corps in the garrison; the desperate enterprise at the east of the rock was made when they were practically the sole defenders of the place; and it is undoubtedly principally owing to their noble exertions that their great commander, the Prince of Hesse Darmstadt was able to secure us in the possession of the Rock Fortress.

In 1827, His Majesty King George IV. presented the corps of Royal Marines (thus styled by order of George III in 1802) with a Device and Badge. These consisted of a crown, the royal initials G. R. enclosing an anchor, and the great globe encircled with a laurel wreath (the last having been given for the siege of Belle Isle in 1761); the whole founded on the motto *Per Mare, per Terram*, and surmounted by the word "GIBRALTAR." In the address of H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence, when bestowing these insignia, together with new colours, on the corps at Chatham, the Duke said—"The motto, peculiarly your own, *Per Mare, per Terram*, has been allowed to remain; and surmounting the entire is the word GIBRALTAR, in commemoration of the important national services you performed there."

It is probably not generally known that the special services herein commemorated were those glorious ones at the memorable defence of 1704-5, which we have just alluded to. Many military readers have probably (with the writer) been a little misled by Drinkwater's use of the term *Marine* in the sense of *Naval*, in his description of the doings of Captain Curtis (afterwards Admiral Sir Robert Curtis), and his naval brigade, at the great siege of 1779-83. It seems certain, however, that this *Marine* Brigade, as Drinkwater everywhere styles it, was composed almost entirely of naval seamen, commanded by naval officers. It is doubtful if any marine soldiers formed part of it, unquestionably no marine officers were with it. It is more probable that the marines of the ships from which these seamen were drawn were not removed from the ships to which, under their then naval organisation, they belonged; for the

disciplinary duties which at present occupy so large a share of the attention of the corps whilst navally employed in Her Majesty's ships, were in those days of an even more arduous nature than is now the case.

In our relation of the services of the marines at Vigo, and in the siege of Gibraltar of 1704-5, we have not confined ourselves solely to the clear information given by Cannon; but he will be our principal guide in dealing with their further active military operations.

In August 1705, only four months after Hesse Darmstadt had driven off the Spanish and French hosts, that daring soldier (after improving the fortifications of the rock) joined Lord Peterborough in his expedition with Sir Cloudesley Shovel (who commanded the fleet), against Barcelona. Two regiments of foot for sea service, or acting marine regiments, formed part of the land forces.

In the storming of Montjuic Fort, which led to the capture of Barcelona and to the submission of all Catalonia, one of these regiments (Southwell's) headed the assault, and drove the enemy from the outworks. The operation was conducted under the personal direction of Peterborough and Hesse Darmstadt; and it was on witnessing the success of the marines that the Prince, "advancing with great eagerness through all the fire," was shot with a musket-ball in the thigh, and, after being carried to an adjacent cottage, expired.

A great soldier and an able administrator passed away when George of Hesse Darmstadt fell on the field of battle. Does the English nation fully recognise all that it owes to this German Prince? A less enterprising spirit than his would certainly, during the memorable council of war held on board *Rocks's* flagship, have discouraged the project of attacking Gibraltar. The preceding attempt at Barcelona (where 1,600 marines were actually landed) was due to his initiative. Is it not, then, probable that the idea of the Gibraltar expedition was also originated by him? However this may be, we find him first skilfully conducting the land operations which led to the surrender of the fortress; then, hardly installed as Governor, he, with his marines and other brave troops, defends the rock triumphantly against the surprised and infuriated Spaniards, for a siege of no less than seven months' duration. Barely has he time to repair and consolidate the defences, when the Barcelona expedition gives him an opportunity of volunteering his services to Peterborough in aid of the audacious undertaking. Lastly

ontjuic, at the head of the English troops, and once more
ing with his staunch and well-tried marines, he meets a
s death, a fitting end to so brilliant and noble a life.

suggest that the Royal Marines, in particular, should
h the remembrance of Hesse Darmstadt by all means in
power. He led them to victory in the palmy times when,
ditionary soldiers, they formed the chief portion of our
ry, and before the latter days had arrived when they were
elegated mainly to the duties of ship police.

or the capture of Barcelona, Carthage was taken, and
arines left there as garrison. Alicant was then attacked,
aptured after a gallant resistance, the marines from the
nd from Carthage constituting the principal land forces
ed. Ivica, Majorca, Toulon, Cagliari, Minorca, and
olis in Nova Scotia, all formed the scenes of joint expedi-
(successful in every case except that of Toulon), in which
arines and the navy co-operated in attacking and striking
emy.

1709, the fortress of Alicant, garrisoned chiefly by marines,
making a prolonged and devoted defence against the
ful forces of France and Spain, was obliged to succumb.

Isle of Cette, in Languedoc (1710), and Quebec (1711),
apital of the French American possessions, were next
ted by similar expeditions, in which the marines were again
ncipal troops engaged.

war of the Spanish Succession ended, in 1713, with the
of Utrecht, which confirmed the British possession of
ltar, Minorca and Nova Scotia; a reduction in the forces
took place, and all the marines were disbanded.

was not till war broke out again, or not till twenty-six years
the peace of Utrecht, that the marines were again embodied.
e year 1739, six regiments of marines were raised, each
any of the various regiments of foot-guards contributing
on-commissioned officers towards their establishment, and
tal number being about 4,800.

war which followed lasted nine years, and, for the last
was waged with both Spain and France. The first expedi-
was that of Admiral Vernon in November 1739, against
bello. Two hundred marines were engaged in the attack,
was completely successful.

1740, four battalions of marines were specially raised in
America, and formed into a regiment for the defence of
ritish American possessions. In the same year each of the

six English regiments was increased by 340 men, and four additional regiments were raised, each containing 1,155 officers and men. The total number of the ten English regiments was now 11,550.

In January 1741, the great joint expedition under Vernon and Wentworth against Carthagená was undertaken. The land forces included six English regiments of marines, and the American one of four battalions lately raised, numbering altogether probably between 8,000 and 9,000 men. There were three army regiments among the troops, and the total military force was 12,000.

Owing to the want of unanimity between the naval and military Commanders-in-Chief, the expedition ended unsuccessfully, but not till after a very severe and bloody engagement with the enemy had been fought. The soldiers having been landed, and their health and spirits having become rapidly undermined by great hardships and the bad climate, Brigadier-General Wentworth resolved to attack the Castle of St. Lazar by escalade; accordingly, before day-break on the 9th April 1741, a storming party, consisting of 500 grenadiers, led by Colonel Grant of the 5th Marines, supported by a force of 1,000 English Marines, and followed by a ladder party of American Marines, advanced against the enemy's lines. The fortifications were carried in splendid style; but the lodgment gained was not adequately secured; Colonel Grant was killed; and the troops, after sustaining a destructive fire for several hours with great intrepidity, and losing no less than 600 officers and men, were obliged to retreat, and to re-embark.

The Carthagená expedition having thus failed, the commanders resolved to proceed against St. Jago, in the island of Cuba; but here again misunderstandings between them ruined every purpose; and after several months' delay at the position taken up in the island, during which sickness made great ravages, the project was abandoned, and the island evacuated.

In these two unfortunate undertakings the English marines lost the enormous proportion of 3,346 men out of somewhat over 6,000, the number with which they commenced the operations.

In January 1742, reinforcements numbering 3,000 men, of which as many as 2,000 were marines, joined the expeditionary forces at Jamaica. Small parties were detached to act in the Bay of Honduras and in South Carolina; but no undertaking of importance was carried out this year.

In February 1743, a small expedition proceeded, under Commodore Knowles, against La Guayra, near Caracas. On board the ships were 600 marines and 400 of Dalzell's 38th Regiment. After a severe action between the ships and forts, with considerable loss on both sides, the squadron retired. The troops could not be landed on account of the heavy swell.

In April 1743, Knowles sailed for Porto Cavallo, and the troops and sailors were landed; but they re-embarked in the ships the same day, after being repulsed in an assault on some batteries, and the expedition failed.

In March of this year the French had formally declared war against us; and a force of 11,550 marines was granted by Parliament, for the year 1744, as part of the establishment of the army.

In April 1745, the French possession of Louisburg, in Cape Breton, was the object of a joint expedition, headed by Commodore Warren and Brigadier-General Pepperell, of the American Militia; and a force of 2,000 men was landed, including American levies, seamen, and 500 marines. The operations ended, after a month's siege (in which about 100 men were lost on our side), in the capitulation of Louisburg, and with it the whole dependency of Cape Breton.

The last important land-and-sea operation undertaken by Great Britain in this war, was that against L'Orient in September 1746. The expedition was under Admiral Lestock and Lieutenant-General Sinclair. It included sixteen sail of the line, eight frigates, 5,000 army troops, and a regiment of marines. The troops were landed; but after a few days' abortive operations, in which we lost some 150 men, the soldiers were re-embarked, and the expedition abandoned. The project had been badly arranged, and apparently the usual want of unity prevailed between the commanders.

The number of marines voted for the year 1747 was 11,150; but in February of this year they were placed under the command of the Admiralty, though still borne on the army establishment.

In 1748 detachments of marines took part in the expeditions (both unsuccessful) against Fort St. David in Southern India and Port Louis in Hispaniola. In June of this year the negotiations for the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle were commenced; and in November 1748 the whole of the ten regiments of marines were disbanded.

The peace lasted about seven years. In 1755 it became evident that war with France was again inevitable, and fifty companies of marines were raised on the naval establishment and placed under the direct control of the Lords of the Admiralty. The companies were formed into three divisions, and stationed at Chatham, Portsmouth, and Plymouth respectively. From this time the marines constituted a permanent branch of the naval forces: an Act was passed for their regulation while on shore, and their organisation and localisation remains to this day as then arranged.

During the Seven Years' War, which began in 1756, the marines had many opportunities of distinguishing themselves. In the joint expeditions against St. Malo, Martinique, and Belle Isle, their services are specially recorded by historians; whilst in the similar operations against Rochefort, Cherbourg, Louisbourg, Guadaloupe, Dominica, Havanna, and Manilla, it is certain that they all took part. Again, in the American Independence and revolutionary wars against France, the marines must have shared in the numerous expeditions undertaken against the French possessions all over the world during these bloody and prolonged struggles, and during those that followed, up to the Peace of 1815. But, after 1748, their history becomes so intermixed with that of the navy that it is difficult to assign them a distinctive warlike existence; for the marines became then as much an essential element in the manning of a ship of war as the seamen themselves, and they fell into the useful but anomalous position in the navy which they now occupy, a position which entails primarily, as we have already said, duties as soldiers connected with the maintenance of discipline on board ship, but, secondarily, a share in almost every operation of a sailor's life except that of going aloft.

We submit, then, that (as the badge of Gibraltar which they carry on their colours implies) the true military history of the corps lies in the incidents of the two great wars which we have specially alluded to, viz. the war of the "Spanish Succession" from 1702 to 1713, and that of what may perhaps be called the "Spanish Claim of Search," from 1739 to 1748. It is to this military history of the marines that we think reference should be made when considering the origin and object of the corps, its past achievements, and its future administration.

Before we commence our proposals regarding the organisation of the marines, it will be well to notice the rules and instruc-

tions issued by authority of Her Majesty Queen Anne on the 1st July 1702, for the better government of the marine regiments. In these it was directed "that when on shore they were to be quartered in the vicinity of the dockyards, in order to guard them from embezzlement, or *from any attempt that might be made on them by an enemy.*" The words we have underlined point in the particular direction which our remarks are now about to take.

Why, we would ask, should the spirit of these instructions not, at the present time, be carried out more completely? Why, in fact, should not the Royal Marines be treated as the branch of the service to whom should be entrusted, when on shore, the garrisoning of our coast fortresses? By this means the infantry of the line, expressly trained as they are for *field* service, but now shut up, to a great extent, in the coast fortresses of Chatham, Portsmouth, Devonport, Dover, Portland, Pembroke, Malta, Gibraltar, Bermuda, and Halifax, as portions of the garrisons of these places, would be available to be concentrated in peace-time in camps of training like that of Aldershot, and to take their part at once, when required for war, in an expeditionary or field force.

But, before everything, we would submit that the Royal Marines should, by a simple stroke of the pen (as it were), be transferred from the navy to the army; and their control, from the administration of the Admiralty to that of the War Office. They *are* soldiers; and, as a matter of course, they should be commanded and administered by soldiers. Not only would this course meet the earnest wishes of the marines themselves (so far as we are in a position to judge), but the opinions of the most accomplished officers of the navy all tend in this direction. In fact, in the navy the idea seems quite prevalent that marines acting as policemen on board ship are an anachronism. The sailors feel that they can be trusted now-a-days not to develop mutinous tendencies any more than soldiers.

Well, having the marines established now in our project as part of the infantry and artillery of the army, and entrusted with the special duties of garrisoning our defences, it may, perhaps, be thought that the name of "marines" might as well be dropped, since their maritime connections would virtually be severed. But no. In the first place, their localisation in the various fortified ports would always tend to maintain their relations with the seamen of the fleet; and in

the next place, what is to prevent them still serving, by detachments, on board Her Majesty's ships, whenever occasion should require, whether in peace or war time, *on precisely the same footing as other soldiers are when on board men-of-war, whether troopers or otherwise?*

The quartering of the marines at the various fortified ports at home and abroad would always render them ready to embark at short notice on board Her Majesty's ships. But we now come to a further development of our proposals. We would associate the garrison brigades of Royal Artillery, and the garrison companies of Royal Engineers, with the Royal Marines, in the duty of defending our fortresses; and the three branches, the marines, the garrison (or fortress) artillery, and the garrison (or fortress) engineers, would then form a *fortress service* of the army, in contradistinction to the cavalry, guards, infantry of the line, field artillery, and field companies of engineers, which would form a *field service*.

The garrison or fortress troops of the artillery and engineers would then equally with the marines (who would now form the garrison or fortress infantry), be liable to, and available for, service on board Her Majesty's ships, according as the warlike requirements of the time might demand. A cruise of a few months would not be at all an unacceptable change to the monotony of garrison life, in our foreign sea-fortresses, to most of the soldiers (and officers) quartered there; at the same time the blue jackets from the fleet would appreciate an occasional turn of duty in the forts; and the military and naval services would, by this method, become more *united*, or at one, than has ever before been the case.

The three naval arsenals of Chatham, Portsmouth, and Devonport, would still remain the head-quarters of the marine divisions, from which, detachments to the smaller home fortified ports (*e.g.* the Thames, Sheerness, Dover, Portland, Pembroke, and Queenstown), and to the foreign sea-fortresses in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, would be made. The Royal Marine Artillery would fitly join the Fortress Royal Artillery, and the inappropriate term of *light infantry* now applied to the marine infantry would be abolished.

But we have not even yet set forth fully all the changes we would make in connection with the marines. We come now to another, and perhaps the most important. It relates to the officering of the marines and of the army generally. There should, in our opinion, be only one military school for the train-

military officers.* The separation of the "Ordnance" of the army from the cavalry and infantry is in these respects absurd, and is gradually leading to dangerous consequences arising from various causes that need not here be fully dwelt upon.

Now, Sandhurst or Woolwich, whichever may be deemed desirable (we should certainly say Sandhurst for choice) one training college for all officers.† Let cadets join quite young, or (with a stiffer examination) later on, as their parents best. Let commissions be then allotted to those who pass the final examinations, giving those who choose their choice of branches of the service according to vacancies there may happen to be in these branches respectively, taking care that manners and athletic qualifications receive their due value in the apportionment of marks.

Branches to which choice would be allowed would be as

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|------------------------|---|------------------------------|
| 1. Cavalry. | } | Field service. |
| 2. Infantry. | | |
| 3. Field Artillery. | | |
| 4. Engineers. | } | Field and Fortress Services. |
| 5. Marines. | | |
| 6. Fortress Artillery. | } | Fortress Service. |

Regarding the engineers, it would be for the authorities of the service, after officers had completed their *curriculum* at Sandhurst, to allot permanently (according to ability and capacity) each officer to either field or fortress, to which each officer should be

It may be observed here that the method of bestowing commissions in the artillery and engineers now in force at Woolwich is not strictly fair. Let us submit an instance of its working. Suppose that at a particular examination at our new College there shall be 54 vacancies in the service generally, located as follows—Cavalry, 3; infantry, 20; field artillery, 7; engineers, 10; fortress artillery, 9. The first three men on the selection list have the pick of the whole service; the next five have a certain choice of everything except cavalry; and so on. In no one branch tends in any way to detract good men from the other branches. All the cadets have their choice, con-

sidering the days of the great East India Company, Addiscombe was their sole training college for all branches of the service.

The economy of keeping up only one college and one staff of professors is self-evident.

sistently with the nature of the vacancies and with the carrying out of the principle, "first come first served." If the first 49 out of the 54 candidates choose to avoid engineers, the last five must take them : or if the first five out of the 54 choose engineers, the remaining 49 must necessarily choose some other branch.

The last point to be adverted to is that connected with recruiting and organisation. We would strongly advise that the arrangements now in force in the Royal Marines should be retained when they should be placed on their new footing. And especially would we advocate this conservative policy at a time when the recruiting for the army generally is falling off so palpably. It has sometimes exercised the present writer to imagine why steps have never been taken to increase the numbers of the Royal Marines whenever those of the regular army have fallen materially short ; for soldiers are soldiers, whether they be borne on the army or on the navy estimates. There never seems to have been any difficulty in recruiting the marines. Is it not indeed quite a popular service in certain districts ?

It is evident that the result of carrying out the ideas herein sketched out would be a reduction in the numbers of the infantry of the line, and a corresponding increase in those of the Royal Marines. But the *cadres* of the former need not be interfered with ; and the opportunity might perhaps be taken of sweeping away the thoroughly useless and inefficient brigade depôts and regimental district-recruiting organisations, of simply quartering the home battalions of the various regiments in the new brigade depôt barracks lately built, and of making these battalions (by introducing a system that shall give every officer and man in them an *interest* in the matter) the fountains and depôts for future recruiting.

Although the marines would now form a portion of the military forces of the country, it by no means follows that their cost should be transposed to the army estimates. On the contrary, the expenses of the whole of the fortress service of the army, and a great portion of the cost of maintenance of the coast fortresses (which are primarily naval bases), should, in our opinion, be borne by the Navy Estimates ; but this consideration opens up a large question which is not strictly within the scope of this paper.

The troops of the fortress service would be held especially available for duty in *joint expeditions* and at sieges of an enemy's coast fortresses. Whether these soldiers, or local corps, or

ombination of the two, should garrison the colonial and
ian fortified ports, such as Port Royal, Bridgetown, Cape
rn, Simon's Bay, Port Louis (Mauritius), Colombo, Bombay,
n, Singapore, and Hong Kong, is a question that might be
ermined hereafter. The writer would be inclined to suggest
t Gibraltar, Malta, Bermuda, and Halifax, should be the
y foreign fortified ports at which in peace time fortress troops
uld (as a rule) be liable for duty. Under these circumstances
; fortress service would be a by no means unpopular one
her with officers or with men. At the same time, the troops
the field service would probably be able to look forward to a
; far distant time when India would be their sole foreign
tion in time of peace.

The future of the Royal Marines seems a question of the
most importance both to the army and to the navy. At
sent the corps numbers some 12,000 men, who are on all
ids allowed to be the cream of the army. They are greatly
ated as soldiers; whereas in the amphibious position they
r hold, their energies are cramped, they are overshadowed by
l naval traditions, and they are more or less dissatisfied.

Let the proud position the marines won for themselves with
sse-Darmstadt be restored to them; let them, for all time,
end the stronghold that their valour then secured to us;
l let them form the nucleus and foundation of a new and well
ised fortress service.



Indian Districts during the Revolt.

BY H. G. KEENE, C.I.E.

XIV.

THE province of Rohelkhand, or Rohilkund, as more commonly spelt, was (in the North-Western Provinces) the one in which British power was most completely overthrown. It will not, therefore, present materials for the treatment hitherto pursued. Instead of the narratives of administration more or less maintained, and expedients, often successful, to cope with the disorganisation consequent on the evil deeds of the sepoys and the temporary paralysis of lawful authority, we have now to deal with reports of disaster unretrieved, murder unavenged, attempts at flight, hiding, escape, or—at most—successful adventure.

This sub-province—bounded on the west and south by the Ganges, on the north by the sub-Himalayan range, on the east by Oudh—constituted a civil division containing six districts, besides the protected state of Rámpur; it comprised over eleven thousand square miles, and the population was over five millions, of whom the majority were Hindus, a considerable minority being Muhamadans, mostly Pathans descended from Afghan military colonists. The past history of the country is peculiar, and has been more prominently brought before the general reader than that of most parts of India. In the decay of the great Mughul empire of the middle ages it was occupied by Afghan military adventurers, who subdued, without exterminating, the Hindu population, and established a semi-independent principality under a dynasty of their own. In the last half of the eighteenth century, this family being represented by a minor, power devolved upon his guardian, Rahmat Khán—known by his title of “Háfiz,” or Protector. The land, being fertile and lying on the borders of Audh (or Oude), attracted the attention of its neighbours. In 1773, when the Mahrattas

for the time expelled from Hindustan, the Nawáb of who was titular Vazir of the empire, obtained from the Dehli sanction to chastise the Rohillas, who had been ag with the Mahrattas, and to occupy the country. The ruler, Warren Hastings, agreed to assist, a proceeding h he was severely censured ; his conduct formed part of liamentary impeachment of which Mr. Hastings was ds the object, but the count was not sustained. In work* I have attempted to show that the verdict was a e, in spite of the unfavourable opinion so strongly d by Macaulay in his famous *Essay*. Be that as it e resistance of the Rohillas was overcome at the battle a † (23rd April 1774), where the Protector was slain. e conquest under Lake, Rohilcund fell, with the rest of an, into the hands of the British, and became part of : now called the North-West Provinces.

57 Rohilcund was (as it is still, indeed) a Division, or sionership, consisting of six districts, which were called, rely, Philibhit, Morádábád, Bijnaur, Bareli (or Bareilly), and Shahjahanpur. [There was a small *enclave* of in- nt territory held by the Nuwáb of Rámpur, a descendant ld reigning family of Rohillas.] The first was a forest the foot of the Kamaon hills, and the events there call articular remark. Bijnaur was held for a time, and force abandoned, by the magistrate of the district, Mr. A. ear (*vide* Malleeson, vol. iii. p. 400 ff., for an interesting of the interregnum that ensued). Badaon also ejected h chief, Mr. William Edwards, whose escape has been at in treating of events at Farukhábad. Of the doings vil officers at the other three we have pretty full accounts, an epitome may be here given.

district of Morádábád the senior officer was the judge, erwards Sir) John Cracroft Wilson, of whose energetic r a description was given in the chapter on events in The other officers were Mr. C. B. Saunders (subsequently at Haidarábád), district magistrate, and Mr. J. S. Camp- ther of Sir G. Campbell, M.P., and afterwards Judge of f Court of the Punjab). As these officers were not only lower standing in the service, but also devoid of his local knowledge and experience, the Judge volunteered

* *the Mughul Empire*, 111 ff.

anpur Kattrá, the scene of another action in 1857, where his grandson ad.

the direction of affairs, an offer which was at once accepted by the Government of Agra. His first step was to ride over to Rámpur and endeavour to enlist the sympathies of the chiefs of that small state on the British side. This was on the 14th of May. On the 18th, hearing that a party of mutineers was approaching from the westward, Wilson went out to attack them with some troopers, who had come to their homes in the district on furlough, and a detachment of the 29th Native Infantry, of which the head-quarters were stationed at Morádábád. The troopers behaved well, and a number of prisoners were taken, with cash in their possession, who turned out to belong to the 20th Native Infantry, a detachment that had mutinied—as already related—at Muzafarnagar. Next morning, the force having gone back to Morádábád, some more mutineers were seized in that station, and one of them was shot by a man of the 29th. Unhappily, the dead man proved to be brother to another of the 29th, and on this becoming known some men of that corps—who had doubtless been already tampered with and prepared for mutiny—hurried to the jail where the prisoners were confined. With the connivance of the guard they threw open the jail, releasing all the convicts, of whatever class. Wilson mounted his horse and went to the spot, accompanied by some military officers; but, finding the task beyond the strength of his party, turned round and galloped off to a neighbouring garden where there was a body of the Nuwáb's cavalry encamped. Here he was refused assistance in insolent terms; but, not to be baulked, he next hastened to the lines of the 29th, where he found that the adjutant of the regiment had already gone after the convicts with a party of faithful sepoys. Having persuaded a non-commissioned officer to follow him with a few men, Wilson pursued and captured some of the convicts, having been in the pursuit at one moment surrounded and obliged to shoot three of them in self-defence. Some villagers came to the spot on hearing the firing, and with their aid nine more were secured. Altogether, including captures made by the adjutant, the officers had recaptured no less than 150 of the escaped prisoners. That day the ladies took refuge in the Court-house and in another building, where they were resolutely guarded by the native head of the Collector's office (Jawád Ali), who stood sentry over the door with a drawn sword. In the afternoon the Rámpur cavalry were reported by their native commandant to be in a state of insubordination amounting to mutiny; and a parade of the Company's troops in undress was ordered for 5 P.M. At that

hour the Judge proceeded, purposing to address the men, and rode up to the guns which were pointed at him, the artillerymen standing by them with lighted portfires. Overawed by his bold bearing, they let him pass without firing. The British officers joined him here ; but the sepoy had not paraded as ordered. Being allowed to provide themselves with ball-cartridge, however, and assured that no treachery was meant, they at length emerged from their huts, and assembled on the parade-ground. A hollow square having been formed, Mr. Wilson delivered his harangue, concluding by swearing upon the Bible that he would use his influence with the Governor-General to pardon the past offences. The men took an oath of fidelity in turn ; confidence was restored ; and a general feeling ensued that all was safe for the time. Next day the native officers busied themselves in soothing the men, a party of whom followed Lieutenant Clifford and a party of troopers in punishing some Gujars of a village eight miles off, who had opened prematurely the campaign of plunder.

On the 21st a mob from Rámpur advanced on Morádábád flying the green flag of martyrdom, and led by a policeman of that city dressed in green, in token of being a soldier of the Crescent. Wilson went out to meet them at the bridge of boats, accompanied by some troopers and a party of the 29th, under Captain Faddy, of that regiment. The leader and a dozen others were arrested, and the rest fled ; but the prisoners were handed over to the Rámpur authorities on the following day. The next ten days were signalised by minor adventures and expeditions, in some of which the 29th men showed a good spirit, and not a day passed without the untiring Judge going to their lines and conversing with the native officers and men.

But the fact was that all these exertions were in vain. With the exception, possibly, of Sikh and Gurkha corps, every regiment in the Bengal army had long since been inoculated with the virus ; and on the 1st of June rumours became current that the brigade at Bareilly had mutinied *en masse*. It soon became certain that the 29th would follow the example, and the civil officers attempted to remove the treasure. While loading it on tumbrils they were guarded with wonderful fidelity by two native officers, who at length interposed their own bodies between the Judge and the Collector on one side and the loaded muskets levelled at them on the other. The officers, civil and military, then thought, and thought rightly, that they had done all in their power. A little after 3 o'clock, in a blazing sun, four English officers, four ladies, and a discharged British gunner,

set off on their forlorn march to Meerut, attended by twenty-five troopers of the 8th Irregular Cavalry and some of the furlough men. On the road they met with much kindness. "Tears were shed, and milk was offered by villagers while we waited at their village" for the officers of the 29th, who never appeared. On the bridge at Garhmukteswar the refugees were met by Mr. Fleetwood Williams; and about 5 o'clock in the morning of Friday, June 5th, they reached Meerut. Here the British refugees were hospitably received by their companions in misfortune, while the faithful horsemen of their escort were promoted on the spot by the general commanding the division.

Thus ends the narrative of the mutiny at Morádábád, and of the attempts made by civil officers to check or retard it. For some time to come Mr. Wilson and his troopers were occupied in collecting revenue and keeping the peace on the eastern side of the Meerut district, separated from Rohilcund by the river Ganges, as already related in our chapter dealing with events in that district. It was not till towards the end of October that he was again engaged in the affairs of Rohilcund.

In the meantime, we may turn to see what had been going on at Bareilly, the chief town of the division. Here were posted Messrs. Robert Alexander, the Commissioner (an accomplished gentleman of good Irish family), G. D. Raikes and D. Robertson, Judges; J. Guthrie, district magistrate; G. B. Paasley, joint magistrate—all of the Civil Service; Drs. Hay (civil surgeon) and Hansborough (superintendent of jail), with Dr. Buch (Principal of college), and several minor officials. The force (consisting of half a battery of field artillery, the 8th Irregular Cavalry, the 18th and 68th Regiments Bengal Native Infantry), formed a brigade commanded by Brigadier Sibbald, C.B. There were also a number of clerks and European tradesmen. The ladies and children were sent to Naini Tál, in the Kamaon hills, on the receipt of news of the Meerut mutiny and massacre; on the 31st May the infantry and artillery broke loose from the control of their officers, but the cavalry were still considered staunch. Indeed, in the earlier days of the Mutiny, it was generally thought that the "Irregulars" would escape the contagion. And this particular corps had borne privation and done good service in the Burmese war, four years earlier. It will be seen that those who remained true vindicated these expectations by the most faithful and valiant conduct. Mr. Alexander had done what he could to keep the people of the city quiet, but a number of the Muslim citizens were evidently in an excited

and untrustworthy condition; the landlord of a township called Kiára, in the immediate vicinity, combined with them, though a Hindu. A grandson of the ill-starred "Protector," of the last century—Khán Bahádur Khán—professed to second the Commissioner's exertions; and a Maulvi attached to the College delivered a discourse at the Mosque, showing that it was unlawful to rebel against the Government. But on the 30th May Khán Bahádur had an interview with Mr. Alexander, in which he candidly declared that "the case was hopeless"; and, taking his hand, said, "Provide for your own safety." When, therefore, on the morrow, the news of the mutiny was known, it found Mr. Alexander to some extent prepared. Though ailing at the time, he contrived to mount his horse and ride to a pre-concerted rendezvous, in the cavalry lines; and there he met Colonel Colin Troup, who, in the absence of the Brigadier, proposed that all present should ride with him across country in the direction of Naini Tal. Mr. Guthrie, the Magistrate, however, preferred to remain with Lieutenant Mackenzie, of the 8th, and try the effect of one charge with the cavalry. The attempt failed, and then they followed the rest of the fugitives, accompanied by twenty-five good and faithful horsemen, almost all native officers. They did not loiter long on the road, reaching Naini Tal on the morning of the 1st, say seventy-five miles in about twenty-four hours. The station, civil and military, was at once given up to rapine, arson, and murder. Messrs. Robertson, Hay, and R. Orr (the last an uncovenanted deputy-collector), took refuge in the house of a Muhamadan sub-judge, where they were murdered by ruffians of the town. A like fate overtook Messrs. Raikes and Buch. Dr. Hansborough defended his jail till it was broken; he managed to conceal himself during the night, but was taken in the morning and brought before Khán Bahádur, by whose sentence he was put to death. This forms an indelible stain on Khán Bahádur's career. The officers of the 18th Native Infantry were spared by their men, but some afterwards fell slaughtered in a village; others were protected and eventually rescued. The Brigadier was shot by his orderly as he was riding to the cavalry lines. Lieutenant Tucker, of the 68th, was slaughtered by his own men as he was mounting his horse in front of the officers' mess-house. An Irish lunatic, named Healy, appears to have been the only white man who was spared; he was discovered in confinement when Bareilly was re-occupied by Sir Colin Campbell a year later. Altogether, some thirty-five adults were slain in cold blood, besides an almost equal number of

children. It is no imputation upon Messrs. Alexander and Guthrie to say that all this crime and suffering might have been diminished, if not entirely avoided, had the place been in charge of a Wilson or a Gubbins. Such men are exceptional; Mr. Alexander, though in bad health and deceived by his native advisers, took all ordinary measures; but the non-official community omitted to send away their families while it was yet possible, or to repair to the appointed rendezvous themselves in good time, and the military officers fell at their proper posts in the discharge of their duty. Still, it can hardly be said that all possible precautions were taken; and the events at Bareilly are not among the most creditable occurrences of the time. The fact is that the events of the time were so startling that no one who was an eye-witness would think of judging severely officers who, in a position of responsibility, were taken by surprise or thrown off their balance. Men not bred to war—cradled, indeed, in a long and profound peace; used to the most complete and obsequious deference from all by whom they were surrounded; suddenly assailed by forces on which they had never reckoned, and which they were wholly without the means of appreciating or resisting.

The departure of the authorities from Bareilly was clearly unavoidable in the circumstances; they were not blamed; and Mr. Alexander ultimately obtained the 3rd class Order of the Bath.

Khán Bahádúr assumed the reins of power, a native officer named Bakht Khán becoming commander of the troops. Many Hindus of distinction joined them at first, the remainder bowed to the blast. The district fell into total anarchy; the people (as Mr. J. Inglis, the writer of the principal *Narrative* relates), "at once rose, not so much in rebellion against the British as against all government; every man" (it is the old story) "prepared to wreak his vengeance on his private foe, or take violent possession of land to which he considered himself to have a claim." A Hindu, named Sobha Rám, who had served in the British Commissariat, was appointed *Diwán* (finance commissioner) of the district; other officials, Hindu and Musalmán, were appointed to various posts; the bankers suspected of pro-British sympathies were tortured and despoiled of their money; on the 11th June the sepoys left for Dehli, under Bakht Khán; an income-tax and property-tax of 10 per cent. was imposed; a semblance of authority was established, which, however, did not extend far beyond the confines of the town. Measures were taken to secure the co-operation of the Thákurs (leaders of the

Rájput clans), and several of them tendered their allegiance with the usual propitiatory gifts. The British, under Colonel Ramsay, continued to hold the Kamaon hills and to defend Naini Tál against all comers.

XV.

Let us now turn to the adjoining district of Sháhjahánpur, where equally tragic events, if on a smaller scale, had been going forward. On the 17th May Mr. Bramly—whom we have seen doing good service in connection with Aligarh—made over charge of the district to Mr. Mordaunt Ricketts, a fatal, if unavoidable, instance of “swopping horses while crossing a stream.” Mr. Ricketts was a man of chivalrous courage and romantic character ; but he had no local knowledge or influence, and could only adopt the ordinary precautionary measures. The 28th Native Infantry was the corps present, and the officers believed that about five hundred of the men, of whom 150 were Sikhs, might be trusted to remain faithful if the remainder were to rebel. On the 31st May—the day of the Bareilly mutiny, and the date believed to have been fixed on by the conspirators for the general insurrection, had not events been precipitated at Meerut—the regiment broke out. The English were at church, the day being Sunday. A small party of the worse characters among the sepoys went to the building, and rushed in, armed with swords and clubs. Ricketts was at once cut down, the ladies climbed into the belfry. Some other officers were shot in escaping, or near the lines. But the residue were rescued, for the time, by the better-disposed sepoys, and held a council as to their best future course. As the bungalows of the station were by this time in a blaze, it was decided by the next senior officer, Mr. Charles Jenkins, that the non-combatants should be at once escorted to Powain, the fort of a neighbouring native nobleman, who, however, refused (from mere timidity) to take them in. This was the same chief who, in a later stage of affairs, assumed courage to kill the celebrated “Maulvi ” of Oude. They accordingly passed on to the civil station of Muhamdi, not far off, where they were hospitably received by the district-officer, Mr. Thomason. Twelve officers, a sergeant, seven ladies, and two children, reached Muhamdi on the morning of the 2nd June. All, I believe, were ultimately slaughtered. Mr. A. Smith, the Assistant-Magistrate, was left behind sick, and was at once murdered by the mutineers. They then proceeded to Rossa, the sugar-factory of Messrs. Carew, which they

plundered and burned. The gentlemen in charge of the property escaped with their lives, but afterwards perished in the Oude jungles. Seven Europeans in all had been murdered in the first outbreak; some well-disposed Muslims gave the bodies decent sepulture in the church-yard. The *déchéance* of the British Government was proclaimed, and the usual efforts were made to create a native administration, under a local chief, the Nawáb Ghulám Kádir Khán. The remainder of the official *Narrative* is devoted to a description of this interregnum, and to the characterisation of the numerous faithful natives (official and non-official) who continued to correspond with the Commissioner at Naini Tal; it is observable that of all these only one took service, even ostensibly, under the rebel administration. It lasted until the 30th April 1858; adopting—so far as possible—the methods, and even the phraseology, of the British system, which was restored without difficulty after the rebels had been driven out. This restoration took place on the 2nd of May.

Meanwhile, affairs in Bareilly had gone from bad to worse. The Hindu leaders chafed under the rule of the Patháns (so are the Indian Afgháns named), and Khán Bahádúr found himself obliged to raise a considerable army, which ultimately rose to twenty-nine battalions and forty-four squadrons. These quarrels, and the continued reports of British successes in the surrounding districts, caused constant trouble at Bareilly and elsewhere in Rohilkund; while the unmolested presence and occasional resistance of a large party of British at Naini Tal, under the Commissioner, Colonel (now Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir) H. Ramsay, acted as a perpetual menace and thorn-in-the-side. On the morning of the 2nd October it was determined to make a display, and an attempt to recover lost prestige. Under pretence of having received a patent with a dress of honour from the rebel Court at Dehli, Khán Bahádúr held a solemn *durbár*. But it was a festival of Herod. Attended by his ministers, in gala costume, mounted on elephants, and followed by a shouting rabble, the usurper proceeded, gorgeously appareled, to a garden near the town, where preparations had been made for the solemnity. After his investiture a royal salute was fired; and then a messenger from Dehli, stepping softly behind the great man, whispered in his ear that the rebel head-quarters there had been stormed by the British, and that the king—his sovereign of honour—was a captive in their hands. Turning as pale as his complexion would permit, Khán Bahádúr rose and left

the assembly; nor did he ever after take part in public civil proceedings.

About this time authentic intelligence began to reach Wilson, on the further side of the Ganges, of the presence of Christian refugees of various classes and of both sexes in the villages of Rohilcund. In the beginning of October, he and his faithful followers (of the 8th Irregular Cavalry) had allowed themselves a fortnight to rest. On the morning of the 20th, being at Aligarh with Mr. Bramly, he opened a letter brought over by a couple of native messengers, addressed to the Chief Civil Officer at Meerut. It proved to be from Captain J. Y. Gowan, and contained "a touching appeal for the rescue of himself and thirty other Christians, survivors of the Bareilly massacre," and now concealed at a village near to the town of Kattrā (the scene of Hāfiz Rahmat Khān's defeat and death in the last century). Sending word to the Chief Commissioner at Agra, Mr. Wilson left a note for Gowan (written in the Greek character) with Mr. Bramly, which the latter promised to send on to Gowan with the Chief Commissioner's reply, when it arrived from Agra. The purpose of Wilson's note was to inform Gowan that, whatever might be the decision of the Government, he (Wilson) would surely be at a certain ford on the 28th, prepared to rescue the refugees. When the Chief Commissioner's answer arrived, one of the messengers took it, with Wilson's enclosed, to the village where Gowan and some six of his companions, adults and infants, were awaiting his return—with what anxiety may be partly imagined. When the envelope was hastily opened, nothing at first appeared but a precept from the Government offering a reward of ten thousand rupees "to any native who would escort in safety to Aligarh all the Christian refugees now lying concealed in Rohilcund." This was cold comfort; and Gowan, with sinking heart, was in the act of destroying the envelope when he felt the enclosure and read Wilson's Greek note. Great as had been his disappointment was the consequent reaction. It is on record that the seven forlorn creatures, who felt that they had passed from death into life, fell simultaneously upon their knees in the shed where they were lurking, and offered their tribute of pious thanks to the Almighty; and a historical painter could hardly desire a more pathetic subject for his art. Hastening, then, to his earthly protectors, the native villagers, Gowan consulted with them; and the result of the consultation was the despatch of a second letter, written in Greek like that to which it was a reply,

and fixing another *rendezvous* for the 29th—the earliest date, as it would seem, on which he could come down with his company to the river-side. Wilson received this note at 7 P.M. of the 28th. In another hour he had started with 100 horsemen and four fast elephants; and the native officer, Buland Khán, was the only person to whom the secret of their destination was confided. It was a service of danger; Khán Bahádur had some five thousand men in the neighbourhood (some of whom soon afterwards fought only too well!), but Wilson secured the boats at the ford of Kuchla (the first that he had named to Gowan), amused the enemy with feints, and then, marching in the cold autumn night thirty miles down the river, reached the place where he expected the refugees, only to meet with fresh disappointment. To cut a long story short, Wilson reached the fort of Kádírganj early on the morning of the 31st, got a breakfast out of the “Nawáb” (as the man in charge called himself), by a mixture of boldness and conciliation, and had the pleasure soon after of receiving a cart, escorted by matchlockmen, and containing Gowan, with Sergeant and Mrs. Belcham, and their children. The good native officer, Buland Khán, when he saw the children, turned aside to hide his tears, and muttered, “And these are the darlings whom those infidels seek to murder—God’s curse on them!” On the 2nd November Wilson’s party marched with them into Aligarh, and the following morning brought them safely into Meerut. This is only one specimen of the wisdom and courage of this truly remarkable man, whose humanity was only equalled by his energy. First and last, Mr. Wilson was instrumental in rescuing sixty-four Christian refugees in Rohilkund; and surely, of all the gallant “Cucherry Hussars” of the time, none better deserved the honours that he received, or the subsequent prosperity that awaited him in his long retirement in New Zealand. The behaviour of his followers was excellent; and he lived for months among them, speaking Persian and Hindustani, and wearing the dress and accoutrements of a native officer. He told a tale of his meeting Mr. Cocks in this disguise, which showed a vein of humour. On another occasion he rode up just in time to prevent his men being attacked by the daring Paterson Saunders, who mistook them for mutineers. Gowan also did good work through the winter campaign. It was not till May that Wilson returned to Morádábád, which he had left as a fugitive nearly twelve months before; when he did return he was accompanied by Captain Gowan, and by Sergeant Belcham,

promoted to Sergeant-Major. Khán Bahádur and his *Diwán* made good their escape, and—so far as I am aware—were never again authentically heard of.

It only remains to state briefly what was the state of popular feeling in Rohilcund at the time. It is Mr. Alexander's deliberate opinion that, neither from fact, document, or oral testimony, can it be inferred that there had been, out of the lines of the regiments, any organised conspiracy for the overthrow of the existing Government, or the establishment of one to take its place. The nature of the administration that ensued aids—in his opinion—to disprove the idea of any pre-existing plot; though there might be deemed to be something suspicious about the early adhesion of the Hindu landholders. But it is quite certain that many Hindus—especially among the moneyed interest—held aloof from the first, and of the rest a good number soon fell away. No early communication with Dehli was traced, as would have been surely the case if the rising, as a political movement, had been pre-concerted; though after Khán Bahádur's usurpation had been consummated, he naturally aspired to the sanction of "Imperial" patronage and countenance.

Furthermore, both among Muslims and Hindus, there were not wanting many who preserved their fidelity under the most searching trials. Thus, Badr-ud-Din, the *Kotwál*, or Head Inspector of Bareilly, Amir Ali, and Zakaria Khán, of the Revenue Department, Abdullah Khán, *Kotwál* of Philibhit, and a few native subordinates, accompanied their European officers to Naini Tál, and remained there with them, at considerable personal inconvenience to themselves, till the restoration of order in May 1858. Four other native officials remained in their districts, doing such service as was possible; like the former group they were all Muslims. Among non-official natives who either actively assisted the Government, or at least did not assist the rebels, the Commissioner mentions seven prominent Hindus and a Muhamadan. Of the first three (Rajput landholders of Bijnaur district) he says that they "displayed valiant deeds against the common enemy"; adding that "all their strength, and all their pecuniary resources, were put forth to aid the Government and re-establish order"; when unsuccessful two of them retired beyond the Ganges, the third falling into the hands of the rebels.

Others, it should be added, kept up a correspondence with the Commissioner at Naini Tál; and, though they may have been somewhat in the position of trimmers, it must be remembered

that the mere act of writing to the British authorities at such a time was one of considerable danger, and if discovered would have cost them their lives.

XVI.

And this brings me to the conclusion of my task. I have not thought it necessary to trace the doings of the civil officers beyond the confines of Hindustán Proper—or the North-West Provinces—of which alone I have personal knowledge, and in regard to which there are full civil official *Narratives* forthcoming. But I hope the reader will pardon me if—seeing that it was here that the revolt arose, and had its focus—I add a few words as to the probable origin of this great disaster. Frequent allusions have been made in the course of our narrative to discontents arising from the transfer of landed property under decrees of Court. But this painful consequence of civilisation would never by itself cause a general rebellion; so long, at least, as the Government was strong. We have seen Mr. Alexander's opinion as to the absence of evidence in respect of a general, pre-arranged, national rising; and we have, I think, had reason, in studying the other narratives, to concur in his view. Had there been such a wide-spread and well-organised plot, it would seem that one of two things must have occurred. Either those loyal tribes, and chiefs, who afterwards held aloof from the revolt or actively joined in its suppression, would have given information to the authorities when they were tampered with; or else (if we are to suppose that they were left out) the conspirators and their emissaries must have acted with superhuman wisdom and vigilance in selecting those on whom they practised, and in keeping back all knowledge of what was going on from those they could not bring themselves to trust. On the other hand, general as was the indiscipline and high the prætorian spirit among the native soldiers, the support that they immediately received at places like Dehli and Cawnpore leads me (in my individual capacity) to believe that political discontent, and even political incendiarism, must have had a considerable share in causing the outbreak. I do not say that I am supported by conclusive authority; but it is my own humble though unhesitating opinion that Azimulla, the Nāna's Secretary, returned from Europe in 1856 with a readiness to rebel, founded on a belief in the weakness of Britain, and the will and desire of Russia to use the Persian trouble as a stepping-stone to an attack on British India. That he fell into communication with Queen Zinat of

Dehli, of whose discontents I had some personal knowledge when serving under Mr. Simon Fraser in the Dehli territory in 1854. That the scheme of restoring the Mughal Empire with Mahratta agency (the *status quo ante* preceding British conquest) about this time occurred to the Queen and to others. And that they saw, in the disorderly and contumacious spirit that had long been growing in the Bengal army, a stock of explosive matter. Lastly, that they found, in the greased cartridges, the spark of fire wherewith to ignite the mine that, as they hoped, was to blow into the air all that obstructed the execution of their designs.

It was certainly, to change the metaphor, a most unhappy coincidence that, while the germs of political discontent were thus fermenting at Dehli, stimulated by events in the Crimea and in Persia, there should have been such a nidus for the reception of the poison as was presented by the condition of the Bengal army. It was at one time thought that religious fanaticism contributed another unhappy factor to the general confusion; and of this there may be some evidence, but it is neither abundant nor strong. That there was anything like a universal fear of Christianity being propagated by force may be fairly doubted. The missionaries were not just then making unusual efforts, nor was the Government giving them any unusual countenance or aid. Their schools, in which the study of the Bible was imperative, were attended as willingly as were the Governmental schools from which the Bible was excluded. But there was one religion, warmly acknowledged wherever the system of caste existed; the worship of "the Almighty Rupee." Men whose neglect of ritual observances had led to their excommunication were heavily fined on re-admission to the intercourse of their respective brotherhoods: and an all-powerful Government could always expose its troops to these penalties. More than a generation had elapsed since a sort of passive mutiny due to that cause had been violently extinguished and quenched in blood at Barrackpore: yet the Government had continued to tamper with the caste-rules of their native soldiery, and, by so doing, to render them liable to social penalties. Again, the religion of the rupee had been attacked in another way by recent reforms of the pension-establishment; stringent rules having been issued for the guidance of invaliding committees whereby the pensions that the sepoys had been accustomed to consider secured to length of service were withheld until the applicant could produce

a medical certificate of not being able to stand up under his arms. This might relieve the pension-list, but could it have a good effect either on those in the service or on their friends outside? Then there was the annexation of Oude, the home of so many of the sepoy; whereby not only was a shock given to the public conscience but also to the prestige of the native soldier. The profligacy and maladministration of the Court of Oude might be distressing to ideas of official purity derived from a different form of civilisation; but people might well ask whether such considerations necessarily led to the exile of a friendly prince and the sequestration of the whole revenues of his principality—a principality which we had ourselves erected into a kingdom. It was felt by others than natives that a less arbitrary and less revolutionary measure might have secured the welfare of the people of Oude. Those among them who were connected with the army were absolutely injured by the annexation; for they lost privileges which they had hitherto enjoyed as servants of the paramount power domiciled in a tributary state.* Nor were these the only causes of discontent: innumerable faults had weakened the military system. The regiments were in a high state of pipe-clay, but they were too much alike. It may be an objection to organising an army in corps of different races and creeds that they will show jealousies and create disturbances when cantoned or brigaded together; but the opposite evil was now seen to be far greater. When (with the sole exception of a few non-Hindustanis in distinct corps, none of which joined the revolt) you had Sikhs, Pathans, and Hindustanis blended together in equal proportions in all corps, the Bengal Infantry resembled a country in which the same strata pervaded the whole structure of the land. A connection of comradeship was substituted for the dissidences of blood and belief; the shock of a convulsion once communicated ran through the whole body in which the new solidarity prevailed. Further, the commandants had lost their free scope of action, and with it their hold over their men; centralisation had brought its procrustean uniformity, its dead-level of mechanical mediocrity. A battalion's appearance in peace was taken as a sign of its efficiency for war; the colonel was saved the trouble of originality by a code of the minutest regulations; corporal punishment was abolished for the sepoy, though they were paraded to see their white comrades flogged; the sentence of a regimental court-martial was liable to probable

* It should be noted that in Oude—though in Oude only—the rising was both national and universal, and inspired by a really patriot spirit.

reversal on appeal or reference; the younger English officers were sometimes spoken of as "the refuse," when they were really disappointed men, rotting in undesired idleness, because they had nothing to do in their regiments, and wanted the interest requisite to the obtaining of staff-employ.* That they were not intrinsically bad material, may be inferred from the good service performed by their contemporaries who obtained civil preferment or were attached to the staff of the army, and from the universal courage and confidence in their men that they themselves showed at a time when confidence had ceased to be well-founded or courage to be of use. But that could not be a good system which taught a young man, on entering the ranks of the army, to make it his constant object to get away from them, and which led him to regard his regiment as a place of punishment,† and to look upon his native comrades as the instruments of his torture; while, in the meantime, the fortunate emancipated ones were kept free from military duties till they almost changed their nature, and then, on promotion, returned to their corps, which they were to manage without power, and lead without experience.

Given these conditions, can we wonder at the result? They may be thus summarised:—

1st. A body of pampered mercenaries, over-disciplined, wrongly enregimented, threatened in their caste, their privileges, their pensions.

2nd. Inefficiency of regimental officers, combined with a starved military administration. For example, the means of transport had been abolished for a saving of seventy thousand rupees per annum. The consequence was seen when it took the head-quarters a month to get from Ambála to Dehli after the outbreak in May.

3rd. Weakened confidence in British probity. This affected all classes at the time—some less, some more.

The Native Army, in this state of demoralisation, would form a fit subject for treasonable tampering on the part of friends of the dethroned King of Oude and the threatened family of Dehli. A day fixed for a rising—Mr. Wilson, in his intercourse with the soldiery, learned that the 31st of May had been the day originally determined—imperfectly concerted plans; action pre-

* It should here be noted that Halleybury students who failed to qualify for the Civil Service, were usually sent out to India as military officers.

† Regimental employ was actually so used in the case of officers whose offences were not considered heinous enough to require trial by court-martial.

precipitated by injudicious conduct (over-ruled by Britain's fortune to a happy result); such seem sufficient causes to account for the origin of the great rebellion.

Most, if not all, of the evils and dangers above signalised, have now been removed; and the suggestions here made may perhaps seem to deserve to be consigned to the category of post-eventual wisdom. I may, however, add that many civil officers of those days were aware of the unsatisfactory state of things in the Bengal Army; and that the above statements are taken, with but trifling alterations, from a letter which the present writer addressed to a friend in England on the 6th June 1857. His excuse for reproducing them here is that, so far as he is informed, the truths that they may contain ought never to be lost sight of nor forgotten. The love of uniformity and paper-symmetry will never be banished from the average official mind. All sorts of financial mirage will always tempt rulers thirsting for money to make a show with. But the great need of public life, without which the devotion of civil administrators loses half its effect, will always be—in one word—Discipline. And this is the one thing that the average official mind is too prone to sacrifice.

Let a final remark be permitted as to the effect of that much-debated institution, the system, so-called, of Caste:—

Among other difficulties attending the scheme, if such there was, for taking advantage of the temporary weakness of Government to promote a general rising of the country, must be noticed the extraordinary absence of solidarity in a land peopled, like India, by discordant tribes. What is generally known as "the system of caste" must, no doubt, have the effect of hampering any united effort for national independence. Indeed, a vast region so inhabited can hardly be called "a country," so as to be conceived of as animated by a spirit of common patriotism. What takes that form in other parts of the world, will be here split up and represented by a hundred or a thousand displays of what the natives call "brotherhood." That spirit, arising out of the archaic Aryan institution of the Corporate Family, causes the members of each tribe to feel as if they were all of kin, and will also lead to a feeling of smouldering but real hostility against every other tribe, and thus prevent effective combination.

On the other hand, it must be allowed that this spirit sometimes acted unfavourably on the efforts of the Government to maintain order. The native officials often tried to do their duty.

But they could not combine for administrative purposes as did their British colleagues. This has been lately pointed out by an Anglo-Indian settler who has been contributing some papers to the *Pioneer*, an excellent local journal. It is conclusively shown in all the *Narratives* from which our story has been gathered that "A. P. W."—whether or no he was present at the time—is quite justified in his description of the difficulties encountered by those native officials who remained faithful.

On the whole, therefore, and without any conscious yielding to Chauvinist bias, it will be proper to record that the presence of one or two well-selected English officers in every county of British India was an absolute advantage to the cause of order, next only in value—if in any degree subordinate—to the presence of loyal and trustworthy bodies of troops. It would have been of little avail to kill or expel the mutinous sepoys, or to burn down the hovels of rebellious villagers, if there had not been intelligent, humane, impartial agents at hand to encourage the well-affected and heal the ravages of fire and sword. At the same time it is equally plain that the best efforts of civil officers would have been of little avail without the gallant concurrence of the soldiers and their brave leaders. If India was saved, it was *tam Marte quam Mercurio*, the exploit of the "United Service."

A Health to Old England.

A NEW NATIONAL SONG.

BY CAPTAIN CLARK KENNEDY, F.R.G.S., ETC., LATE **COLDSTREAM GUARDS.**

1.

A HEALTH to old England, the gem of the sea !
Hurrah ! for the well-beloved land ;
Our glorious old country, the land of the free,
Unconquered for ever shall stand !
Oh ! say not that Britons in earlier time
Were braver than those of to-day :
Old England hath ever a glorious prime
Of valour ! Deny it who may !

2.

We will conquer the foemen we conquered of old,
Whether Russian, or Prussian, or Gaul ;
Our sons shall the honour of Britain uphold,
Nor fear lest that honour should fall.
The fleets of old England shall scour o'er the sea,
Our blue-jackets brave as of yore ;
Our soldiers as valiant as ever shall be
To fight for the dearly-loved shore.

3.

Should e'er on our shore the invaders appear,
They *die* e'er they win to the strand !
Every inch of the soil to our hearts is so dear,
We 'll fight to the death for our land !
Then strike for old England the home of the free,
No peril our hearts can appal :
Then strike for the right ! Let our battle-cry be
"Saint George and our God for us all !"

4.

But happily long may we peacefully dwell
By sweet English valley and hill ;
Should duty e'er call us the foe to repel,
Each sword shall be true as each will.
Then down with the foe ! we will give them a grave,
Who to Britain come over the foam
Of the ocean ! we 'll sink their ships under the wave !
Hurrah ! for our Queen and our home.

The Royal Naval College.

CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO THE HIGHER
EDUCATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS.

BY A VOLUNTARY STUDENT.

THE fact that the last term at the Royal Naval College at Greenwich was only attended by sixteen voluntary students, viz. seven commanders and nine lieutenants, certainly calls for explanation, and would seem to suggest an inquiry into the utility of maintaining so costly an establishment with a large staff of professors, in the face of such eminently unsatisfactory results.

The College was established some ten years ago, as most of our readers are aware, for the higher education of naval officers, and various inducements have been held out to members of the profession on half-pay to repair here for the purpose of improving their minds by study. But from the poor response which has been made to this invitation of late, the inference might be drawn that no very general desire existed amongst naval officers to avail themselves of the magnificent opportunities for mental improvement which are afforded here. Such an inference, however, though natural, would be a mistaken one. Indeed, it may be asserted without fear of contradiction, that naval officers as a body are willing and anxious to utilise their spare time, in the intervals between active employment, in any way that is most calculated to promote their own efficiency, and to conduce to the welfare and high reputation of their profession.

That something is wrong at Greenwich, either in the matter of facilities for attendance, or in the course laid down for study, is evident on the face of it; and the writer believes that the most simple and straightforward way of approaching this question with a view to its solution, will be by stating as briefly as possible the reasons which, so far as his own experience enables him to judge, deter officers from studying here; and, in doing so, he proposes to avail himself somewhat freely of a letter which appeared in the *Army and Navy Gazette*, and attracted a good deal of attention at

the time, owing to the very lucid and temperate way in which the author's views on the subject were stated.

The opening sentence is somewhat prophetic. "It is with much diffidence," says the writer of the letter, "that I venture to address you on a subject of such deep importance as the Royal Naval College at Greenwich; but I feel certain that, unless some one speaks out on a matter on which many feel very strongly, the ultimate success and popularity of the institution will be seriously affected." It may be remarked that this letter appeared just ten years ago, at the end of the first regular term of study, which was attended by some sixty or seventy voluntary students. Contrast this with the present meagre attendance! To continue: "Whatever may be the opinion with regard to the working of the institution, one important fact is placed beyond dispute, namely, the existence of a very general desire for knowledge amongst all ranks of the service, as shown by the numbers studying there. No doubt some are attracted by the mere novelty of the thing, and, after this has worn off, experience considerable difficulty in maintaining a strict attention to their studies; but such will always be the case, and, even supposing some few to join with no serious intentions of hard work, it would be impossible for them to remain a period of nine months without learning something, be it ever so little, and this little may be the means, ultimately, of imparting to them a taste for learning, and a further desire to increase their stock of information; while, on the other hand, it is always in the power of the Admiralty to weed the College of men who idle away their time, and fail to make good use of the opportunities for mental improvement afforded here. A still more hopeful sign of the success of the College is an impression which is gradually gaining ground that, previous to promotion to the rank of commander, it will be considered an indispensable qualification to have passed a term of study at Greenwich; and how few men are there who could not afford to devote nine months of their time as lieutenants to study of some sort, with incalculable benefit to themselves and the country which they serve?"

"The first point I wish to draw attention to," continues the writer, "is the nature of the course of study open to voluntary students, for there is a strong feeling amongst those who have just completed their term in favour of a change. We find that, out of six hours' work per day, three, and in some cases four, hours are set apart by the existing regulations for mathematics, while, at the utmost, two hours per week are individually allotted to modern languages. Now, without depreciating in any way the importance

of some knowledge of mathematics to naval officers, I feel confident that the attempt to compel all men, irrespective of age and previous acquaintance with the subject, to devote two thirds of their time to it will prove fatal to the complete success of the institution; under existing regulations, however, there is no alternative, and any officer desirous of availing himself of the opportunities afforded by the College for the improvement of his mind, must either sacrifice two thirds of his time to a subject which, in the majority of cases, will prove of no practical value to him, or give up all idea of going there. I trust I shall not be misunderstood, and that these remarks will not be interpreted into an attempt on my part to raise a foolish cry against all scientific studies, for nothing could be further from my intentions. What I do wish, however, is to prevent the College from falling into the hands of a clique of mathematicians, who would sacrifice everything to the study of their pet subject, without duly considering the practical results which are likely to ensue. Assuming the advantage of a knowledge of mathematics, does it necessarily follow that all minds are equally adapted to its acquirement? I know as a fact that with many the subject is positively repugnant, and that the study of it, in so far as any practical results can be expected, is simply a waste of time. When such is the case, is it wise to make it compulsory? Surely we ought to look for some useful results, and not rest content with the bare fact of devoting so many hours a day to the study of a certain subject. To put the case plainer still, might we not with equal reason enforce the study of music or painting, without first of all ascertaining whether the pupil has an ear for music or an eye for colour? Our first duty surely lies in discovering how far his own inclinations lead him to adopt any special subject, and to what extent he is justified in pursuing it, judging from the qualifications he exhibits. As regards mathematics, there are a select few with whom the study is a pastime, and possesses quite a fascination; with such men the pursuit of this branch of knowledge is likely to bear fruit in after years, and for this reason deserves every possible assistance and encouragement. But to treat all alike, irrespective of age, mental capacity, and previous training, is simply ridiculous, and will, I feel sure, prove most prejudicial to the ultimate success of the College.

“One of the strongest arguments brought forward in recommendation of mathematical study, is the admirable training it affords for the mind; it is, in fact, regarded as a species of mental gymnastics. But when a man reaches the age of thirty or more, he may surely be excused for looking forward to some tangible result of his

labours; and the question naturally arises whether the game is worth the candle, and whether the mind cannot receive an equally good training by a more profitable exercise. A knowledge of mathematics is absolutely indispensable for the pursuit of many scientific subjects; it should, however, be regarded as simply the means to an end, and not as an end in itself. But when the end in view requires such a profound knowledge that no possible amount of study in a given available time can enable the student to attain to it, does it not stand to reason that the time spent in the vain endeavour to acquire the requisite knowledge is wasted?

"One can scarcely believe that the Naval College was instituted with a view to converting naval officers into marine engineers, or naval architects, for the absurdity of pitting them with any chance of success against men who have received a special education to qualify them for these professions must be evident to anyone; and we all know how few amateur mathematicians there are who ever reach a point at which they can apply their theoretical knowledge with any tangible advantage to themselves. Why, then, attach such an exaggerated importance to mathematical study? unless, indeed, the "mental gymnastics" theory be accepted as the true explanation of the course pursued. There is always a tendency amongst men who have devoted the greater part of their lives to the study of any particular subject to over-estimate its importance, and, without too carefully weighing its practical value in relation to other studies, to judge other people by the particular standard to which they may themselves have attained, forgetting the time and labour the effort has cost them. I think that such a tendency may be traced in the course of studies laid down for voluntary students at Greenwich, and, unless a change is speedily effected, there will be a very considerable diminution in the numbers in the next and future terms. Nor need this excite surprise, for is there not something humiliating in the spectacle of an officer who has attained to high rank in his profession, and yet anxious to improve his mind by study, being handed over to make sport for a young professor fresh from college, who possibly measures the worth of his fellow-creatures by their knowledge of the Calculus? I have dwelt at some length on this matter because there is a strong feeling amongst those recently engaged in study at Greenwich that the time they have devoted to mathematics might have been employed more advantageously to themselves in the study of modern languages, practical chemistry, or some of the so-called extra subjects."

There is no doubt that the writer of this letter hit on the weak

point of the College ; and from our own experience we can confidently assert that the views herein expressed will be heartily endorsed by the majority of past and present students ; while the fact that not a single officer of seniority in the higher ranks of the service attended the last term of study, affords a striking commentary on the concluding sentences.

The establishment of the College at Greenwich marked a new departure in naval education from which, directly and indirectly, great advantages are likely to accrue to the service. Such a step was a palpable recognition of the claims of science, and, provided always that the aspirations of the professorial staff are kept within due limits, we believe it will always receive the support of the large body of officers for whose benefit it has been provided.

There is no denying, however, that the College has not fulfilled all the objects for which it was established—it has not proved so attractive to voluntary students as was predicted and provided for ; and the reasons, as we have seen, lie in the fact that every branch of learning is subordinated to mathematics ; the College having deteriorated into a sort of mathematical forcing-house. Is this state of things desirable in the interests of mental culture ? That vast advantages may be derived from mathematical learning there can be no doubt. The advantages which are likely to be derived from mathematical learning, as cultivated at Greenwich, involves another and a very different question ; and we will venture to say that there never was a more complete instance anywhere of such extravagant and over-acted attachment to any branch of knowledge as that which obtains at Greenwich with regard to mathematics. An officer goes there in September, and remains till June, and in all that time his principal and almost exclusive occupation is learning mathematics, as if there were no other kind of excellence. We have a very high opinion of the benefits derived from mathematical study as an instrument of mental discipline in early life, and this discipline is none the less profitable because at the outset it is merely irksome. But whence comes it that the expenditure of time and labour is totally put out of the calculation when mathematics are concerned ? In every other occupation the question is fairly stated between the attainment and the time employed in the pursuit ; but in mathematics it seems to be thought sufficient at Greenwich if the least possible good is gained by the greatest possible exertion—if the end is anything, and the means everything. The one branch of learning in which it seems there can be no excess, no balance of profit and loss, is mathematical learning.

Another misfortune which is likely to result from the exaggerated

importance attached to mathematics is that students will come, in process of time and from the effects of association, to love the instrument better than the end—not what may be achieved by the use of mathematics, but mathematics themselves. The glory will be to show that I am a mathematician. The good sense and increased professional ability which I gain by my acquaintance with mathematics is matter of opinion; but if I grind at this branch of learning for nine months, and obtain a “G” at the end, this is something positive; I establish my pretensions to being scientific, and gain the credit of learning, while I sacrifice all its utility.

We must guard against the general inversion of the right subordination between means and ends.

There is a delusive sort of splendour in a number of men pursuing one object, even though they never thoroughly obtain it, and yet, though it be very splendid, it is far from being very useful. Mathematics is the great object at Greenwich. Many minds so employed may in time produce great results, and much fame, in that particular department of learning; but if the other subjects which are equally useful to human life were cultivated here in the same degree—if some applied themselves to chemistry, some to languages, some to experimental philosophy, and if every attainment was honoured in the same degree as mathematics—the system of the College would be infinitely more valuable, though the splendour of its name might be something less.

Mathematical learning is undoubtedly the basis of scientific knowledge, though the amount that is absolutely necessary is comparatively small. But when we find elderly men whose minds have no particular bias in this direction, and into whom “mathematics cannot be put, except by a sort of moral force-pump,” as a learned Greenwich professor graphically puts it, advised to pursue this line of study into the higher branches, on the grounds of the admirable mental discipline it affords, we can only express our wonder at the system which exacts such mistaken zeal. And when we consider how few there are that ever attain that degree of proficiency in the higher branches of mathematics which would enable them to use it freely and securely, either as a source of enjoyment, or as an instrument of mental culture, or of independent research; how many, within a few years after leaving school or college, who remember nothing but the tediousness of the work, and never taste its proper fruits; we are bound to admit that the system which obtains at Greenwich looks very much like a case in which there is a great expenditure of teaching force with very small results.

The great objection is, that in constituting such an extensive

mathematical course an indispensable article of higher education, you are not making the most of the brief portion of human life which most men can afford to spend here. You may call this mathematical course a foundation if you please, but it is a foundation upon which there is absolutely no time to rear any other structure ; and if you occupy a man with one thing for nine months you exhaust all his leisure time, and, if the subject is distasteful, he becomes disgusted, and probably works no more. He is called into the world and compelled to act, and if you have neglected to put other things into him they will never get in afterwards. If you have fed him only with signs and symbols, he will likely enough remain a narrow and limited being to the end of his existence.

We would place mathematics upon a footing with the other objects of study at Greenwich, but allow it no superiority. Good mathematicians—if they are desired in the navy—would be as certainly produced by this means as good chemists, naturalists, or philosophers are now produced in other walks of life, without any direct provision whatsoever for their production. Why are we to trust to the diversity of tastes and varieties of human ambition, in everything else, and distrust it in mathematics ? There are manifold diversities of capacity and inclination, which it is not wise to ignore—minds, not otherwise particularly weak, which are incapable of grasping the sequence of mathematical reasoning, and a still greater number who, though not afflicted with such incapacity, feel either a difficulty in the pursuit, or a distaste for the object, which amounts to a practical disqualification ; and when, as we know to be the case at Greenwich, middle-aged people are invited, under the pretence of study, to spend the greater part of their daily life over problems for investigating the range and velocity of projectiles under impossible conditions, in calculations as to how many combinations can be made with six beans taken two at a time, and over profound inquiries into the nature of the parabola, we can feel but little surprise at the reluctance shown in the profession generally to sacrifice valuable time and labour over questions of such doubtful utility.

The question arises whether, considered simply as an instrument of mental discipline, there are not other studies which are not less efficacious than mathematics—whether, after all, a protracted course of mathematical study is the infallible panacea for mental discursiveness. To accept this as a well-established fact is the common cant of the day. But, we have only to extend the range of our inquiries to find many eminent men holding to the opinion that there are other studies which, in some respects, are even

more beneficial than mathematics, as calling higher powers into action.

Archbishop Whateley, when asked his opinion on mathematics as a cure for desultory tendencies of mind, replied—"Certainly I should not recommend mathematics as the remedy; though one might naturally expect that the fault of mere mathematicians would be an over-rigid demand for demonstration in all subjects, I have found the fact to be the reverse. They generally, when they come to any other subject, throw off all regard to order and accuracy, like the feasting of the Roman Catholics before and after Lent. With them, mathematics is 'attention,' and everything else 'stand at ease.' The defect of mathematics as an exclusive or too predominating study is that it has no connection with human affairs, and affords no exercise of judgment, having no degrees of probability." Thus far the author of *Logic*. The *Times*, in a leading article on Mr. Spottiswoode's address to the British Association at Dublin, some few years back, drew the attention of its readers to "the warning which was given long ago by Sir William Hamilton, to people who imagined that, because mathematical study affords the highest examples of correct reasoning, it must be the best training for precision of thought even in matters of ordinary life. That idea," the article went on to say, "must be taken with great caution; mathematics deal purely with certainties, but nine-tenths of the material of ordinary thought must be modified by uncertainties, and hence it is quite as necessary to cultivate the sagacity which can weigh conflicting probabilities, as the vigour of the mind which can draw exact deductions. Some of the greatest mathematicians, such as Descartes and Pascal, have been eager to admit that, so far, their science was not the best of preparations for the rough reasoning of practical life."

We commend these remarks to the very serious consideration of those responsible for the existing state of things at Greenwich. The bias given to men's minds by protracted studies in one groove is so strong, that it is no uncommon thing to meet with mathematicians whom, but for their grey hairs and wrinkles, we might easily mistake for school-boys. Their talk is of problems, and it is quite clear that, if men's ages are to be dated from the state of their mental progress, that such men are eighteen years of age. Their minds have been so completely possessed by exaggerated notions of mathematical learning, that they have not been able, in the great school of the world, to form any other notion of real greatness. We would, therefore, caution all who are desirous of promoting the efficiency of the service against the danger of the education of naval

officers falling into the hands of a band of "enthusiasts, who think that the methods of their own science are sufficient for all the purposes of existence."

As a matter of experience, as well as of fact, it will be found, at any rate in the naval profession, that the best mathematical scholars are by no means always the best officers; indeed, the rule is quite the other way, and numerous instances might be given of clever mathematicians who bungled over the ordinary duties of their profession in a way which plainer men would have avoided intuitively. The truth is, the qualities which go to make up a good practical officer as well as a sound theoretical student are seldom found allied in the same individual, and the exceptions which might be brought forward only prove the rule. A too persistent study of mathematics has the effect of spoiling an officer for the rough practical work of his profession, encouraging habits of mind unfavourable to rapid decision in moments of difficulty or in the face of danger. A scientifically trained mind may be better prepared for mastering the duties of the profession, though even this is open to question, but as a matter of experience it is found that a too rigid theoretical education creates a distaste for the ordinary routine of life; men become too good for their bread and butter, and get the notion into their heads that minds so well equipped should be exonerated from the common every-day work of their profession.

Objections as to the exaggerated importance attached to mathematical studies at Greenwich, are sometimes met by the very unfair and narrow-minded retort, that personal reasons exist for those objections, which are nothing more than ignorant prejudices against mental culture of any sort, having their origin in personal disinclination or inability to study abstruse subjects. The writer would, therefore, beg to remark in self-defence that, in common with many others who share the same views on this subject, he has passed through the prescribed course of study for voluntary students at Greenwich, taking high places, moreover, in all subjects, and passing third out of a large number of competitors in mathematics. But he had a strong impression at the time, and this has since ripened into conviction, that the long hours spent over mathematics were so much wasted time and labour. He has never derived the slightest practical benefit from it since; and this seems to have been the general experience of others with whom he has come into contact. But let anyone who is desirous of obtaining impartial testimony on this subject, take the trouble of making inquiries amongst his friends and acquaintances who have acquired a reputation for practical ability, strong common-sense, and a power

for overcoming difficulties—who have, in fact, achieved a considerable measure of success in their several callings, and he will find an overwhelming majority who have played their part in life without the aid of mathematics. It is evident that this branch of learning is not the one thing needful.

The writer would be sorry if what he has said should appear too contemptuous towards mathematical study, which he hopes will always be held in great honour at Greenwich, though he certainly does not wish it to hold that exclusive honour which it at present enjoys. A great mathematician is an ornament to his profession, and an important acquisition to his country; but in a place of education he would give to all knowledge an equal chance for distinction, and would trust to the varieties of human disposition that every subject worth cultivation would be cultivated. Looking always to real utility as a guide, he would see with equal pleasure a studious and inquisitive mind investigating the mysteries of international law, the properties of bodies, or mastering one or more foreign languages. He would not care whether the student was acquiring a knowledge of fortification, surveying, or steam, because we know that all these subjects have a bearing on the profession, and are as desirable as objects of study as that taste should be gratified, and the mental powers excited into healthy activity. Great knowledge in so brief a period of study as nine months it would be impossible to convey; but a strong taste for its acquisition might be instilled, and a disposition to respect it in others.

The prodigious honour in which mathematic learning is now held at Greenwich is surely the most absurd of all absurd distinctions. If you rest all reputation upon doing that which is a natural gift, and which no labour can attain, you remove all incentive to work. If men will not occupy their time profitably when the opportunity is afforded, the fault rests with themselves. But it would be as reasonable to expect that all should be short and stout as that they should be good mathematicians. In either case it is to make an accidental, unattainable, and not a very important gift of nature the only, or the principal, test of merit. This is the reason why men who make a very considerable figure at school or college so often make no figure in the world; and why others who are passed over without notice turn out to be valuable, important men. The test established in the world is widely different from that established in a place which is presumed to be a preparation for the world; and the man who gains the highest honours at college, and is regarded as a perfect miracle by the professors, finds himself

shrink into absolute insignificance because he has nothing else to command respect or regard but a talent for formulas.

The duties of a naval officer are essentially practical; his life is passed in providing for emergencies, and contending with difficulties, and he has a not unnatural contempt for the mere theorist—the man who talks learnedly on subjects with which he has but a limited practical acquaintance. And this contempt for mere theoretical learning is aggravated by the knowledge of a fact derived from his own experience of men, distinguished for their scientific acquirements, who are chiefly remarkable in every-day life for their pre-eminent incapacity for practical work of any sort. The man who combines in his own person thorough practical ability, with sound theoretical knowledge, commands the hearty admiration and respect of his brother officers. Such a combination is comparatively rare in any walk of life, but the individual who unites these qualities is the man marked out for success in his calling. For this reason we would give at a college established, as we are informed in the circular issued by the Lords of the Admiralty, “to provide for the education of naval officers of all ranks, in all branches of theoretical and scientific study bearing upon their profession,” every facility for the study of mathematics and the kindred sciences. There are men we know with a special mental bias in this direction: encourage them to follow up this branch of learning by all means. But here let the line be drawn; let no compulsion be exercised. There are, as we have pointed out, diversities of taste and disposition which it is not wise to ignore under any circumstances, but more especially under the circumstances referred to, where the course of study is of a voluntary nature. Provision has been made at Greenwich for instruction in a large variety of subjects, and the comprehensive nature of the curriculum has been the means of deluding the unwary into the belief that some freedom of choice would be permitted. In this, however, the student is woefully mistaken. He finds the bill of fare to resemble in some sort that of the thrifty Restaurateur’s which, bristling with appetising dishes, proves on closer acquaintance to be a snare and delusion, resolving itself into a single dish under a variety of names, the same disgusting flavour running through the whole. Pardon the simile, but the revulsion of feeling in either case is about the same.

The inducements to attend amount to something like this: You may come here for the purpose of improving your minds by the study of subjects bearing on your profession, but on one condition, viz., that you occupy the greater part of your time over a branch of

learning which, as our own experience has shown us, is practically useless in after life. Nine months is by no means an excessive period to devote to study of any sort, but when two-thirds of it are occupied in resuscitating long-forgotten mathematical formulas which, together with other useless and burdensome incumbrances, have long since been cast aside by the student in his weary pilgrimage through life, we see the absurdity of the system under which such waste of mental energy is possible.

It is a matter of profound regret in the profession generally, that those who are responsible for the farce which is being enacted at Greenwich, under the name of learning, have not had the courage to come forward before now, and say boldly "We will have no more of this delusive humbug; four hours a day at mathematics shall be a *sine qua non* of attendance no longer. Voluntary students shall have perfect latitude in their choice of subjects. Those who have a penchant for mathematics may pursue them to their hearts' content; those who prefer languages may study French, German, Spanish, or even Chinese if they like that better, though there is no professor of the 'Heathen colloquial' at present on the College staff; while others again whose tastes lie in the direction of some of the other subjects included in the curriculum, let them confine their attentions to one or more, without dissipating their energies over the whole." The opposition to such a step would be a curious experience. Vested interests in the shape of the professorial staff would doubtless be arrayed in a solid phalanx against any such innovation as fraught, in their opinion, with the direst consequences, and the struggle would be bitter and prolonged; but as the efficiency of the navy is of more importance than "vested interests," we live in hopes that the hour will produce the man who will dare to beard the mathematical lion in his den.

The principal apologist for the existing state of things at Greenwich is Professor John K. Laughton, M.A., who, in a paper read last year at the Royal United Service Institution, gave some account of the work achieved at the College during the period which had elapsed since its foundation. Professor Laughton is an able man, and when we find that he occupies one of the "chairs" of mathematics at Greenwich, besides being a lecturer on meteorology and naval history, it is evident that his attainments are extensive. He has constituted himself of late years somewhat of an authority, so far as writing and speaking on the subject goes, on naval education from the instructor's point of view. It is even whispered that once upon a time this very versatile professor wrote a learned treatise on the manœuvring of fleets at sea, without ever having

done anything more practical in the way of steering a ship than looking on! which reminds one of the story of the military tailor who drew up an elaborate course of training for cavalry soldiers without ever having been "outside of" a horse. Mr. Laughton's literary efforts on the subject of education are always interesting, often amusing, and sometimes instructive; they are invariably distinguished by "the correct and elegant use of his mother tongue," which, as Mr. Laughton remarks in the paper we refer to, "is an accomplishment which befits every English gentleman"; and the College authorities are to be congratulated on having secured the services of a gentleman of such varied acquirements.

Mr. Laughton sees much to admire in the economy of things at Greenwich. He speaks of "*our* work,"—the professorial work—"as in the main, satisfactory." He even has a commendatory pat on the back for "the officers who come as voluntary students, as being for the most part really desirous of learning," which, as he explains, is the reason why he speaks of "*our*" work being satisfactory "in the main." But as there is no rose without a thorn, so at Greenwich there is cloud which somewhat mars the serenity of the professorial sky. "This did grievously weight us," says Mr. Laughton in the agony of his heart. What? "The small foundation of scientific knowledge which the officers, more especially who came as voluntary students," brought with them as part of their equipment for the pursuit of knowledge; "and thus," continues the Professor, "a large—*an undue portion*—of the time was taken up in attempting to establish that basis." (The italics are our own.) That this attempt was "not always with much satisfaction either to student or to the instructors," we can well understand.

Mr. Laughton is grieved in spirit about men who join the College "without first mastering the elementary principles of geometry and algebra." Resuscitating things that have been dead and forgotten for a dozen years or more, is, we admit, likely to prove "extremely irksome, and, in many cases utterly impossible."

"A very serious question arises as to what we"—*we*, the collegiate staff—"are to do with such men; men whose minds have hardened down into other grooves; men into whom mathematics cannot be put, except by a sort of moral force pump, and then only to escape as soon as pressure is taken off." What, indeed, from a mathematical professor's standpoint, can you do with such men? Gentle shepherd, tell me what?

We can quite understand that the staff have a very poor opinion of "such men"; indeed, it is evident from Professor Laughton's

treatise, that he thinks "small beer" of naval officers who fail to come up to the requisite mathematical standard; reminding us of the lecturer on chemistry at the Royal Academy, who, if our memory does not fail, expressed a somewhat contemptuous opinion of artists who were ignorant of the chemical properties of their colours, including in his list one of the first English painters of the day. Of course, from the worthy lecturer's point of view, a knowledge of chemistry was the one thing needful for salvation. That Professor Laughton should advocate mathematics is as natural as that a tradesman should recommend his wares. He sees something to admire in other subjects—history, languages, and even English grammar; but always in the corner of his discourse brings mathematics in—mathematics *ad nauseam*! But of course, mathematics are the *raison d'être* of Greenwich just now. "Any instruction that may be given in subjects not theoretical and scientific—*though not prohibited*, and in some cases directly approved—is outside the strict line prescribed for the work at the College," we are informed. "It is thus," says Mr. Laughton, "that hitherto so much time has been devoted to mathematics, it is thus that so much time is still devoted to mathematics. 'I own it,' 'I deplore it,' but I cannot add, 'I condemn it.'" Alas no, that would be too much to expect of poor human nature!

When an educational establishment has been teaching useless things for a long time, it appears at first degrading in it to be useful. A series of lectures on fleet manœuvres would certainly be discouraged at Greenwich, probably despised, perhaps even not permitted. To discuss the respective merits of the ram and torpedo, and to investigate the subtleties of the Merchant Shipping Act, would come so near to matters of every-day professional life as to seem undignified and contemptible. And yet, what other measure is there of dignity in intellectual labour amongst any body of men, but more especially amongst naval officers, but usefulness? And what ought a college to mean but a place where every subject is taught which is useful, and has a practical bearing on professional work? Nothing would so much tend to bring mathematical studies within proper bounds, as a steady and invariable appeal to utility in our appreciation of all knowledge.

Professor Laughton admits that, "there are, of course, plenty of subjects of very great professional interest and utility, into which the study of mathematics, even the most elementary, does not enter," and that, "naval officers ought to be familiar with them, and ought to work at them to attain that familiarity; but," he adds, "I do not know where they are to do this." Again, "We

have, indeed, a certain limited amount of instruction in French and German, but certainly not enough to do more than enable the student to keep up any knowledge he already has." If this is not strong enough condemnation of the existing régime at Greenwich, it would be hard to say what is. By a reference to the College staff, it will be found that there are no less than three professors of modern languages whose sole function, it seems, is to assist officers to "keep up" a knowledge of languages which the vast majority of those who attend have never even acquired!

The fact of so little importance being attached to the study of languages is to be deplored, for next to a knowledge of his duties there is nothing so generally useful to a naval officer as some acquaintance with modern languages. We have every-day experience of this in foreign ports, as well as of the inconvenience arising from the almost universal ignorance of naval officers of every tongue except their own; and considering the frequent intercourse there is between the officers of our own and of foreign ships, it might be thought that some acquaintance with French, German, or even Spanish would be more useful than a high standard of proficiency at those abstruse calculations about beans and parabolas which, as we have seen, absorb so much of the time and energy of students at Greenwich. Travel has always been regarded as a means of expanding and improving the mind; but to derive any benefit from it the traveller must, as Bacon says, "have some entrance into the language before he goeth," otherwise, "he that travelleth into a country before he hath some entrance into the language, goeth to school and not to travel." For lack of this "young men shall go hooded, and look abroad little." These remarks apply with much force to naval officers, the majority of whom, it must be confessed, afford a practical illustration of their truthfulness; for, notwithstanding the extent of their wanderings and the unusual facilities afforded by their profession for acquiring a knowledge of foreign countries and peoples, they fail to derive as much benefit from their travels as they might do.

A stronger argument than this in favour of linguistic studies it would be impossible to advance; and with three professors of languages on the staff of the College, it might seem to the uninitiated that unusual facilities were afforded at Greenwich for naval officers to prosecute these studies. But this is quite a mistake, for, "in the present state of things," says Mr. Laughton, "I do not know where they are to do this."

Once more, and finally, let it be observed that the objections which have been raised against the existing régime at Greenwich are only

intended so far as they apply to the course of study laid down for voluntary students; to deal with the College on broader grounds would involve the far more comprehensive and intricate question of naval education in its largest sense, which the writer is not prepared to enter into at the present time.

The great fault at Greenwich, so far as the vast majority of naval officers are concerned, has undoubtedly been in handing it over to a body of well-meaning civilians—specialists, who, however well versed they may be in the particular branch of learning they represent here, are ignorant of the requirements of the profession. Their efforts in the direction of what is termed “scientific instruction” have, moreover, unfortunately received the approbation and support of a small but influential clique of naval officers, who, instead of exercising their own common-sense and judgment, have succumbed to the siren-like voices of the “professors,” and now imagine that by inscribing “scientific education for naval officers” on their banner, and retailing the adverse criticisms of certain foreign “professors” on our training system, they achieve a sort of reputation for enlightenment themselves. During long periods of naval inactivity—we mean immunity from war—there is a tendency amongst officers of an active turn of mind to give their attention to subjects which are more useful as instruments of mental culture than as preparations for war, as a means of acquiring a reputation for professional ability. And since the qualifications of an officer, in time of peace, can never be subjected to the rough test of war, an entirely false and superficial standard comes to be recognised as the one by which all officers must be measured when considering their claims for promotion. That such a standard has been gradually developed of late years in the navy it is impossible to deny. That, if it comes to be worshipped with the infatuated devotion which some men demand for it, the consequences to the profession, and ultimately to the country, must be disastrous, we are bound to assert. To be scientific has a sort of delusive splendour about it. To be physically strong, hardy, endowed with a cool head, clear eye, courage, strong nerve, and ready resource, together with an average amount of mental ability, though more likely to conduce to success in war, is not found to be so conducive to the professional advancement of the possessor in time of peace. To affect contempt for mere physical attainments is, if we mistake not, the latest phase of the so-called “æsthetic” school. A naval “æsthete” would be a novel and interesting phenomenon!

“That the Greenwich College was made for naval officers, and not they for the College,” is a sentiment in which we heartily con-

cur, and yet, as so many are debarred from making any real use of the facilities for study which are afforded here, it would seem, as a matter of fact and experience, to be rather the other way. As it now exists, the College is admirably adapted for the development of the fictitious standard of professional efficiency to which allusion has been made. That such a standard exists, and is believed in in certain circles, is evident from Professor Laughton's treatise under the somewhat misleading title of "Naval Education." Naval education is a sort of "happy hunting-ground" just now for "professors" of all sorts. The subject is wide enough, and any writer might well be held excused for approaching it with a certain amount of diffidence and modesty of assertion. Opinions might even differ as to a mathematical professor's qualifications for discussing the subject at all. Professor Laughton, however, would seem to be troubled with no misgivings on this score, for he not only lays down the law somewhat dogmatically in respect of the "scientific education" of naval officers, but ventures even to treat of that branch of their training comprised under the heading of "seamanship." Rather dangerous ground, it might be thought, for a mathematical professor to venture on! But Mr. Laughton is so confident of his knowledge that he goes on to call in question the professional ability of certain young officers from a nautical standpoint! The spectacle of a mathematical instructor getting up before an assembly of naval officers in the theatre of the Royal United Service Institution, and discussing their qualifications as seamen, must have been a novel experience for those who were present on this occasion. It argued a deficiency in the sense of the humorous on the professor's part which we are sure his warmest friends must have deplored. We can only exclaim, with our old friend Punch, "Oh, those Professors!"

Mr. Laughton is an accomplished gentleman, and desirous, we firmly believe, of promoting the efficiency of the naval profession according to his lights; and people unacquainted with the service might, from his confident utterances on the subject of naval education even hold him to be an authority on the matter. But the very fact that the best years of his life have been devoted to teaching mathematics and kindred subjects to naval officers on shore, disqualifies him from discussing the question of education in its largest sense. What can Mr. Laughton know about the practical duties of the profession, beyond what he learned many years ago while looking on? He may talk eloquently enough *about* these matters, but he cannot speak of them from personal experience. He may even endeavour to realise the difficulties seamen have to

contend with in his imagination; but how different is all this "make believe," in the luxury of the study, from stern reality? Hence the small amount of weight attached to Mr. Laughton's opinions in naval circles, and this notwithstanding the *ex cathedra* tone of his utterances, and their high literary excellence. Naval education is far too important a matter to be entrusted to a small clique of crotchet-mongers. It should be controlled by clear-headed, practical men, with a wide experience of the world, and a clear appreciation of the wants of the profession.

In conclusion, we would cite a few observations from an article in the *Army and Navy Gazette*, having reference to the matter under discussion, as embodying the views of the vast majority of naval officers:—

"We firmly believe that the system of enforced mathematical study on *all* officers is a real frustration of several of the objects which we think all the promoters of the Greenwich scheme had in view. No better mathematical teaching could have been obtained than was open to the officers studying at the late naval college at Portsmouth, under the care of that distinguished mathematician, Professor Main. The real difficulty at Portsmouth was to find first-rate teaching with corresponding facilities for instruction in the modern languages, physical and chemical sciences, international law, &c. &c. If these important subjects are to be made merely subsidiary to a course of mathematics, which absorbs all the best hours of the day, we can only say that very inferior teaching and appliances than those provided at Greenwich would have sufficed; and it was a pity to have disturbed the Portsmouth College for such meagre advantages as seem to have been practically gained. . . . The instruction in these subjects, as well as the appliances for a practical study of them, have been provided at Greenwich with no sparing hand. All that is required is to elevate them from being mere adjuncts to a mathematical course—which is in many cases useless—into principal studies, coupled with such regulations as may insure that the country shall obtain the full application of the energies of the studying officer, for which purpose it would seem, to a great extent, that the mathematical course is laid down. Let this system be tried, and its advantages will soon make themselves manifest by an extensive and varied range of accomplishments in naval officers, which will re-act beneficially on the service in a thousand ways not even dreamed of at present."

Incidents in Southern India

DURING THE MUTINY YEARS 1857-1858.

BY CAPTAIN RALPH N. TAYLOR, LATE MADRAS STAFF CORPS.

IN the memoirs of the late Colonel Meadows Taylor (an old friend but no relative of mine) occurs a public history and description of a somewhat remote and obscure district within His Highness the Nizam's dominions, called the State of Shorapore! Never of sufficient importance, either from position, size, or revenue, to find any prominent place in the history of the Hyderabad kingdom, this small province obtained a certain propriety only from three distinct causes. First, the connection with it of Colonel Meadows Taylor, as political officer; second, the effete, debased, and miserable character of its last Rajah; third, his insurrection against the British Government in 1858, his capture and death, and the total collapse of his dynasty for ever.

Meadows Taylor's connection with Shorapore lasted about ten years. During the minority of the Rajah, he acted as a sort of regent and general comptroller of the revenues and administration, and he succeeded in rescuing the province from a state of debt and disorder, which he replaced by good management, resulting in economy, wealth, and prosperity. To those who were as well acquainted with Meadows Taylor as I was, it will be nothing new to state, that in addition to his good temper, courteous manners, and sociable as well as hospitable qualities, he was both a remarkable and a talented man. Remarkable, because, commencing life at the early age of eighteen, as a soldier of fortune in a foreign country, and under a native government, he educated himself to a proficiency in languages and duties, which qualified him for any post in the country, military or civil, and obtained for him recognition and reward from the Government he served; talented, inasmuch as, the sphere of his own personal observation, knowledge, and experience being limited, and in spite of much hard work and daily recurring business, he

found time for reading and keeping himself informed on all the important historic and political events of the day ; he found time to write novels, such as *The Confessions of a Thug, Tara, &c.* ; and in addition to all these, he acted as special correspondent to the *Times*, his letters to which journal served to make him an Indian historian of the period in which he lived. Whatever may be public opinion of him as an author, he has left behind him sufficient proof of intellectual power of no mean order. I am personally aware that the inhabitants of Shorapore had the highest respect for Meadows Taylor, and feared the moral influence which his character and position commanded throughout the district. One can imagine that the "State of Shorapore" was not exactly a pleasant place to live in for a solitary European, when General Fraser describes it as "a wild and barbarous district, replete with disorder and irregularity of every conceivable kind."

The Rajah of Shorapore was a child of seven years, or thereabouts, when Meadows Taylor took him in hand. He learnt first Canarese, his own language, then Hindustani, Mahratta, and English. His revenues increased during his minority ; and in 1847, after payment of all expenses, there was a surplus of £10,000. The Rajah's mother, a wicked and depraved woman, had the boy's horoscope taken when he was four, and it said that he was fated to die in his twenty-fourth year. In accordance with Indian custom the Rajah came of age at eighteen, and his country was handed over to him. From that moment commenced his decadence. Weak and vain, pampered and flattered, he soon became an easy prey to his own vices, and the scheming people about him. All his ready money was soon expended in debauchery, drinking, and presents to his myrmidons, and he became notorious throughout the land for possessing vices of the very worst and most disgusting kind. It was in 1852 the young Rajah came of age, and on the following he lost the advice and counsels of Meadows Taylor, and became his own master. For five years he went from bad to worse, and in 1857 the Mutiny found him a young chief of bad character and no means, but with a body of 10,000 armed troops who would obey him even in the worst cause. Offers of increased territory, and presents of money, soon tempted him to forget that all he had was owing to the British Government, and his name was soon entered among the disaffected chiefs of southern India. It was curious how the prediction of his horoscope came to be fulfilled, because there were reasons to believe it might be tided over. Early in 1858 the

Rajah of Shorapore was in open rebellion. The story of our attack upon his city, the Rajah's miserable fears and flight, will be told hereafter; but his subsequent fate is told by Meadows Taylor in these words: "The Rajah of Shorapore had been sentenced to death; but the Resident had commuted his sentence to transportation for life, which was the most his power admitted of. This sentence had, however, been still further commuted by the Governor-General to four years' imprisonment in a fortress near Madras (I think Chenglepur). In addition the Rajah was to be allowed to have such of his wives as he pleased with him, and his own servants. If he showed evidence of reform and steadiness, his principality was to be restored to him." Here was the chance that the prediction regarding his death might prove false; but that was not to be. Hardly had his family received the intelligence of his reprieve, than an express reached the city with this short despatch: "The Rajah of Shorapore shot himself this morning dead, as he arrived at his first encampment. I will write particulars when I know them." In this manner was the prediction of his death accomplished, because in a few days more the Rajah would have completed his twenty-fourth year. He had left Secunderabad a prisoner in charge of a military guard, with an English officer to command, and this is what happened. "He had travelled in a palankeen, with the officer commanding his escort near him all the way to their camp. When they arrived, the officer took off his belt in which was a loaded revolver, hung it over a chair, and went outside the tent. While washing his face a moment afterwards he heard a shot, and, running back, found the Rajah lying on the ground quite dead. The ball had entered his stomach and passed through the spine."

Whether the act was intentional or accidental can never be known, but its result was the death of the last Rajah of Shorapore, who left no issue, and whose territory thenceforth passed to the Sovereign of Hyderabad, His Highness the Nizam, to whom it was presented by the British Government in return for his firmness and loyalty during the mutinies in the north.

It happened that in the Mutiny years I was in charge as deputy commissioner of a district in His Highness the Nizam's dominions, called the Raichore Doab, so named after its principal town—now a railway station, midway on the line from Madras to Bombay—and from its position between the rivers Kistna and Toongbudra, which meet at a point at its eastern extremity where stands the ancient town and former city of Kurnool.

Bounded on the north by Shorapore, on the south by the district of Bellary, and on the west by those of Dharwar and Belgaum in the Bombay Presidency, the Raichore Doab forms the remotest south-west corner of His Highness the Nizam's dominions. Its extent is 6,000 square miles, and its revenue in those days was thirteen lacs of rupees. We possessed a civil and military station at Lingsoogoor, where our strength and weakness in Europeans and natives consisted in two civil and five English military officers, attached to a force consisting of a detachment of artillery with two guns, a troop of irregular cavalry and a regiment of infantry, all belonging to the Hyderabad Contingent, and composed entirely of men recruited from the northern districts of India, which at that time were in a state of revolution and war. So far, in spite of many efforts, the tide of rebellion had not as yet flowed south; but our peculiar situation, isolated from any assistance (the nearest military aid being at Bellary, ninety miles off), was one not only of grave doubt and anxiety, but of doubt which must be hidden and anxiety which must be suppressed. So far as physical force went, the station, treasury, district, and ourselves, were at the mercy of that small body of troops at Lingsoogoor. Information and news reached the bazaar every day in that mysterious manner common to India, and all the events in northern India were as well known to every sepoy and sowar as they were to ourselves. Fully aware of this, the commanding officer, Colonel Wyndham, and I, took good care to communicate freely to the native officers every item of news which appeared in the daily papers, and took them entirely into our confidence in regard to the safety and welfare of our station and its inhabitants. We used to hold councils of war in the morning, and receive reports of any unusual occurrence, such as the arrival of any fanatics from the north, or any attempt from any quarter to tamper with the sepoys. I am bound to say we received the most loyal support from those native officers, and during those troublous times it was their fidelity and loyalty to us that prevented a spirit of insubordination or rebellion ever reaching their men. The Jemadar commanding the cavalry came from Delhi; his family, at the time it was besieged by our troops, were in Delhi, and he used to come to me constantly for any additions to the news otherwise received. On the fall of Delhi, which this officer heard of as soon as I did, he came to me, held out the handle of his sword for me to touch, in token that that sword was at my service to use, and asked me to assist him in procuring the earliest possible information about his.

family. There was a sense of duty and loyalty to the Government he served, throughout this man's acts, which remind one of that honour and chivalry in a soldier of which our own country is so justly proud. One other curious feature about our native *personnel* was that the cavalrymen were all Mussulmans, while the infantry were Hindoos; and the inhabitants of the bazaar and cantonment were of mixed local races and castes, having nothing in common with either, and possessing as a whole distinctly separate interests and inclinations. Owing to this fact, a combination among them all seemed highly improbable; nor was it, to my knowledge, ever attempted. In my own office I had the earliest and best information from every side, and for this purpose had established an express service of villagers to carry letters at any hour, in addition to the ordinary post, when the packet bore my signature, or had attached to it a feather, which signifies speed. Thus I possessed rapid communication with Hyderabad on the north, Bellary on the south, and Belgaum and Dharwar on the west. All these were military posts, watching the course of events, and more or less prepared for action at any moment. Our greatest danger lay in the armed population of the provinces of Hyderabad. Arabs, Rohillas, and mercenaries of all sorts spread about in small bodies throughout the country, ready at any moment to loot a village or fight the authorities: these men seemed easy tools for the messengers from Nana Sahib and others, sent to stimulate rebellion through the land. No one could tell whether success would lie with the evil counsellors known to be inciting the people, or with the great influence and wisdom of Sir Salar Jung. It is well known that Hyderabad remained faithful, and to this cause alone we owed the safety of southern India. Emissaries from the north, visiting every station and every man of any note, urging combination and rebellion, were busy on every side; the sepoys of the Hyderabad Contingent were tampered with at every military post, and the whole of the southern Mahratta country was ripe for rebellion. Towards the latter months of 1857, news from Belgaum reached us that rebels were about in gangs, but no organised movement had as yet occurred. Then came an occasional murder of English officials, and the employment of the Mahratta horse, under Captain W. A. Kerr, to pursue and hunt down bodies of armed men in open rebellion, and trying to raise the country. This body of horse were of the greatest service, because, aided by the constant watchfulness of the civil officers, their rapid movements from one side of a district to

another prevented the assembling of any very large number of rebels at one time in any given spot. But my information showed clearly enough that the chief zemindars, rajahs, and heads of districts bordering on my province, had been induced to believe it was to their interest to join the rebel cause, and were only awaiting the proper moment to do so. It was no doubt intended by the northern plotters, that a general rising of the whole southern Mahratta country, and such parts of Hyderabad as would agree to join, should take place simultaneously at a preconcerted signal, but these objects were defeated by the progress of events in the north. Intelligence of demoralisation among the mutinous troops, of victories by the British arms in every contest of any importance, and of the gradual ascendancy and power of the English Government in India, disturbed the conspirators acting as enemies of that power in the south, and effectually disposed of all hope of an extensive and general rising either in Hyderabad or among the Mahrattas. At the same time, the Governments of Bombay and Madras were as well aware as I was that, in my neighbourhood, among some few of the Mahratta chiefs and rajahs, there still existed a spirit of disaffection, which it behoved us to watch and guard against. Measures were at once taken to meet any emergency. A field force was ready for moving in the Belgaum district, not far from the Hyderabad frontier; a similar body of troops, prepared to march at a moment's notice, was encamped at Bellary; and our small force at Lingsoogoor could have been under arms and on the move in a few hours. This state of preparation lasted for some weeks without any overt act of rebellion taking place; and all chance of any action being necessary on our part might have gradually passed away, with the continuance of news of subsidence in the rebellion of northern India, had it not been for the foolishness and depravity of my neighbour, the Rajah of Shorapore. This young man was in correspondence with me, and his letters professed loyalty and devotion to the State; but, to my knowledge, his acts were opposed to his professions, and I told him so. He was not only in constant communication with suspected rebels on the Mahratta side, but he received secret emissaries, sent from disaffected northern parts purposely to tamper with the Hyderabad chiefs and rajahs. He commenced a sort of preparation of his own troops, that mercenary body of Baydurs of whom Meadows Taylor makes frequent mention; and he entertained in his service 100 Rohillas and Arabs from Hyderabad. This last act may have been dictated by fear.

as well as disaffection, but it was one which in Hyderabad was understood to mean resistance or fighting. I told the rajah that all he was doing was well known to me and to the Government, and advised him at once to dismiss his Arab and Rohilla retainers, and send them back to Hyderabad. He did not answer for a long time, nor did he do as I advised.

About the time of these occurrences I was invested by the Resident with full powers of a judge, under a Special Act passed as a temporary measure to provide for times of rebellion and disturbance. I could try rebels with arms in open rebellion, and hang them, if necessary, on my own authority. There was not much cause for the exercise of this power, as my own district was as yet undisturbed, but the knowledge of it (soon communicated through Brahmans in my office to the whole country) probably had some slight moral effect. It was not long before I became assured that the imbecile and debauched Raja of Shorapore was being urged, by those around him, to take up arms and rebel against the Government. The Beydurs had assembled in large numbers at Shorapore, the Rohillas and Arabs were on active service, guns were placed in position, ammunition served out, the gates closed, and the fort of Shorapore placed in a state of defence. I reported these circumstances and said that the time had come when we must take action against Shorapore, or the Rajah and his mercenaries might take it into their heads to cross my boundary and march against us.

Everything was done by the Resident at Hyderabad to save the Rajah of Shorapore from open rebellion. He even sent his own assistant on a political mission direct to the Rajah, who was always either too drunk or too silly to listen to him. Early in February 1858, this officer, Captain Rose Campbell, received information that the Arabs, Rohillas, and Beydurs intended to open the campaign by attacking his camp and murdering him. This news, communicated to us at Lingsoooor, brought Captain Arthur Wyndham and his regiment of infantry under the walls of Shorapore on the 7th February, while a field force, consisting of part of the 74th Highlanders, 47th Native Infantry, four guns, some Madras Cavalry and Mysor Horse, under Colonel Hughes, were encamped twelve miles off. I offered my services to guide this column to Shorapore, and Colonel Hughes was good enough to allow me to act as his Aide-de-Camp. We started early in the evening, and, with the assistance of native guides, I led the column across the river to my frontier, so that,

after marching all night, we arrived within a mile of the fort at 4 A.M. My first duty was to find Colonel Wyndham, which I did at daylight, and was directed by Colonel Hughes to tell him to bring his regiment up and join the Madras column, in support, as Colonel Hughes intended to attack the fort at once. On riding over to Wyndham with the message, a distance of about two miles, he told me that he had been attacked in the night by a force of Rohellars and Arabs, who had made a sortie from Shorapore, with a view of cutting up his regiment: that he had repulsed them; that his men had been under arms all night, and had had no water; so that he would be unable to move for some little time. This would not suit Colonel Hughes at all. Directly he heard Wyndham's reply he dismounted, took off his forage cap, and from its lining produced a pencil and clean piece of paper, on which he wrote an order on his saddle. Turning round to me, he said, "Give that to Colonel Wyndham and tell him to come up at once." This was soon done, and on my return I found the column formed in order of battle. Daylight revealed the position of the rebels and ourselves. Less than a mile to the north of us lay the grim fort of Shorapore. At its foot a broad level of dry rice-fields, and between that and our position a range of small hills covered with boulders and brushwood, and now occupied by parties of Rohillas and skirmishers sent out from Shorapore. These men opened fire upon us as soon as they could see, and our troops at once advanced in the following order:—Artillery on the right; 74th Highlanders, 47th Regiment, in the centre; cavalry on the left Wyndham's regiment in support. The 74th threw out skirmishers, who opened fire wherever they could see the enemy, and, supported by the companies behind, went straight at the small hills, dislodging the Rohillas and making them retire. Meanwhile the guns in the fort had opened fire in a very feeble manner, and were speedily answered by our artillery. Those small hills alluded to were of no great extent, and were soon taken. Colonel Hughes seeing this, ordered me to tell Captain Lawson, commanding artillery, to advance 100 yards nearer the fort, and then to desire the Highlanders to keep up with the guns. I found Lawson performing his toilet in rear of his guns, firing rapidly, and, after giving him the message, rode on. His brother, in the Highlanders, was the next man I came across, commanding the skirmishers of his regiment. He looked very fat about the chest, and, as I came up, said, mysteriously, "Stop a minute." Unbuttoning his shell jacket, he pulled out a bottle of Hock, and

handed it up to me to take a pull. These two little episodes are characteristic of the brothers Lawson, each a good soldier and a good fellow in his own line. And now, the small hills being cleared, and our line close on the paddy flats, occurred an incident by no means creditable to our cavalry, and which I observed on my way back to the Colonel's position. A small party of Rohillas, carrying a standard, were crossing the flat, retreating towards a small gate of the fort, when our cavalry officers on the left, saw them, and instantly resolved to charge. No time was to be lost, and Captains Newbury and Stewart, after giving the order, started. As a body the cavalry did not follow, but, being well mounted, the two officers went at great speed, racing for the standard. As they approached, finding escape impossible, the Rohillas stood, and took aim. Newbury was shot in the stomach, fell off, and died soon afterwards, and Stewart received a severe sword-cut on the head which knocked him over. Their men were nowhere, and did nothing, for the Rohillas found time to pick up Newbury's helmet, escaping into the fort, where they laid their trophy at the Rajah's feet, and received rewards.

All the enemy now being cleared outside, it only remained to take the fort; but, knowing that the Bombay force, under Colonel Malcolm, was close to the western frontier of Shorapore, and was moving rapidly on the city, Colonel Hughes, much against his inclination, thought it right to await their arrival for a combined attack, which, however, was not destined to take place. Information of our intention to storm and take the city next morning was quite sufficient for the Rajah, upon whom Meadows Taylor says it had the following effect:—"When this reached the ears of the Rajah, and he heard, also, that Colonel Malcolm's force had with it a large proportion of English troops, who, together with two companies of the 74th Highlanders, under Colonel Hughes, made a sufficiently imposing array, he saw there was no chance of escape except by flight; and in the evening, accompanied by a few horsemen, he left Shorapore, and proceeded direct to Hyderabad."

Malcolm and Hughes next morning marched into the city unopposed, and a good deal of looting took place before it could be stopped. Then a Prize Committee was formed, and all private loot ordered to be given up. Being myself away from my district without leave, I returned at once to Lingscogour, where the news from the west pointed to an early rising of some of the small chiefs, or zemindars, in Zharwar and Bel-

gaum. About this time, too, many of my own people had been tampered with, and I hardly knew in what exact spot the first outbreak in my district would take place.

It happened that among the disaffected zemindars of the Dharwar was one Bheem Rao, of Moondurgi, a Brahmin, who had been formerly in the service of Government, and retired to take possession of and live on his own estate, which had been lately surveyed and assessed by the Government officials. It was said that he was displeased and dissatisfied with the settlement, and was ready to join others in rebellion against the English. His estate lay not far from the south-west corner of my district, with which he was well acquainted and in constant communication. The chief place of importance in that corner was a hill-fort, called Kopaldroog, in which was situated the Local Government office and treasury. It was a strong place, rising out of plains all around, and could not have been taken by rebels except through treachery. Meadows Taylor says of Kopaldroog: "It is a marvellous fort, indeed, being entirely impregnable. It consists of two fortifications, one encircling the town, which had been re-modelled by the French engineers in Tippoo's service, and all the bastions and cavaliers filled with embrasures and ramparts for heavy guns, the other fortification being of the great granite rock within the *enceinte*, the batteries of which command every portion of the land below, on all sides, to a great distance. This hill-fort must be upwards of 500 feet high, and is inaccessible except by a flight of very rude rough steps, which wind in and out among the rocks, and in some places extremely narrow and unsafe." There were several old guns in the upper batteries, and at the summit was a circular battery having just below it some deep cisterns in the naked rock, which contained beautiful clear water.

It was quite the end of May 1858 when I received an express from Kopal that Bheem Rao, with some 400 armed men, had crossed my frontier and marched to Kopaldroog, having arranged with the Killedar to deliver up the keys of the fort to him. Colonel Hughes was then with his force in the Bellary district, on the south of the river Toongabudra. The news of Bheem Rao and his rebels having seized my fort of Kopal, together with the records and treasury, which contained only about 8,000 rupees, reached Hughes as soon as it did me. He marched at once, and sent me word to join him. Owing to Wyndham, with some Highlanders and his own regiment, being detained to guard Shorapore, there were at Lingaogoor only

two guns and twenty-five cavalry sabres. With these I marched, the same afternoon, and, by travelling all night, covered the whole distance of thirty-six miles, and at daylight found Hughes in position before the walls of Kopal. As usual with Indian forts, the outer wall was composed entirely of mud, upon which a cannon-ball makes very little impression. Hughes opened fire at once on the principal gate, and the stone portions of wall which supported and strengthened it, intending from that point to storm the fort, placed his infantry in readiness to advance, and surrounded the whole fort with small parties of horse. Bheem Rao had obtained possession of Kopal droog by bribery and treachery, but he found himself now in a trap from which there was no escape. It was not long before the people of the town and the rebels perceived that our guns would soon make a breach. Bheem Rao and his armed men retired to the citadel, and closed the gates. On this, the townspeople at once exhibited white flags along the walls, and shortly afterwards themselves opened the outer gates.

Such garrison as Bheem Rao possessed were now surrounded in the inner fort of stone, and our soldiers were ready to attack. By this time, however, the rebels had lost all heart, and some among them opened the gates of the citadel. The Highlanders rushed in, firing at and killing every opponent. Bheem Rao himself, running across a rock hoping to reach a small sally-port of escape, was shot by a Highlander in the ear, and fell dead on the spot, and the remainder of the rebels surrendered. I took possession at once—after seeing the body of Bheem Rao and having it identified—of the office records and treasury; the troops were withdrawn to their camps; the townspeople visited me and brought supplies: and by the afternoon everything appeared, outwardly, as if no rebellion had taken place. My official duty lay in executing justice on the traitor who delivered up the keys and fort to Bheem Rao. He was soon found, tried, and hung the same evening. All the remainder of the rebels were tried by a military court, and many of them sentenced to be shot. This summary conclusion of Bheem Rao's adventures effectually extinguished any sparks of rebellion or disaffection in that part of the country, and, in fact, proved to be the last occasion requiring the employment of our troops in the open field in southern India.

Pre-eminence in War.

BY MAJOR F. W. GRAHAM.

(Continued from page 189.)

DURING the last great war between this country and France, the strength of our navy and the gallantry of our seamen did much to establish our supremacy, particularly at sea; but the suicidal policy of the first Napoleon helped to render it more overwhelming. By his edicts prohibiting the Continental nations of Europe from trading with us, he threw the whole of their sea-borne commerce into the hands of the Americans and ourselves. Our merchants armed their vessels, and became contrabandists, and the sea soon swarmed with privateers.

There were two objects of equal importance in what Napoleon called his Continental system. The first was by alliances, treaties, and leagues, with neighbouring powers, to effect the exclusion of English commerce; the second was, by the same alliances, to prepare the maritime and military means of attacking England.

Napoleon hoped to attack England in India by means of Russia, Persia, and Turkey; in the Antilles by means of Spain and the United States; and finally, England was to be attacked in Europe by the union of all the states interested in overthrowing her maritime power.

The strategic conception which led the French armies to Waterloo was planned and executed with consummate skill; and though an error of judgment detached Grouchy in a wrong direction, the fame of the genius that planned the whole lives, and makes the glory of Waterloo greater.

We have before us in our own time a very remarkable case of a great political strategist in the German Chancellor Prince Bismarck. No one will deny that his countrymen are indebted for their triumphs in a great measure to his Statesmanship.

Take for example the campaign of 1866, and observe the effect of the alliances established by Prussia on the strategy of the campaign. Austria in this war was assailed on both flanks, on the right in Bohemia, and on the left in Italy. The campaign in Bohemia was the vital one, that in Italy may be looked upon as a diversion. Prussia was enabled to bring about this double flank attack on Austria by establishing previous to the war an alliance with Italy, and this alliance caused some of the best troops of Austria and one of her ablest generals to be engaged far away from the main attack.

Again, Hanover, Cassell, and other minor German states, were secret allies of Austria, and the Saxon alliance was of the greatest strategic importance to her, and of corresponding danger to Prussia; for an Austrian and Saxon army concentrated on the Prussian frontier would be within a few days' march for Berlin. Accordingly the strategy dictated from Berlin led in the first place to the establishment of communication between the two separate parts of the kingdom, and the prevention of the possibility of an enemy acting on the right flank and rear of the Prussians. This was brought about by a sudden and successful invasion of Hanover causing the Saxon army to withdraw, and the Prussians gained a further advantage by being thus enabled to operate from both Saxony and Silesia on Bohemia.

The details of the strategy in Italy and Bohemia are alike remarkable for the forethought displayed by the Austrian in the Italian campaign, and the Prussian in the Bohemian.

The problem in Italy was how to attack the Austrians, posted as they were behind the defence of the quadrilateral and the river Adige. The Italian General was furnished with several strategic conceptions. It was suggested that an army of 100,000 men should cross the Lower Po, in the east of the Mincio, and take up a strong position between Mantua and Leguano, and by their presence hold the Austrian army within the quadrilateral, while the remainder of the army by the aid of the fleet disembarked at Trieste and pushed directly on Vienna.

Again it was suggested that the Italians should march through the Tyrol and deploy in the valley of the Danube, thus co-operating with the Prussians, with whom the greatest interests in the campaign lay. The presence of the Austrian squadrons prevented the first of these plans from being attempted, and the second was abandoned on account of the difficulties to be surmounted in the passage of a huge army, accompanied by its train, through the mountains. Nothing was left but to attack the front

of the Austrian position on the Po and Mincio. There appeared two ways of doing this:—

1st. To cross the Mincio and enter the zone of fortifications, to turn on either fortress and receive the attack of the enemy issuing from the Adige.

2nd. To divide the army, one portion operating on the Mincio, the other on the Po, risking the disadvantage of such a movement.

The Italians decided on the latter, and divided their army into two masses: one, consisting of 120,000 men under the King, assembled on the Chiesef were to cross the Mincio; the other, numbering 80,000 men under Cialdini, was to operate on the Lower Po from Ferrara and Rovigo. The King imagined that having crossed the Mincio and attracted the Archduke's attention to the mass approaching his position, would give perfect freedom to the force manœuvring on the Lower Po to overcome the difficulties of passage, reduce Rovigo, cross the Adige, and unimpeded enter Venetia, unite with his army, and together invest the Archduke at Verona. The Austrian hope of success was based on this division of the Italian army. The Archduke had concentrated his army at Montaguana behind the Adige, and was there prepared for three eventualities; *first*, he considered he might have to accept a defensive battle on the heights or outer skirts of the high grounds about Custozza; *second*, he might have to move along the line of railway to Castelmovo and fall on the Italian flank; *third*, it was possible the Italians would not cross the Mincio, but only demonstrate along that line to draw attention from Cialdini. In this case the Archduke intended to cross the Mincio at Peschiera, and attack the King, recognizing that his great object was to defeat the King's army as early as possible.

The result of the campaign demonstrated the strategic theory of the Archduke to be correct, viz. that in selecting the larger force of the enemy for destruction, the minor attack led by Cialdini would fall to pieces of itself.

At the opening of the campaign in Bohemia the Prussians were in occupation of a very extended front, viz. from Torgan to the river Neisse, and in addition to this they were divided into two separate armies. (Herwarth's army was incorporated with that of Frederick Charles. The Austrians, on the other hand, were concentrated round Olmutz, with a view of assuming the offensive, not contemplating being thrown on the defensive.

The extension of front acted in a peculiar manner on the

Austrians. The Prussians were completely screened behind a continuous chain of high mountains; the establishment of their head-quarters in the first instance at Neisse, and the demonstrations of a corps on their extreme left at Mittelwalde, tended to confuse and deceive the Austrian leader and keep him in ignorance of the blow preparing. They saw it was easier to maintain a force of 200,000 men on a broad extent of territory than in one place, and therefore kept them extended till the last moment, thus concealing their subsequent intentions and facilitating supply.

This extension of front was necessary in another point of view. For it was necessary to watch not only her chief foe Austria, but also the Bavarians on the Maine, and the troops of the Southern Confederacy; because an army operating from the corner where the Saxon and Bavarian frontiers meet, through Saxony on Dresden and Berlin, would be most advantageously situated to co-operate with an Austrian army operating against Prussian territory through the passes of Zittau. The Prussians fully comprehended this, because their first care on the occupation of Dresden was to fortify the left bank of the Elbe and destroy the railways running from Dresden to the western frontier of Saxony.

To account for the division of the Prussians into two great armies we have only to turn our eyes to the map and see what advantages the armies acting from Torgan and Gorlitz, as the Prussians would have done, would have over an army acting from Dresden; a powerful flank attack would have been at once developed. Again, insomuch as the Austrians were not in a position at once to assume the offensive, the concentration on the Neisse river of the Crown Prince's army threatened Vienna and chained Benedek to Olmutz.

In the Prussian advance, they made it their first grand object to reunite on the enemy's territory, before delivering the battle which was to decide the campaign. The Austrians took few precautions to close the passes leading from Silesia into Bohemia, Benedek accounts for this by saying he was marching on a position on the Elbe, from whence according to contingencies he would move either through the passes himself or into Saxony; why, therefore, close them? The position he was marching to occupy was an advantageous one from whence to crush the forces advancing in fractions through the defiles; but knowing as he did of the presence of the enemy's masses on his right flank, every hour that passed during the flank march to the west must

have been accompanied by uneasy feelings for the safety of that flank, and the instant the enemy's forces came through the passes his contemplated movement would become hampered and uncertain, and in continuing it he attributed to his adversary that dilatoriness which would enable him to complete it.

In the campaign of 1870-71, the French strategic front was widely extended, they intended concentration and assuming the initiative ; but they were thrown on the defensive by the superiority of the Prussians. The strategic front they took up for offensive purposes was broken, and they were defeated in a series of actions—Worth, Wissenburgh, Forbach—in which actions, owing to the dissemination of their forces, the various corps composing their army could not assist one another.

In a recent article in *Blackwood*, the writer says: "Germany is chiefly indebted for her military pre-eminence to Field-Marshal Von Moltke. The successes of the German armies are attributable, not to the display of any remarkable ability by commanders of armies, corps, or divisions, but to the organised foresight, forethought, and painstaking—in short, to that vast capacity of taking trouble which, under the guidance of Moltke, was displayed in the officers of the Prussian General Staff in anticipation of War."

Chambray says: "Military merit is quite peculiar in its nature, and not of a nature generally observed." This is particularly true with respect to the command in the field. In the armies of the French Republic there were generals who had neither talents nor education, who could hardly understand a map, who understood little about the great operations of war, and yet were distinguished commanders of divisions, particularly when they formed part of a *corps d'armée*. On reaching their ground they made their dispositions at once, and forthwith attacked the enemy. They had, if I may use the expression, the "instinct of battle."

To the enlightened statesmanship of our forefathers, to the right and fitting direction given to the energies of the people by those who have held the helm of public affairs, must fairly be ascribed no small share of the merit of having placed England in the high and honourable position which she occupies among nations.

The geographical position of England is peculiarly adapted to the defensive strategy that has generally characterised the rôle pursued by her statesmen. They have recognised the

security of the United Kingdom from immediate attack, and have utilised the power of motion given the nation in command of the sea, in order to quit the defensive attitude for purposes of offence.

Alfred the Great quickly perceived that the repeated invasions of the Danes could alone be checked by the establishment of a navy more powerful than theirs. Since his time, the naval supremacy of England has, with little interruption during civil wars and internal discord, preserved the pre-eminence of this nation in war.

After Crecy and Poitiers, the ruinous expense of the Continental wars led Edward III. to turn his attention to the commerce of the country, and a new policy was introduced through which the welfare of the country has been immensely promoted. The idea of making conquests on the Continent was abandoned, and the nation began to devote itself to the development of the natural advantages which these islands possess. The deeply-indented coasts, numerous fine harbours, mild though stormy climate, have favoured the growth of a hardy race of seamen. The great commerce of the country by sea has developed large numbers of men, trained to the sea, and who formed, during the last great war, the reserve from which the fleets of Nelson were supplied; whilst our enemies, on the other hand, were destitute of naval reserves.

In Anderson's *History of the Origin of Commerce*, it is recorded that Lord Herbert, speaking against interference in the affairs of France, says: "Let us, therefore, in God's name, leave off our attempts against the terra firma, as the natural situation of islands seems not to suit with conquests of that kind; or, when we would enlarge ourselves, let it be that way we can, and to which it seems the eternal Providence has destined us, which is by the sea. The Indies are discovered, and vast treasure brought from thence every day. Let us, therefore, lend our endeavours thitherwards; and if the Spaniards or Portuguese suffer us not to join with them, there will yet be region enough for all to enjoy."

By following the course here roughly marked out, England has become the first power in the world at sea.

"The rule of Napoleon, in the height of his fame, was not so haughty and despotic on the Continent as was that of England at sea. Men still living remember the times when the British flag was saluted by every sail that traversed the sea in any quarter of the globe, and no ship of any nation dared to pass a British man of war without striking its flag."—*Art. "Army" B.E.*

England has welded together various nations and races into an empire of 150 millions in the East Indies, she has become the parent of large and flourishing colonies in various quarters of the globe, and also may claim to have founded a state in America—the United States—which in two centuries has acquired greater dominion than the Romans did in ten. “At no time has industrial accumulation with its results—progress and civilisation—been possible, unless accompanied by the will and the power to defend it. No nation has made its mark in history that has not, at some time of its existence, been pre-eminently distinguished for martial spirit and proficiency in arms, or been allowed to throw its full energies into the pursuits of peace till it had proved what it was able and willing to do in war.”

This applies especially to the history of the English people ; for although England has long given up attempts on the *terra firma* of Europe, and sought to enlarge herself by commerce and civilisation, her path has been beset with many difficulties, which have brought her into frequent collision with other Powers ; and the high position which England now occupies as a nation would never have been achieved if her people had not been a brave and warlike, as well as an industrious race.

During the last two centuries, or at least since 1688, England has been engaged in upwards of seventy wars. The result of these wars, with few exceptions, has been favourable to the nation. So much so, that a well-informed French officer—Baron de Grancy—recently expressed himself with regard to the British army in the following words :—

“Possèdent les souvenirs de gloire et de succès les plus solides sans contredit, parmi toutes les armées Européennes.”

In addition to what we have already noticed, the great power of England lies in the united people, the national wealth, rapidly increasing mechanical and productive powers. And she grows stronger from better Government, from the greater union of the people, and the wealth created by the hand labour and skill of the people, and the wonderful development of the mechanical resources of the kingdom.

Contrast this state with that of Turkey. Burke calls the Turks a “wasteful and disgusting empire” ; yet time was when they had pushed their standards to the gates of Vienna. They have lapsed into inactivity and indolence ; their empire has fallen into decay and anarchy, owing to the want of a pure executive, a better financial administration, and sensible law.

Lastly, let us turn to another of the ruling powers of the world—Russia—the head of the Slavonic race ; that race which has yet a great career to run, and “the narrative of whose ascendancy,” according to Arnold, “is the remaining page that will conclude the history of the world.”

The work of a single ruler raised this nation from obscurity, and gave them fleets and commerce, arts and arms. The policy they have since pursued is remarkable, and has been frequently compared to that of Rome.

The Roman Senate, in every foreign war during the century and half which followed the second Punic war, took care to appear in the character of a protector. Every state which Rome protected was ultimately subjugated and absorbed by her. And Russia has been the protector of Poland, the protector of the Crimea, the protector of Courland, the Circassian and Caucasian tribes. She has first protected, and then appropriated them all. She protects Moldavia and Wallachia.

It is not the object of this essay to discuss present politics, but it has been recently said that the Russian policy first foments disturbances in neighbouring provinces, proposes mediation, sends assistance to keep peace. She then proposes military occupation ; and, having obtained that, she requires a military guarantee, and her next step is incorporation. She gains by the arts of diplomacy what has been gained by war. The emancipation of the serfs has cleared the way for the military reforms she needed to make her power equal, if not stronger, than that of her neighbours.

The subjects we have been considering constitute, we conceive, the principal elements of success in war, so far as preparation and skilful direction contribute to success. But, although a long series of successes assumed to constitute pre-eminence, the above causes of success can only be looked upon as proximate causes of pre-eminence—something more is required to give pre-eminence. It is the outgrowth of a vigorous state of the national life in general in which the civil Government has its share.

From ancient history we learn that the Romans held imperial sway over the greater portion of the known world for several centuries ; we can, therefore, readily admit their pre-eminence in war ; but it is a remarkable feature in their history, and there has been nothing like it since.

Distinction in war and great successes may readily be pointed out, but not pre-eminence. At one time the Turks were the

terror of Southern Europe; at another, we hear of the Spanish infantry; and from time to time nations have gained temporary superiority through some important changes which have been introduced into their military institutions; as for instance, the Swedes under Gustavus Adolphus, the French in the time of Louis XIV., the Prussians under Frederick II., the French again under Napoleon, and the Prussians, quite recently, with the needle-gun and system of short service and reserves. But such changes become adopted by other nations, and thus matters are from time to time brought again to a level.

Clausewitz says: "Armies are now so much on a par in regard to arms and equipment that there is no notable difference between the best and the worst of them."

At the present time, in place of anything resembling the Roman empire, the political destinies of Europe and the world are ruled by four or five great Powers, one of the oldest of them being our own country.

III.—THE TACTICAL FORMS USED ON THE FIELD OF BATTLE.

"Strategy having conducted the forces to the field of battle is supposed to hand them over formally to Tactics."—*Clausewitz*.

It is not intended to enter into a minute description of the tactics followed by the individual troops of any particular army in attacking or repelling an enemy; for that would lead to a correct estimate of the value, character, and effect of the arms in use, and of the change or changes from any preconceived notions we may have on the subject, that may be noticeable in the conduct of the battle itself.

We shall endeavour to point out that the possession of military *coup d'œil*, coolness, skill, and the disposition and use which a general makes of his forces on the field of battle, in conformity with the features of the ground and the character of the troops to which he is opposed, has much to do with gaining victory, the object of the battle; and that all this has raised individuals, and the troops they command, to a pre-eminent position on the roll of fame.

The victory over the Macedonians at Cynoscephalæ was chiefly owing to the advantage the Romans had in the tactical formation of the legion as opposed to that of the phalanx. The legion was a formation elastic, capable of movement, and with power to adapt itself to every position and emergency, and, in the battle, was opposed to a formation hitherto victorious, but which became unwieldy in the presence of the legion.

Again, at Pydua, the phalanx formation failed through the same causes which occasioned the victory at Cynoscephala. It was a formation suitable for defence and attack on level ground ; but when it advanced on a retreating enemy, and came on broken ground, its chief strength, which lay in the coherence of the mass, disappeared ; it opened out in huge chasms, and was decimated.

The tactics initiated by the Romans were followed by the Frank and German nations which succeeded them. Through the rise and fall of the feudal system to the establishment of standing armies, change in arms and tactics followed close on one another. The sword, shield, javelin, and bow give place to the pike and fire-arms ; the mailed horsemen of the feudal age are overthrown by the infantry of the Swiss, and disappear for ever.

Warfare, in the middle ages, consisted of raids into different districts, attacking castles, *melées*. These accomplished, the soldiers plundered, and returned to their own countries.

On the introduction of standing armies and fire-arms, the proportion of pikemen was lessened and musketeers increased ; and their fire was developed by a more extended formation ; a great advance was made. But great difficulties had to be contended with even as late as the seventeenth century : the roads were bad, lands uncultivated, the trains of artillery cumbersome.

The power of attack gained much by the advance of civilisation. In earlier ages, armies were very reluctant to move from their own districts. The improvements in communications, lighter trains, improved arms, affected the conditions of war.

As the power of attack increased, so steps were taken in the art of defence ; hence it is to the increased power of attack we may trace the regeneration of fortifying science. Fortified places sprung up all over Europe ; and an army entering an enemy's territory immediately sat down before one of these fortresses, and the campaign was considered successful if it ended in the fall of the place.

During the wars in the reign of Louis XIV., the formation of brigades and divisions, introduced by the great generals of that time, laid the foundation of the army corps of Napoleon's time.

The defeats at Blenheim 1704, and Almanja 1707, were due to the imprudent mixture of cavalry and infantry. In the latter battle, the infantry were shut up in villages, the line of battle being rendered continuous by cavalry. The allies cross the river separating them from the French, complete their infantry

formation, support it with cavalry, crush the French cavalry in the centre with their fire and shock, and blockade the infantry confined in the villages, who are forced to surrender.

The system of discipline introduced in the Prussian army increased to an enormous degree the power of motion, and we see this in the way Frederick the Great moved his armies. Owing to the discipline he introduced, the instruction of his officers, the superior arms and organisation, he was enabled to commit his armies to long marches. Making use of such agencies he asserted the value of offensive operations opposed to the war of position at that time in vogue.

His enemy expected to enlist victory on their side by entrenching themselves at certain positions previously determined, awaiting the attack, and expecting to succeed owing to the difficulties presented to the attacking force. Frederick turned these positions; and, by bringing a preponderance of numbers at certain points, carried them.

His great tactical stroke was "placing his line within striking distance obliquely across the extremity of his adversary's line."—*Hamley*.

The tactics of Frederick the Great are the foundation of what are now termed linear tactics. The admirable drill and discipline of the Prussian troops enabled him to spread his army over a broad front; but the depth of his attack was decreased thereby. And when the Prussian army, adhering to their old system of tactics, is met by the army of the French Republic with a system of tactics admirably suited to the characteristics of the soldiers which composed it, the system of Frederick meets its final end on the heights of Jena and Auerstadt.

The intelligence of the French soldiery was turned to account in their employment as skirmishers of "highly-trained light infantry" (*Hamley*), who covered the advancing columns; and the thinner formation of line without reserves gave way before the attack of the deeper one, composed of skirmishers' line and column with reserves.

Napoleon aimed at having a line to oppose a fire to the enemy, and close columns ready to attack.

Another remarkable feature in Napoleon's tactics was brought about by the deterioration of his infantry consequent on losses in war. He turned his attention to artillery, and surprised his enemy at Friedland and Wagram by destroying parts of their

line of battle by the concentrated fire of artillery, followed up by the advance of heavy columns of infantry.

His artillery was in a high state of perfection; his infantry were no longer to be trusted to the independent action they followed in his earlier campaigns, and were therefore held in greater masses more immediately under the eyes of their commanders.

At Friedland, Leuormont, who commanded the French artillery, united the artillery of Victor's corps, 36 guns, and overwhelmed the Russian masses, which were driven into the defile in front of the village.

At Wagram, again, the artillery of Davoust and Oudinot overwhelmed the left wing of the Austrians; and, at the same time, Napoleon orders 100 guns to be massed in front of his centre, supporting the flank attack, and completing the discomfiture of the enemy.

The system of tactics used by Napoleon, and the offensive form of action he followed, were both admirably suited to the gay, volatile, and excitable temperament which characterises the French soldier. Distinguished for impetuosity of attack, he is not, however, supported by an equal constancy and perseverance in maintaining the contest, and becomes demoralised by defeat and disaster.

In our own nation are to be found many supporters of the defensive form of tactics, and they turn to the campaigns of Wellington as the exponent of their theory.

Wellington's tactics were singularly adapted to the war he was engaged in, also to the training of the army he commanded, the topography of the country, and likewise to the method of war of his adversary. His system became a matter of necessity. His deficiency of resources and interests tied him to the coast, where the freedom of manœuvre by sea enabled him to change his base of operations. His adversary was forced to attack him. He selected his defensive positions with great care and judgment; his fine tactics and line formations were superior to the French and their columns; and he fully recognised the fact that "the success of the defence depends on the fire of the deployed battalions; and it is only by fully employing the fire that the possibility at last arises of deciding the issue with the bayonet."—*Möltke*.

The French invariably attacked Wellington because they had attacked and beaten everyone else, overlooking the fact that they had beaten troops with a different tactical system from his.

At Busaco and Talavera, the attacks by the French carry condemnation of their tactics. They ignored the training, discipline and firmness, and constitution of the British ; and in their frontal attacks, under these circumstances, they were exposed to defeat.

Wellington could almost depend on his adversary attacking him as he wished, that was, frontally ; therefore his defensive tactics were successful. " He had experienced the fierce ardour of the French attack, the impetuosity of columns led by Massena and Ney, and he devised, very skilfully, the means of first blunting the force of that impetuosity, and then overcoming it."

The difficulties of the defenders begin as soon as their adversary declines to play their game by attacking frontally. He cannot force the adversary to attack.

Frederick Charles says that few positions cannot be turned, and it is better perhaps to run strategic risks than in attacking such positions.

Thinking, at Salamanca, that Wellington was slipping from his grasp, Marmont detached a corps (Thomières) to seize the Ciudad Rodrigo road. Wellington's *coup d'œil* grasped the opportunity the gap displayed in his adversary's line of battle, and, with terrible counter-stroke, inscribed the name of Salamanca on the British standards.

Looking at the great variety of troops that at different times were under the command of Wellington, and his almost uninterrupted successes, we are led to observe that his successes were in no small degree owing to the intimate knowledge he possessed of the characteristics of these troops ; and, applying this knowledge to their tactical formation, he invariably made the best of them in battle.

The Spanish and Portuguese, who were apt at seeking and utilising cover, he employed as skirmishers ; the immovable British infantry he retained to meet, with fire and shock, the impetus of the French columns ; and those allied troops that he was not so sure of as he was of the British troops, he formed in column, and thus kept them more immediately in hand.

The genius of Nelson pointed out to him the plan of attack at the Nile.

It is only reasonable to infer that with armour-clad ships and rifled guns both Wellington and Nelson would resort to different tactics.

Turning now to more recent times, and we are led to examine

the influence on success that has been brought about by arms of precision.

In 1866, the Austrians, armed with the muzzle-loader, were opposed to the Prussians with the needle-gun. The latter owed their superior armament to the watchfulness over military institutions of their country.

"It was not the rapidity of the fire of the needle-gun," says an Austrian officer, "which demoralised so many Austrian regiments, but the rapidity of loading. The Austrian had to expose himself in the act of loading; the moment he did so he was fired at by the Prussian, whose loading was done so rapidly that he might be said to be always loaded. In battle, the Austrian soldier for a great part of the time felt himself unarmed in the presence of another always ready to fire."—*Stoffel, translated by Home.*

(To be continued.)

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